To be fair, this could be all considered "representation". That is to say, perceptions, conceptions, and imaginations (abstractions) are all architecture. The things-in-themselves are only known through the "furniture" of this representational stage. The furniture needs the interaction though. One can never have pure abstraction without the things-in-themselves running through the stage and its furniture transforming the sense-data into representation.

And this is the aspect that is emphasized by Schopenhauer and how he differs perhaps. He emphasizes that you can never have an object without a subject and vice versa, lest you get caught in the "furniture" and not the objects that interact with it. — schopenhauer1

I think this is quite fair, in that we can do away with some of what Kant emphasizes in the simple number of categories he uses to render objects manifest: "unity", "apperception" and so on.

Granted, one picks and chooses, his idea of "intuition" is rather important, I think. I tend to prefer Hume on the imagination, as he gives a more robust account, though I would have to read Kant more in-depth to see how he articulates the topic.

And for sure, I think Schopenhauer's idea of us being subjects and objects is quite sensible and rational.

Yeah, I mean, I don't want to suggest that Kant's system fails or falls apart, it's very good.

Spacetime is indeed a form of synesthetic a priori judgments (which go beyond propositions as is the case with statements). But I don't see how a bunch of other things are considered synthetic and a priori too.

For instance, color.

It would be replied that color requires experience of an object, so it's not synthetic a-priori. But that's misleading, objects do not give us color, we add colors to objects via the innate apparatus we have, namely the eyes and the brain. The objects merely "open" or "awaken" our capacities.

Likewise, with spacetime, if we had no sense-data at all, how can we say these would still be synthetic-a-priori? We would need a world to apply this framework to, otherwise it's kind of useless.

Same with music and sound, and many other things.

As for causality, that is indeed a big problem. I was an ardent defender of Schopenhauer in almost all instances but reading Hume a few times makes me question Schopenhauer's confidence and Kant's "solution".

We can say, Kant (and Schopenhauer) argue how causality is an innate property of the mind as it deals with objects.

This does not guarantee that our notion of causality actually applies to external objects. We could be miss-attributing the moment of causality and in any case, the way we interpret causality may not be the way it works in the world.

There are even arguments that there is no causality in quantum mechanics, things just happen. I think this specific formulation is wrong, but it gets very murky very quickly. Note I amnot denying the existence of causality, but our application of it and our confidence in it on several occasions.

Yep! I am rather familiar with it, though I could perhaps use a brush-up or two. But it will be a while, since I've read him more than any other.

While I may disagree or be unsure of one point or another pertaining to his metaphysical system, I do believe something along those lines, is what is needed with Kant.

It's a bit hard to defend him exactly as he wrote his system over 200 years ago, we have updated science he did not have, which would've forced him to modify his form of sensible intuition, for instance.

Not to mention advances in linguistics which play an important role in our cognitive capacity. So, modifications of his system is in order. As would be the case with almost all the classics, obviously.

"Here we have a wide ocean before us, but we must contract our sails."

There might not NEED be real objects we represent, but are there in fact such objects? — Mww

I believe so, otherwise it seems to me we are stuck in Berkeleyan idealism. But in these topics we can't be certain. Maybe there aren't. Unlikely, but possible.

Thing is, though, under normal conditions, this perception enables this stimulated neural pathway, so….how to direct the external stimulation along the same pathway in order to generate the experience of the same object but without the perceptual conditioning event. — Mww

Exactly. As I understand it (which is Allais interpretation of Kant, whom I think has the best one) Kant is concerned with how we actually experience real objects in "ordinary" or manifest reality. If that's his concern, he is right to argue we need external stimulus, and you are also correct the brain does not care either way.

However, I think the Cartesian account of perception is correct, I have to find the quote from Allais the puts this issue very well, but essentially, the Cartesian account is concerned with how our brain constructs what we experience in principle, not in "ordinary life", in which we are concerned with the actual "real objects" we encounter on daily basis.

while it doesn’t prove that speculative system is not the case, it doesn’t disprove it either. All that can be said is the brain does all the real work, which nobody contested anyway, even without knowing how it does its work. — Mww

Again, completely agree, especially with the last sentence, which is no minor point.

Those dispositional states reside in us as a condition of our human intellect. Metaphysics doesn’t call them states, per se, but something consistent with the theory which suggests their necessity. Kant calls them pure intuitions with respect to the perception of objects, the categories with respect to understanding the perceptions, pure reason as “the One to Rule Them All”.

Scientifically, what would a dispositional state look like? How would we know it? — Mww

To quote Kant:

"This schematism of our understanding with regard to appearances and their mere form is a hidden art in the depths of the human soul, whose true operations we can divine from nature and lay unveiled before our eyes only with difficulty."

I'd perhaps add: not unveiled at all. Or if that's too strong: at least at the depths we would like.

The science for dispositional states is too far off, we don't really have an inkling how concepts arise nor how ideas work, other than some very weak "theories" pertaining to neuroscientific brain imaging or worse, the occasional evolutionary storytelling, which doesn't shed any light on this topic.

But if ideas don't exist in a dispositional matter, we could not explain how all of us experience the world in an extremely similar manner. We never see perfect triangles in the world, we see curved lines connecting, but interpret them as a triangle. Same with straight lines.

When we reach the level of trees or rivers, things are much more complex, but the mechanism must be similar.

So yes, it all comes from the brain interacting with the world, but we know so little of both, we cannot provide a scientific theory of how this works. Something like Kant's program is the best we can do, provide a detailed outline of some of the operations we can tease apart.

Sure. But what I had in mind is something like Schopenhauer's version or maybe even Mainlander, though I have to read him more closely to see if he does simplify Kant.



That's the thing, in principle I don't believe that there need be real objects which we represent.

It can be done by electrical stimulation of the brain, and we would see, for all practical purposes, the same object as if there were a "real empirical object".

Does this change synthetic a-priori knowledge? Maybe. It suggests that what we have are dispositional states which objects "awaken" or "make clear", when we have experience of them.

But the experience is accidental and not, strictly speaking, required for the idea to arise.

It's a technical term, which can be used in several ways. The issue is, is there a better way to think of what counts as "empirical"?

What prevents this word from applying to ideas?

You have baited me. :cool:

So knowledge a priori, because it is legislated by logic and can have no empirical content, must get its content from representations that do not arise from anything sensible, which leaves only understanding as its source, the representations of which are conceptions. Because there is no knowledge possible at all from a single conception, it follows necessarily that knowledge a priori is the conjunction of a manifold, or a plurality, of conceptions, the relations between them logically conditioned by the LNC. — Mww

As I've told you, I find Kant very good, but I think this level of technicality may be excessive, so I'd either change the vocabulary to something more intuitive, or I'd simplify his system a bit. I always remind myself that Kant was a Newtonian, hence his emphasis on Space and Time being forms of sensible intuition and not spacetime, worth keeping in mind.

Having said that, the potential Issue I see, is that it's not clear to me that a-priori knowledge need not have "emprical content". If we knew enough about the brain, we could simulate everything we experience with electro-chemical stimulation. What matters is what the organism reacts to (in terms of what "sets off" our mental mechanism, not behavior to be clear), not what there is in the world, in so far as we are dealing with philosophy of mind.

Then we might quibble and argue if electrical stimulation counts as "empirical content". Maybe, maybe not. The word empirical can often be restricted to publicly observable phenomena, things we can all see with our eyes.

But it need not be. Empirical content can be thoughts or ideas, so far as I can see.

It didn't occur to me at the time, since I know you tend to comment on Kant discussions. Had I known you don't visit this area much, I would have tagged you.

Good, detailed reply for the OP.

The traditional issue of mind being "non-physical" reckons back to antiquity and even early modern science, in which the concept of the soul was used somewhat interchangeably with the mind, indicating that we understood physical phenomena much better than we actually did (and still don't).

In modern talk, the domain of the mental is a very hard nut to crack, being that outside some narrow fields of insight, such as a bit from neuroscience, some from linguistics and a bit from psychology, we know so very little of it.

And it makes sense too, given that we are analyzing our most unique gift from nature: thought. So, it's not surprising.

And while being an atheist is perfectly fine (I suppose I am one too), not much is gained by attempting to argue that the mental is opposed to the physical is some obscure manner. Otherwise, we are repeating the mistakes of the 17th century. Saying the universe is mental or physical does not highlight much about it, in my opinion.

Agreed to a large extent. It seems to me this question hinges on two different, albeit related issues of what "touching" is, that roughly corresponds to Sellars' "manifest" vs. scientific image of man.

In ordinary life, we touch things all the time, keyboards, fruit, other hands, etc. There can be no doubt touching happens here: just peel an orange.

Things become significantly more complicated in the scientific image in which the forces of physics must be taken into account in considerable detail.

So yes, there are aspects of touch that are the bread and butter of physics, though they often don't directly play a role in our ordinary usage and thinking of our concept of touch.

As for brute emergence, I'm the odd one out and think it happens all the time. That's a different story though.

"We have the ideas of matter and thinking, but possibly shall never be able to know whether any mere material being thinks or no; it being impossible for us, by the contemplation of our own ideas, without revelation, to discover whether Omnipotency has not given to some systems of matter, fitly disposed, a power to perceive and think, or else joined and fixed to matter, so disposed, a thinking immaterial substance: it being, in respect of our notions, not much more remote from our comprehension to conceive that GOD can, if he pleases, superadd to matter a faculty of thinking, than that he should superadd to it another substance with a faculty of thinking; since we know not wherein thinking consists, nor to what sort of substances the Almighty has been pleased to give that power, which cannot be in any created being, but merely by the good pleasure and bounty of the Creator."

- John Locke

No comment from Mww. :scream:

What a travesty.

It's fair to point out criticisms of many philosophers regarding how they interpret Kant. Say Schopenhauer or Russell.

But Hegel is a special case, I'm not going as far as to say that he offers nothing, some people get content out of him.

Nevertheless, he had an interest in being as obscure and controversial as possible, for academic reasons and prestige. All this stems from Kant actually, but Kant had lots to say...

Quite. There is a misguided tendency to take physics way outside of its purview.

If getting cut by a knife or tickled by a father doesn't register anything, perhaps there is nerve damage.

:fire: :fire:

"Inside" and "outside" become obscure terms as applied to the universe. A bit like speaking of up or down or east and west. Not exactly, but similar.

It's an issue of trying to be sensible and not going too far with a concept that may not apply as is commonly used. Empirical data for entropy is established for certain systems. On a universal scale, the evidence provided leaves me hesitating as if to pay much attention when some claim that entropy explains everything.

So it's speculation, hopefully tied to some degree of common sense. But I could be totally wrong.

I don't see why "all of existence" should include or not include an open or closed system, I don't personally see empirical evidence to suggest either. The issue about using entropy too broadly remains in both, only that in one case it is wrong in principle, and in the other case, it should be applied with care. No more than that, as I see it.

With something as vast as the universe, the meaning of a "closed system" is obscure in a way that does not arise, say, in a heat engine, or other small you could even say "encased" systems.

It would seem to rule out a multiverse, of which we have no empirical evidence for or against. Plainly many universes would have to have an effect on the universe we have now.

I would be forced to guess that nothing could affect the universe, in principle, which goes beyond itself, such as whatever "space" or "domain" or, I know not what, the universe is expanding to - in this case nothing "outside" the universe prevents its expansion.

So, if this is the case, which again, may be true but is nebulous, then we use entropy in applicable cases. To argue it has an effect on every possible system, looks to me like a extremely strong extrapolation from the origins of the concept.

So when some physicists, like Sean Carroll (and many others), say that we can understand the evolution of the universe via the arrow of time and entropy, I think some important complexities are being left out. But that is just an impression.

What nags at me is the extrapolation from steam engines to the universe. That's a gargantuan leap. Then again, Newton discovered gravity observing apples falling. So there's that...

Sure! Anytime. :victory:

Where does it say the universe is like a black hole?

In any case, if the universe is open system, then we are being mislead by insisting on analyzing it in terms of entropy, so here I would suppose we'd agree.

If, however, it turns out to be a closed system, then understanding the universe through entropy is sensible, but even here, one should be somewhat careful as to not spread the concept of entropy through every phenomenon, rendering the term more-or-less meaningless.

I read two of his short books In the Miso Soup and Audition, both were quite good and strange, though perhaps Miso Soup was a bit better.

This one looks to be the best one yet of the short ones.

But frankly, they pale in comparison to his big books, especially his Coin Locker Babies, which is a real masterpiece of mayhem and craziness, crackling fun and imaginative.

His From the Fatherland with Love, was good, but a bit too long and too much about politics, so it can become quite a slog.

I don't know why he is not more popular, nor why they don't release his more of his long books (if he has more, which I'd think he should, but am certain.)

Overall, however, he is great and if you like weird and violent material, he is a must read. If you get squeamish about blood and the like, then it would be better to skip him.

Popular Hits of the Showa Era by Ryu Murikami

Just finished The Word is Murder by Anthony Horowitz. He's a real talent!

Sure entropy exists. What's not clear to me is how far it should be extended. It was originally used to describe the behavior of particles in heat engines it was stated that particles in closed systems can only go from "ordered" to "disordered" states. That's fine.

But does such an abstraction apply to the entire universe? Is the universe an open or closed system? What does it mean to say that the universe is closed?

Cosmologies that are based on the concept of entropy have to face these issues...

Sounds nice, but is problematic. If you don't know what you are looking for, it will "find" you eventually and is necessary in so far as you have questions that seek elucidation.

Even if you know what you are looking for, you may not know what about it is making you curious.

That’s kinda the whole can of worms, innit? We’re going to bother with establishing a category, calling it “truth”, demand a certainty from it….then only be somewhat confident in it? Nahhhh….I want my truth indisputable, at least at the time I determine it, and from the same system from whence it came. If your truth is better than mine, on the other hand, then I got a whole different set of problems. — Mww

I see a problem, because I think Sellar's distinction between the Manifest Image and the Scientific Image to be quite right, yet the truth of a theory in physics, say, general relativity, is quite different from truths given from testimony, say, a witness describing a crime.

I will grant that they must share (the notion or category of truth that is) a resemblance. If there are several witnesses describing the same event, we might very well get different descriptions, how do we determine which one to take a true?

General Relativity is, once established, considerably easier to verify.

So we likely have different cognitive faculties working in different domains of life, with one that overlaps on both of them, the notion of "truth".

Absolutely. We do it all the time without ever granting to ourselves the very power by which it is done. Apparently, we’re satisfied understanding no truth from empirical conditions is at all possible, thereby no truth at all is possible. Which is catastrophic in itself, for in such case, there is no legitimate reason to attribute moral agency to humanity in general. — Mww

Sure, quite a catastrophe, but thankfully we don't go that far (denying truth).

It's obscure to me honestly. Some echoes of hints here and there, but no genuine insight as to how it is done (attain truth), even if we manage to reach it, some of the time.

I fear replying you to you on occasions, your sophisticated way of expression could make it easy to misunderstand (or rather misstate) what you are saying, but, I will risk it.

Granted, what you point out I think is correct, we have to distinguish what is true, with truth as well as take into account what are the cognitive conditions such that we can establish such a category as "truth" and be somewhat confident it is correct.

What is all quite puzzling here, despite it being trivial as well, is that whatever truth is, is established by us, it's not as if we can measure "the world" with "the world" and say "Aha! Here it is, look at the world corresponding to itself."

Which brings out very complicated questions, why do we choose one specific theory over another one, when both can explain similar phenomena? Why are theories radically under-determined by the evidence, that is, why do we leave so much stuff out? We need to of course; we cannot explain everything in one theory.

But that we are able to establish truth (or an approximation) based on something within ourselves, is, as I said, very trivial (what's the coherent alternative?), but also flabbergasting...

As to the things in the environment they affect the body differently pre-cognitively it would seem such as, for example, one appears as a tree and another a waterfall. One I can move around, remove branches and leaves from, maybe use its bark, even cut it down and burn it, the other I can go under and be washed, or watch the sunlight sparkling on the water and feel the fine mist of water vapour on my skin and so on. So, it seems to me that thgere is no arbitrariness in the ways we come to differentiate the things in the environment, they all have real pre-cognitive affactes on the body, on the skin, on the nerves, it seems. — Janus

If someone adds a chemical solution to what we call a river, it hardens and if I paint yellow lines on it, it becomes a road - and can be used as such. The change is chemically trivial, yet our conception radically alters, notice that in this case, we wouldn't perceive this hardened thing to be discontinuous from the surrounding terrain.

And if you put a concrete wall in front of the waterfall, it becomes a dam of sorts.

These small changes raise questions about how we individuate. Where I cannot find a fault in this, is in mathematics, it seems necessary.

It's not arbitrary, you are correct, it's subtle and delicate. Small changes drastically change how we conceptualize items as being one or many (is a tree one thing, or many?, etc.)

Our understanding of the microphysical seems to show us that things are not merely as they appear. But then the micro-physical itself is another, sensorially augmented, appearance. It's truly a mystery. — Janus

100% agree. It makes no sense as to how these microphysical things could lead to anything really...

But you are hitting on a most interesting point, often overlooked. What you say about animals is indeed correct. It raises the same issue, the animal is doing the individuating (in so far are we are able to discern what they do), meaning, it's an internal mechanism of the creature. And I think this generalizes to all creatures, that have a minimum level of experience (above a slug, for instance).

To me, the mystery is as to what that diverse world is in itself; I don't even consider what to me seems the most implausible possibility that it is all a human production. — Janus

I just don't see an alternative, with the only exception, is to give cognition to the world, a kind of panpsychism.

No two things in the world are exactly the same. Individual things are perhaps never the same from one moment to the next, some more obviously different through time than others, of course. The hill near my house, covered with tall eucalypts looks the same from day to day, but if I cast my thoughts back a few years I remember the trees were much shorter (Flooded gums grow 3-4 meters a year). — Janus

This is another mystery to me, the lack of identical aspects to object in the world. This changes in the micro-physical world, but that's virtually alien to lived experience.

Interesting, we seem to have different starting conditions, but agree on similar conclusion.

It's something like that, I've yet to read the official English translation, which is allegedly coming out this year.

As I understand it's "as if" (and it's very important to keep this in mind) God killed himself, creating the universe and life being as it were, his remains, going on to eventual total extinction. Which is fine for his metaphysics.

But for our concerns about metaphysics here, I don't see a practical difference between non-being and non-being, in that, prior to us arising, we were part of the process that made up "God's corpse" as it were.

We weren't alive and are now alive by accident. And death will be the same, I think. He was more or less correct in describing something like the Big Bang, but what happens after, we do not know. Maybe it's the complete cessation of all activity, maybe we contract back again to another Big Bang, maybe there are more universes. We have no idea.

Funny that you mention Nietzsche, in some other places I go to, he so popular. Never really got his popularity, aside his good prose.

Yeah, he's quite dark. But I think his account, when read secularly is quite coherent. But the problem of how out of one many arise, remains, no matter who espouses it.

As to what happen in death, I don't think Mainlander's is any more coherent than Schopenhauer. Once one tries to say that death is a long sleep or terrible isolation or whatever, it becomes kind of empty talk, imo. It's just whatever metaphor you prefer to use.

Correct. And, incidentally, also Kant's flaw - which they could not have predicted.

I think modern physics shows that space and time exist external to us, while not denying that we have a particular way of interpreting and cognizing these aspects.

So I am not clear that time is not metaphysically real, some physicists see it as fundamental. Others as emergent.

But I do agree that the specific version of the will as expressed by Schopenhauer, while I think valid in some important respects, does break down when it comes to multiplicity. Perhaps Mainlander does a better job here.

"Here we have a wide ocean before us, but we must contract our sails." As Cudworth puts the matter.

You give good arguments on a most difficult topic: to account for one-ness in an ocean of multiplicity. I currently have no horse on either side, but I think the logic is a bit hard to beat:

What comes prior to something, must be simpler that the resultant. Likewise, these separate things we see in the universe, must have been more closely united then they are now and our best theory suggests something like this via the Big Bang Model.

The issue is if we can maintain that all is one, or if we are forced to say that there are several simple things, which cannot be further united, for whatever reason.

A most interesting topic, probably beyond our understanding. But you have a point, no doubt.

How do you know those fingers are yours??? :eyes: :naughty:

Sure, and even here, one could make the Cartesian argument that even mathematics could be deluding us, some demon making us think 2+2 is 4, maybe it’s something that else. Very unlikey, not impossible.

I mean, a good deal of epistemological questions do not affect our day to day life, we pursue them because we find some of them interesting. What makes a tree seperate from the ground a *fact* about the world? Or a chair different from a table? Is that a fact about the world or something that pertains to the way we conceive the world?

It seems to me that hard problems remain, no matter what we postualte, individuality being a hard topic, as is identity and grounding relations…

The example of Schopenhauer pointing out that Kant assumes plurality when he argues for the existence of "things-in-themselves", isn't an intuition. Individuation is something we do to nature, it's not something that is inherent in it. So, in this sense the "thing-in-itself" makes more sense than "things-in-themselves".

I mean, sure, if you ask for demonstration in the sense of empirical evidence like physics, that can't be given here. But this arises too with many issues such as free will or that each of us has conscious experience, etc. Demonstration can be an extremely high standard to meet in philosophy.

It's a bit like what Descartes said, I forget the exact quote, but the gist of it being some philosophers try to complicate things so much to hide or obscure the fact that they are saying either silly or trivial things. Or as Tallis cleverly pointed out in one of his books, the explanations they try to give are more difficult than the phenomena they are trying to explain.

And I think this applies to most "illusionists". It's just too obvious and when you deny things to this level, it's hard to proceed and get anywhere.



I do recall reading from you that you dislike Schopenhauer or aren't a fan. Now I can see your reasoning about it clearly. I think your reasoning is on the right track, though I very much disagree with calling Schopenhauer "stupid" - heck the fact that a good deal of the fathers of modern physics - Einstein, Schrodinger and Pauli all considered him a genius, cannot lead me to that conclusion.

But putting that aside, issues of taste are not a matter of convincing anyone, we have to attempt to look at the topic as clearly as possible. It could be that by thinking about this issue too "Kantian" or "Schopenhauerian" or even "Russellian", could be an impediment to try and clear up what we are talking about.

I agree, we have access only to representations. Even what physics tells us about the world are representations, the way we are able to discern what parts of extra mental world is made of. But we have a problem, if physics were the whole story, then we would have to posit representations "all the way down", it could be the case, but it would eventually lead to a kind of Berkeleyan idealism.

So we can say something about it, I think. Whatever the "thing in itself is", we can, more or less safely say that it is non-representational in nature, it grounds our representations, and it must be something extremely simple.

Then we can argue if it makes sense to speak of this concept as being plural or monist, or if it has in itself, any causal powers. I very much agree with you that we do not know if the world has causality as a built-in feature. Our minds appear to have such a built-in causal mechanism.

Here we enter difficult territory. So while agree with most of what you say, I depart a bit in thinking it is completely futile to attempt to give (at least) some negative characterizations of what the thing in itself could be, there are a few clues we can follow, though we will never reach certainty.

I think something like what you suggest is quite true. We have to purge ourselves of the idea of "dead and stupid matter". To be clear, such a view was entirely coherent and sensible (for the most part, some acute observer like Gassendi, Locke and Hume noticed something strange here), that's what matter looked like for those who studied it, with the technology and theories they had.

With what we know now, matter is not nearly as vulgar as we once thought. Nevertheless, we can't say it's dead exactly (that's a human category, after all - it's in biology too, but it's a bit unclear it seems to me), but we can't say it's alive either. It just is. Maybe it is a blind striving of some kind, a sort of impetus or tendency to just go on, and perhaps, complexify itself, to some degree.



That's a fantastic quote of his, and applies entirely to most (if not at all) of those who call themselves "illusionists", Frankish, Churchland, Rey and others.

But they wouldn't find this reasoning convincing because, they don't believe that in having consciousness, we know anything about it. Which just manifestly and clearly overlooks some utterly obvious and important factors, which have played a large part in the history of philosophy, including the nature of identity, continuity through time, the nature of testimony, discussions about the appearance of ideas and on and on.

But it seems some of the old problems remain, in slightly different terminology. Thankfully, it's not a very popular current, because of its obvious problems, not unlike panpsychism, which also has its issues and followers.

I find it funny that there's discussion about materialism in relation to Schopenhauer, for the very thing I quoted is quite relevant, I'll post it again:

"The tendency to gravity in the stone is precisely as inexplicable as is thinking in the human brain, and so on this score, we could also infer a spirit in the stone. Therefore to these disputants [between 'spiritualists' and 'materialists'] I would say: you think you know a dead matter, that is, one that is completely passive and devoid of properties, because you imagine you really understand everything that you are able to reduce to mechanical effect. But… you are unable to reduce them… If matter can fall to earth without you knowing why, so can it also think without you knowing why… If your dead and purely passive matter can as heaviness gravitate, or as electricity attract, repel, and emit spark, so too as brain pulp can it think."

He thought the materialists of his day and the subjective idealists (Berkeley, Fichte) were both wrong.

Today's view of materialism is outright incoherent if we take as benchmark Dennett or the Churchlands as main figures, it barely makes any sense. As for "subjective idealists", if there are any, don't arise much in discussion, maybe Kastrup gets a mention sometimes, but has his own issues.

Obviously any avenue of research you find interesting ought to be pursued, but it does no harm to be more-or-less clear of what you mean when you say "materialist", "idealist" and so on.

As for the thing in itself, whether Kant was right, or Schopenhauer or Cudworth or maybe even Plotinus is more "on the right track", we do not know. But, aside from Plotinus (who can be read in secular manner), this is no mysticism, it's just sensible, heck even John Lock agreed with it - though he called it "substance", still, extremely similar idea.

Now, the more we speculate on its nature in a positive sense - aside from brief comments - the more liable we are to make mistakes. Schopenhauer avoids this, mostly and provides interesting reasons, but as with anything on the edge of our understanding, not unlike quantum mechanics, a lot of woo can arise.

Sure - I was only commenting on that specific quote which Mww provided, if you add more context then that often changes things. Schopenhauer does frequently mention animals and was one of the first philosophers to call for empathy to animals and applauded the then very progressive laws passed in London offering animals some rights, so he does have an idea similar to that of the umwelt, though not in that term, obviously.



"Therefore to these disputants [between 'spiritualists' and 'materialists'] I would say: you think you know a dead matter, that is, one that is completely passive and devoid of properties, because you imagine you really understand everything that you are able to reduce to mechanical effect. But… you are unable to reduce them… If matter can fall to earth without you knowing why, so can it also think without you knowing why… If your dead and purely passive matter can as heaviness gravitate, or as electricity attract, repel, and emit spark, so too as brain pulp can it think."

He did not like materialism at all, but he wasn't of a fan of religious spiritualism, though he did very much enjoy The Upanishads and had a mystical side as expressed in his view of the arts, specifically music.

You might say that the idea of a short canal across forbidding mountains was the ding an sich (ideal referent) of the man-made watercourse we have today. Is the visionary concept of a future state merely a poetic metaphor, or also a causal force? — Gnomon

But the ding an sich is meant to be introduced, in a way, as a limiting notion, in a sense something which we cannot go behind or understand, it serves as a reasonable postulate indicating the limits of enquiry.

In Schopenhauer, the Will is not an idea, it is a concrete phenomena which pervades the whole universe.

Again, will as the closest approximation we have of the "thing in itself".

Willed actions, as felt phenomenologically, could be labeled representations, though they surely feel immediate in a way nothing else in the world does. So here it's tricky.

But I don't see a contradiction. In so far as we have to conceptualize the idea of the will in order to talk about it to others, we proceed to do so.

I agree, it need not follow and is false as can be appreciated just by merely looking at how other organisms interact with the world.

Unless he has in mind existence in a special sense of the word, that supposition is difficult to defend.