it's the people in the middle group who feed into the second-to-last, and treating them like enemies only makes them more likely to shy away from our side and get suckered in with our enemies — Pfhorrest

Do you have any evidence if this?

The problem is that, as you point out, people in the last group think they're in the first, and treating an idea as a valid contribution to the 'marketplace of ideas' makes it seem more 'good', by inclusion at the big table than it might otherwise be.

So, what is it that prevents people in the third group from being facilitated in joining the last group by being convinced that the last group's ideas are just as valid and likely to be right as the first group's? Afterall "if there wasn't a chance they're right, why would we even be considering them".

And don't say "by rational argument", because the very existence of these groups is evidence that people adopt and maintain ideas for reasons other than rational arguments. It would be a perfomative contradiction to argue that we could use rational argument to resolve a situation brought about by a failure of rational argument.

I think it's useful to differentiate between at least these five different shades of ideological (dis)agreement, and treat each kind of person differently in conversation:

- People who solidly hold correct opinions for good reasons

- People who just socially identify with the side of those correct opinions

- People who don't have strong opinions one way or the other and just try to give all ideas a fair shake

- People who have been duped or manipulated into thinking that bad causes are good causes

- People who honestly and devoutly have genuinely bad intentions — Pfhorrest

This seems like a bit of a biased categorization, because I think the basic disagreement is one of methodology. One group doesn't think the way to arrive at 'correct opinions' is through reason, or at least reason alone, but via tradition predominately. In making distinctions this way you are already favoring one method above another, and misrepresent people who favor the other method by looking at it solely the perspective of your preferred method.

What I think could help, is trying to understand why people come to different opinions, and see if there is enough of a common methodology and basic values that I think are necessary to make it even possible to continue discussing these things rationally. If not, there's little point to it, and the best thing to do might be to just agree to disagree.

I'm actually just starting a detailed analysis of the way that social membership steers political and ideological domination through an ongoing process that evolves from simple consensus to monopoly with dissenters (the dominant ideology becomes ossified and less able to accommodate new facts) to competing ideologies and the eventual concentration of these new ideologies into dominant 'polarized pairs', liberal-conservative, idealist-positivists, etc.. All centered on Mannheim's sociology of knowledge, but hopefully extending it in a kind of dialectical circularity to present-day application.

Key is to recognize that people hold ideas from a standpoint of a complete worldview that is primarily action-oriented.

treating an idea as a valid contribution to the 'marketplace of ideas' makes it seem more 'good', by inclusion at the big table than it might otherwise be.

So, what is it that prevents people in the third group from being facilitated in joining the last group by being convinced that the last group's ideas are just as valid and likely to be right as the first group's? — Isaac

I don't mean to suggest that we should treat the truly ridiculous ideas of the "other side" as legitimate like that, but only that we shouldn't treat the people as enemies merely for not having made up their minds about them, because that then frames us and the undecided as enemies, as so inclines them to whatever side is opposite ours. We should be clear in our view that those ideas are not worth consideration, but we should convey that in a way that's more like warning a stranger away from a path they may not have seen the dangers of, and less like attacking an enemy for daring to even consider going down that path.

I don't mean to suggest that we should treat the truly ridiculous ideas of the "other side" as legitimate like that, but only that we shouldn't treat the people as enemies merely for not having made up their minds about them, because that then frames us and the undecided as enemies, as so inclines them to whatever side is opposite ours. We should be clear in our view that those ideas are not worth consideration, but we should convey that in a way that's more like warning a stranger away from a path they may not have seen the dangers of, and less like attacking an enemy for daring to even consider going down that path. — Pfhorrest

I see. I didn't get that from my first reading, but it makes more sense now. I think distinguishing the forth from the fifth group will be difficult, and so ensuring we present a sufficiently resilient front against the fifth might be compromised by a less antagonistic treatment of the fourth. In theory I agree, but in practice I think it might only apply to a few cases where one is sure one's interlocutor is in the fourth group and not the fifth, otherwise one had better be sure they know that they are made one's enemy by holding such ideas.

I'm actually just starting a detailed analysis of the way that social membership steers political and ideological domination through an ongoing process ... All centered on Mannheim's sociology of knowledge — Pantagruel

Why on earth would you centre such an analysis on a book that's 70 years out of date. Do you really have such a poor opinion of modern sociology that you think nothing of note has been advanced since then?

In theory I agree, but in practice I think it might only apply to a few cases where one is sure one's interlocutor is in the fourth group and not the fifth, otherwise one had better be sure they know that they are made one's enemy by holding such ideas. — Isaac

I agree here too. I was thinking specifically of cases where one knows the person in question and has seen them fall in with bad views in real time. I think of my parents in this category; I know from a lifetime of experience they are well-intentioned and loving (albeit severely flawed) people at heart, but they've also both been suckered in by whatever they're reading on the internet into believing stuff on the edges of Qanon territory. The person in the conversation elsewhere that inspired this thread was talking about a friend of his who he can now barely speak to because that friend has been suckered into Qanon too. These are people who weren't going around their whole lives throwing around the N-word and Nazi salutes or the like, but otherwise good people who somehow fell for some bad rhetoric.

I suspect that it's only the people who do know such people well enough to tell that they're in group 4 rather than 5 who have any chance of reaching them anyway, so it seems fine that the only people for whom the distinction can be made are also them, the only ones in a position to act on that distinction.

Why on earth would you centre such an analysis on a book that's 70 years out of date. Do you really have such a poor opinion of modern sociology that you think nothing of note has been advanced since then? — Isaac

Why read Plato? Philosophies can only present certain things within the limitations of the social and ideational context in which they developed. Within new contexts, new meanings can arise. That is also in that out of date book and a common theme to studies in historicism.

If you really don't believe that great historical works contain elements of current merit and value, then you're probably not in the right place....

I was thinking specifically of cases where one knows the person in question and has seen them fall in with bad views in real time. I think of my parents in this category; I know from a lifetime of experience they are well-intentioned and loving (albeit severely flawed) people at heart, but they've also both been suckered in by whatever they're reading on the internet into believing stuff on the edges of Qanon territory. — Pfhorrest

It's not an unfamiliar phenomenon unfortunately. I don't know anyone personally, but have been made aware of people who used to be within my social group starting to adopt Trumpian style rhetoric. All from the far left, curiously. All citing political correctness around transgender issues as their tipping point. Don't quite know what to make of it, but I hear it a lot, just anecdotally.

a detailed analysis of the way that social membership steers political and ideological domination... — Pantagruel

...is not a philosophical investigation, it's an empirical one. Social membership is an empirical property and the effect it has is an empirical observation.

You might have a philosophical approach to the way in which you want to frame that data, but to do so, you need the data itself. A lot of Mannheim's ideas have been corroborated, it's not that he's wrong, just that ideas about empirical matters should be checked against up to date data where possible, not discussed from the armchair as if we could work out what is the case just by thinking hard.

If you really don't believe that great historical works contain elements of current merit and value, then you're probably not in the right place — Pantagruel

I didn't say anything about it lacking either merit or value. What I claimed it lacked was contemporaneity. I'm asking why you'd want to base an analysis on a book which has that particular flaw, regardless of its other potential merit, which I'm sure any modern sociology text could equally lay claim to.

Way I see it, there is only the first 3 groups. No one would ever identify as someone from group 4 or 5. Group 4 is group 2 that you don't agree with. And group 5 is group 1 that you don't agree with. Sounds to me like a spectrum of how seriously you take your ideas, with 1/5 (arguably, 2/4) being the most and 3 being the least.

I don't mean to suggest that we should treat the truly ridiculous ideas of the "other side" as legitimate like that, but only that we shouldn't treat the people as enemies merely for not having made up their minds about them, because that then frames us and the undecided as enemies, as so inclines them to whatever side is opposite ours. We should be clear in our view that those ideas are not worth consideration, but we should convey that in a way that's more like warning a stranger away from a path they may not have seen the dangers of, and less like attacking an enemy for daring to even consider going down that path. — Pfhorrest

The middle group, AKA the "fence sitters". A decidedly derogatory term. These people are a liability because they are undecided, so it's no wonder they get considered enemies.

We should be clear in our view that those ideas are not worth consideration, but we should convey that in a way that's more like warning a stranger away from a path they may not have seen the dangers of, and less like attacking an enemy for daring to even consider going down that path.

We, we, we. There's that us vs. them rhetoric.

Do you personally know what it's like to be that "fence sitter"? I do. Your style so far is not inviting me to get closer to your side.

People who solidly hold correct opinions for good reasons — Pfhorrest

Wtf is a "correct opinion"? Politics has obviously driven some our members insane.

Putting people.that you don't know into groups. Sounds like a bigot to me.

...is not a philosophical investigation, it's an empirical one. Social membership is an empirical property and the effect it has is an empirical observation. — Isaac

Empiricism is a philosophical position. Maybe that's the advantage of reading seventy year old books. You pick up a few things.

What I claimed it lacked was contemporaneity. — Isaac

John Dewey makes the obvious point that there is nothing more ephemeral than "the modern". I like to think that, when I absorb the nuances of Mannheim's thought, or Heidegger's, I am in a way bringing the force of their intellects to bear on current situations. I believe Heidegger would agree with that inasmuch as he talks about a kind of exo-temporal dialog of a "community of rational beings".

Mannheim may not be your contemporary, but I certainly am.

Wtf is a "correct opinion"? Politics has obviously driven some our members insane. — Harry Hindu

This is true. There is a strong, underlying normative tenor here.

Do you personally know what it's like to be that "fence sitter"? — baker

I do. The "fence sitter" in the conversation elsewhere that inspired this thread reminds me of a younger me. It's for the sake of people like that that I'm even thinking about this topic. I don't want to see them treated as enemies, but as potential friends.

This is true. There is a strong, underlying normative tenor here. — Pantagruel

Because politics is a normative field. The questions at hand are what are the right or wrong things to do with our society. Anyone who thinks that nothing is actually right or wrong are just bowing out of that discussion. Anyone who is participating in that discussion is asserting something as right or wrong and acting as though some people (like themselves) are correct in their assessment of which is which and others are incorrect.

The topic of this thread isn't determining which is which, but just what's a good way to address people relative to their place on a spectrum of (dis)agreement about which is which. "A good way" both in the sense of a kind and respectful way, and also in the sense of a productive and effective way.

Because politics is a normative field. The questions at hand are what are the right or wrong things to do with our society. Anyone who thinks that nothing is actually right or wrong are just bowing out of that discussion. — Pfhorrest

Maybe. But while it may be reasonable to flag certain opinions as less credible because of poor justification (kind of ethical falsification), saying that other opinions rise to the standard of correctness is overreaching. Being well-justified is a long way from being correct. Correctness conveys an absolute authority which can only contribute to antagonism when mediating between conflicting viewpoints.

The topic of this thread isn't determining which is which, but just what's a good way to address people relative to their place on a spectrum of (dis)agreement about which is which. "A good way" both in the sense of a kind and respectful way, and also in the sense of a productive and effective way. — Pfhorrest

Judging from the reactions, it would seem that what you are proposing isn't very effective and productive. And honestly, I don't know why that should be all that surprising considering following your categorization someone who disagrees with you can only be incorrect, because they are either confused/not informed enough/to be converted (middle group) stupid/misguided (4th group), or morally corrupt (5th group). Doesn't seem all that respectful to me. If I were to make a guess, it's this kind of attitude that drives people in the middle group to the other side.

Rarely have I seen someone change their minds following rational arguments. And people seem to especially resist being told what to think or do if they feel like something is being forced onto them. What maybe helps is just listening without trying to convert them and trying to engage them on their terms. But yeah nobody ever does that.... ships passing in the night, all the time.

Rarely have I seen someone change their minds following rational arguments. — ChatteringMonkey

This is why I am pursuing the sociological approach which views detailed ideological positions as representative of more fundamental social trends, driven by actual volitional energies of the "whole man". If we can understand why groups of people come to believe what they do then we can begin to find ways to bridge the disparate positions. And indeed, we can see that these type of inter-evolutions and even reconciliations do occur, aiding us in our analysis.

Rarely have I seen someone change their minds following rational arguments.
— ChatteringMonkey

This is why I am pursuing the sociological approach which views detailed ideological positions as representative of more fundamental social trends, driven by actual volitional energies of the "whole man". If we can understand why groups of people come to believe what they do then we can begin to find ways to bridge the disparate positions. And indeed, we can see that these type of inter-evolutions and even reconciliations do occur, aiding us in our analysis. — Pantagruel

I think that's a step in the right direction, but it might also be worth considering that it's not a real possibility to bridge certain disparate positions. Beliefs seem to be clustered in coherent wholes, i.e. you typically don't just change your mind on some fact or value in isolation, but because it fits better into a larger structure of beliefs that is already there. And those seem very hard to alter, as is I think well documented with the phenomenon of religious conversion or de-conversion.

I think that's a step in the right direction, but it might also be worth considering that it's not a real possibility to bridge certain disparate positions. Beliefs seem to be clustered in coherent wholes, i.e. you typically don't just change your mind on some fact or value in isolation, but because it fits better into a larger structure of beliefs that is already there. And those seem very hard to alter, as is I think well documented with the phenomenon of religious conversion or de-conversion. — ChatteringMonkey

Absolutely, which is why it may be necessary to excavate the historical origins of some positions to see where the fundamental divergences really are.

Empiricism is a philosophical position. — Pantagruel

So. That empiricism is a philosophical position doesn't affect what things are empirical, it only affects the extent to which you believe that those things inform us of reality as a whole. Are you implying that social membership is not a property derived from the senses?

I like to think that, when I absorb the nuances of Mannheim's thought, or Heidegger's, I am in a way bringing the force of their intellects to bear on current situations. — Pantagruel

How could you possibly? They're unaware of data from modern research and so are unable to apply their intellects to it. Not even Heidegger is clever enough to consider data gathered nearly fifty years after he died (though I would not put it past some of his acolytes to claim as much). No, what you're doing is using your own intellect to elbow modern data into theories people came up with without the benefit of. It's fitting the data to the theory. Something rightly frowned upon in the sciences.

I kind of agree with this, but I think that's down to how the OP frames the problem.

As Khaled and others have said, the way this is cast looks like the difference between 1 & 5 is whether you agree with it. That's not very satisfactory.

I think it's better to consider it in terms of mode of discussion.
1. Does the speaker have respect for facts?
2. Is the speaker consistent in their view?
3. If their assumptions are biased (which isn't necessarily bad in itself), does the speaker identify those biases?
4. Is the speaker looking to start a dialogue?

I'd then suggest that the scale runs from answering Yes to all four, to answering No to all 4. Not sure of the order. Not sure it matters. Someone for whom it's No across the board is likely a bad faith propagandist looking to recruit naive fence-sitters. Doesn't much matter whether they're a raving fascist or a raving communist, they're beyond engagement.

It will just so happen that your 5s will be mostly No (I think).

Your interpretation of the limitations of the application of philosophical thought is ludicrous.

I'm currently reading Herbert Marcuse's One-Dimensional Man. When it was written, it was a cutting-edge contemporary philosophical critique of contemporary society.

In it, Marcuse excavates historical thought all the way back to Plato and Aristotle. Your criticisms of my post are simply not credible from any perspective. So, you can focus on criticizing the actual content of my post, or, better yet, come up with something substantive yourself.

Chapter 5 - Negative Thinking, from One-Dimensional Man

The closed operational universe of advanced industrial civilisation with its terrifying harmony of freedom and oppression, productivity and destruction, growth and regression is pre-designed in this idea of Reason as a specific historical project. The technological and the pre-technological stages share certain basic concepts of man and nature which express the continuity of the Western tradition. Within this continuum, different modes of thought clash with each other; they belong to different ways of apprehending, organising, changing society and nature. The stabilising tendencies conflict with the subversive elements of Reason, the power of positive with that of negative thinking, until the achievements of advanced industrial civilisation lead to the triumph of the one-dimensional reality over all contradiction.

This conflict dates back to the origins of philosophic thought itself and finds striking expression in the contrast between Plato’s dialectical logic and the formal logic of the Aristotelian Organon. The subsequent sketch of the classical model of dialectical thought may prepare the ground for an analysis of the contrasting features of technological rationality.

In classical Greek philosophy, Reason is the cognitive faculty to distinguish what is true and what is false insofar as truth (and falsehood) is primarily a condition of Being, of Reality — and only on this ground a property of propositions. True discourse, logic, reveals and expresses that which really is as distinguished from that which appears to be (real), And by virtue of this equation between Truth and (real) Being, Truth is a value, for Being is better than Non-Being. The latter is not simply Nothing; it is a potentiality of and a threat to Being — destruction. The struggle for truth is a struggle against destruction, for the “salvation” (sozein) of Being (an effort which appears itself to be destructive if it assails an established reality as “untrue”: Socrates against the Athenian city-state). Inasmuch as the struggle for truth “saves” reality from destruction, truth commits and engages human existence. It is the essentially human project. If man has learned to see and know what really is, he will act in accordance with truth, Epistemology is in itself ethics, and ethics is epistemology.

This conception reflects the experience of a world antagonistic in itself — a world afflicted with want and negativity, constantly threatened with destruction, but also a world which is a cosmos, structured in accordance with final causes. To the extent to which the experience of an antagonistic world guides the development of the philosophical categories, philosophy moves in a universe which is broken in itself two-dimensional. Appearance and reality, untruth and truth, (and, as we shall see, unfreedom and freedom) are ontological conditions.

following your categorization someone who disagrees with you can only incorrect, because they are either confused/not informed enough/to be converted (middle group) stupid/misguided (4th group), or morally corrupt (5th group). Doesn't seem all that respectful to me. — ChatteringMonkey

I think you've misunderstood what @Pfhorrest is talking about. He's suggesting a way of approaching people who disagree with you using categories relative to the person using them. So there are no other ways to categorise those who disagree with you ethically. They're either wrong, misinformed (where an ethical choice might be based on empirical data), or misguided (where an ethical choice might require some complex consideration). I'm not sure what other category you might imagine putting people in...

'Also right' doesn't work because that would take them outside the scope of the people being considered (those who disagree with you).

'Differently right'...? 'Using alternative facts'...? 'Not yet right'...?

What is this other category in which we could place those who disagree with us ethically aside from misinformed, misguided, or wrong?

What is this other category in which we could place those who disagree with us ethically aside from misinformed, misguided, or wrong? — Isaac

They could be right.

They could be right. — Pantagruel

If you thought they were right they wouldn't be in the category of people with whom you disagree would they?

You might not think they are right, but you could be wrong. Hence there is a whole missing category.

You might not think they are right, but you could be wrong. — Pantagruel

If you thought you were wrong, then why would you persist in that idea? If you thought you might be wrong (and they might be right) then their idea would be equally value and they wouldn't be in the category of people with whom you disagree. It's set out in the OP

ideological (dis)agreement — Pfhorrest

A person whom you think might be right is not a person with whom you disagree and so is outside of the scope of situations this advice applies to.