I find this rather puzzling. Yes, it's true, having a doctorate may make me seem to be "higher in the ladder", but all that means is that I had the time, interest and opportunity to do something I thought would be worth doing.

What bothers me to no end, is how little I know about the darn history, everything you read or contemplate leads to 20 other topics and 20 other obscure figures and it's impossible to read it all, much less know it in-depth.

On the other hand, your mastery of Kant is awe-inducing. I will read the Critique again, even more carefully, probably a commentary, it will be long and maybe I'll fail to do what I have in mind. But even if I do pull it off, I'd still be behind you.

Heck, I've read Locke, Hume and Leibniz twice, both times with quite a bit of care. And I still fear I misunderstood many, many aspects. Nowhere near what you do with Kant. The only similarity in me would be Chomsky, but he doesn't have a Critique or an Essay Concerning Human Understanding. And his linguistics stuff, once it goes beyond lay-audiences, is beyond me.

So, don't sell yourself short.

For sure. I don't recall how I felt about Skinner and his skin, I read him in high school. Looking back though, it's just so incredibly poor. But finding a wife is not so bad a price to pay to put it with it, I'd think. :)

Oh yeah, some fringe stuff can be very good, taken with care and salt. For literature it pays off though, and so far as I can see, a good novel is the best psychology a person can get.

Don’t you think behaviourism was reductionist from the outset? That it was basically a Procrustean bed - because the mind couldn’t be observed, and science built around observation, then it has to be excluded from consideration. (Dennett does say somewhere that his approach is basically behaviourist.) — Wayfarer

I don't know enough about the history to say. I suspect not, I don't think most phycologists as psychologists, believe this. It's not even useful at all for what they do.

In philosophy, with the bit that I've seen (not a lot - I find it stupid and insulting), the feeling I get it that this approach (behaviorism, vulgar empiricism - meaning, modern versions - sophism, etc.) stands in contrast to another tradition, which you can call Platonic, Rationalistic, etc.

The main point of contention is that either the world is, put in corny manner: either there is something special about us, or there is not. Those who think that we are special, tend to be strong believers in the importance and range of mind. Those that do not, take us to be mere machines, doing what is to be expected from the "laws of nature", such that neither mind nor nature is special.

Dennett called himself a "Neo-positivist" in one paper, so, it's not too far off.

But I need to stress, not that you don't already know this: Locke and Hume whom I have read carefully, would be insulted by how empiricism has been so distorted and mangled. These were among the best philosophers in history, virtually nothing to do with this modern mediocrity.

As to how physics comes into consideration - isn’t it the case that modern mathematical physics is grounded in the quantisation of measurable attributes of bodies? And that this was then taken as paradigmatic for all manner of science, culminating in what René Guenon describes as ‘the reign of quantity’? Then only what is measurable is considered significant. And furthermore the paradigm assumes the separation of observer and observed - something which has been found to be untenable in quantum physics. — Wayfarer

Also very much in line with Tallis, whom you and I both admire.

I don't disagree this is what physics does, in essence. Nonetheless, I do believe that the stuff physics describes existed prior to us, and that we are made of the stuff of physics (but there's a lot more to it than physics, by an unimaginable amount), notwithstanding the many difficulties involved.

But I would agree with you, I think, in saying that, for all practical purposes, physics is not relevant to the mental, and it is related to the brain is a very basic and uninformative manner.

On the one hand, it doesn’t seem like there could be, but on the other, it seems impossible there isn’t. — Mww

Quite so. Or very close, as I see it.

To (most) of those who don't bother with understanding a bit of modern physics, there is no problem, they are aware and experience the world.

Those who do read or listen or watch material on modern physics, the problem is immense: how could the things of physics lead to mind?

We don't know, likely will never know. But, since we are conscious, then we are forced to conclude that there is nothing in physics which prevents minds from arising, when the stuff of physics is suitably arranged.

Do they?

Do they have the freedom not to get killed? There's no evidence for this.

How is this even contentious?

@180 Proof

:ok:

I can't believe I'm still surprised, but it still happens.

Philosophically, I think Gilbert Ryle may have been one the modern precursors in trying to get rid of ideas. Hence "the ghost in the machine".

But more broadly, Galen Strawson points out that it was likely the psychologist John Watson Psychology as the Behaviorists Views It that established the tradition. What began quite nobely as an attempt to understand some of human psychology, by limiting itself to what could be observed - we cannot see into another person's mind - somehow morphed into the view that there is no mind or mental.

But it goes back, haven't read him closely or enough, yet Hobbes for instance, gives an impression of something like this view.

It's all based on the mistaken idea, that we know something enough to dismiss serious problems as illusions or delusions. But we don't. We don't know what a particle is, much less do we know how the brain works. Skinner's psychology, in light of this, is embarrassing.

Compare the people in Gaza vs. most people in Copenhagen. Then tell me there is no difference.

You didn't include universals in your OP.

The list you provide is quite good, but I think an option of "other" without qualifications would've been useful.

Ideas are as "real" as anything is, in fact it is what we are most acquainted with out of everything there is. Now, the problem aren't ideas per se, it's the world: that's what we really struggle with. Our best science cannot account for 95% of the universe.

And the 5% we do know is giving us a lot of problems, conceptually, theoretically and so on. So, yeah, I do think ideas are a problem - despite our intimate acquaintance with these. But the world is stranger, the mind-independent world anyway.

So, the issue as usually discussed is quite the opposite of the mainstream formulation. It's ghosts all the way down, as far as I can see.

I mean if spirits exist, they are metaphysically possible and so would be logical too.

We may even be more constrained in logic than in metaphysics, for there is a lot about the world which we do not know, and perhaps cannot know, given that we have biological minds.

Sam Harris, eh.

If it's logically possible, it is metaphysically possible too. I don't believe we could postulate something logically which could, in principle, be impossible metaphysically, unless one wants to play word games like golden-lead, or a triangular circle.

Very much so, it's just crazy all over. Those last 150 pages or so, were very, very tough and I probably missed over 60-70% of the references, but, still, a good challenge.

:up:

In a sense it does, in another sense, it does not.

Goodman goes into some of this in Starmaking.

I think so too, she starts, iirc, speaking about how Kant is an empirical realist but also a transcendental idealist, that he is both and that there is no contradiction. You say something similar.

She'll go on to speak about how he would fit today under different analytic interpretations (realism vs. anti-realism, metaphysical vs. deflationary interpretations, etc.)

But the part I liked the best is the last 2 (maybe 3) chapters, which is what I've read many times.

Entire book 2. So, if you do agree with her, seems to me you have a decent theory in the works. :)

Anytime! :cheer:

Oh heavens.

If it were easy, it would be no fun. :cool:

Mmm. It's not super, super easy, but, much easier than the Critique, Lucy Allais' Manifest Reality is sublime. Try that one out.

Then read his (Kant's) Prolegomena. After that, you could try other sources, or just struggle with the darn thing.

Or get yourself an @Mww, if they are up for sale. They can help a lot. :cool:

Where do you get off the train? (meaning, at what point do you hit the 'its now a futile endeavour' line in your enquiry?) — AmadeusD

I don't think it's of much difference to other issues like freedom of the will, or matter thinking, personal identity and so on.

You get off whenever you get tired of it or bored with it or find a unique approach that may be somewhat satisfactory.

It's not doubting that there is an external world, Hume never doubts this, what he is pointing out as problematic is in having an idea of external existence which is different from our specific perceptions of them.

Well, I'm still stuck with Hume's "Skepticism with Regard to the Senses."

The thought experiment consists in looking at objects to attempt to get the idea of a continued existence of objects as well as trying to find the reasons for why we believe objects to exist in a manner distinct from our perceptions of them.

We can't. Yet we do assume both, quite strongly, yet we don't have good reasons for doing so. It's really hard. But fascinating notwithstanding the futility of such an exercise, it's an obsession.

It's pretty damn rough to read. It's one a the very few cases in which I recommend secondary literature before reading the book, there's plenty of it.

But even with this secondary literature, there's a whole lot that is just hard to follow, because he is just way too technical. But of course, it has come excellent ideas.

I have probably written here more than once, but, I like the question, so I will reply again.

The hard problem of consciousness seems to hard, because we have forgotten about the hard problem of motion, which we do not understand, but can study quite successfully.

And, then, I think if we clearly look at the situation, we have many hard problems, the problem of morality, the problem of will, the problem of identity, the problem meaning, the problem of mind, the problem of magnetism, the problem of first origins and on and on and on.

For whatever curios reason, consciousness is taken to be specifically more problematic than any of these. I don't see a reason to believe it.

My example was against your point that you would rather take a more supported and seeming option rather than a less supported and unlikely option. The OP was asking what your reasons to believe in the existence of the world are, while not perceiving it. — Corvus

But your example of the Earth being round has less immediately perceivable proofs, than the argument that the Earth is flat. The latter is much easier to believe, because the world feels that way. But once we introduce reason to the equation (of which only a part of it is in experience) then we can see much more and better evidence suggesting the Earth is round, of which of course we know have evidence beyond doubt.

Your question about how do we know if the Earth exists if we are not perceiving it is much less evident than the belief that the Earth exists absent us. It only appears more evident if you ignore the great amount of evidence that is not immediately available for conscious experience.

If fact, what you seem to be getting at goes way beyond Berkley or Kant or any other idealist. Very few of them say that the world does not exist if we are not perceiving it. They take it for granted.

What they question is the conceptions we should make about the world absent people, but never denying that the world exists, in some manner or other.

I'm sure there are exceptions, but they are very rare.

:chin:

Anything is possible.

:victory:

Wouldn't it be like saying that the earth looks more flat than round, so it must be flat. It looks like the Sun is rotating the earth, so the Sun is rotating around the earth?
This was what the ancient and the medieval people believed and supported, and anyone saying against it was punished by law too.

But it has been turned around by Copernicus and Galileo totally and incredibly. So what looks seemingly like the case, and supported by the majority is not always the truth. — Corvus

It's rather the opposite, funnily enough.

The world looks and feels flat, but there is much more evidence to support the claim that it is round, but most of the evidence we use to support this claim comes from experiments which go beyond immediate conscious perceptions.

So, your own example is an argument against your own OP.

Because it is more coherent and is better supported than the alternative of nothing existing absent us. There is more to evidence than continuous perception of a thing.

Heck, the world might not be continuous, but even claiming this stops way short of saying that nothing exists. Of the latter claim, we have virtually no evidence.

So, what's the plan? Starve everybody? Just had an acquaintance from Gaza confirm his cousins were killed yesterday, parents and children, just like that.

Hezbollah so far has not escalated, Iran said they weren't going to get involved for now. So, what gives? Biden not going to do anything? Just let them all die?

The survivors of one of the worst massacres in history will reply in kind to others? Great.

Are there any resources online that will show me a roadmap or book list? I just want to feel that my academic endeavors are productive and not just a vehicle to feed my intellectual ego. — T4YLOR

Depends on what aspect of philosophy is what interests you the most. If it's ethics you may want to start with an introduction to ethics book, such as the Very Short series, which are quite good.

If your issues are more of a metaphysical/epistemological nature, then I think Bryan Magee's books are excellent as an introduction.

If it's on faith - that I can't help you with.

It's always going to be hard to start, I had no clue what I was doing until things started "clicking", I suspect the same or something similar will happen to you, should you follow this interest.

As for difficulty understanding some authors, classical ones most of all, first time through just take in what you find interesting don't stress too much. It's in the subsequent reading that you can read more in depth, and then you'll get a better understanding.

Good luck.

Well, there is a verbal resemblance between idea and ideology, though I do not know if they have share a common root meaning.

What is stupid? Well, denying evidence, for one thing is a big deal, especially if the evidence is backed up by many studies.

Yet as you mention an otherwise smart person will do something stupid, and a stupid person can say smart things. But then it seems as if calling someone "smart" or "stupid" is relative to a subject matter or a specific act.

So, it may be inaccurate to say that a person is stupid at everything, or smart at everything.

I don't know if this is stupid per se, but, a related matter that irritates me is lack of curiosity about the world. There is so much to discover and its never been easier to find information, yet we see many people completely oblivious to most of it, focusing instead on shallow things.

Which in itself is not bad, sometimes we need a break from "serious stuff" to just relax. But if that's the whole extent of your involvement in the world, then I think you are missing out on one of the most important things of being a human being, which is to take pleasure in our capacity to think and engage with problems.

I think so too.

But we agree on the bigger points, so, all seems well for now. :)

We are beginning to speak about different things now. As you ask, yes, I think determinism is one thing, mechanical is another. My impression was that, by now most physicists (that I read, which admittedly are popular scientists) reject the view that the universe is a big machine (like a giant clock, for instance, or the example Timothy mentioned), but they call still be deterministic, and many are.

I was pointing out that this view, that the universe was not a machine, was reluctantly recognized by Newton, much previously than QM. Now, you can define a machine in a different way than the traditional conception if you want.

You are correct, there are some theories that may suggest a deterministic outcome, like Many Worlds or some remaining "hidden variables" theory. Maybe they're correct. Or maybe not, I can't say.

I don't see what big outcome in philosophy hinges on a deterministic universe. Like, if you have in mind free-will, I don't think the universe being one way or the other matters for this topic. But that's a subject for a different thread.

Apologies for the insertion.

I initially said that the mechanistic picture of the world was proven false by Newton, and I believe this is true, based on not only what Newton says, but also what Locke, Hume, Priestley, Russell and Chomsky say (among a few others).

I should've added for clarity's sake that it is this specific conception of materialism (as mechanistic) which was shown to be false, not the whole school of thought.

There are other kinds of materialism, presumably the kind you are finding in the Google articles. That materialism tends to be associated with the view that everything that exists is physical in the sense of what physics says there is. That's not mechanistic, our best theories of physics aren't mechanistic, they are probabilistic.

Newton's views are often misinterpreted, when this quote is given, they tend to say that Newton had trouble understanding gravity because it didn't make sense to him, but that the image he left was that of a mechanistic universe, but that's not what he says in that quote.

Of course, there are other materialisms which are defended, such as Galen Strawson's or Dennett's or even Sean Carroll's. These are very different in character.

Again, sorry for the misattribution. I am rather slow today...

The vast majority of physicists think the world is a machine? What? That's news to me.

Sure, he was superstitious, but on gravity he was quite serious and celebrated for it. I wonder what physicists we are reading that are coming to opposite conclusions.

That was Newton's interpretation of his own work as outlined in the Principia. Hume and Locke agreed that his conclusion was correct.

You can skim the essay I provided in that other thread, but the essay is long. It goes well beyond a mere opinion.

Well, there's a long thread that covers this topic, here:

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/12417/chomskys-mysteries-of-nature-how-deeply-hidden-reading-group/p1

Especially the essay in the OP.

It would take a long time to elaborate. The gist is that, contrary to popular claim, Newton proved materialism wrong when he discovered gravity. Materialism was understood to be mechanistic. Hence his famous quote:

'It is inconceivable that inanimate brute matter should, without the mediation of something else which is not material, operate upon and affect other matter without mutual contact, as it must be, if gravitation in the sense of Epicurus, be essential and inherent in it... [this] is to me so great an absurdity that I believe no man who has in philosophical matters [science] a competent faculty of thinking can ever fall into it."

(Bold added)

This is then expanded upon by Locke mostly, but also Hume and Priestley all the way up to Russell and Eddington.

But, there's a lot to it.

But we aren't mechanistic, this was proven to be false by Newton.

Often a lot of these debates in metaphysics are debates about terminology, as if saying the world is made of physical stuff or mental stuff is even clear or useful in any manner. Reductionism and eliminitavism may be rather different in the extreme view it tends to take, but I don't think it should be taken seriously.

QM can say some interesting things about the nature of the world, though one should be careful of extending the results of QM beyond its own field, which is (extremely) microscopic phenomena.

So far, most of the popular theories offer some quite wild speculations, like alternative universes or many worlds, or the argument that time may be emergent and hence not a fundamental part of the world. Maybe these theories are right, maybe they're wrong, I can't say.

But even if one of these is true, many of the problems of metaphysics remain as they were. Perhaps narrowing down what kind of metaphysics you are interested in, could help. Otherwise, the issue is too broad to tackle. Experience and physics though related in some manner, are perhaps too far apart to discuss fruitfully.

So, I am raising the question of the nature of metaphysics and perception and how may the nature of 'reality' be understood in the most helpful way? — Jack Cummins

In the most helpful way for what purposes? Is to gain a better intuition about what the world is made of? Then you should continue to read what physicists say about these things.

Is metaphysics about what physics says? Well, based on the meaning of the word, not entirely. One should at least be able to say, that whatever metaphysics you think is most persuasive, it should not go against what our best science predicts, or it is likely wrong.

This may be where the issues of what is metaphysics may come into play, in trying to understand the nature of ' reality'. I struggle with this area of thinking, but am not sure how many is my psychological issue or one of metaphysics. — Jack Cummins

In modern terms based on how the issue is talked about today, say "physicalism" or "realism" or whatever, there is indeed no sharp distinction between "metaphysics" and psychology, especially the more speculative side of it.

The issue here is that there is no agreed upon meaning of the term metaphysics, and I don't think such a non-contentious definition will ever arise.

I currently don't have a lot to say but, this quote is great:

There's the bit where you say it and the bit where you take it back. — Austin

I did not know this was the origin of that quote. Excellent. :up:

And yet, and yet, we have flat earthers. No pics from the edge? Interesting. :joke: