Sure. No problem. If I had to be repeating my views on this topic for 5 years, I'd be hesitant to repeat myself again. :up:

Yes and that approach makes sense. I suppose what's left if empirical evidence is not available, is to rely on the plausibility of the arguments. But we also use intuition here and this depends on our sensibilities as in one may prefer idealism because one thinks the mind creates the world or some other such view.

I can only think of What necessarily is not real, or an impossible object / world (i.e. membership rule/s for the Null Set)? A question (re: my apophatic conception) of negative ontology. — 180 Proof

I think I remember parts of that argument. It's interesting, but too technical for me to be able to reply intelligently.

I was intrigued to discover that there is a 'Feminist Metaphysics'. — Amity

Well, I'd like to think reason is neither masculine nor feminine as applied to these types of topics. It gets muddied in political affairs at times. But I had never heard of feminine metaphysics, but I'm not even surprised.

The point of me asking for a person to give an example of a metaphysical problem dissolving through language use and one which does not is simply to see if people are willing to point to one example in which analysis or clear use of words can put a problem to the side tends to show that philosophy of language can be useful.

Sometimes certain people tend to make all problems of philosophy a problem of using a word incorrectly. I think that's taking it way too far. On the other hand, if someone says philosophy of language is useless, then I think that's clearly wrong.

Many of these problems are substantive, but I'd be suspicious if someone said that not a single problem in the long list of these issues is one which was framed incorrectly.

But people have somewhat different ideas as to what constitutes metaphysics...

So what's that, then? A clear and obvious reality? A reality that is taken for granted, or is at hand, perhaps?

If we drop the word "manifest", what would change? There would presumably still be taxies. I don't see that we need "manifest reality" in order to will one's arm to move to hail a cab. The wording just doesn't obviously help. — Banno

It's Sellars distinction. I think it's a good one. Manifest reality deals with mental entities. Science, if our theories are correct, deal with mind-indepdent entities.

But your mind does not have a mass. So it is not a form of matter. — Banno

Hmmm, that's not clear to me. It certainly comes from mass, we just don't know how the mass realizes this feat of experience. I can't well take my mind out of my brain and confirm that it has no mass. It may seem to have no mass, I'm not sure it doesn't.

Then again, you may be correct.

It's a good indicator of something fishy going on. — Banno

Yes. It trivializes something which shouldn't be treated this way.

SO the question arrises, yes, OK, but which is it really - neurones or intent?

And that might be the metaphysical knot - the view that one description must have primacy.

And the strategy, the way of doing metaphysics, would be to probe deeply into any alternative solution to see if it does reduce mind to matter, or matter to mind.

So there's a start. — Banno

They both play a role. I think the problem here is to ask how do neurons relate to a willed action of raising my arm. I can hit my shoulder at a particular angle and my arm will raise. I can also move it. I don't doubt that neurons play a very big role here, and a puzzling one at that.

As to what really is going on, is suggested by what you yourself said: it depends on what aspect of the world you want to analyze. Do you want to speak of manifest reality where people raise there arms to hail a cab? Then I think it makes sense to speak of will.

Do you want to talk about how this is realized in the body? Then you can speak of neurons and physiology.

I think that mind is molded matter. So I'd take that question as meaning how does some matter, my arm, reduces to another piece of matter, my mind or vice versa. Unless you have a specific meaning for the word mind which would be different. Then we can talk about that. I think the terms experiential for mind and non-experiential for what we usually call body, is potentially less confusing.

But maybe not.

And you're right, my mistake, I try to avoid using "just" - it's very misleading.

I know none of this is helpful, but it does leave the problem of definition. But I would have you say not what metaphysics is, because that is problematic, and as well there are more substantial definitions, but nothing remotely like you've described. Instead, you decide. After all, your discussion. And when you've said, then the rest of us can pick at it, making it strong if it's any good. — tim wood

I see your point and it is valid to a large extent. Let me see if I can work around the definition issue by offering example of topics which are considered to pertain to metaphysics:

The ground of existence: is it non-mental, mental, neutral and so on.
The nature of the self: do they exist, if so, do they exist apart from the body.
Free will: Do we have it or don't we? Are we determined by causal forces or do we "interrupt" them in an act of freedom
Identity: Do objects have an identity or do we give them identity entirely? If so do we pick out the identity of object by its physical characteristics or by mental continuity?
Causality: Does it exist or should we speak of habits or tendencies in nature?
The nature of reality: Do we access it directly or are we stuck with appearances?

And so on. Honestly, I think it would be best if people take metaphysics to mean whatever they think they understand it to mean when they think of the word, minus New Age interpretations. Because today, I think it is basically impossible to speak of metaphysics without extremely substantial epistemological input.

So the best I can do is to say metaphysics is what we call a certain series of questions that fall under that name. So are the topics I named substantial or are they a problem of us using words incorrectly?

That's already a difficult question, with different people taking metaphysics to mean different things.

As I understand it metaphysics is the study of the most general features of the world and it essentially involves experience and language. Experience, obviously, otherwise we'd not be typing anything. And language because we need to express our thoughts in some manner in discussions of this kind.

I'd put my neck out and say that a good deal - but by no means not all - of metaphysics is a priori, that is, we need not go to the world and do empirical experiments about it, though we are not prevented from doing so, of course. So it is largely conceptual.

We just need our concepts and the world. So issues like whether God exists or not don't require much empirical experiments, nor do experiments tell us if the world is fundamentally mental or non-mental. For these we must rely on arguments that articulate our intuitions.

That's my approximation of metaphysics.

Fair enough. I don't know how to @ people yet in my post. But needless to say, you're invited. :wink:

Sure there is a point in saying that a large portion of metaphysics can be cleared up by clarifying what we mean when we use certain words. For example "real" is an honorific word in English, as in this is the deal and this is the real deal. There aren't two types of deals the deal and the real deal. We are just using real for emphasis in this instance.

What-it's-like arguments seem to me to be peculiar to English. They can't be articulated nearly as well in other languages, thus there is reason to be suspicious that we are being held captive by language, as Wittgenstein said.

At the same time, the classical debates in metaphysics of idealism vs realism or free will vs determinism and so on down the long list, aren't only about the use of words. If it were only that, I suspect that many of these debates would have died out. Nobody, or very few at most, speak about phlogiston anymore or of elan vital and the like.

The reason these questions remain, is because the issues are hard. Is the world fundamentally non-mental or is the entire world a product of our representations? Are we the product of one long causal chain in which the big bang set in motion all our choices and decisions or do we have the capacity to act in a manner that is not dictated entirely from previous act?

If there is no self - which is different from considering the self as distinct from the body - then why do we treat other people as if they had a self of some kind? We can perhaps clear up some confusion by clearing up what we mean when we say "mind" or "will", but that seems to me to leave the main point in these disputes entirely unresolved. And they may remain in this domain, as they have for thousands of years...

I mean, sure you could replace "white" in such quotes with "Hispanic", which I am in part, and you can say some stereotypes about it. It wouldn't necessarily be wrong about some people, often a minority in that group. There are some truths in stereotypes, I think. But it doesn't condemn an entire group. Nor is an individual (or group) a collection of stereotypes.

I don't think the language is particularly offensive. Maybe if you put in "black" and say such phrases, it might be ignorant. But there's a long history behind that. I think you can say that black people tend to be better at sports than white people and that isn't wrong. It just doesn't apply to everyone.

You can also say that black people support Obama much more than is merited by his actions. And I get that. I think it's a mistake to think Obama was so good, but I don't see the problem.

It's not as if the quote imples white people are f**king cra*ers that only f**k there cousins or something like that. That would be racist or close to it. But that's my take, I could be well wrong.

Sure, those are factors too. Wealth will shield or help out in many circumstances, so in this respect in today's society having more money rather than less, would mitigate the circumstances to some extent.

I think each issue should be taken in turn. If a person is homophobic but not racist, then one deals with that. But if the person is racist but not homophobic then that is the issue to work on. I think education, exposure and rational arguments are the best way to deal with these issues.

Some people will never change the way they view the world. Some may lessen the intensity of such feelings over time.

It's not about giving out a medal to those who are most oppressed. It's about pointing out that some people deal with more issues than others. Which does not make any persons particular grievance therefore invalid.

I think what I wrote is important, but it does go both ways. I strongly resist the idea that quantum mechanics has any metaphysical implications. It's physics. That's hard for me to maintain sometimes, given how much it has changed the way people think about the world. It's probably true that keeping the distinctions clear and definite has become something of an ideology for me. I probably need to work on that. — T Clark

It's not clear to me either. I've worked on this topic and have spoken with esteemed figures too, due to the work I was doing. I think "metaphysics" depends on were you are coming from. I suspect Sellar's distinction between the "manifest image" (ordinary everyday life) and the "scientific image" is crucial here.

For Strawson "metaphysics" is about the nature of the world, but part of it is a-priori. But as he says, some a-priori facts are facts about reality, just as much as empirical demonstrations are matters of fact. But not everything in metaphysics can be settled, far from it.

For Chomsky, "metaphysics" should be re-interpreted in the manner of Ralph Cudworth namely how the world interacts with our cognitive faculties.

So you are far from alone here. The way you use it is legitimate too. At least Schopenhauer and maybe even Kant would agree with you, which is not bad company necessarily.

On the forum we see a lot of seems-to-me theories about consciousness that don't take the results of lots of fairly recent work into consideration. — T Clark

Sure. The only issue is that some of the scientific work here, say, Hoffman's work on vision and how the eye works, leaves entirely open all options. But I agree that looking at empirical experiments can be useful.

Well "measuring" oppression can be tough if we are looking for exact numbers in terms of such a person is of X descent thus he is, on a scale from 1 to 10, an 8 on the oppression scale.

But sure, there are aspects in which one can be subject to oppression more than others. Like if a person were black, Jewish and gay simultaneously, then such a person would likely be subject to more oppression than if that person were "only" gay, at certain periods and countries in human history.

To be more precise that saying "reality is whatever there is", I would probably say that I'm a "rationalistic idealist", similar to the Neoplatonists of Cambridge or perhaps some strains of Kantianism.

What this means is essentially this: what is real is whatever happens to be in the world that interacts with our innate cognitive faculties. In this sense, reality is species-dependant. If something exists in the world, but it doesn't interact with us in some manner, then for intent and purposes it isn't part of our conception of reality. This means that there may be many aspects of reality we simple are ignorant about, but still exist for some other species to interact with.

This takes as a given that our mental images need not refer to any aspect of reality as seems to be the case with our thoughts. So we have the thoughts in our heads, which are infinite and whatever exists "out there" that we happen to interact it with by accident. There is no necessity in us being able to interact with the world the way we do, it just so happens that we are this way,

Yeah, I read the Allianza version. It was far from the full book, probably less than half.

I mean, it was good, but it was missing many arguments you could see many ... in the book.

I know the one due next year if the full version, I want to read his epistemology in detail, not a general outline. The Alizana version is good to get familiar with him.

Well yes, that's true actually. What I should have said is that I don't think that science is the whole of metaphysics. I'm using science extremely narrowly here meaning physics basically.

But I think the whole of science includes much more than physics. One such domain where we know very little is in psychology which includes our conception of the world, our perceptions too. These latter aspects can be called "philosophical", without too much controversy I'd think, although parts of perception and common-sense conceptions can be studied empirically.

Then there's the topic of monism, pluralism, dualism, idealism, physicalism and so on. At this point we just call these topics "metaphysical" ones, because I don't think these can be settled by empirical demonstrations.

The relationship between science and mathematics is one that perplexes me. This is an interesting quote. It has set me thinking. — T Clark

If you find that quote interesting, you might want to take a look at his An Outline of Philosophy, where he says this and plenty more. I thought it was quite good and pleasant to read.

Yes. His philosophy was very much based on science. He says in this book "matter has become as ghostly as anything in a spiritualist séance."

Nevertheless, I wish more philosophers at that time in the history of physics would have written about the subject and its implications for philosophy at large. Not many of them did that, so far as I know. Though some of the founders of QM did. Still, Russell did pretty good work, but I do agree with you that he goes a bit too far into science for my tastes.

Which is why, although he can be obscure to the extreme, I've always liked Whitehead quite a bit. Even more than Russell in some aspects.

I can speculate a bit based on what we've talked about, but it's never been to clear to me how much science should play a role, say, in metaphysics. I think it should have a significant role to play, but I wouldn't base an entire ontology or a worldview on the scientific image...

That's quite funny. I just finished the book where he says that. An Outline of Philosophy. It was extremely good even beyond comments of that type. I liked it better than his Human Knowledge

It's interesting that based on (for him) new physics, he describes the world in terms of events, not things.

Hey Banno, sorry if this breaks the rules you had in mind, but I remember one specific antinatilism thread where @unenlightened and @schopenhauer1 were arguing.

It got to the point were unenlightened said something like "you are wrong to disagree". I have never laughed so much on a public forum of any kind.

Just to see someone post that phrase was just spectacular. Maybe that thread in general was more of the same AN bs argument but, it was extremely funny.

I suspect some Presidents and VPs curse at what Israel is doing, I know Carter and Clinton have been pissed off before.

But if they don't go public and say something, things remains the same.

and possibly the VP, I think. — Benkei

Kamala Harris? No.

She's not going to do anything to shake the status quo.

Clint Eastwood - Gorillaz

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1V_xRb0x9aw

I ain't happy, I'm feeling glad
I got sunshine in a bag
I'm useless but not for long
The future is coming on
I ain't happy, I'm feeling glad
I got sunshine in a bag
I'm useless but not for long
The future is coming on
It's coming on, it's coming on
It's coming on, it's coming on

Finally someone let me out of my cage
Now time for me is nothin' 'cos I'm counting no age
Now I couldn't be there now you shouldn't be scared
I'm good at repairs and I'm under each snare
Intangible (Ah y'all), bet you didn't think so
I command you to, panoramic view (You)
Look I'll make it all manageable
Pick and choose, sit and lose
All you different crews
Chicks and dudes, who you think is really kicking tunes

Picture you getting down and I'll picture too
Like you lit the fuse
You think it's fictional, mystical - maybe
Spiritual hero who appears on you to clear your view
When you're too crazy
Lifeless to those a definition for what life is
Priceless to you because I put ya on the hype shift
Did ya like it?
Gut smokin' righteous but one talkin' psychic
Among knows possess you with one though

I ain't happy, I'm feeling glad
I got sunshine in a bag
I'm useless but not for long
The future is coming on
I ain't happy, I'm feeling glad
I got sunshine in a bag
I'm useless but not for long
The future (That's right) is coming on
It's coming on, it's coming on, it's coming on, it's coming on

The essence, the basics without it you make it
Allow me to make this child like in nature
Rhythm you have it or you don't
That's a fallacy, I'm in them
Every spiralling tree, every child of peace
Every cloud I see you see with your eyes
I see destruction and demise
Corruption in the skies
From this fucking enterprise that I'm sucked into your lies
The Russell that is muscles
But percussion he provides

For me I say God, y'all can see me now
'Cos you don't see with your eye
You perceive with your mind
That's the end of it
So I'mma stick around with Russ and be a mentor
Bust a few rounds on motherfuckers
Remember what the thought is
I brought all this so you can survive when law is lawless (Right here)
Fearless, sensations that you thought was dead
No squealing, remember that it's all in your head

I ain't happy, I'm feeling glad
I got sunshine in a bag
I'm useless but not for long
The future is coming on

I ain't happy, I'm feeling glad
I got sunshine in a bag
I'm useless but not for long
My future is coming on

It's coming on, it's coming on, it's coming on, it's coming on

My future
It's coming on, it's coming on, it's coming on
It's coming on, it's coming on, my future
It's coming on, it's coming on, it's coming on
It's coming on, it's coming on, my future
It's coming on, it's coming on, it's coming on

One Headlight - The Wallflowers

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Zzyfcys1aLM

Reality is, whatever there is.

Yeah, but I feel that saying "there is only one kind of stuff, namely matter" doesn't really say much. All we have to do to "save materialism" in this sense is to extend the definition of "matter" as far as we need. — SophistiCat

This is true in a sense. On the other hand we now know that what we should study is matter and physical stuff, not Gods or angels.

I think it's kind of astonishing that at bottom, there is only one kind of stuff, such that everything is physical. Maybe trivial sure, but also insane, given the world looks so pluralistic.

In any case materialism doesn't need to "saved" any more that "empiricism" or most other "isms". It all depends on what we mean when we say these words.

Sure, it is kinda funny.

As for the rest of your post, I don't think I have much to add that wouldn't be repetitive. In an case, interesting topic. :up:

:lol:

I guess he's that influential.

But I think DFW gets a fair share of attention, as he should. At least he did interview and wrote about many topics. Pynchon only has a few pages of autobiography in slow learner. We know almost nothing about him.

Wallace was rather open, given his issues.

Added to my reading list. — csalisbury

Since you like this type of literature, I guarantee you won't regret it.

Fair pushback on Mason & Dixon - I'll admit I haven't finished it (a few attempts, always faltered in the first section.) — csalisbury

I understand. I was in a Pynchon phase at the time, so I forced read through his tough books. With Mason & Dixon, I remember the beginning fairly well, and the ending. The rest is a blur, I recall almost nothing of it. I will have to go back to it sometime, when I'm up for a huge challenge.

In fact, my story with not finishing Pynchon is pretty bad. My biggest embarrassment as a reader which I hesitate to mention: I quit Against the Day at like 900 pages. :scream: I had like 150 pages left, but for some strange reason, I kept pushing it back and reading other stuff so that by the time I got back to it, I was lost. Yeah, insane on my part... I liked it, but burnout got to me. I should've forced myself just a bit more...

at a point I want to just yell - yes, we've had this conversation many times! I get it, man! It's spelled out in the first scene of your first book! — csalisbury

Yep, you are right. You can easily mix parts of V., GR and Against the Day into one book, and it would have significant similarities. It's like a genius paranoid speaking about everything. But clearly, he's not for everyone.

At the same time I'm a huge Melville fan, and he does this stuff too - there's no accounting for where and why you'll cut slack. — csalisbury

It's becoming harder and harder to find authors these days that can write and challenge and surprise you all in one go. I suspect there are some out there, but they're hidden way, way behind the "Bestsellers" section. It's a bit sad and very hard to find new stuff in this type of genre.

Yes. The idea is to say the same thing, in a profoundly different way. And style and vibe are very important.

As for Pynchon, I'd definitely agree that V. is his most fun work. Gravity's Rainbow obviously the most difficult, but perhaps his most wide ranging and profound. But I remember having to force myself to read 240 pages before I found a page that I could entirely follow. Granted, once he hits you with his incredible style, the book lifts off, pun intended.

I've heard Pynchon described as a "one-trick pony". This is perhaps not unfair. It's just that his trick is exceptional. Where I perhaps disagree with you a bit, is on Mason & Dixon. I think that even if he's riffing or not, there's evidence it took him over 20 years to write that book. The language displayed in that book is extraordinary and parts of that book are also magical.

One author, who is not well known at all, but who in my opinion writes like a mixture of Wallace and Pynchon + his own style is Jim Gauer, author of Novel Explosives. I think there's an argument for him being better than Pynchon and Wallace in some aspects, in that although his work is difficult, it is also very philosophical, it covers many topics and is probably the most fun book I've read, easily beating both mentioned authors in terms of fun factor alone while not sacrificing any depth.

The writing itself is subjective of course, some will prefer Wallace or Pynchon. It's a bit of a toss up for me in terms of style between the three.

It's crazy to think such a style of book could be exciting, profound and so so erudite. Yes I do propaganda for that novel. :razz:

La Vie En Rose - Edith Piaf

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kFzViYkZAz4

True, eugenics led to a horror show. But during the enlightenment, we already had phrenology, which was used to try and justify slavery. And before that, class was used as weapon for the nobility. So in this respect we've always had plenty of quite ugly things to point to.

It is correct that the UDHR was an important moment in history. We now simply have to live to its words. But this applies practically to all documents, notably to constitutions the world over. I know that Rorty mentioned that pomo was probably born sometime in the late 19th century.

I think the pomo that is most prevalent is the one that arose from France, with Lyotard. And then we also have Jameson, who simply declared we live in a pomo society. I think I find more continuities with the French pomo school than a larger historical one.

Nevertheless, Wallace had this newer tradition in mind when he spoke of pomo, I think. I take it to mean a total confusion in regards to our epistemic situation and a regarding of different stories as mutually legitimate. That's fine. But it can be taken too far, and then we get into stuff like "there is no objectivity", "truth is dead", etc.

That's too much. Heck Plato was dealing with people who played with words over 2000 years ago with the sophists. But the French pomo puts this on steroids, it seems to me.

Yeah, that all makes sense. If you can't stand yourself in terms of being unable to cope with life, that should probably become a priority. If you are then are more-or-less well, then you can help or try to help other people. That's not controversial, I don't think.

As for the left you describe, yeah. It has many problems and is more fragmented than the right. It isn't entirely obvious when one should step in and help or leave others be. People's intuition differ on these topics - because they're complex.

As for postmodernism, that's one way to describe it, saying that it's the name for our era. Not intending to sound too much theoretical, but I don't think modernity ever finished, despite what is said about "the failure of the enlightenment" and so forth. It was a tremendous success, prior to that "The West" was in a state of near-total religious mania.

I don't think pointing to the World Wars or fascism is a fault of modernity, though the technological innovation used in missles and tanks may be counted as a consequence. As far as I can see, at least in WWII, the fascists were reverting to tribalism, not rationality. The enlightenment in this sense, never really finished and probably never will, if honest, open inquiry is to remain one of its goals.

But I know this last point is endlessly disputable.

Israel's strategy is baffling except as an attempt to maintain the conflict for as long as possible as cover for expansions of settlements, expulsions, and further encroachments. — Baden

It is. But they can only get away with these "wars" in so far as the US allows it. For the US, the settlements aren't aren't much of a problem, occasional rhetoric aside.

It is somewhat curious that they pound Gaza every X amount of years. By now, popular opinion is very much against them. And regardless of anti-BDS laws or propaganda campaigns, I think they've essentially lost the PR war. They can't get that back anymore.

But the situation in terms of the massacres, not the occupation necessarily, may only change if the US becomes firm with Israel and tells them to stop these massacres or we cut out military aid.

And even then, given how nationalistic Israel is right now, it's not clear that they would acquiesce on settlements, though they would have to give up on Gaza assaults.

Samson option and what that implies may become a factor. Hopefully not.

If you consider what his ideas actually are, it'd seem that were they to actually have been into place, the situation there, though still with certain predicaments, would be preferable to what exists now. United States collaboration with right-wing authoritarian regimes was born out of a cynical anti-democratic anti-Communism and not some form of genuine Neo-Liberalism. — thewonder

The neoliberal project can never fully be realized, as with any other school of thought be it Marxism, Capitalism, Austrianism, Socialism or anything else. These doctrines can only be pushed so far. They can't get every single thing they want, but they can get a lot.

Friedman's ideas on markets are somewhat similar to Mises'. If freedom is taken to imply whatever you can purchase and nothing else, then sure, these figures are very much freedom oriented. But based on what you're saying, I don't think you or I are convinced that freedom is restricted to transactions.

There are all kinds of problems with Neo-Liberalism, but I don't think that it is really what to cite as what has made the Liberal democratic project, to me, at least, insufficient. — thewonder

Clearly not. It's extremely hard to point out all the malaise we see in society. I only choose neoliberalism because I think it captures a lot, but very far from all, aspects of society.

Take say pomo, supposedly it is very left wing. Maybe some aspects of it are. Other aspects of it seems to me to obscure reality rather than shed light on it. I have in mind pomo philosophy, not literature. I really like pomo lit, but not philosophy. The latter is often used as a critical lens which aims to elucidate almost everything.

But instead of doing that, I think it gets stuck in ever smaller units of power measurement, rendering its adherents to fight with each other on things that many people could not care less about. What reading of Marx is best? How many pronouns should we have? Should science become horizontal?

It has its uses in places to be fair. I think Foucault is interesting in part. But to be fair, a neoliberal analysis may also fall prey to this. If everything is reduced to creating a habitat for markets and creating a competitive consumer society, then it will miss aspects of society which are explicitly rejecting such an ideology.

And many other problems. A-one-size-fits-all approach just won't work, it will create ideologues, I think, more often than not.

A person's way of life and relationship to the world can be very easily utilized in order to manipulate them. You should only really care about your way of life and relationship to the world, however. It's just something that you can't ever let go of. — thewonder

You can only control yourself, and even that's hard. But trying to help others is self beneficial too. ;)

The idea in Capitalist Realism is that there is no Capitalist ideology. It's already cynicism. I think that the danger is of a more generalized cynicism than any form of indoctrination. — thewonder

I think Mirowski does a much better job than Fischer, because it is more oriented towards a specific strand of market ideology that is currently pervasive and encompasses a lot of aspects of society all over the world, which is neoliberalism. It is now showing some signs of waning in the US, not so much in the EU. But it has been proclaimed "dead" many times before, so one need be careful here.

Friedman is a part of that group, but far from the most important or sophisticated member in terms of ideas, that would fall to the likes of Hayek, Ropke, Mises, Schumpeter and so on.

I do think that it is easy to engulf oneself in negativity and hopelessness, it is a real meaning-problem. But if we let it consume us, we get completely stuck. Not only in our actions, but in our capacity to use analytic reason.

User participation within the production of goods and services does offer a certain degree of choice. It's, of course, considerably more troubling when you think about companies collecting massive amounts of data to build profiles of people to know what to market them. The experience is very strange, almost akin to schizophrenia. It seems like the ads are speaking to you directly because they kind of are. — thewonder

Sure. Systems are way too complex and large to say, point blank: there's nothing good at all about them. Sometimes people manage to use aspects of this system, say Facebook or Twitter to organize against other powerful entities, as was seen on Occupy, for instance. So "choice" in itself is not bad in certain areas, in other areas the idea of "choice" obscures real alternatives, such as the case of healthcare in the US, versus a state-system, because markets wouldn't stand to make money.

I was just saying that it's as if you're not let to feel as you should about the human experience. There's no boundless joy, whimsical caprice, emotional depth, righteous indignation, or catharsis. There seems, to me, to be a somewhat deliberate attempt to disrupt how we naturally feel about things. That's what I'm saying bothers me the most. — thewonder

Yes, I think this is a problem too. Wallace was good about pointing this out. I mean, I think it still happens, but it can get co-opted quite easily. But I take your point.

Currently rereading:

Never Let A Serious Crisis Go to Waste by Philip Mirowski

And also reading a novel:

The Good Son by You-Jeong Jeong

We desire authenticity to the point of psychological terror. Anything that lets us feel again is somehow good. I've just been invoking extreme examples to point this out. — thewonder

Sure. Maybe I'm stretching the idea too far, but I think part of this has to do with neo-liberal indoctrination. Philip Mirowski has done very good work on this. We strive to stand out by being unique and selling ourselves in every conceivable aspect of our lives through social media for example.

We rate every experience we have on Google, and so forth. I think this is more extreme market thinking than pomo, even if pomo also plays its part by sidelining people with spectacle.

hink about The Waking Life, for instance. People consider for it to be the worst form of pseudo-intellectual trite. It was a good film, y'know? What I'm suggesting is that this idea that we should care for and consider the world as it actually is should not have been a passing trend. — thewonder

I don't think this has passed. It is true that there is more cynicism employed by several companies. For instance, it is true that now it quite common to see a product in a store or a supermarket and such products say "a portion of the profits go to well-established charities", as if that takes care of social responsibility alone.

But the environmental movement, I think is quite strong world-wide, and with good reason too. Global warming is extremely worrisome.

Ah, did not know. Thanks for sharing.

Both of these books are Strawson's. Maybe Chalmers wrote in the latter book, as it contained many responses by philosophers.

It becomes very strange later on in the last essay, he starts introducing micro-subjects of experience and speaks about the inner and the outrer aspects of experience in ultimates...not convincing.

Ah ok. Then yes. I agree with that and I do think it is problem.

He'd probably say that radical emergence can't happen because every aspect of nature would be a miracle, there'd be no reason, law, habit or anything for why things occur.

Yes, Curtis is thought provoking at the very least, whatever else anyone thinks about him.