You are first asking if something is true. But true in this sense amounts to asking nothing more than if the thing is what it says it is, and I think this may be granted; i.e., that the judgment is a priori. Given that it is a priori, the question then becomes can the judgment be a priori and yet what it avers violate the law of non-contradiction?if some thing is true a priori, is it also necessary? — Banno
Yeah but one water's not actually water and my kid, who I happened to name Richard Nixon, isn't actually Richard Nixon. — csalisbury
My sense is that Kripke isn't talking about a priori a posteriori synthetic analytic etc in the same as Kant. So the introduction of him here is a kind of confusion of genres. — csalisbury
And what do you make of the case, in the Kripke text I quoted above, in which we ponder what it might have been like of gold were not yellow? — Banno
But one 'water' is water and the rest isn't. The same way I can name my kid 'Richard Nixon' but he still isn't actually Richard Nixon. — csalisbury
My impression is that Kant is talking about the structure of cognition and the form of reality. And that Kripke is talking about rules about identity - about the relations of things and names - that one must follow to do science and to have meaningful discussion.
It seems to me that to combine the two, without a big big qualifying and explanatory preface, is to mix genres and to generate confusion. — csalisbury
The water is actually water (that would be an analytic truth :smile: ). Your Richard Nixon named kid is actually Richard Nixon. In all possible worlds, the "water" (of the village) is rigidly fixed to whatever substance they named. The water that is H20 is also rigidly fixed to H20. They are different referents, but they are rigid designators none the less. In all possible worlds, there is some essential thing that water has that if you took it away it would not be water. It is just that there are two waters, just as there are two Richard Nixons. There are several interpretations of Kripke- once is causal essentialism I believe. That would mean, at some point there was a dubbing of Richard Nixon (the president guy) and Richard Nixon (some other Richard Nixon), and that name is fixed to that referent by this original baptism. I believe Banno has a broader interpretation whereby it is simply the fact that we use the name Richard Nixon in some historical fashion that it gets fixed on to a thing. — schopenhauer1
I get this, I swear! My example - the village- was designed (tho maybe poorly) to accommodate these very ideas. So I know my kid Richard Nixon is really Richard Nixon, but he's not that Richard Nixon. The water, not in the original pond - the water that is just like water except for not being H20 - may very well be 'water' if the people call it that. But it's not the same 'water' as the water in the villagers pool. It has the same name, but its different. Same name, different identity. — csalisbury
The fact that two different referents can have the same name doesn't matter to this model. It is only the fact that there is some essentialness that stays the same in all possible worlds after the referent is dubbed that particular name. — schopenhauer1
To say that something, as a consequence of something else, is necessarily so, is just to say that given the antecedent, the consequent necessarily follows - just logic 101. But does it imply existential necessity? I kinda think it does not. Logical, but not existential necessity. Which I suppose is to say that if the terms and conditions are instantiated, then it would be existentially necessary. Yes? No? — tim wood
In terms of responding to the OP, this is the right answer.The noumenon is a limitative notion. — Snakes Alive
As to how you might want to label the processes of the discovery that water is h2o, that's a different topic. — tim wood
H2O is water is a proposition. As such, if you know what water is, then, per Kant, the law of non-contradiction applies — tim wood
It's his ideas as laid out by him we should attend to — tim wood
It seems to me that Kant presupposes that there exists a world which, by virtue of its being independent of our experience, is unknowable, yet nevertheless is the cause of our experience. — DiegoT
When we place ourselves under a showerhead and turn the tap, it is not water we feel, but the sensation constructed by our mind to label this update on environmental interaction of our skin. We can not feel the actual element. — DiegoT
Kant uses certain scientific truths that can only be gained through our a priori psychological predisposition for space/time/causality (and other categories).
Reply — schopenhauer1
It comes from a priori synthetic categories of our psychology. — schopenhauer1
FYIIt's transcendent because it's something beyond pure reason — 3017amen
It is not uncommon to assert that Kantian dualism between the noumenal and the phenomenal rests precisely on the analytic/synthetic dichotomy. — Sentience
The supposition relates to how is synthetic a priori knowledge possible. I believe that is part of the 'bridge' you are speaking of...the bridge that transcends logic. — 3017amen
Seems to me to be two very separate domains of discourse. — Mww
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