I would say that's the case yes, I agree with Ramsey that logic is simply a mode of thought, not an objective fact about the world, and as such is prime to some subjective variation. — Isaac

Isn't that also a conclusion arrived at by using logic? I always get confused by these kinds of arguments.

But that's not what your claim is here. It's not simply that some things are right and others wrong and that we should strive to reject the wrong, leaving the viable options for what is right. I agree entirely with that claim. — Isaac

But if you agree with that claim, then you also agree that there is a way to figure out what is wrong, don't you?

I am not sure I buy the distinction you make between claims about the truth value and claims about the method. Why can I make one claim, but not the other? I can say that the flat earth theory is wrong because it's refuted by observation, but I can not say the zetetic method (something some flat earthers champion) is wrong because it arbitrarily singles out some observations as more relevant?

Both of these claims seem equally based on logic, it's just that the factual claim is mediated by the scientific method.

Isn't that also a conclusion arrived at by using logic? I always get confused by these kinds of arguments. — Echarmion

Well, it depends on how circumscribed your definition of 'logic' is. Ramsey likens logic to aesthetics, or ethics. A mode of thinking we find to be pragmatic. So, by that measure (a mode of thinking, among others) the observation that logic is such a thing is just empirical, and the resolution of empirical data need not be subsumed within the definition of 'logic'. I think the merit of this approach is that it avoids the potential circularity of defining logic by 'whatever mode distinguishes right from wrong answers', and then that any answer delivered by flawless logic is right on that basis.

But if you agree with that claim, then you also agree that there is a way to figure out what is wrong, don't you? — Echarmion

Not as I see it, no. That there are states of affairs which are objectively the case does not necessarily imply that there are means of determining them. I infer that there are states of affairs which are objectively the case because it seems to be a good explanation for the success of scientific prediction. Not being privy to the exact thought processes of those making these predictions, however, I'm less confident about assuming some homogeneous method accounts for their apparent success.

In fact, the access I do have to their thought processes through cognitive sciences seems to me to show quite the opposite. A heterogeneity of method.

I am not sure I buy the distinction you make between claims about the truth value and claims about the method. Why can I make one claim, but not the other? I can say that the flat earth theory is wrong because it's refuted by observation, but I can not say the zetetic method (something some flat earthers champion) is wrong because it arbitrarily singles out some observations as more relevant? — Echarmion

I think you're right, you can make both claims. In a sense, that's my point when I said...

Say you have a proposition, and you 'feel' it's wrong. Later you compare it to another (necessary) proposition and you 'feel' it leads to a contradiction. How is your first 'feeling' made objective by your second? You could be wrong in either case, in either case we might agree that there is a 'right' answer out there somewhere...

What is it about the status of feeling there's a contradiction that gives it this authority over any of your other feelings about the proposition in question? — Isaac

Basically, I'm disputing @Pfhorrest's notion that there is one method (feeling that there is a contradiction), rather than a suite of methods. I'm saying you can make both claims, but that it is not necessarily required that your first claim is justified by your second. There's no special status given to the feeling that two propositions are contradictory above the simple feeling that one proposition is wrong. 'Wrong' and 'contradictory' are just two attitudes we might have toward propositions.

Nobody here is saying that "knowledge is inherently flawed", we're saying that knowledge doesn't operate the way justificationists say it does, because if it did then the Munchhausen trilemma would in turn show that knowledge is impossible, which is exactly the kind of contradiction you're talking about. That contradiction is thus reason to reject the possibility of justificationism. — Pfhorrest

My point was that you were using justifications, or reasons, to show that justifications and reasons are not valid qualifiers for knowledge. If so, then your assertions are not necessarily knowledge. If they aren't knowledge, then they are either wrong or just scribbles on a screen. What you seem to be saying is that reasoning does not necessarily lead to knowledge. If not, then how do you know that you know anything?

Beliefs require justification to qualify as knowledge. How much justification some belief needs to qualify as knowledge can vary depending on the state of affairs being talked about which includes the origin or causes of said state if affairs. States of affairs created by humans (like Trump is the 45th president if the United States) seem to be easier to justify than facts not created by humans (the solar system was formed 4.5 billion years ago from a massive cloud of hydrogen gas). Presidents are arbitrary creations of our own mind and don't need justification beyond most people agreeing and using the words in that way. The latter doesn't depend on popularity as that would be a logical fallacy. It depends on the actual state if affairs being the case or not. Presidents are created by humans therfore knowing what presidents are is simply an act of you defining what they are at any moment. The solar systems formation is dependent upon facts not created by humans but facts that existed before humans and their knowledge of such facts. So there are some facts that we can know merely due to the fact that we created those facts.

Knowing that you believe something requires no more justification than you believing it.

If they aren't knowledge, then they are either wrong or just scribbles on a screen. — Harry Hindu

Well they are scribbles on a screen regardless but where did beliefs go? Knowledge or nonsense? Doesn't sound right.

Well, it depends on how circumscribed your definition of 'logic' is. Ramsey likens logic to aesthetics, or ethics. A mode of thinking we find to be pragmatic. So, by that measure (a mode of thinking, among others) the observation that logic is such a thing is just empirical, and the resolution of empirical data need not be subsumed within the definition of 'logic'. I think the merit of this approach is that it avoids the potential circularity of defining logic by 'whatever mode distinguishes right from wrong answers', and then that any answer delivered by flawless logic is right on that basis. — Isaac

I can see what you mean here. And that seems like a reasonable position to take with regard to specific, formalised logic systems, like predicate logic, modal logical or mathematics. But at the same time, it seems to me that there must be some basic wiring in the human brain (and, being basic, it would have to be universal to the species) which provides a basic problem-solving framework. Even if all "logic" in the strict sense is empirical, there must be some way to process empirical data in the first place.

Not as I see it, no. That there are states of affairs which are objectively the case does not necessarily imply that there are means of determining them. I infer that there are states of affairs which are objectively the case because it seems to be a good explanation for the success of scientific prediction. — Isaac

Aren't you pre-supposing a correspondence theory of truth here? You start your deliberation at states of affairs, when we could start it at mental phenomena instead. The idea that there might be something "objective" that our mental phenomena might correspond to, and that the success of prediction is a measure of "objectiveness" must be coming from somewhere. There is already some kind of method at work here.

Not being privy to the exact thought processes of those making these predictions, however, I'm less confident about assuming some homogeneous method accounts for their apparent success.

In fact, the access I do have to their thought processes through cognitive sciences seems to me to show quite the opposite. A heterogeneity of method. — Isaac

The cognitive science you refer to sounds interesting. Can you expand on it with reasonable effort?

Apart from that, isn't "success" the homogenous method we're looking for? It doesn't particularly seem to matter whether all the methods are heterogenous if we can then judge the results by a homogenous standard - their predictive success.

There's no special status given to the feeling that two propositions are contradictory above the simple feeling that one proposition is wrong. 'Wrong' and 'contradictory' are just two attitudes we might have toward propositions. — Isaac

Well it does feel to me that they're different. That saying something wrong is different from saying something incoherent. I can imagine wrong states of affairs - counterfactuals. But I cannot imagine contradictory ones. By the same token, I can organise a society according to wrong goals, and have those goals nevertheless be reached. That's not the case if the goals are contradictory.

Of course, this may just be because I have been taught to distinguish between two kinds of "wrongness".

Lot of talk to refute the reason's power to defeat the values found by using reason.

There are two kinds of truths: a priori and a posteriori. The first kind is true at any time, in any part of the world, because it does not depend on empirical observation. The second kind is the truth we find in such things that can be demonstrated to be false by experiment, by observation (if any).

Reason can't defeat a truth if it's an a priori truth. And reason is part of the a priori truth.

Reason can't defend the truth of an a posteriori truth. Only observation can defeat it, and nothing can defend it in an absolute sense.

================

There is a lot of hoolabaloo on the forums in this thread because people are too lazy to observe the nature of these kinds of truths, or they are lazy to state which of the two they are talking about.

I am not an exception from making this fault in my discourses.

"Munchausen Trilemma" is nothing more than a restatement of what was already known at the time of Aristotle. From Posterior Analytics, part 3:

The first school, assuming that there is no way of knowing other than by demonstration, maintain that an infinite regress is involved, ...
Our own doctrine is that not all knowledge is demonstrative: on the contrary, knowledge of the immediate premises is independent of demonstration....
The advocates of circular demonstration are not only faced with the difficulty we have just stated: in addition their theory reduces to the mere statement that if a thing exists, then it does exist-an easy way of proving anything. — Aristotle, 350 BCE

Just another sad case of analytic philosophers reinventing Greek Philosophy.

Correct; it is also known as Agrippa's trilemma.

Agrippina's trilemma: it seems to be a reasoning, which tackles the a posteriori knowledge with a priori tools, and shows its points that way. A brilliant trilemma.

it seems to me that there must be some basic wiring in the human brain (and, being basic, it would have to be universal to the species) which provides a basic problem-solving framework. — Echarmion

Yes, it seems that's basically true, although the further back in developmental term researchers are able to go the fewer assumptions we seem to have. So far the idea of cause and effect seems fixed, rules around containers and contained objects seem hard-wired and are probably essential to our visual system. Rules around object permanence, surprisingly, seem to be learned rather than innate, so I think the law of identity is of questionable origin, instinct-wise. Laws like non-contradiction are almost certainly learnt. Very young babies show no surprise at all at obvious contrary scenarios co-existing, Andras they do with something like an larger object seeming to fit in a smaller container.

I generally tend to think that some ways of processing sense data are hard-wired, but they're often not the ones we'd expect, and I don't think they cover all that much of even what we might call 'rational thinking'. The expectation of consistency in the world is the one 'rule'of rational thought I'd be tempted to say was hard-wired, but if a new piece of research later proved it not to be, I wouldn't be that surprised.

Aren't you pre-supposing a correspondence theory of truth here? — Echarmion

Not intentionally, no, and it's not clear from the rest of the paragraph what has lead you there, could you perhaps explain a bit further the link you're seeing here?

The cognitive science you refer to sounds interesting. Can you expand on it with reasonable effort? — Echarmion

Sure. A fair amount of work has been done trying to see what goes on when people are resolving the truth value of syllogisms "Socrates is mortal...etc". The findings are broadly that the regions of the brain involved in the resolution vary quite a bit. Not hugely, but enough to be interesting. Subject matter changes what regions are employed, for example. Syllogisms regarding unfamiliar objects are more likely to utilise the left cerebral cortex alone, Andras those involving familiar objects might be solved referring to the perirhinal cortex dealing with memories of the properties of objects.

http://www.yorku.ca/vgoel/reprints/Goel_cambridge2a.pdf is a really approachable read on all this, with a great discussion on the contribution of neuroscience to psychology at the beginning.

The point here is that if the method for solving a simple syllogism is this heavily context dependent, it seems vanishingly unlikely that we're all assessing theories and beliefs in anything like a consistent manner.

isn't "success" the homogenous method we're looking for? It doesn't particularly seem to matter whether all the methods are heterogenous if we can then judge the results by a homogenous standard - their predictive success. — Echarmion

Yeah, I can go along with that. It's very much the view of the Cambridge version of pragmatism at least (I don't know much about American pragmatism). That which works when we act as if it were the case is less wrong than anything which doesn't. But calling that a 'method' I think could only be justified with something like trial and error. With something like statistical analysis of empirical data, we might judge the outcome by it's success, but the method by which we derived the theory we're testing was not itself to 'test it's success'. It was to compare the statistical significance of a correlation against the probability fo it's occurring by chance. It's a specific heuristic which we've found delivers useful results in the past, so we reuse it.

Well it does feel to me that they're different. That saying something wrong is different from saying something incoherent. I can imagine wrong states of affairs - counterfactuals. But I cannot imagine contradictory ones. By the same token, I can organise a society according to wrong goals, and have those goals nevertheless be reached. That's not the case if the goals are contradictory. — Echarmion

I certainly would agree they're different. But does that difference lead to one being superior to the other in establishing which theories are wrong?

I certainly would agree they're different. But does that difference lead to one being superior to the other in establishing which theories are wrong? — Isaac

Well, saying something is wrong because it is inconsistent gets you in a lot less trouble than saying that something is wrong because it "feels wrong". So it's superior in that sense. And I don't think much trumps saying that things are wrong because they are inconsistent in terms of not getting you into trouble. So I would guess that's why pfhorrest uses it as the arbiter.

saying something is wrong because it is inconsistent gets you in a lot less trouble than saying that something is wrong because it "feels wrong". So it's superior in that sense. — khaled

Yes, I agree. We find it a more satisfying argument, for sure. But consider the case of something like "I can fit this car into this matchbox". You just can't. The plain and simple fact that you can't is actually more compelling than an argument that it is inconsistent with the laws of physics because one might not fully understand the laws of physics and so leave room for doubt. One can more clearly 'see' a car can't fit in a matchbox, than one can 'see' the contradiction with the laws of physics.

I would guess that's why pfhorrest uses it as the arbiter. — khaled

I would have less issue with it if he did, but it comes along with a long line of previous argument about the means by which 'wrong' ideas can be objectively identified as such, and it had little to do with what people find satisfyingly convincing. Were that the justification, I'd probably agree, with a few caveats.

There are two kinds of truths: a priori and a posteriori. The first kind is true at any time, in any part of the world, because it does not depend on empirical observation. The second kind is the truth we find in such things that can be demonstrated to be false by experiment, by observation (if any).

Reason can't defeat a truth if it's an a priori truth. And reason is part of the a priori truth.

Reason can't defend the truth of an a posteriori truth. Only observation can defeat it, and nothing can defend it in an absolute sense. — god must be atheist

Why do a priori truths not need justification (observation), but a posterior truths do? It seems to me that there is still an observation taking place or else how do you distinguish the a priori from a posterior truths? How do you know the difference between them to be able to make an objective assertion for what a priori and a posterior truths are not just yourself, but for others too? What are we to look for in distinguishing a priori from a posteriori truths?

Words are just scribbles and sounds, so a priori truths take the form if scribbles and sounds which are empirical forms.

To know that you know anything requires some sort of empirical justification, which can include use of sounds and scribbles.

I don't think so. There is still a justification required to believe in empirical evidence and that of the senses. You never really get around justification because otherwise you would never do anything. What justifies the belief in sensation after all? Science can't proceed without justifcationism, I mean that is essentially the function of evidence, it justifies our claims and beliefs.

If you want to rule out justification then you rule out everything else with it. There would be no reason to claim anything or use anything for support because you could never justify it's use.

Exactly. Reasoning is the act of providing reasons, or justifications, for your conclusion. How do you arrive at conclusions (knowledge) without reasons or justifications?

I think that philosophy tends to run away with language in that people say stuff that they believe is interesting and profound, but when you parse their statements it makes no sense whatsoever.

I just find it odd that they try to get around justification.

I will answer your interesting objection, HarryHindu, I'm not avoiding, it, it's just not convenient for me to think right now for a few days.

I just find it odd that they try to get around justification. — Darkneos

Think of it as similar to the coherentist branch of the trilemma. What you're basically looking for is a complete set of beliefs that doesn't contain contradictions within itself. But rather than saying "this is a coherent set of beliefs, therefore it is true", as the justificationist coherentist does, a critical rationalist only says "this is a coherent set of beliefs, therefore it remains possible". Both agree that you rule out possibilities by showing them incoherent, but the important difference is the differentiation between justified as in "epistemically permissible" and justified as in "epistemically obligatory".

Why do a priori truths not need justification (observation), but a posterior truths do? It seems to me that there is still an observation taking place or else how do you distinguish the a priori from a posterior truths? — Harry Hindu

A priori proofs or truths don't need justification by observation, but they do need a sentient being with powers of reason, which in our experience comes about with learning about the sensed world.

1. Peter is both Peter and not Peter.
2, Peter married Mary.

1 is obviously false. In any set of circumstances. No matter in what physical realms we place this sentence, it's always false. It cannot be but false. Granted, people need to know that Peter is a proper noun, and what the rules and syntax of grammar are, and how their semantics make up a meaning. That part depends on sentient learning, but once it's integrated into a sentient mind, the rest follows.

2 can only be known to be true if you actually gain factual knowledge about this. It is not true in all possible worlds. In communities where no man Peter alive ever married a female Mary it's not true.

You totally missed my point.

If a priori truths don't need justification, then what were you trying to show with visual scribbles on the screen?

Why do a priori truths not need justification (observation), but a posterior truths do? It seems to me that there is still an observation taking place or else how do you distinguish the a priori from a posterior truths? How do you know the difference between them to be able to make an objective assertion for what a priori and a posterior truths are not just yourself, but for others too? What are we to look for in distinguishing a priori from a posteriori truths?

Words are just scribbles and sounds, so a priori truths take the form if scribbles and sounds which are empirical forms.

To know that you know anything requires some sort of empirical justification, which can include use of sounds and scribbles. — Harry Hindu

This misrepresents what a priori and a posteriori mean. I don't need to look in my wallet to know that if I have £10 then I have at least £5, but I do need to look in my wallet to know if I have £10. "All husbands are married" is true by definition but "all men are married" isn't, and requires us to check each person to see if they are a man and if they are married to determine its truth.

That reading sentences requires observation is irrelevant to the distinction. You can just think the propositions if you like.

Edit

Actually, thinking about it again I can understand your point. Knowing that all husbands are married is knowing that "husband" means "married man", and knowing that "husband" means "married man" isn't a priori knowledge, and so therefore knowing that all husbands are married isn't a priori?

Perhaps the distinction is that a priori truths are truths that derive from the meaning of the words and a posteriori truths are truths that don't. After learning a language I can know that all husbands are married but I can't know that all men are married, and that is how the distinction is made.

After learning a language I can know that all husbands are married but I can't know that all men are married, and that is how the distinction is made. — Michael

It's worse than that even. Since there's no objective set of rules as to what words in a language 'really' mean, nor boundaries where one language ends and another starts (pidgin English for example), you don't even know that all husbands are married a priori after you've learnt a language. You know it in no less a way than you know the earth is round. All the while you continue to successfully use the terms synonymously, it's true. At any point in future, or within any given sub-set of language speaker, or within any new language game, it may cease to be the case.

Actually, thinking about it again I can understand your point. Knowing that all husbands are married is knowing that "husband" means "married man", and knowing that "husband" means "married man" isn't a priori knowledge, and so therefore knowing that all husbands are married isn't a priori? — Michael

Not only that, but it requires the existence of marriage and men - both of which are visual concepts. The statement is about men and marriage, without which the statement makes no sense. We are talking about things that we can observe and whose existence is the justification for such statements.

Perhaps the distinction is that a priori truths are truths that derive from the meaning of the words and a posteriori truths are truths that don't. After learning a language I can know that all husbands are married but I can't know that all men are married, and that is how the distinction is made. — Michael

It's more like just how we think, or the process of thinking, or categorizing. It seems that a priori truths are being conflated with the process of thinking and reasoning. Thinking is always about things. The process by which we categorize observable things is still dependent upon observed things. The same process can be applied to other things. Categorization isn't a truth. It's a way of processing information.

It's worse than that even. Since there's no objective set of rules as to what words in a language 'really' mean, nor boundaries where one language ends and another starts (pidgin English for example), you don't even know that all husbands are married a priori after you've learnt a language. You know it in no less a way than you know the earth is round. All the while you continue to successfully use the terms synonymously, it's true. At any point in future, or within any given sub-set of language speaker, or within any new language game, it may cease to be the case. — Isaac

It would always remain the case, even if humans became extinct and language disappeared from the universe, that husbands were once defined as married men by a particular human society. Or you could at least say that a particular society of humans at one time organized scribbles in this way: "Husbands are married men".

If a priori truths don't need justification, then what were you trying to show with visual scribbles on the screen? — Harry Hindu

you are absolutely right. I don't see any point in your objection. If you insist on equating conceptual thought to dots and scribbles, and you deny that meaning transcends physical signs that convey it, then I especially see no point in your objection.

you are absolutely right. I don't see any point in your objection. If you insist on equating conceptual thought to dots and scribbles, and you deny that meaning transcends physical signs that convey it, then I especially see no point in your objection. — god must be atheist

How else do you justify that you engage in conceptual thought if not by using scribbles and sounds? Michael was on the right track by equating it to language (symbol-use). The scribbles point to observable things and events (men and weddings). Categorization is a type of information processing and is based upon goal-oriented behavior. To say that the category is true is to conflate truth with an arbitrary rule/goal by which information is processed.

How else do you justify that you engage in conceptual thought if not by using scribbles and sounds? — Harry Hindu

That's just it, HarryHindu. You equate the two: conceptual thought and dots a scribbles. That is, if I may make this observation, your mistake in your reasoning. Whereas here you clearly stated "... by using scribbles and sounds".

I don't suppose you see my point, or that you ever will. Using something. Do I make that something into the thing that I am using it to create it?

A few examples: Pyramids, highways, railroads and buildings: People were used to build them. Are railroads (the actual rails) people, money, design or execution? No, they are railroads. Yet according to you, how you use dots and scribbles, the dots and scribbles are the concept themselves. Well, no. You are making a huge mistake by being unable to separate the two.

I am getting angry. This is by no way to affect you, as I believe and hope that I have kept my tone civil. But I can't hold back much longer. Please forgive me, but I must terminate my debate with you, on extended doctor's orders. This is a reflection on you, and on my condition. Please forgive me, but this is it for this topic. I ran out of patience.

That's just it, HarryHindu. You equate the two: conceptual thought and dots a scribbles. That is, if I may make this observation, your mistake in your reasoning. Whereas here you clearly stated "... by using scribbles and sounds".

I don't suppose you see my point, or that you ever will. Using something. Do I make that something into the thing that I am using it to create it?

A few examples: Pyramids, highways, railroads and buildings: People were used to build them. Are railroads (the actual rails) people, money, design or execution? No, they are railroads. Yet according to you, how you use dots and scribbles, the dots and scribbles are the concept themselves. Well, no. You are making a huge mistake by being unable to separate the two.

I am getting angry. This is by no way to affect you, as I believe and hope that I have kept my tone civil. But I can't hold back much longer. Please forgive me, but I must terminate my debate with you, on extended doctor's orders. This is a reflection on you, and on my condition. Please forgive me, but this is it for this topic. I ran out of patience. — god must be atheist

I don't understand the turn in your emotional state regarding this topic. There really is nothing to get emotional about. You've actually moved the ball forward with your examples. Thanks.

To use your example of say the Pyramids, yes, it took people and their tools and the actual materials to make the Pyramids. This is equivalent to you using pen and paper, or a computer with a keyboard, to create scribbles on the paper or the computer screen. The scribbles are the finished product, or result of people and their tools. The scribbles are a representation of the conceptual thought, just as the pyramids are a representation of concept that created them (a visual of large pyramids).

My point is that while the physical pyramids are not the same as the conceptual pyramids, they both appear in the same way - as a visual of a shape of a pyramid constructed by stones that is used to house the corpses of pharoahs. What I'm saying is that you use the same visual of scribbles in your head that you then use to create those on paper with a pen. When thinking, "All husbands are married men." all you are thinking of are sounds and scribbles in your head, just as when thinking about pyramids before contructing them, you are thinking of the visual of a pyramid. To say that one is thinking of a pyramid, one could be thinking of the Pyramids in Egypt, or some other pyramid - even one that only exists in their head, but they all have the shape of a pyramid in their mind because that is what thinking of a pyramid entails.

I asked how do you know the difference between a priori and a posteriori knowledge. The same can be asked about how do you know that you're thinking of a pyramid or a cube? They appear different visually - no matter if the pyramid and cube is in your head or out in the world. The same can be said about a priori and a posteriori knowledge. They appear differently in the mind or on a computer screen as a pattern of scribbles/sounds. Given that most of us talk to ourselves in our mind and not write to ourselves in our minds, a priori knowledge often takes the form of sounds in your head or sounds spoken from your mouth.

If you want to say that those scribbles and sounds point to real things in the world, then that is simply more of what I've been saying - that what those scribbles point to is the justification of that knowledge.

What is necessary for all husbands to be married men? Men and marriage? Language? What? Wouldn't those things be the justification for "All husbands are married men"?

so we can argue about stuff

What Is The Münchhausen Trilemma?
NOVEMBER 16, 2018 BY IDEASINHAT
WHAT IS THE MÜNCHHAUSEN TRILEMMA?
The Münchhausen trilemma is a problem in the branch of philosophy known as epistemology; the Münchhausen trilemma, also known as Agrippa’s trilemma, reveals that any theory of knowledge cannot be certain and that all beliefs are unjustified.

In other words, justified beliefs, which are beliefs founded on reason and logic, cannot be obtained, as the Münchhausen trilemma demonstrates the impossibility of justified premises.

There have been numerous attempts to establish justified beliefs, but none have been satisfactory thus far. And so, the Münchhausen trilemma thought experiment is still a problem for any theory of knowledge — IDEASINHAT

That is about like saying we can not catch a fish because it does not stay in the same place.

May I offer the concept of democracy? It is rule by reason and we come to that reason by arguing until we have the best reasoning. This process does not stop but is ongoing. At any time, anyone can argue the established reasoning is not the best reasoning and then trying to persuade everyone of better reasoning. That is why we have a governing body all the time, instead of establishing what will be, and then simply enforced the status quo.

I will argue at a given moment in time, agreement on the best reasoning is justified. It just isn't unchanging like a holy book.