The premise you've added to get to the conclusion is that there cannot be causation between different kinds of object.
There's nothing to be said for that premise. It appears false - my mind does not appear to be material, yet does appear causally to interact with things quite dissimilar to it - and even if it were true, the fact my mind appears immaterial not material would mean you should conclude that the sensible world is mental, not that the mental is material.

I argued that Strawson's argument is that everything is conscious. So my cupboard is, as are the atoms composing it, and whatever they are composed of. Which is absurd, of course, but is what one would seem to be reduced to saying if one thinks you can't get out more than you put in.
I also pointed out that this also seems to mean that other properties, such as the property of being morally responsible, would have the same implication. If we can't get out more than we put in, then we can't get moral responsibility out unless atoms are morally responsible too. So now atoms are blameworthy and so is anything made of atoms.
If one remains a materialist despite being driven to these lengths, then I think one has discovered that one's materialism is a faith.

I don't think that formulation captures what Strawson in saying, because if we say that a table is conscious, we would associate it with our own intuitions of consciousness which would make this view completely insane. And whatever one may think of Strawson, he's not insane. Is he wrong? Perhaps, I think he's wrong in some sense, sure.

It would be more accurate to say that Strawson thinks that tables, rocks, pianos, etc., are made of the kind of stuff that, when modified in a specific manner constitute consciousness. But the property of experience is already in the stuff which makes everything up. As would be the case with every other emergent property of nature, once we "go up" from fields or strings or whatever is at the bottom of things.

If one remains a materialist despite being driven to these lengths, then I think one has discovered that one's materialism is a faith. — Bartricks

Yes. This is true. But as he points out, any metaphysical view is tied to some kind of faith, because we have no way to test these views. We can only depend on reasons and what sounds likely or intuitive to us.

By 'faith' I mean believing something irrespective of whether it has any support from reason. That does not mean that all views have an element of faith. For following reason would not be a faith position.

There are those who decide they already know what's true and then go out searching for arguments in support of it. They are just playing a pointless game. And then there are those who follow reason to find out what's true - Plato's definition of the philosopher (the one in whom reason is in charge, rather than appetite or spirit).

There is no reason to think materialism about the mind is true. When faith in a view is widespread, many mistake that for evidence or think that there must be an evidential base for it. But there is no evidential base for materialism about the mind. I have asked to be shown evidence for it time and time again, and in 10 years of asking, no one has provided me with any, just fallacious arguments that won't withstand a moment's reflection.

Back to Strawson. I do not see how you are going between the horns of the dilemma I presented. If conscious states can be wrought from that which is not itself bearing such states, the have emergence of precisely the sort that you say Strawson is opposed to and is using panpsychism to avoid. But if we do not have emergence, then conscious states - not something else - must be fully present in molecules.

Consider shape. We cannot get shape from that which is not shaped. Molecules have a shape as much as the objects they compose. They do not have to have the same shape, but they have a shape. Likewise for conscious states. Consciousness cannot emerge from that which is not conscious. There are as many different conscious states as there are shapes, so there is no need to suppose that the conscious states of the molecules composing my brain are the same in terms of content as those of my brain itself. But what one cannot say is that the conscious states of the molecules are somehow not as real or conscious, for that would be akin to saying that molecules do not really have shapes themselves.

So Strawson must, onpain of inconsistency, insist that everything has conscious states. Not something 'like'consciuos states, but the real deal. Thus my wardrobe is conscious. My hand is. My ear is. A speck of dust is. Properly conscious.

That's insane, of course. Why? Because our reason tells us loud and clear that those things are not conscious. That's what insanity is. A person is insane when they have rationally derailed in some spectacular fashion.

Our rational intuitions - from which all evidence is derived - tell us that conscious states are the preserve of minds and that minds do not have the properties we identify with material objects. So our reason is clear: material objects do not possess conscious states. That's why we attribute minds to matter and not consciousness. We do not think the cat's fur is conscious or that a lump of ham is. We think the cat has a mind - that there is 'a' soul in there or associated with it, and it is that - and not the skin and bones - that has the conscious states (as it is with us too).

Panpsychism and unconsciousness. I take it that I am sometimes unconscious. How's that possible on Strawson's view?
I take it as well that Strawson thinks people do die and that when they die that essentially involves permanently ceasing to be conscious?
How's that possible?
Take shape. I can change the shape of an object, but I can't stop it having a shape for a period. So how is unconsciousness possible, then? If an object can go from being conscious to unconscious, then it goes from having a state to not having it. But by Strawson's lights that would be impossible surely, for just as we can't get out what hasn't been put in, we can not fail to get out what we have put in. Same applies. An object can't be shaped at one point and have no shape whatever at another and then resume being shaped once more. For that would involve states coming from nothing and going into nothing. Likewise for consciousness then, on this absurd view.

I can destroy entirely something - I can smash a sculpture, say - but when I do this I do not destroy a thing's shape, but destroy the thing itself. So presumably on Strawson's view my own consciousness will only be destroyed when my brain is demolished. If my heart stops beating, i will still be alive until such time as my brain disintegrates. I mean, my brain has a shape until it no longer exists, right? So it has consciousness too. Presumably Strawson is appalled at our practice of burying people who still have identifiable brains.

There is no reason to think materialism about the mind is true. When faith in a view is widespread, many mistake that for evidence or think that there must be an evidential base for it. But there is no evidential base for materialism about the mind. I have asked to be shown evidence for it time and time again, and in 10 years of asking, no one has provided me with any, just fallacious arguments that won't withstand a moment's reflection. — Bartricks

At bottom, this is mostly a terminological dispute, not so much of substance. I think that's important to point out. Panpsychism aside, Strawson's materialism claims that everything is physical, whatever the nature of the physical may be.

But if you don't like the term, you can say that everything is immaterial or you could adopt neutral monism. I would even say idealism here too, with the caveat that I don't think that everything is made of ideas, nor is everything in the world the product of a person.

Materialism used to have a distinct meaning and could be counterposed to other views. When it had a intelligible meaning was back in the time of Descartes and Hobbes. When materialism essentially meant mechanistic materialist: the world is a giant machine, like a massive clock. But it didn't reach the domain of mind. Hence Descartes' dualism.

That all fell apart when Newton discovered gravity and proved mechanistic materialism to be false: the world does not work like a clock, there is action at a distance with no direct contact. But with that we lost an intelligible notion of "body". So metaphysical dualism collapsed.

Consider shape. We cannot get shape from that which is not shaped. Molecules have a shape as much as the objects they compose. They do not have to have the same shape, but they have a shape. Likewise for conscious states. Consciousness cannot emerge from that which is not conscious. — Bartricks

Yes. That's the intuition. And what Strawson tries to avoid by articulating panpsychism, he wants to avoid "radical emergence" as described in your own words.

I think radical emergence exists, it's what happens in nature. We do get shapes from that which lack shape and we do get consciousness out of non-conscious things, just as we get water from molecules that give no indication at all that they have such properties.

People today call that magic. It was more or less accepted as a brute fact back in 17th and 18th centuries.

conscious states - not something else - must be fully present in molecules — Bartricks

As a property, like electricity or gravity or liquidity, which is inherent in matter. This does not mean that this property is realized in ordinary objects, any more than liquidity is realized in tables. It's the same stuff at bottom, but only different configurations of matter lead to liquidity, which is also not found in tables.

So Strawson must, onpain of inconsistency, insist that everything has conscious states. Not something 'like'consciuos states, but the real deal. Thus my wardrobe is conscious. My hand is. My ear is. A speck of dust is. Properly conscious. — Bartricks

I've stressed the point several times. I don't know how to express myself more clearly. I'll say it one more time: Strawson is not saying that a table is conscious, nor is a wardrobe. He never says that. What he says is that the stuff tables and wardrobes are made of consists of matter than has in it the capacity to become conscious when configured in a certain manner as in the case of brains.

Again, think of liquidity. It's not found in wardrobes, but it can arise when configured in a specific manner. We don't therefore say that tables and wardrobes are wet.

This does not imply what you keep saying, namely that ordinary objects are conscious. They are not, nor does Strawson ever claim that at all.

Many thanks. :) — Manuel

Thank you for the appreciation. My intention was to present Mainländer as a legitimate possibility of thought, because he is completely disregarded by academic philosophy and is regarded merely as a philosophical curiosity that is not to be taken seriously.

you don't seem to understand what I am doing. I am 'refuting' Strawson's view.

I describe his view. I present it with a dilemma.

Here it is again: either conscious states are present (so, 'realized'to use your term) in molecules, or they are not and we have emergence.

You then keep telling me that Strawson does not think conscious states are present in molecules.

Er, so? That just shows he is inconsistent then.

You can't get out what you didn't put in. That's the intuition he's trying to respect. We agree on that. So, that means molecules need to be conscious. To get consciousness out, you need to put it in. See? That's the logic of his view. One can't back peddle and decide that no consciousness is realized at the molecular level, for the have emergence by a different name - the very thi g he wants to avoid.

Between the non-living and the living there also seems to be an infinite gap. Panpsychism is a modern vitalism. — hypericin

Not sure about your first sentence. That's why I had quoted Nietzsche in my original post:

"Let us beware of saying that death is opposed to life. The living is only a form of what is dead, and a very rare form." (Friedrich Nietzsche: The Gay Science: 109 Let us beware. Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy)

The linguistic distinction between alive and dead could prove to be questionable. Things are rather neither alive nor dead. These features are possibly only human attributions. On the other hand, I could consider all things as dead or all as alive.

The latter is called hylozoism, according to which matter is alive in a certain way. The question is: Is vitalism merely a hylozoism or merely a panpsychism or both?

To your second sentence: I think that panpsychism need not be associated with vitalism. It is only about the sober and neutral attribution of conscious experience to material entities.

This is not about the meanings of words. This is a matter of substance.

I am an idealist. So I think everything that exists is either a mind or a state of mind.

That, I take it, is not Strawson's view.

Materialism is the opposite of immaterialism. There's room to quibble over the precise definition of materialism, but it must not be so broad as to include immaterialism. It must not, for example, simply mean 'the view that is true', for now it is unhelpful and means identifying as a materialist means no more than one believes the true view, whatever it may be, is true. Which is vacuous.

Materialists believe there are objects extended in space. That's a good working definition.

I don't think there are. But even if there are, there's a debate over whether our minds are such things.

Your historical analysis is quite false. Descartes did not just arbitrarily believe that minds were not material mechanisms, he argued that they are not (Hobbes thought they were and they disagreed at the time).

Descartes' arguments have not been refuted and if he were alive today he would still be a dualist and would join me in deriding the stupidity and dogmatism of those who think the mind is material. He didn't suffer fools gladly and he'd have torn Strawson a new one.

How would a panpsychist explain the incredibe fragility of our consciousness? — hypericin

Good question. I don't know. I recommend you google Philip Goff, who does a good job of explaining panpsychism. I was just concerned with the basic idea without problematic details.

I am an idealist. So I think everything that exists is either a mind or a state of mind. — Bartricks

Now I understand you better. You reject materialism in general. And if you are not argumentatively convinced by the rescue attempt of materialism with the help of panpsychism, then that is completely philosophically fine.

As an idealist, you must consider a materialism without panpsychism even more absurd and insane, no?

Liquidity - is it an emergent property or not? You tell me. Tell me what the property is exactly, and then whether it is emergent.

If it is not emergent, then we can use it to model what Strawson is saying, yes? If it is emergent, then we can't and it would constitute a counterexample. Agree?

@Bartricks It must also be said that panpsychist discussion and reasoning is still in an early stage of development. Therefore, there may be some truth in your detailed objections for the time being. I was only concerned with the basic idea.

As to matter, it could not create itself; therefore, it emanated from an immaterial existent. — val p miranda

That would no longer be materialism. I wanted to start as a working hypothesis merely from materialism, which can represent in the end actually a wrong view.

Most of the arguments for the immateriality of the mind do not suppose materialism to be false. That is, they do not depend upon rejecting the existence of anything material.

I think materialism about anything is false primarily because the very notion of a material object makes no sense as any such thing would be infinitely divisible and I think that is impossible.

Panpsychism can be used to illustrate that absurdity - for there are no basic material units from which larger material objects are made, and thus the panpsychism will have to posit an actual infinity of conscious things - but it is also independently nuts. That is, even if material objects can and do exist, panpschism would be absurd and irrational.

So, material objects do not exist. As minds do, that entails that minds are immaterial.

But even if material objects do exist, minds are clearly not material objects.

Like I say, there is precisely no evidence that minds are material objects and plenty that they are not.

My case against materialism does not depend on immaterialism. One - one - argument for immaterialism about the mind goes by way of a refutation of materialism about anything. The other 12 arguments do not.

The only reason I mentioned my own immaterialism about everything was to demonstrate that 'materialism' can't plausibly be used to refer to any view.

I think it is a non starter. It addresses itself to a minor problem, not a major one. And its 'solution' is prima facie absurd and clearly raises more problems than it solves.

The real problem confronting those who think minds are material is the mammoth pile of rational intuitions that imply minds are immaterial and total absence of any positive evidence that they are material. The problem is not one to do with emergence. That's a problem - if problem it be - after you have provided us with some reason (epistemic reason) to think minds are material.

That's the problem with contemporary philosophy of mind - it's largely dominated by dogmatists who are focused on rearranging deck chairs on the titanic.

Which is less insane for you: eliminativism (eliminative materialism) or panpsychism? Some say that eliminativism is the most consistent and proper materialism.

Eliminativism is more absurd than panpsychism.

For instance, I take it universal Eliminativism is absurd? That is, I take it we can all agree that the view 'nothing exists' is insane?

This thought that I am having right now exists. And a thought is a mental state. So at least one mental state - the one I am in right now - exists.

And it seems about as evident that thoughts require a thinker. Thus i, a mind, exist too.

I can't doubt that there are norms of reason either, as it was by recognizing that I have reason to think thoughts exist if I am thinking that I concluded that a thought exists. That is, to recognize that a thought exists requires having another thought, namely that there is reason to think a thought that is being thought exists. And likewise, to think that thoughts require a thinker is to think there is reason to believe a mind exists if a thought exists. And so in a way, norms of reason exist even more certainly than my thoughts and my mind do, as it was only by first recognizing that I have reason to believe something that I came to believe my thought and mind exist.

So thoughts, a thinker, and norms of reason all exist with the utmost certainty.

Material objects, note, are yet to enter the inventory. Maybe they will, maybe they won't. But that they have yet to enter itself tells us something. Namely that one is being incredibly stupid if one makes materialism the touchstone of reality, for then one is insisting that that which exists more surely should be made sense of in terms of that which exists less surely, and if one cannot make sense of it that way, then one should conclude that the less surely existent things are what really exist. Which is the pinnacle of rational perversion. This was Descartes' point - one of them - though few recognize or live by it. Pity.

Descartes did not just arbitrarily believe that minds were not material mechanisms, he argued that they are not — Bartricks

Yes, correct. He based that in large part to the creative aspect of language use.

I'm offering Chomsky's version of events. Which I've found to be accurate based on historical and original sources.

Materialists believe there are objects extended in space. That's a good working definition. — Bartricks

Well if you call quantum fields extended, okay.

Descartes' arguments have not been refuted and if he were alive today he would still be a dualist and would join me in deriding the stupidity and dogmatism of those who think the mind is material. He didn't suffer fools gladly and he'd have torn Strawson a new one. — Bartricks

Ah, ok then. :up:

Based on what I've seen thanks to you and YuYuHunter, I can't wait for the translation.

Mostly his epistemic/metaphysical stuff. His pessimism is a bit too strong for me. :grimace:

I don't have a clue what a quantum field is. But the concept of materialism predates any such notion. It's not a boundary condition in materialism that anything anyone thinks exists should be capable of being captured by it. For then one is just using 'material' to refer to what exists regardless of its nature.

Like I say, a good working definition is 'extended in space'(it's Descartes' definition). That's good regardless of whether quantum field would qualify.

I don't understand what you said about Descartes. He made several arguments for the immateriality of the mind. They're good arguments.

I don't have a clue what a quantum field is. But the concept of materialism predates any such notion. — Bartricks

Then you are working with an outdated notion of materialism. I mean, you can use it if you like. It has no relevance to what's happening now because the notion of materialism used by Descartes was directly based on the science of his day. That science is now outdated.

I don't understand what you said about Descartes. He made several arguments for the immateriality of the mind. They're good arguments. — Bartricks

Yes he argued that the mind cannot be explained by mechanistic means, among other arguments. And he's right about that to this day.

What are you on about? Maybe try reading Descartes himself rather than this Chumpsky guy.
Note too that as a general rule the mention of quantum mechanics in a philosophical discussion is an admission of defeat.

Now, liquidity - you haven't answered my questions about it. What is liquidity and is it an emergent property or not?

It is the consciousness problem, not the mind-body problem. If I believe in materialism, then I assume that I myself am a complex matter entity that has become evolutionary. When I trace my evolution ontogenetically and phylogenetically, I arrive at some crude organic and inorganic stuff. If I understand this stuff in every respect as without consciousness, then I must nevertheless think about how I myself came to have consciousness. After all, it did not fall from the sky. It is philosophically elegant to assume consciousness already in that crude stuff. One must assume so also no sudden inexplicable jumps of consciousness. — spirit-salamander

You seem to have said above that what applies to consciousness does not also apply to life. Can you explain why you think that, if indeed you do?

Panpsychism and unconsciousness. I take it that I am sometimes unconscious. How's that possible on Strawson's view? — Bartricks

It's identity not consciousness that is lost.

Materialism is the world view most fiercely opposed by philosophers since Plato (Aristotle, Leibniz, Kant, Schopenhauer to name just a few great names). They all had good reasons to reject materialism.

However, materialism is still popular. I have found for myself that I need to modify it somewhat to consider it plausible. — spirit-salamander

I don't think there's much point in debating this question, since there has never been a unified concept of "materialism." The word has been thrown around for a long time, but its meaning has remained vague. These days, more often than not, materialism is used as a strawman, a word to label ideological opponents to whom you can then attribute untenable and unattractive views that, in all probability, they don't actually hold.

Defining materialism precisely is problematic, and even if you succeed, you will only identify your version of materialism. Defending or knocking it down would not accomplish much, as far as the general concept is concerned, because as I said, such general concept does not exist.

I think it would be more productive to advance or attack specific positions and not bother about isms. If you want to talk about ontology, talk about ontology; if you want to talk about the mind, talk about the mind. Who cares what it's called?


But to comment on a couple of quotes in your post:

"As we will see later, fields have energy. They therefore are a form of matter; they can be regarded as the fifth state of matter (solid, liquid, gas, and plasma are the other four states of matter)." (Marc Lange - An Introduction to the Philosophy of Physics) — spirit-salamander

This sounds very confused. A field is not a state of matter like solid or liquid. Fields in physics are mathematical models used to describe... physical stuff (let's not get hung up on what "matter" is), in whatever state it may be. Saying that a field is a state of matter is like saying that engineering is a type of car.

"Ordinary matter is held together by electric fields, so if those fields are altered by motion, then it is only to be expected that the shape of the matter will be altered." (Wallace, David. Philosophy of Physics: A Very Short Introduction) — spirit-salamander

Looks like you pulled this quote out of context and misunderstood its meaning, which is precisely the opposite of the point you were trying to make. I am guessing that Wallace here is discussing the rationale behind Einstein's theory of relativity. What he says about electric fields being affected by motion is a counterfactual: as everyone knows, the shape of matter is not affected by (inertial) motion. You didn't need to hunt for a quote to make your point about fields affecting matter though, because that's just what physical fields are: they quantify forces, potentials and other things that affect matter.


ETA: Oh, I see it's now a Bartricks thread. Abandon all hope.

Note too that as a general rule the mention of quantum mechanics in a philosophical discussion is an admission of defeat. — Bartricks

In materialism? Really? To say that quantum mechanics is the study of physical stuff is an admission of defeat? That's surprising.

Now, liquidity - you haven't answered my questions about it. What is liquidity and is it an emergent property or not? — Bartricks

Liquidity is defined as "the state in which a substance exhibits a characteristic readiness to flow with little or no tendency to disperse and relatively high incompressibility."

It is an emergent property, of course.

I have not yet been able to justify it properly. Here I have tried. It is still half-baked.
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/540768

I think that the question of consciousness is philosophically more pressing than the question of life.

It is an emergent property, of course. — Manuel

If the historical reality of the cosmic microwave background is accepted, then it follows that all physical properties are emergent.