A Modal Contingency Argument

Elliot Fischer

1) There is a possible world W where every contingent being has an explanation for why it exists.

2) The totality of all other contingent beings in W is itself contingent.

3) Therefore, there is an explanation of this totality.

4) This explanation must involve a necessary being.

5) Therefore, a necessary being exists in W.

6) If a necessary being exists in a possible world, then it exists in all possible worlds.

7) Therefore, a necessary being exists.

8) This necessary being is God.

9) Therefore, God exists.

1) A possible world just means a complete way reality could possibly be/have been.

Something is possible means it is consistent with the necessary truths of reason (e.g. consistent with whatever follows from the law of non-contradiction) and conceivable.

It is consistent with the necessary truths of reason and conceivable for every contingent being to have an explanation for why it exists. Thus, it can be said there is a possible world (let us name it W) where every contingent being has an explanation for why it exists.

2) The totality of all contingent beings (TCB) only has contingent components. If all the components of TCB failed to exist, then the TCB would fail to exist as well. The components of the TCB are contingent, so they all could have possibly been non-existent in some possible world. Therefore, the TCB could have been non-existent in some possible world, hence it is contingent.

4) The TCB cannot have an external contingent explanation because there is no contingent being outside of the TCB, and this is the case because the TCB is itself the totality of all contingent beings that there are. Therefore, the explanation of the TCB must involve something non-contingent, that is to say, a necessary being.

Furthermore, to say that a contingent being explains the TCB would amount to saying that a contingent being explains its own existence. Because for something to explain the TCB, it would ultimately explain every contingent being. But no contingent being explain its existence. Therefore, the explanation of the TCB must be non-contingent, that is to say, a necessary being.

6) This is true because a necessary being (a being that cannot fail to exist, or there is no possible way reality could have been without it existing) by definition is a being that exists in all possible worlds.

To say that a necessary being exists in a possible world just is to say that a being that exists in all possible worlds also exists in a possible world. To say that a necessary being exists in a possible world but not in all possible worlds would be a contradiction.

7) The actual world is a world among all possible worlds since it clearly is possible for it to exist (if it weren’t it would not even exist), so this follows logically from 5) and 6).

8) The necessary being is beginningless, immaterial, omnipotent and personal, and to this all men give the name ‘God’.

Beginningless:

The necessary being exists necessarily, hence the fact that it exists must be true no matter what period of time or else timelessly. Therefore the necessary being is everlasting/eternal.

Immateriality:

a) The essential properties of the necessary being must exist necessarily. If a necessary being had a material essential property, then that essential property could possibly be different, it could possibly change with respect to its location and instantiate different forms. Matter of fact, material objects are constantly changing at their atomic and molecular levels. But the essential properties of the necessary being couldn’t have been different because they are necessary. Therefore, the necessary being has no material essential properties.

b) There are contingent material beings. Say, an ice cube. It is possible for the ice cube to melt, we can see it happen. So this ice cube is contingent. Now here is the crux of the matter: what is the relevant difference between this contingent material being and other material beings in possibility? If I have more ice cubes, maybe in different shapes, sizes, in odd numbers etc, it still seems that they could have been absent from reality because none of these differences seem relevant enough to render one thing necessary over contingent. In fact we can find contingent material beings of all sizes, weights, positions, ages etc. What exactly are the relevant differences between this material being and any other material beings that would make them any of them non-contingent? There are none, as far as I know. So this shows that very plausibly all material beings are contingent.

Omnipotence:

a) If the power of the necessary being was arbitrarily limited to some extent rather than other, then it seems conceivable for it to have more or less power, thus making it contingent and hence requires an external explanation for its limitation. It seems weird to say something is necessarily limited to some extent rather than another. But in order to causally explain something one needs power, hence the power of the necessary being cannot have an external explanation because the necessary being cannot explain its power without having power to begin with. Therefore, the power of the necessary being is necessary, and hence without limit.

b) If the PSR is true then it is necessarily true, otherwise the possibility of unexplained contingent beings creeps in and I have shown earlier why that shouldn’t be allowed. If the PSR is necessarily true, then the necessary being ultimately explains all contingent beings across all possible worlds. If the necessary being ultimately explains all contingent beings in all possible worlds, this is equivalent to say that it can explain each and every single one of them. And if this is the case, then it has the power to explain every metaphysically possible being, which just means that it is omnipotent.

Agency:

a) Being personal is a capacity to exercise mental faculties, it is a power. Now since having this power is possible for the necessary being then it follows therefore that the necessary being is personal because it has all possible powers (it is omnipotent).

b) As far as we know, immaterial beings are either abstract objects or minds. Abstract objects are causally inert, whereas the necessary being has causal power. Therefore the necessary being is plausibly a mind.

c) As far as we know, explanations are either scientific or else agential. Scientific explanations involve laws of nature and initial conditions. But the necessary being is immaterial and is causally prior to all other conditions. Therefore the necessary being plausibly has agency.

d) Consider that if a set of facts F is more likely to obtain in Hypothesis A rather than Hypothesis B, then F is evidence for A over B.

Now consider that the world is organized, orderly and harmonious, it has narrowly finely tuned constants for intelligent life to obtain, it seems to have things with objective purposes or functions (eyes are for seeing etc), it is aesthetically pleasing and has creatures attuned to beauty, it contains moral truths and creatures who can grasp them etc. We have shown that there is a First Cause of the world. The suggestion that this cause is a highly intelligent being with intent to create life, who has aesthetic sense and good will is very plausible in these considerations.

Bartricks

↪Elliot Fischer

I don't think it is a compelling argument.

First, if it goes through it does not prove 'God', but rather a 'necessary existent'. That thing will not be God, for if it exists of necessity then it cannot not exist, and thus is not omnipotent. This is an argument I have made elsewhere on this board. But briefly, it is plainly absurd for me to have powers that an omnipotent being lacks. I can take myself out of existence. Thus, an omnipotent being has that power too. Thus an omnipotent being is not a necessary existent, but exists by the grace of its own will (and so exists contingently, not of necessity).

Of course, that is not a reason to think the argument is faulty, it is just to point out that - if it works - it disproves God rather than proves him.

But as to the argument itself, it is faulty for you have make two false assumptions. The first is that all contingent existences stand in need of explanation. The second is that a necessary existent would not stand in need of explanation. Both of these assumptions are false.

Imagine that causal determinism is true. Well, in that case everything that has come into being, has come into being of necessity. For determinism is the thesis that everything that happens 'had' - that is, was necessitated - to occur, given the past and the laws of nature. And so if we stipulate that the past and the laws of nature are themselves necessary, everything that exists, and everything that occurs does so of necessity. Yet clearly the fact there is a cup of coffee on my desk is still a fact that cries out for explanation.

What's the problem here? The problem is that even though something may exist or occur of necessity, it can still have a cause of its existing or occurring (as in the case of my cup of coffee being on the desk - it's there by necessity, but it was still caused to there). So, 'being cause to be so' and 'being there of necessity' are compatible. And that's why establishing that something exists or occurs of necessity will not by itself suffice to explain it - for it remains an open question whether it was caused to exist or not. Thus we can still intelligibly ask of anything that exists of necessity "was it caused to come into being or not?" Thus, the 'necessary' and 'contingent' distinction is not one between 'needs an explanation' and 'doesn't need an explanation'.

Contrary to popular belief, 'it exists of necessity' is not a satisfactory answer to 'why does this thing exist rather than not?' And positing necessary existences will not stop an explanatory regress.

Turning now to contingent existences - is it true that they always require explanation? Well, no. We can, by ratiocination, discover that if anything has been caused to exist, some things must exist uncaused. Here:

1. If anything exists, it either exists uncaused, or has been caused to exist
2. Some things exist
3. Therefore, they have either been caused to exist, or they exist uncaused
4. There cannot be an actual infinity of causes
5. If all things that exist have been caused to exist, there will be an actual infinity of causes
6. Therefore, not all things that exist have been caused to exist

I made no appeal to contingency or necessity above. So, without appealing to those notions, we can soundly conclude that some things that exist, exist uncaused.

That's sufficient to establish that such things do not require explanation. For when we ask for an explanation, we are surely asking for causes? If, then, we know, by the light of reason, that if anything exists at least one thing must exist that has no cause, then we know, by the light of reason, that if anything exist, at least one thing does not require explanation. Explanations, after all, must come to an end somewhere (to challenge this is to insist that nothing can be explained). And they terminate, as this argument shows, not in a 'necessary existent' (for that would not terminate the explanation), but in an 'uncaused causer'. (This does not establish that the uncaused causer exists contingently - that remains an open question - the point is that whether it exists of necessity or contingently is not the fact about it that is doing the explanatory work).

There's another argument that verifies the above one, though it is controversial because it appeals to the existence of God. But as I have just argued above, if God exists, then all things - including himself - exist contingently. Yet God himself has not been caused to exist. So, if God exists then we have an example of a contingent existent that has no cause of his existence.

Bartricks

I now want to go through those divine attributes you list and show why, in my view, necessary existence doesn't imply any of them - indeed, is positively incompatible with some.

Beginningless:The necessary being exists necessarily, hence the fact that it exists must be true no matter what period of time or else timelessly. Therefore the necessary being is everlasting/eternal. — Elliot Fischer

A necesary existent is not necessarily everlasting. If causal determinism is true - and the laws of nature and the past are necessary - then everything that exists exists of necessity. Yet clearly not everything is everlasting. So, you cannot validly conclude from something's existing of necessity, that it exists forever.

Immateriality: — Elliot Fischer

The same applies. If causal determinism is true, then everything that exists exists of necessity. It would appear that some of what exists is material. Thus it would seem that something can exist of necessity and be material. Existing of necessity does not, therefore, establish that the existent in question is immaterial.

When it comes to omnipotence, you say this:

a) If the power of the necessary being was arbitrarily limited to some extent rather than other, then it seems conceivable for it to have more or less power, thus making it contingent and hence requires an external explanation for its limitation. It seems weird to say something is necessarily limited to some extent rather than another. But in order to causally explain something one needs power, hence the power of the necessary being cannot have an external explanation because the necessary being cannot explain its power without having power to begin with. Therefore, the power of the necessary being is necessary, and hence without limit. — Elliot Fischer

You are quite right to think that an all-powerful being's power is unlimited. But that's precisely why it can't exist of necessity. For if it exists of necessity, then it lacks a power: the power not to exist at that moment. So, far from necessary existence implying omnipotence, it implies the exact opposite. An omnipotent being can do anything, including taking himself out of existence. Thus an omnipotent being does not exist of necessity. (Exists, yes, but not of necessity).

Agency: you're case for the being possessing agency depends on his being omnipotent, which he wouldn't be if he exists of necessity.

Elliot Fischer

First, if it goes through it does not prove 'God', but rather a 'necessary existent'. That thing will not be God, for if it exists of necessity then it cannot not exist, and thus is not omnipotent. This is an argument I have made elsewhere on this board. But briefly, it is plainly absurd for me to have powers that an omnipotent being lacks. I can take myself out of existence. Thus, an omnipotent being has that power too. Thus an omnipotent being is not a necessary existent, but exists by the grace of its own will (and so exists contingently, not of necessity). — Bartricks

You can fail to exist due to your contingency, God's necessity renders His non-existence logically impossible. On the Christian and Muslim tradition, Omnipotence is power over all logical or metaphysical possibilities.

But as to the argument itself, it is faulty for you have make two false assumptions. The first is that all contingent existences stand in need of explanation. The second is that a necessary existent would not stand in need of explanation. Both of these assumptions are false. — Bartricks

No, I never said all contingent existences requires explanations, this isnt the SPSR this is the WPSR, I merely stated this is possibly the case. A necessary existence is not grounded in anything because it is absolutely fundamental.

Imagine that causal determinism is true. Well, in that case everything that has come into being, has come into being of necessity. For determinism is the thesis that everything that happens 'had' - that is, was necessitated - to occur, given the past and the laws of nature. And so if we stipulate that the past and the laws of nature are themselves necessary, everything that exists, and everything that occurs does so of necessity. Yet clearly the fact there is a cup of coffee on my desk is still a fact that cries out for explanation. — Bartricks

Causal determinism isnt true though.

What's the problem here? The problem is that even though something may exist or occur of necessity, it can still have a cause of its existing or occurring (as in the case of my cup of coffee being on the desk - it's there by necessity, but it was still caused to there). So, 'being cause to be so' and 'being there of necessity' are compatible. And that's why establishing that something exists or occurs of necessity will not by itself suffice to explain it - for it remains an open question whether it was caused to exist or not. Thus we can still intelligibly ask of anything that exists of necessity "was it caused to come into being or not?" Thus, the 'necessary' and 'contingent' distinction is not one between 'needs an explanation' and 'doesn't need an explanation'. — Bartricks

No, you've made numerous mistakes. Firstly that's not metaphysical necessity, secondly, unless you assume the causal chain itself is metaphysically necessary, then the fact that X event obtains under causal determinism isnt metaphysically necessary, it's still contingent because it doesn't exist in some possible worlds. Tl:Dr you're confusing what metaphysical necessity means.

1. If anything exists, it either exists uncaused, or has been caused to exist
2. Some things exist
3. Therefore, they have either been caused to exist, or they exist uncaused
4. There cannot be an actual infinity of causes
5. If all things that exist have been caused to exist, there will be an actual infinity of causes
6. Therefore, not all things that exist have been caused to exist — Bartricks

1 begs the question because it presupposes existent things can be uncaused.

4 isn't true, actual infinites are possible.

5 isn't true, you've presupposed that all things that exist = an actual infinite

I reject the conclusion.

I made no appeal to contingency or necessity above. So, without appealing to those notions, we can soundly conclude that some things that exist, exist uncaused. — Bartricks

Your argument is severely flawed but even if I accepted it, ors a strawman because I'm not employing a SPSR.

Elliot Fischer

A necesary existent is not necessarily everlasting. If causal determinism is true - and the laws of nature and the past are necessary - then everything that exists exists of necessity. Yet clearly not everything is everlasting. So, you cannot validly conclude from something's existing of necessity, that it exists forever. — Bartricks

Yes it is, something metaphysically necessary cannot fail to exist by definition, it's existence is purely necessary, so you've got your definitions confused like in the last comment.

The same applies. If causal determinism is true, then everything that exists exists of necessity. It would appeal that some of what exists is material. Thus it would seem that something can exist of necessity and be material. Existing of necessity does not, therefore, establish that the existent in question is immaterial. — Bartricks

Once again, that's not what metaphysical necessity is, to put it simply for you - something metaphysically necessary exists in possible worlds and cannot fail to exist. Under causal determinism, it is necessary that what will occur, occurs.

You are quite right to think that an all-powerful being's power is unlimited. But that's precisely why it can't exist of necessity. For if it exists of necessity, then it lacks a power: the power not to exist at that moment. So, far from necessary existence implying omnipotence, it implies the exact opposite. An omnipotent being can do anything, including taking himself out of existence. Thus an omnipotent being does not exist of necessity. (Exists, yes, but not of necessity). — Bartricks

Responsed above - it's logically contradictory for something metaphysically necessary to not exist, and I've explained what omnipotence is in the two main Abrahamic religions.

Bartricks

↪Elliot Fischer

You can fail to exist due to your contingency, God's necessity renders His non-existence logically impossible. On the Christian and Muslim tradition, Omnipotence is power over all logical or metaphysical possibilities. — Elliot Fischer

Irrelevant. I have the power not to exist, yes? So, an all powerful being must have that power too. He wouldn't if he exists of necessity.

What you say about those traditions is also false and irrelevant. Both Jesus and the Koran describe a God who can do 'anything'. They do not describe a necessary existent. But anyway, this is a philosophy forum not a 'describe your favourite tradition' forum.

No, I never said all contingent existences requires explanations, this isnt the SPSR this is the WPSR, I merely stated this is possibly the case. A necessary existence is not grounded in anything because it is absolutely fundamental. — Elliot Fischer

Yes, but you can't get to your conclusion unless you assume that all contingent existences require explanations.

Causal determinism isnt true though. — Elliot Fischer

Beside the point.

No, you've made numerous mistakes. — Elliot Fischer

Dunning and Kruger.

1 begs the question because it presupposes existent things can be uncaused. — Elliot Fischer

No it doesn't. It assumes that all things that exist have either been caused to exist, or they haven't. Like wot it says.

4 isn't true, actual infinites are possible. — Elliot Fischer

No they're not. And even if they are, this would undermine your case as one could then have an actual infinity of prior causes and one wouldn't need either to posit an uncaused causer or a necessary existent.

Bartricks

↪Elliot Fischer

Yes it is, something metaphysically necessary cannot fail to exist by definition, it's existence is purely necessary, so you've got your definitions confused like in the last comment. — Elliot Fischer

No, this is just confused. I could explain again, but you've already made up your mind.

Responsed above - it's logically contradictory for something metaphysically necessary to not exist, and I've explained what omnipotence is in the two main Abrahamic religions. — Elliot Fischer

Er, yes - that's why God doesn't exist of necessity. Blimey. And no, what you said was false and irrelevant. Anyway, I can tell this isn't going anywhere - bye.

Elliot Fischer

Irrelevant. I have the power not to exist, yes? So, an all powerful being must have that power too. He wouldn't if he exists of necessity. — Bartricks

No, shrugging it off as irrelevant does not encourage any kind of discussion. I've explained what omnipotence classically is and I've explained why that doesn't fall under it - so your point is moot.

What you say about those traditions is also false and irrelevant. Both Jesus and the Koran describe a God who can do 'anything'. They do not describe a necessary existent. But anyway, this is a philosophy forum not a 'describe your favourite tradition' forum. — Bartricks

Oh really?

Often we infer from these passages that God “can do anything.” But that doesn’t quite reflect the full biblical teaching. There are things that God cannot do. He cannot lie (Titus 1:2, cf. Num 23:19), nor, similarly, can he perform any immoral action. Since God is perfectly holy and good, he cannot do anything evil. And, since he is perfect truth, he cannot do things that are logically contradictory, like making round squares. His truth is a perfect consistency of thought and action. Nor can God do things inappropriate to his nature as God, like buying shoes or celebrating his birthday.

That's Christianity, as for Islam - Muhammad b. Yusūf al-Sanūsī (d. 1490) puts it simply:

"Divine Power and Will:

The Reality of Divine Power: It is an eternal Attribute of which the existence and non existence of any possible thing is derived from, in accordance to the Divine Will."

You've misunderstood what Traditional Abrahamists mean by omnipotence, I hope you can admit where you're wrong.

Yes, but you can't get to your conclusion unless you assume that all contingent existences require explanations. — Bartricks

Yes, I can, actually. It's a Modal Argument - Do you know how those work? I'm not required to assume the SPSR is true, I only maintain it's possibility.

No it doesn't. It assumes that all things that exist have either been caused to exist, or they haven't. Like wot it says. — Bartricks

Wonderful, you've just admit to it begging the question. You've presupposed that it's POSSIBLE for things to come into existence uncaused, that's the very thing being disputed, to presuppose it in the premises is to beg the question, so your argument commits that fallacy.

No they're not. And even if they are, this would undermine your case as one could then have an actual infinity of prior causes and one wouldn't need either to posit an uncaused causer or a necessary existent. — Bartricks

Yes, they are. And no, It wouldn't - because I allow for infinite regresses of contingent causes anyways, that's not relavent to my argument - refer to premise 4 and it's explanation.

No, this is just confused. I could explain again, but you've already made up your mind. — Bartricks

No, you've literally confused causal necessity with metaphysical necessity. Under causal determinism, if we even assume it's true, events are CASUALLY necessary, NOT metaphysically necessary. I mentioned that you were conflating different ideas of necessity and you just shrugged that off - This isnt honest truth seeking whatsoever.

Er, yes - that's why God doesn't exist of necessity. Blimey. And no, what you said was false and irrelevant. Anyway, I can tell this isn't going anywhere - bye. — Bartricks

1. You have misunderstood omnipotenneve
2. Conflated different kinds of necessity
3. Commit fallacies in your argumentation

Thanks for the discussion, Goodbye.

Wayfarer

You've misunderstood what Traditional Abrahamists mean by omnipotence — Elliot Fischer

:up:

A Modal Contingency Argument

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