So tell me something, any updates at all regarding more literature on innate ideas? — Manuel
For empiricism there is no essential difference between the intellect and the senses. The fact which obliges a correct theory of knowledge to recognize this essential difference is simply disregarded. What fact? The fact that the human intellect grasps, first in a most indeterminate manner, then more and more distinctly, certain sets of intelligible features -- that is, natures, say, the human nature -- which exist in the real as identical with individuals, with Peter or John for instance, but which are universal in the mind and presented to it as universal objects, positively one (within the mind) and common to an infinity of singular things (in the real).
Thanks to the association of particular images and recollections, a dog reacts in a similar manner to the similar particular impressions his eyes or his nose receive from this thing we call a piece of sugar or this thing we call an intruder; he does not know what is sugar or what is intruder. He plays, he lives in his affective and motor functions, or rather he is put into motion by the similarities which exist between things of the same kind; he does not see the similarity, the common features as such. What is lacking is the flash of intelligibility; he has no ear for the intelligible meaning. He has not the idea or the concept of the thing he knows, that is, from which he receives sensory impressions; his knowledge remains immersed in the subjectivity of his own feelings -- only in man, with the universal idea, does knowledge achieve objectivity. And his field of knowledge is strictly limited: only the universal idea sets free -- in man -- the potential infinity of knowledge.
Such are the basic facts which Empiricism ignores, and in the disregard of which it undertakes to philosophize. The logical implications are: first, a nominalistic theory of ideas, destructive of what ideas are in reality; and second, a sensualist notion of intelligence, destructive of the essential activity of intelligence. In the Empiricist view, intelligence does not see, for only the object or content seen in knowledge is the sense object. In the Empiricist view, intelligence does not see in its ideative function -- there are not, drawn form the senses through the activity of the intellect itself, supra-singular or supra-sensual, universal intelligible natures seen by the intellect in and through the concepts it engenders by illuminating images. Intelligence does not see in its function of judgment -- there are not intuitively grasped, universal intelligible principles (say, the principle of identity, or the principle of causality) in which the necessary connection between two concepts is immediately seen by the intellect. Intelligence does not see in its reasoning function -- there is in the reasoning no transfer of light or intuition, no essentially supra-sensual logical operation which causes the intellect to see the truth of the conclusion by virtue of what is seen in the premises. Everything boils down, in the operations, or rather in the passive mechanisms of intelligence, to a blind concatenation, sorting and refinement of the images, associated representations, habit-produced expectations which are at play in sense-knowledge, under the guidance of affective or practical values and interests. No wonder that in the Empiricist vocabulary, such words as 'evidence', 'the human understanding', 'the human mind', 'reason', 'thought', 'truth', etc., which one cannot help using, have reached a state of meaningless vagueness and confusion that makes philosophers use them as if by virtue of some unphilosophical concession to the common human language, and with a hidden feeling of guilt. — Jacques Maritain, The Cultural Impact of Empiricism
As argued, if this were so we would never learn; we would require the concept in order to recognise the concept.
So that's wrong. — Banno
as if you had to have the concept "laptop" before you encountered a laptop or hear anything about it.
You can't see the problem there? — Banno
With very, very little contact with objects (sometimes with no contact at all) , we come up with concepts. — Manuel
it's other purpose is to discuss the right way to do metaphysics
— Banno
Is there a 'right' way to 'do' metaphysics?
Is there an easy or a hard way...a 'just right' way..
Superficial or deep and wide-ranging...
https://www.wikihow.com/Study-Metaphysics
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/metaphysics/
What kind of metaphysics...
An SEP search - 1290 documents.
Feminist, Arab & Islamic, Chinese, Aristotle... — Amity
One response to what I've said is simply to ignore it. If that's what you want, go ahead. — Banno
I'm assuming you want to add something I missed or correct a mistake — Manuel
I did not manage to specify the field..... — Manuel
I don't know how else to formulate the topic. — Manuel
It was not the intent of my post to imply that Philosophers have "special knowledge" that Scientists don't. Just the opposite : I was noting that when scientists theorize and speculate about topics with no empirical evidence, they are crossing over into the purview of Philosophy. Experimental scientists are doing highly specialized & technical work. But when Theoretical scientists, such as Einstein, use their imagination to "see" things that are not visible to the senses, they are actually practicing Philosophy, Someone once asked Einstein where his lab was, and he held-up a pencil.I'm aware this topic enters into the whole realism vs anti-realism debate. I would still be careful in saying that the stuff posited by science is a metaphysical entity. We can of course debate if science is metaphysics or not. One can make a case that part of science is metaphysics, sure. But I wouldn't tell the physicist that I have special knowledge regarding his field. — Manuel
Yes. Quantum physics opened a can-of-worms for Materialists. They expected to find hard little Atoms at the foundation of reality. Instead, they found fuzzy mathematical Probabilities. Quantum theories defy commonsense, but seem to work well with mathematical logic. Maybe that's why Mathematicians are more likely to accept Metaphysics as a serious occupation, because they are acutely aware that the objects of their calculations do not exist in the Real Material world, but only as Ideas in the immaterial Mind. :cool:I largely agree on your last point here. Matter looks and feels substantial to us, which it is. But at bottom, it isn't. So we have two views on the nature of matter, our common sense conception of regarding tables and chairs and then we have what physics tells us about matter. This brings forth epistemological consideration on top of metaphysical ones. — Manuel
Analysis of language is indeed a legitimate topic for philosophy. But if that language is too specific & reductive, we soon lose the general & holistic meaning of the words. I just came across this quote, which seems to reveal the Achilles Heel of the "linguistic turn" in Postmodern philosophy. :smile:This topic was prompted by another poster: to state it simply are there legitimate metaphysical questions as opposed to problems related to language use? — Manuel
For example, when Maxwell proposed the existence of an invisible and counterintuitive "field", to explain the weirdness of electromagnetism, he was practicing Philosophical Meta-physics. Today, we are accustomed to the concept of "fields", even though we have never seen one. What we observe are the effects of the field on certain kinds of matter, such as iron filings. We "see" those fields with the inner "eye" of imagination — Gnomon
Platonism about mathematics (or mathematical platonism) is the metaphysical view that there are abstract mathematical objects whose existence is independent of us and our language, thought, and practices. — Gnomon
Peirce divided metaphysics into (1) ontology or general metaphysics, (2) psychical or religious metaphysics, and (3) physical metaphysics. — Gnomon
Meta-physics includes the properties, and qualities, and functions that make a thing what it is. — Gnomon
Analysis of language is indeed a legitimate topic for philosophy. But if that language is too specific & reductive, we soon lose the general & holistic meaning of the words. — Gnomon
Soon in fine bookstores everywhere. :smirk:0. The Real – the ineluctable, encompassing horizon (that exhausts – exceeds – categories, concepts, symbolic systems (e.g. randomness, void)). See nonbeing, nonduality, nonlocality.
1. Reality – the ground, including logical / phase-spaces (i.e. reason), encompassed. See being, multiplicity.
2. Existence – maze-paths along the ground (i.e. transformations through logical / phase-space) ... ever-approaching but never arrivating at the horizon. See dasein, event, locality.
3. Fiction – untaken, circular or virtual paths. See illusion-duality (i.e. risk/uncertainty), agency-misery. — 180 Proof's Prolegomena for the Fourfold Root of Insufficient Reason
"Real' gains traction only in a particular contrast.
A metaphysical speculation that attempts to use the word without such a particular context fails to gain traction. — Banno
Not Whiteheadian (or Bergsonian) in the least as far as I can tell. I take Spinoza, Zapffe, Wittgenstein, Cioran, Jaspers, Camus, Haack, Rosset, Meillassoux-Brassier ... as modern influences. :wink:Hmmm. Sounds like a process philosophy of sorts.
I'd be interested in looking at that book. :cool: — Manuel
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