Given this and given the ideal of Christian justice, and indeed the ideal of a requirement for a rebalancing of injustice inherent to most philosophies – consisting essentially in the concept that a meaningful resolution of such nihilism[...] — Robert Lockhart

This was an unexpected turn in the essay. How does the specter of nihilism slip in? Same as in Nietzsche I guess, as the dark side of inflated moral expectations about Cosmic Justice.

I don't have any such expectations of the cosmos, and I see no hints of nihilism in the thought that human animals are radically influenced by cultural contexts.

Given ideals, fail. Read more Beckett. Fail better.

given the ideals of Christian justice — Robert Lockhart

I am not sure what "Christian justice" is. What are you referencing? The Sermon on the Mount, the Roman legal code? Canon Law? The Napoleonic code? English common law? What?

The fact that in the Germany of the 1930’s – 1940’s, for example, the Nazi hierarchy found no difficulty in recruiting an army of enthusiastic volunteers to staff their death camps acts as evidence to indicate that every population must include numerous individuals who similarly would be prepared to engage in such nefarious activities were the opportunity to be provided, but who in practice, in the absence of such opportunity, die innocent by default.
Apart from the disturbing disclosure this period of German history permits then of how deceptively closely, beneath the calm sea of normal society, the potential for such chaos to be unleashed must always lie, there is also the reflection, that if the individuals comprising the Nazi hierarchy had themselves been born elsewhere, they similarly would have died innocent of their crimes, albeit by default. — Robert Lockhart

Over the last 3 years I've been reading about the history of the Nazis and WWII in the period 1922-1945. One of my conclusions is that "the sea of normal society" was neither calm nor normal. The German government and German business (industrial sector, particularly) began waging economic war soon after WWI ended. A variety of cartels (such as IG Farben) set out to dominate critical components of industrial production throughout the world. Using patent law, (sometimes) hidden cross-linked ownership of companies, (sometimes) secret agreements (such as that between Standard Oil and DuPont with IG Farben) restrictive trade rules, and so on, the German Cartels interfered with industrial development in France, the UK, the US, and numerous other countries.

At the same time the German government and the cartels were building the industry and materials needed for the next war. Germany had the time to import and stockpile all sorts of raw materials and semi-processed industrial materials it would need--and wouldn't be able to get--once the next war commenced.

The Nazi party also had almost a decade to engineer social changes so that people would cooperate with, or at least sit still and tolerate the horrors to come. The ruling class of Germany -- in place before WWI, willingly and knowingly carried out this program. The abomination of Nazi Germany didn't happen "to Germany"; the abomination was created by Germany.

Had the big names in German industry and politics been born someplace else, everything else being equal, they might have done the same thing to some other country.

“How many Cromwells lie here – Innocent of their Country’s blood?” — Robert Lockhart

Some of those Cromwells lying in their graves just didn't have the chance Oliver did. Given the chance...

It is pausible to suggest that a person should not be judged morally culpable if his/her actions were beyond their control,
Thomas Nagel quotes Kant:
http://philosophyfaculty.ucsd.edu/faculty/rarneson/Courses/NAGELMoralLuck.pdf

The good will is not good because of what it effects or accomplishes or because of its
adequacy to achieve some proposed end; it is good only because of its willing, i.e., it is
good of itself And, regarded for itself, it is to be esteemed incomparably higher than
anything which could be brought about by it in favor of any inclination or even of the sum
total of all inclinations. Even if it should happen that, by a particularly unfortunate fate or
by the niggardly provision of a step motherly nature, this will should be wholly lacking in
power to accomplish its purpose, and if even the greatest effort should not avail it to
achieve anything of its end, and if there remained only the good will (not as a mere wish
but as the summoning of all the means in our power), it would sparkle like a jewel in its
own right, as something that had its full worth in itself Usefulness or fruitlessness can
neither diminish nor augment this worth.

Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, first section, third paragraph

We tend to question whether or not one has control over their actions, and Kant seems to deny this has any bearing on the morality of the action, which he thinks it is only based on what one wills. Nagel defines moral luck as

Where a significant aspect of what someone does depends on factors beyond his control, yet we continue to treat him in that respect as an object of moral judgment, it can be called moral luck

So to your example only with twin Nazis, one brother stays in Germany goes through the full Nazi indoctrination and is responsible as you have outlined, the other moved to Argentina and led a quiet 'moral' life. Can the life of one of these brothers more culpable or meritorious then the other? and how can that determination be made? Can anyone ever be in full control of their actions. and if not, then how does this not entail nihilism.

If a drunk driver returns to home with no issue, is he/she any more moral than a drunk driver who hits a child on the way home.

We tend to judge morality baed the results of actions. So perhaps Gauguin wasn't morally bad, we can see all the beautiful work he created. Or maybe he was just lucky. Our judgement would be very different if his works were flops.

Nagel questions whether or not we should give up the idea of control.

- Interesting comments, info!

There is a concept - surely intrinsic to most human beings regarding any situation characterised by a manifest imbalance of moral equilibrium, as exemplified by the likes of the Holocaust say - that a correction of such imbalance as retrospective as possible is innately requisite. While the motivation on the part of the victims of injustice towards achieving a current correction of their situation is of course a simply pragmatic and understandable one, the desire that such correction be imposed retrospectively nonetheless clearly involves more complex urges, characterisable at the most primitive level as an animal instinct for revenge and, at a level more empathetic, as a need to disinform, for reasons of self-respect, the contempt of erstwhile persecutors. Transcending such subjective victim-motives however, the witnessing of moral dis-equilibrium, even from the view point of disinterested observers, seems to promote a feeling of discontent and a sense of nihilism towards the prospect, impelling among most such witnesses the urge to seek an emphatic restoration of equilibrium.

Concerning this, the point I intended to suggest in my initial post in this thread was that, in regard to the concept of a court of absolute universal justice which perforce would require to include in its’ deliberations all factors on which the behaviour of the accused was contingent, a verdict imposing retribution, whilst perhaps equating with the concept of the retrospective restoration of moral equilibrium required, nonetheless would effectively constitute an abnegation of duty on the part of such a court regarding the required consideration of the demonstrable roll of Chance in permitting the opportunity to commit the transgression concerned, and result in turn then in the dichotomy whereby this over-arching factor effectively becomes the ultimate determinant of an individual’s fate - preserving some by default and damming others.

Perhaps the best accommodation regarding these conflicting contingencies which such a putative ideal court could in principle achieve then would be the delivering of a verdict describing the degree of guilt requisite to an individual concerning his culpability for those crimes that were in practice wilfully committed but yet not involving the imposition of an external punishment, appropriate as this would be only in the case of an absolute unqualified responsibility which accordingly in practise cannot exist.

Perhaps again however such a situation could still equate with the idea of a degree of retribution being required concommitant with the transgressions committed, in the sense that there would nonetheless exist an inescapable penalty for the culprit concerned in terms of an innately inevitable inaccessibility towards happiness being formed in proportion to the moral degeneracy incumbent on the degree of transgression committed, this in turn then perhaps promoting a process of remorse and, ultimately by this means, one of moral redemption? So, Retribution as it is required being sort of accomplished, but not in the apparently more satisfactory form of a morally referenced judgment based external punishment but instead - ultimately and ironically - in a form comprised merely of logicaly descended, and therefore in principle amoral, consequences? Maybe however a reconciliation on the part of the victims of injustice, who are after all those most deserving of the equanimity capable of being conferred by reconciliation, could nonetheless be attained, somehow, through resigning themselves towards such a paradox!
(All necessarily somewhat abstract and speculative, of course. Though, in my defence, I did put it as straight-forwardly as the subject matter could allow...I think! )