Inasmuch as teleological means concerned with ends at all, but not necessarily to the exclusion of all other concerns, sure. — Pfhorrest

But what is considered the "end result"? If some act causes suffering at the time, but the eventual outcome is the furtherment of happiness, teleologically speaking, do we consider this act to have negative ethical component as a hypothetical act, if noone is to ever find out, or do we see the "end result" in entirely positive light?

Edit: I am suggesting that there will be no negative effects for society in the form of change in attitudes, culture of violence, etc. No implicit effects not recognized at the time. For example, the person who commited the act kept it a secret or killed themselves or something like it.

If some act causes suffering at the time, but the eventual outcome is the furtherment of happiness, teleologically speaking, do we consider this act to have negative ethical component — simeonz

I do. That doesn't necessarily mean that the person who did it is blameworthy per se, but it certainly would have been better if the good ends could have been reached without causing suffering along the way.

I think an important aspect of just means, in distinction to good ends, is making sure that people only get to make decisions to endure some suffering for a later good in the right contexts and circumstances, which basically means (on my full account) that they get to make such decisions about themselves but not about others. Alice can't decide that a little suffering for Bob now is worth it for the much greater pleasure that Charles will get later. Whether Bob's suffering is worth it is up to Bob to decide.

What I mean to say is, how much of the past is ignored to achieve a good end result? If a person dies happy as a result of their life choices, but they have been unhappy most of their life, is this a good result from the teleological standpoint, or is it a failure? Or is the argument supposed to apply to infinite timelines and sustained results, which individuals cannot afford (offspring not considered)?

Alice can't decide that a little suffering for Bob now is worth it for the much greater pleasure that Charles will get later. Whether Bob's suffering is worth it is up to Bob to decide. — Pfhorrest

Well, this is about blame and the extent to which utilitarianism applies, I think. I meant to ask, as per my last post, whether on collective or individual level, the end result implies disregard for the past, if it has no future consequences, or does the happiness tomorrow make no difference to the suffering today.

I'm sure it's already been touched on in the replies, and I'm far too lazy to check, but utilitarianism is arbitrary, but not for the reasons you point out. The obvious reply to this sensical objection is to qualify that it is the foreseeable consequences which matter. Of course, we cannot predict every foreseeable effect an action might have. It is too impractical.

We only need to concern ourselves with the reasonably foreseeable consequences. For example, if Billy going into the woods with a lighter on leads, somehow to the end of world hunger, we can safely disqualify this as a predictable consequence. However, if Billy starts a ravaging fire that displaces several animals and kills many more, well, that is slightly more predictable. It is a bit ironic that you should charge consequentialism as being unpredictable and arbitrary, though.

Think for a moment of how utterly awful we are at ascertaining or predicting our true intentions. Think about how many things are deeply layered in our subconscious.

There is also this point to make. Intentionalism does not matter when one can claim ignorance to reasonably predictable consequences. For example, let's say that it was not Billy's direct intention to kill and displace all those animals that day. Even if this is true, one might rightly say that it must have been clear to Billy that there was at least some chance the whole forest could burn, and Billy was ok with this chance. It is obviously unwise to sanction an ethical theory that does not make individuals responsible for predictable results.