There's the 'one', which includes everything. And then there's an illusion which makes it seem as if there's a duality. Is the illusion part of the one?

Is the illusion part of the one?

I've read WWR, but its been a long time, 5 years maybe?

Not on most days.

I've never quite understood Schopenhauer on the One either though! Individual consciousnesses are unified (to some extent, I'd question that too) but all consciousnesses everywhere, unified in one? I don't really understand that.

For example, look at this cover; the simplicity, the choice of letter type (that is suitable for Scripture), and the marble background tells our subconscious that the content is transcendent, prophetical and abstract or sublime. The title is impressed on our mind very strongly, because it is all we get — DiegoT

All this cover evokes for me is 'default template.' Looks like the type of thing you get when you're trying to make a quick buck off of works in the public domain, and you don't have the money to spend on cover design.

That makes sense. It's the leap from universal 'dependence ' (and I agree with you there) to all-encompassing oneness that throws me. I can't quite get a grip on what 'oneness' means. It feels to me like an extrapolation of our mental capacity to take synoptic views of local situations - to apply that synopticizing to everything. But I can't figure ou how that would work.

I don't know all that much about neutral monism, I'll admit. But, from what I do know - and based on the quotes you've provided - it certainly strikes me as a step beyond either material or idealist monisms.

My stumbling block, here, is the difficulty I have understanding what it means for everything to be 'one' or 'unified.' I have difficulty understanding this concept except through visual metaphors (such as an all-encompassing sphere.)

I note you're either unable or unwilling to answer the question and so there is no way to progress the conversation.

I'm not trolling

Are you saying that, in you usage, 'being everything' and 'everything' can be substituted for one another? I assume that's what the equals sign means. If it isn't, what does it mean?

We've stalled again. I'll try one last time:

Are you saying that, in you usage, 'being everything' and 'everything' can be substituted for one another? I assume that's what the equals sign means. If it isn't, what does it mean?

Again:

Are you saying that, in you usage, 'being everything' and 'everything' can be substituted for one another? I assume that's what the equals sign means. If it isn't, what does it mean?

So is that a yes or no?

I'm trying to get you to clarify, to be as precise as possible, because what you're saying is not clear. The phrase 'being everything' is confusing and demands clarification. I can't agree or disagree with you if I don't know what you mean.

But alright. Are you saying that, in you usage, 'being everything' and 'everything' can be substituted for one another? I assume that's what the equals sign means. If it isn't, what does it mean?

Just to make sure I understand.

In your usage "being everything" means 'being a part of everything"?

You've explained what you mean by 'everything.' I'm asking what the phrase 'being everything' means. I ask that because you've used it multiple times in order to explain your point.

They're not differentiated in terms of being everything — TerrapinStation

'Everything' is, of course, a word I'm very familiar with. "being everything" is a phrase I've never heard, and it's very strange, and I don't understand what it means at all.

I'm not interested in pursuing any line of conversation until we work through the one you've stalled on.

What does "being everything" mean?

What does "being everything" mean?

We've stalled on 'being everything' - which you seem oddly reluctant to elaborate on. We have to get past that before we can move on. You've explained what you mean by 'everything.' What needs explaining, of course, is the very strange phrase 'being everything' which you've used multiple times.

I sincerely don't understand what you're saying. What does 'being everything' mean?

sorry for the curt response, it was late. I just think the individual/totality debate is orthogonal to what I'm attempting to talk about, tho parts of it criss-cross it.

@Terrapin Station

It sounds to me like what you're saying would boil down to treating existence as a property, which is a notoriously fraught idea. But the phrase 'being everything' is strange enough I may be misunderstanding.

What does 'being everything' mean?

I disagree.

Are they saying the world is constituted only by certain individuals, or are they saying that every thing is constituted in the same way as certain individuals?

I have this vague feeling that you can have univocity without, at least, the kind of monism I was talking about in the OP. Would def have to think more about it. I don't think @Terrapin Station is quite talking about what you are.

What does 'being everything' mean?

They're not differentiated in terms of being everything. — Terrapin Station

Are you trying to say that anything that exists has being? Everything that is, is?

I understand that you're trying to show that the card analogy works. I find the elaboration confusing though. To take one part:

But in this case, no differentiation is possible--anything we point to is part of "everything." Yet we can identify it all as part of everything. — Terrapin Station

What do you mean here? How do you point at something without differentiating it from other things?

What do you mean?

Two points to make I guess. First is that I invoked the 'not-all' Logic to diffuse the general question of monism asked in the OP, irrespective of the 'content' of that monism ('mind', 'matter', etc). I think you're cool with this. The second point bears on Zizek's more specific argument w/r/t materialism and the answer to this is that the fact that reality is not-all is the 'content' of Zizek's materialism: for Zizek, to be a materialist is to claim that reality is not-All ('ontologically incomplete', as he puts it sometimes as well), or in yet a third formulation, that there is no big Other.

This answer is 'Zizek specific' btw, insofar as his particular brand of materialism is premised on 'short-circuiting' both form and content. A different brand of materialist would probably have to answer your charge of 'ok but where the positive content?'; Zizek, because he simply identifies the not-All with reality as such, isn't compelled to do so in the same way. — StreetlightX

Yeahh. I guess all I'd say is here is what a million people before have said -which is - why is this 'materialist'?? I'd say it isn't, really, and its a kind of 'what are you gonna do about it?' rhetorical move.

I do think the 'non-all' approach is right, overall.

The noumenon is a limitative notion. — Snakes Alive

In terms of responding to the OP, this is the right answer.

I don't think so? I think it's more like they're carrying on two different seminars in two different parts of the house. I don't think they blend well in one room. Which isn't to say they can't be brought under one umbrella.

"The statement "material reality is all there is" can be negated in two ways, in the form of "material reality is not all there is" and "material reality is non-all:' The first negation (of a predicate) leads to standard metaphysics: material reality is not everything, there is another, higher, spiritual reality. As such, this negation is, in accordance with Lacan's formulae of sexuation, inherent to the positive statement "material reality is all there is": as its constitutive exception, it grounds its universality. If, however, we assert a non-predicate and say "material reality is non-all;' this merely asserts the non-All of reality without implying any exception - paradoxically, one should thus claim that the axiom of true materialism is not "material reality is all there is;' but a double one: (1) there is nothing which is not material reality, (2) material reality is non-All.'" (Less Than Nothing) — StreetlightX

I'm somewhat familiar with this idea, but I think you drew out very well how it applies here.

But still (and ofc, this is Zizek and not you, but -

I don't really see what it means. Like, ok, there's no secondary 'spiritual' realm. No positive ontological reality that mirrors a positive ontological physical reality. Two positive orders. Not that. But what does this way of saying 'not that' really mean, effectively, other than that you can be a materialist, without having to ever say firmly what that means? And with the permission to add whatever kludges you want without having to forfeit your 'materialist' mantle?

[a bit more provocatively. If you read much about Lacan, this historical guy, there's a lot about him doing really clearly abusive stuff, and his followers charitably interpreting these actions, building on his ideas. Jacked therapy prices, aborted meetings, hard put-downs, attacks on other prominent figures, consistent inconsistency etc etc. All happened, all were interpreted as intentional on Lacan's part.

To do a conceptual 'short-circuit.' Let's say you have one guy who says he'll try to do his best to make sure everything he does is in service of building a 'healthy relationship.' Everything I do is 'healthy relationship stuff.' Then you have another guy who says 'Well, I can't say that. But I can say that nothing I do isn't in service of building a healthy relationship.' Cool, so there's no way to identify what's healthy. But there is the infinite interpretive space available to you to rework what seemed unhealthy in order to say how it actually is healthy 'if you only understood him.'

Historically, that seems like exactly what happened with Lacan and his followers.

Metaphysically ----I'm not sure? It's a pleasing conceptual difference, the masculine exception and the feminine not-all, but I don't see how it works out when you apply it.

I know!

I'm trying to say that bringing that analysis to bear on Kant is confused, and confusing.

The fact that two different referents can have the same name doesn't matter to this model. It is only the fact that there is some essentialness that stays the same in all possible worlds after the referent is dubbed that particular name. — schopenhauer1

That's what I'm saying!

The water is actually water (that would be an analytic truth :smile: ). Your Richard Nixon named kid is actually Richard Nixon. In all possible worlds, the "water" (of the village) is rigidly fixed to whatever substance they named. The water that is H20 is also rigidly fixed to H20. They are different referents, but they are rigid designators none the less. In all possible worlds, there is some essential thing that water has that if you took it away it would not be water. It is just that there are two waters, just as there are two Richard Nixons. There are several interpretations of Kripke- once is causal essentialism I believe. That would mean, at some point there was a dubbing of Richard Nixon (the president guy) and Richard Nixon (some other Richard Nixon), and that name is fixed to that referent by this original baptism. I believe Banno has a broader interpretation whereby it is simply the fact that we use the name Richard Nixon in some historical fashion that it gets fixed on to a thing. — schopenhauer1

I get this, I swear! My example - the village- was designed (tho maybe poorly) to accommodate these very ideas. So I know my kid Richard Nixon (love you rick :heart: ) is really Richard Nixon, but he's not that Richard Nixon. The water, not in the original pond - the water that is just like water except for not being H20 - may very well be 'water' if the people call it that. But it's not the same 'water' as the water in the villagers pool. It has the same name, but its different. Same name, different identity.

[Thought my earlier post was lost so rewrote it, worse. disregard]

Yeah but one water's not actually water and my kid, who I happened to name Richard Nixon, isn't actually Richard Nixon, that other guy.

My sense is that Kripke isn't talking about a priori a posteriori synthetic analytic etc in the same as Kant. So the introduction of him here is a kind of confusion of genres.

One person (kant) is talking about the structure of cognition and reality. Another (kripke) is talking about how to use names and identity as best we can in order to meaningfully communicate. Both seem like good conversations, but different ones.