I think so too, she starts, iirc, speaking about how Kant is an empirical realist but also a transcendental idealist, that he is both and that there is no contradiction. You say something similar.

She'll go on to speak about how he would fit today under different analytic interpretations (realism vs. anti-realism, metaphysical vs. deflationary interpretations, etc.)

But the part I liked the best is the last 2 (maybe 3) chapters, which is what I've read many times.

Entire book 2. So, if you do agree with her, seems to me you have a decent theory in the works. :)

Anytime! :cheer:

Oh heavens.

If it were easy, it would be no fun. :cool:

Mmm. It's not super, super easy, but, much easier than the Critique, Lucy Allais' Manifest Reality is sublime. Try that one out.

Then read his (Kant's) Prolegomena. After that, you could try other sources, or just struggle with the darn thing.

Or get yourself an @Mww, if they are up for sale. They can help a lot. :cool:

Where do you get off the train? (meaning, at what point do you hit the 'its now a futile endeavour' line in your enquiry?) — AmadeusD

I don't think it's of much difference to other issues like freedom of the will, or matter thinking, personal identity and so on.

You get off whenever you get tired of it or bored with it or find a unique approach that may be somewhat satisfactory.

It's not doubting that there is an external world, Hume never doubts this, what he is pointing out as problematic is in having an idea of external existence which is different from our specific perceptions of them.

Well, I'm still stuck with Hume's "Skepticism with Regard to the Senses."

The thought experiment consists in looking at objects to attempt to get the idea of a continued existence of objects as well as trying to find the reasons for why we believe objects to exist in a manner distinct from our perceptions of them.

We can't. Yet we do assume both, quite strongly, yet we don't have good reasons for doing so. It's really hard. But fascinating notwithstanding the futility of such an exercise, it's an obsession.

It's pretty damn rough to read. It's one a the very few cases in which I recommend secondary literature before reading the book, there's plenty of it.

But even with this secondary literature, there's a whole lot that is just hard to follow, because he is just way too technical. But of course, it has come excellent ideas.

I have probably written here more than once, but, I like the question, so I will reply again.

The hard problem of consciousness seems to hard, because we have forgotten about the hard problem of motion, which we do not understand, but can study quite successfully.

And, then, I think if we clearly look at the situation, we have many hard problems, the problem of morality, the problem of will, the problem of identity, the problem meaning, the problem of mind, the problem of magnetism, the problem of first origins and on and on and on.

For whatever curios reason, consciousness is taken to be specifically more problematic than any of these. I don't see a reason to believe it.

My example was against your point that you would rather take a more supported and seeming option rather than a less supported and unlikely option. The OP was asking what your reasons to believe in the existence of the world are, while not perceiving it. — Corvus

But your example of the Earth being round has less immediately perceivable proofs, than the argument that the Earth is flat. The latter is much easier to believe, because the world feels that way. But once we introduce reason to the equation (of which only a part of it is in experience) then we can see much more and better evidence suggesting the Earth is round, of which of course we know have evidence beyond doubt.

Your question about how do we know if the Earth exists if we are not perceiving it is much less evident than the belief that the Earth exists absent us. It only appears more evident if you ignore the great amount of evidence that is not immediately available for conscious experience.

If fact, what you seem to be getting at goes way beyond Berkley or Kant or any other idealist. Very few of them say that the world does not exist if we are not perceiving it. They take it for granted.

What they question is the conceptions we should make about the world absent people, but never denying that the world exists, in some manner or other.

I'm sure there are exceptions, but they are very rare.

:chin:

Anything is possible.

:victory:

Wouldn't it be like saying that the earth looks more flat than round, so it must be flat. It looks like the Sun is rotating the earth, so the Sun is rotating around the earth?
This was what the ancient and the medieval people believed and supported, and anyone saying against it was punished by law too.

But it has been turned around by Copernicus and Galileo totally and incredibly. So what looks seemingly like the case, and supported by the majority is not always the truth. — Corvus

It's rather the opposite, funnily enough.

The world looks and feels flat, but there is much more evidence to support the claim that it is round, but most of the evidence we use to support this claim comes from experiments which go beyond immediate conscious perceptions.

So, your own example is an argument against your own OP.

Because it is more coherent and is better supported than the alternative of nothing existing absent us. There is more to evidence than continuous perception of a thing.

Heck, the world might not be continuous, but even claiming this stops way short of saying that nothing exists. Of the latter claim, we have virtually no evidence.

So, what's the plan? Starve everybody? Just had an acquaintance from Gaza confirm his cousins were killed yesterday, parents and children, just like that.

Hezbollah so far has not escalated, Iran said they weren't going to get involved for now. So, what gives? Biden not going to do anything? Just let them all die?

The survivors of one of the worst massacres in history will reply in kind to others? Great.

Are there any resources online that will show me a roadmap or book list? I just want to feel that my academic endeavors are productive and not just a vehicle to feed my intellectual ego. — T4YLOR

Depends on what aspect of philosophy is what interests you the most. If it's ethics you may want to start with an introduction to ethics book, such as the Very Short series, which are quite good.

If your issues are more of a metaphysical/epistemological nature, then I think Bryan Magee's books are excellent as an introduction.

If it's on faith - that I can't help you with.

It's always going to be hard to start, I had no clue what I was doing until things started "clicking", I suspect the same or something similar will happen to you, should you follow this interest.

As for difficulty understanding some authors, classical ones most of all, first time through just take in what you find interesting don't stress too much. It's in the subsequent reading that you can read more in depth, and then you'll get a better understanding.

Good luck.

Well, there is a verbal resemblance between idea and ideology, though I do not know if they have share a common root meaning.

What is stupid? Well, denying evidence, for one thing is a big deal, especially if the evidence is backed up by many studies.

Yet as you mention an otherwise smart person will do something stupid, and a stupid person can say smart things. But then it seems as if calling someone "smart" or "stupid" is relative to a subject matter or a specific act.

So, it may be inaccurate to say that a person is stupid at everything, or smart at everything.

I don't know if this is stupid per se, but, a related matter that irritates me is lack of curiosity about the world. There is so much to discover and its never been easier to find information, yet we see many people completely oblivious to most of it, focusing instead on shallow things.

Which in itself is not bad, sometimes we need a break from "serious stuff" to just relax. But if that's the whole extent of your involvement in the world, then I think you are missing out on one of the most important things of being a human being, which is to take pleasure in our capacity to think and engage with problems.

I think so too.

But we agree on the bigger points, so, all seems well for now. :)

We are beginning to speak about different things now. As you ask, yes, I think determinism is one thing, mechanical is another. My impression was that, by now most physicists (that I read, which admittedly are popular scientists) reject the view that the universe is a big machine (like a giant clock, for instance, or the example Timothy mentioned), but they call still be deterministic, and many are.

I was pointing out that this view, that the universe was not a machine, was reluctantly recognized by Newton, much previously than QM. Now, you can define a machine in a different way than the traditional conception if you want.

You are correct, there are some theories that may suggest a deterministic outcome, like Many Worlds or some remaining "hidden variables" theory. Maybe they're correct. Or maybe not, I can't say.

I don't see what big outcome in philosophy hinges on a deterministic universe. Like, if you have in mind free-will, I don't think the universe being one way or the other matters for this topic. But that's a subject for a different thread.

Apologies for the insertion.

I initially said that the mechanistic picture of the world was proven false by Newton, and I believe this is true, based on not only what Newton says, but also what Locke, Hume, Priestley, Russell and Chomsky say (among a few others).

I should've added for clarity's sake that it is this specific conception of materialism (as mechanistic) which was shown to be false, not the whole school of thought.

There are other kinds of materialism, presumably the kind you are finding in the Google articles. That materialism tends to be associated with the view that everything that exists is physical in the sense of what physics says there is. That's not mechanistic, our best theories of physics aren't mechanistic, they are probabilistic.

Newton's views are often misinterpreted, when this quote is given, they tend to say that Newton had trouble understanding gravity because it didn't make sense to him, but that the image he left was that of a mechanistic universe, but that's not what he says in that quote.

Of course, there are other materialisms which are defended, such as Galen Strawson's or Dennett's or even Sean Carroll's. These are very different in character.

Again, sorry for the misattribution. I am rather slow today...

The vast majority of physicists think the world is a machine? What? That's news to me.

Sure, he was superstitious, but on gravity he was quite serious and celebrated for it. I wonder what physicists we are reading that are coming to opposite conclusions.

That was Newton's interpretation of his own work as outlined in the Principia. Hume and Locke agreed that his conclusion was correct.

You can skim the essay I provided in that other thread, but the essay is long. It goes well beyond a mere opinion.

Well, there's a long thread that covers this topic, here:

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/12417/chomskys-mysteries-of-nature-how-deeply-hidden-reading-group/p1

Especially the essay in the OP.

It would take a long time to elaborate. The gist is that, contrary to popular claim, Newton proved materialism wrong when he discovered gravity. Materialism was understood to be mechanistic. Hence his famous quote:

'It is inconceivable that inanimate brute matter should, without the mediation of something else which is not material, operate upon and affect other matter without mutual contact, as it must be, if gravitation in the sense of Epicurus, be essential and inherent in it... [this] is to me so great an absurdity that I believe no man who has in philosophical matters [science] a competent faculty of thinking can ever fall into it."

(Bold added)

This is then expanded upon by Locke mostly, but also Hume and Priestley all the way up to Russell and Eddington.

But, there's a lot to it.

But we aren't mechanistic, this was proven to be false by Newton.

Often a lot of these debates in metaphysics are debates about terminology, as if saying the world is made of physical stuff or mental stuff is even clear or useful in any manner. Reductionism and eliminitavism may be rather different in the extreme view it tends to take, but I don't think it should be taken seriously.

QM can say some interesting things about the nature of the world, though one should be careful of extending the results of QM beyond its own field, which is (extremely) microscopic phenomena.

So far, most of the popular theories offer some quite wild speculations, like alternative universes or many worlds, or the argument that time may be emergent and hence not a fundamental part of the world. Maybe these theories are right, maybe they're wrong, I can't say.

But even if one of these is true, many of the problems of metaphysics remain as they were. Perhaps narrowing down what kind of metaphysics you are interested in, could help. Otherwise, the issue is too broad to tackle. Experience and physics though related in some manner, are perhaps too far apart to discuss fruitfully.

So, I am raising the question of the nature of metaphysics and perception and how may the nature of 'reality' be understood in the most helpful way? — Jack Cummins

In the most helpful way for what purposes? Is to gain a better intuition about what the world is made of? Then you should continue to read what physicists say about these things.

Is metaphysics about what physics says? Well, based on the meaning of the word, not entirely. One should at least be able to say, that whatever metaphysics you think is most persuasive, it should not go against what our best science predicts, or it is likely wrong.

This may be where the issues of what is metaphysics may come into play, in trying to understand the nature of ' reality'. I struggle with this area of thinking, but am not sure how many is my psychological issue or one of metaphysics. — Jack Cummins

In modern terms based on how the issue is talked about today, say "physicalism" or "realism" or whatever, there is indeed no sharp distinction between "metaphysics" and psychology, especially the more speculative side of it.

The issue here is that there is no agreed upon meaning of the term metaphysics, and I don't think such a non-contentious definition will ever arise.

I currently don't have a lot to say but, this quote is great:

There's the bit where you say it and the bit where you take it back. — Austin

I did not know this was the origin of that quote. Excellent. :up:

And yet, and yet, we have flat earthers. No pics from the edge? Interesting. :joke:

How could we possibly know if it's the beginning of the universe or some stage of a larger multiverse? We have no way of knowing, at least at the moment, maybe even in principle.

Massive props to you dude. That book, after it very rough first 240 pages, just goes nuts. Utterly crazy, fun and brilliant!

Defending the Holy Land: A Critical Analysis of Israel's Security and Foreign Policy
By Zeev Maoz

Yeah, I don't think functionalism is very coherent, it sounds somewhat contrived or forced, as if we are able to determine that nature "built" this organism "for" this exact thing. A single organ can have multiple functions, so which is the main one? That's a subject for debate.

On the other hand, I don't have a proposal to determine how to proceed, other than doing experiments and figuring out what things something does, and this is broad.

There is another option:

We are conscious, all causes are physical, and consciousness is an emergent property of complex biological systems.

The thing is, saying consciousness evolved by natural selection says almost nothing about it - everything else evolved by natural selection, ok, now what? We should attempt to give some account as to why it exists, what does it do and so on.

It doesn't influence behavior. — petrichor

This is something I don't understand. If you see something which you find morally reprehensible or if you are playing baseball or whatever, how doesn't consciousness play a role in how you react or how you hit the ball?

My view is that animals will probably see things differently because they are differently constituted and equipped. So, it would seem to follow that we and the other animals all see things as they naturally appear to the particular beings we are. Those appearances I would say are all "correct", all real functions of the "in-itself" nature of ourselves, other animals and the world. — Janus

In terms of "common sense", that is, how ordinary people view the world, it would seem somewhat striking to consider the idea that many likely radically different interpretations of the world are all correct. But as you say, no animal is wrong.

And yes, I also think that the nature of things-in-themselves plays this role for all experiencing creatures.

Ok.

You don't think the inevitable idea of degrees of accuracy logically terminates in the idea of perfect accuracy? To my way of thinking this would be similar to how the idea of infinity logically follows from there being no limit to counting, or the idea of degrees of darkness or cold terminates in the idea of absolute darkness or cold. — Janus

Not inevitably no, that's the thing, I don't see it as necessity following. You could add numbers for a long time, and not necessarily have the idea of infinity, because for all you know, numbers could come to an end. Infinity is an idea that goes "beyond" numbers alone, it's a different, though perhaps related concept.

Likewise, with improving something. But it's my current mood at the moment, I could be wrong. I'm not wedded to this view. Maybe it's because I've read Hume several times that I am being skeptical or maybe it's a passing phase...

It seems reasonable to think we do experience things in themselves if that is taken to mean that how things are in themselves (including ourselves of course) is determinative of what we experience. But it is a different thing to say that we could experience things as they are in themselves; the very idea stipulates that we cannot because the distinction is based on saying that whatever we can experience of things is things as they appear to us and the in itself is the dialectical counterpart of that. — Janus

No no, I mean, I agree with that completely. I'm talking about "ordinary people', if they don't dwell on this topic much or in depth, they would naturally assume that what we experience are things in themselves.

It would take a philosopher or maybe a scientist, to tell them this is not the case, and it would be easy to provide examples, such as what is the color of the object if there is no light or if say, you point out that a dog and a bear experience the world differently from us, who has the "correct view" of the world?

Then this will likely prompt the admission that there is something we are missing in our account of things.

And so on.

I mentioned building before. When building it is desirable to get everything as level plumb and square as possible, otherwise errors compound and horrible difficulties arise if one's initial setting out has been too far from perfect. So, accuracy is a practical necessity and once understood the idea of perfect accuracy, although unattainable, follows. — Janus

I'm a bit skeptical. I could imagine a case in which "good enough" would do the job, with no conception of perfection. I'm entertaining the idea that perfection is something transferred over from mathematics, but I admit I have to think about this in more depth. Outside of that, currently, I don't see why perfection must necessarily arise for us, though it does.

I would say that following empirical investigation, scientific observation, analysis and theory, show us what objects appear to give us. Once it is realized that we are dealing with things only as they appear the idea of things as they are in themselves logically, dialectically, follows, it seems to me. — Janus

There certainly is the idea of something hidden or beyond us in the history of human thought, call it the Veil of Maya or the Dao or The One - it's a common theme.

Yet many did think that the things we experienced were things in themselves, it follows naturally from common sense. It became a serious topic of enquiry in the 17th century.

Our investigations are always already carried out from within the cognitively given shared world, and they can be our only guide. — Janus

Absolutely, completely agree.

I agree that Locke's distinction between primary and secondary qualities is a valid one, as far as it goes; but it cannot get us beyond appearances. For me it seems that the most important thing for humans just is the world of appearances, it is the only real world for us. On the other hand I think the fcat that we conceive of the "in itself" has had huge consequences for the intellectual and imaginative life of humanity. So, the in itself may, as some say, "drop out of the conversation" but the fact that we can think the in itself as the idea of what we cannot think and can never know is a different matter. — Janus

It's the most fascinating topic of all for me. I wish some of the classics (and contemporaries) talked about it much more.

But what we do have may suffice, given how hard the topic is, and how little we can say about it.

I agree in the sense that we never perceive the whole of any object; so the idea of a whole object or entity, its identity, is "constructed" from various views or touches of things as well as the fact that we all perceive the same things. — Janus

Sure - this is ok with me.

As I said, it seems to me that the realization of imperfection or imperfect accuracy automatically entails the idea of perfect accuracy. — Janus

Ok, but why? Why not merely take in the object without having an idea of perfection? I can see the use of this in geometry - it allows for exact formulations and proofs and the like.

But what about everything else? I agree that having imperfection seems to entail having the idea of perfection, but outside of isolated cases, I don't see why this apparent fact of our constitution is this way.

Yes, I agree we contribute a conceptual element in order to see anything as something familiar. But I also think this must be constrained by the things we perceive as well as by our own natures. I think the same goes for animals too inasmuch as they are able to re-cognize familiar things. If this is right then it follows that there is more to "seeing as" than just acquisition of cultural conventions or symbolic language capability. — Janus

Yes, our own natures limit the range of things we can see, and this is necessary, for if had no limit in what we can perceive, we couldn't give it a scope which would result in no "picture" at all.

The problem here, out of many which can be pointed to, is to so much what we add to things, but more so what the objects give to us. It's very obscure. Although no longer tenable, Locke's distinction of primary secondary qualities is a useful heuristic.

But outside of solidity (concreteness), I have trouble isolating what else belongs to objects alone. I think they have "powers", as Locke says, to induce reactions in us. But there's a lot to work out in terms of details.

I tend to think the language of 'internal versus external' may not be helpful here. I would say both the objects and us (comparing and) contrasting objects pruduces the seeing of patterns. — Janus

It is, admittedly, a very difficult topic, as evidenced by the fact that when you read the classic Descartes through Kant, it's never entirely clear how they are making the distinction, there are some hints, but it's not easy to parse out.

Sure, the emphasis I am making is one of objects being, strictly speaking, a mental construction on the occasion of sense. Both are necessary in practice.

We do tend to see faces and bodily forms in natural patterns (especially when hallucinogens are involved) but I think the potential for interpreting such patterns in various ways is there in the objects as real configurations. — Janus

Well, I would agree to an extent if we are forming a science, I think in this case we can say that the patterns are "real", meaning, an aspect of the world.

But faces on a wooden wall or interpreting perfect geometry when such things don't exist, seem to me to be the way we view the world, being the creatures that we are.

But it's debatable.

As you say earlier classic geometric forms are rarely found in nature apart from the spherical dewdrops, the circular appearance of the moon, and the sun, hexagonal honeycombs, and so on. Some igneous rock forms are also quite geometric. And of course, then you have the advent of human land parceling and building. These natural and humanly produced phenomena, as you said, may appear perfect for all intents and purpose but on closer measuring and analysis reveal themselves to be imperfect. Once we have the concept of the imperfect its dialectical counterpart, the imperfect, naturally follows I would say. — Janus

Which to me raises the question, then why the heck do we have the idea of perfection in objects at all? It's quite curious.

So, I agree with you that the idea of "one" or "many" is not cause by seeing one thing or many, but rather by the perceived contrast between them, which I think comes down to pattern recognition. It is pattern recognition, differences and similarities, that conveys perceptual information to us. — Janus

That's plausible, though I would stress or emphasize that whatever pattern we perceive is internal, so the objects or us contrasting objects and things stimulates us to see a pattern.

As to the slave recognizing squares, I think the etymology word geometry shows that it is likely that people saw actual rectangles, squares and circles as laid out in fencing of land and architecture, and that the idea of perfect geometric forms is abstracted from that experience. — Janus

This may be putting too much emphasis on a small point, nevertheless I'd argue that what we see are quite often very distorted examples of triangles or circles in experience, but that we interpret them as being perfect. We notice that our interpretation is mistaken when we go and check the triangle looking thing and see that a line is curved or not connecting, etc.

It's somewhat akin to seeing a pattern on a wall or the floor, and seeing what looks like a face, when it's just certain points arranged in a certain manner.

I agree with you that there is a sense in which number and geometry "goes beyond" concrete particulars, but only insofar as it is abstracted from our perceptual experience of concrete particulars. In other words, I don't think there is any coherent sense in which number and geometry could be said to be completely transcendent of the phenomenal world. — Janus

This is the issue of Platonism in mathematics, a topic I can barely cover. Maybe you are correct. I do find it somewhat puzzling that we have an idea of a perfect triangle or perfect square, when we know we won't find it in experience.

But that may be a cognitive particularity of our species.

Ah well, then you are a man of good judgment. :cool:



Ah, therein lies the issue. Is it the case that we encounter them in this empirical manner? It's not clear to me.

Here is another problem, closely related, when you see an apple or a cow or any other ordinary object, does the idea of "one" naturally follow from that object?

I don't think it does. It could serve to instantiate the idea we have, but I don't see a causal connection between the object and any number, these are different things, as I see it.

For instance, look at Plato's Meno, Socrates tells the slave to reason about a square. The slave is able to conclude quite a substantial number of facts from something he does not find in experience, squares.

I think numbers are like that, yes, we have instantiations, but these serve only to illustrate the common thing we are trying to express: "two oranges are similar to two horses", etc. each example being an instantiation of something which goes beyond concrete particulars.

I'm not sure. Perhaps mathematics is different, we don't encounter numbers in experience.

Most other things, I think so. The commonsense idea is this picture in which have the outline of a man on one side of the paper, and then on the other side, you have a flower. Then you have an arrow pointing from the flower to the head of the man.

I think it's kind of the other way around, we have these faculties or parts in the mind/brain which must be activated in order to connect with the experience of any object. So it is an interplay, but most of it, comes from the side of the mind/brain, and senses are triggers of activation for the mind.

But that's how I see it, which may be somewhat peculiar.