[A] reason is not an intention but, instead, the sufficient condition, or causal event, indicative of a "method or mechanism".Is it possible to dissociate the method or mechanism from the reason? — Pantagruel
I don't agree because I understand How as correlating with explanation and Why as correlating with intention. Perhaps the latter is a special case (re: agency) of the former which is more general (i.e. mechanistic, pre/sub-agency). Just as 'can does not imply ought', How does not imply Why (even though, inversely, Why (often) implies How like 'ought implies can'). Conflating these interrogatives does – has always done – much mischief in/with philosophy (e.g. theology, idealism, antirealism, psychologism, etc).Asking how is always implicitly asking why.
Conflating these interrogatives does – has always done – much mischief in/with philosophy (e.g. theology, idealism, antirealism, psychologism, etc). — 180 Proof
For a philosopher, that may be true. But for empirical scientists, only "how" questions are relevant to their interests. Except for a few theoretical physicists, they typically leave the "why" questions to theologians and philosophers. :smile:Asking how is always implicitly asking why. Every causal explanation is contingent on some purposive stance within the question. — Pantagruel
I wasn't aware of Herbert ("survival of the fittest") Spencer's list of Principles. Can you express the gist of those "laws" of Nature, in light of modern science? My first impression is that "Persistence of Force" sounds like Inertia; "instability of the homogeneous" sounds like either Entropy or Radioactive Decay: and "Multiplicity of Effects" sounds like a Pleiotropic Gene. But I'm sure he had more philosophical or historical applications in mind. How do you interpret them? :smile:Spencer's First Principles — Pantagruel
Apparently, Spencer was trying to reconcile our commonsense division of the world into Subjective (Inner ; Spirit) and Objective (Outer ; Matter). Like him, I have tried to conciliate Inner & Outer worlds in my personal worldview of Enformationism. In that thesis, the "unknown reality" is the well-known, but little understood, phenomenon of "Information". Its original meaning was subjective, as the contents of human minds : Knowledge. But then Shannon used the term to refer to the neither subjective nor objective carriers of meaning (1s & 0s), instead of the contents. More recently, Theoretical & Quantum physicists have discovered that Information (in the form of Energy) is also the organizing mathematical structure of Matter, hence Objective. So, I have concluded that neither the Subjective, nor Objective aspects of reality is "ultimate". Instead, my view is that everything is ultimately a form of Generic Information.Manifestly, the establishment of correlation and equivalence between the forces of the outer and the inner worlds, may be used to assimilate either to the other; according as we set out with one or other term. But he who rightly interprets the doctrine contained
in this work, will see that neither of these terms can be taken as ultimate. He will see
that though the relation of subject and object renders necessary to us these antithetical
conceptions of Spirit and Matter; the one is no less than the other to be regarded as
but a sign of the Unknown Reality which underlies both. — Pantagruel
PS__What was the source of your Spencer's quote above? — Gnomon
How and why are questions that bleed into one another.
Suppose I put a book back on a mantel. Then a large truck rumbles by, which vibrations are enough to cause the book to fall. If someone asks, "How did that happen?" a variety of answers are possible. That the vibrations from the passing truck caused it to fall is obviously true. But if the book is too large for the mantel, that is also an explanation. Or if I placed the book carelessly. But even with respect to the apparent-proximate physical cause, the passage of the truck, we could say, if the foundations of the house had been more substantial, then the vibrations would not have affected the book. Or if the driver had not detoured from his usual route today. — Pantagruel
Is it possible to dissociate the method or mechanism from the reason? Or from a reason?
Asking how is always implicitly asking why. Every causal explanation is contingent on some purposive stance within the question. — Pantagruel
P(O and N | C) = 1 - epsilon P(C and N | O) = 1 - delta
P(N | C) = delta
P(N | O) = delta
I'd agree with this.Meaningful information theoretic way of describing causes exists, I suspect. — simeonz
What I meant was that there are definitely two distinct questions, when it comes to the causes of an event. One is about the ordinary causes and another about the particular causes. I tried to define probabilistically what a particular cause would look like.Meaningful information theoretic way of describing causes exists, I suspect. — simeonz
I'd agree with this. — Pantagruel
What I meant was that there are definitely two distinct questions, when it comes to the causes of an event. One is about the ordinary causes and another about the particular causes. I tried to define probabilistically what a particular cause would look like. — simeonz
Yes, I followed that. My contention is that there is always a why somewhere. And that the notion of a purely objective how is always an abstraction from the holistic natural context. — Pantagruel
Physics is actually a prime example of the intention dependence of the cause and effect relationship. As you said, holistically speaking, the task to define laws that determine whether an event is admissible presently in our universe with respect to the complete knowledge of its full historical state isn't ill posed, at least probabilistically. But we can never infer such colossal cause dependence, operate with it, and we would never find occasion to reproduce it. But given only the precursor events that have been witnessed locally in the recent past, various laws define constraints on the possible near future outcome. Such laws are easier to infer, operate, actuate, and apply, and are deliberately in the scope of the physical sciences. Even the second law of thermodynamics, may be deterministic globally, but we are interested in its probabilistic local form.Philosophers have too long concerned themselves with their own thinking. When they wrote of thought, they had in mind primarily their own history, the history of philosophy, or quite special fields of knowledge such as mathematics or physics. This type of thinking is applicable only under quite special circumstances, and what can be learned by analysing it is not directly transferable to other spheres of life. Even when it is applicable, it refers only to a specific dimension of existence which does not suffice for living human beings who are seeking to comprehend and to mould their world. — Pantagruel
Physics is actually a prime example of the intention dependence of the cause and effect relationship. As you said, holistically speaking, the task to define laws that determine whether an event is admissible presently in our universe with respect to the complete knowledge of its full historical state isn't ill posed, at least probabilistically. But we can never infer such colossal cause dependence, operate with it, and we would never find occasion to reproduce it. But given only the precursor events that have been witnessed locally in the recent past, various laws define constraints on the possible near future outcome. — simeonz
The truth becomes value-based and not rooted in empirical reality and any mechanical explanations are consequently disrupted. — simeonz
You exclude art and ethics, which may mean that you intend something truly uncomprehensible by this term. How do you define it? I could speculate that some kinds of value are apriori, whilst others are derivative and empirical, refined using scientific methods. But there still needs to be some clarification of the independence of the categories of intrinsic value.Exactly. And that...is...life. Not the portion we intellectually amputate, the whole thing. It's why social scientists like to use the term "irrational" when what they are really talking about is "supra-rational" in my opinion. Everything that isn't reducible to causal descriptions, art, ethics, teleology. — Pantagruel
But the problem is that they are catastrophically unstable. They fail to sustain residue of their original form in the long run — simeonz
Depends on what you mean. First, certain humanities investigate the validity and soundness of our customs and practices using analytic methods, or in reference to the claims of sciences. This is the application of correspondence truth to pragmatic truth, simply by being analytic and objective, even if it is not concerned with the fundamental physical law. Second, a person can be pragmatically skeptical about pragmatics (and about a lot of other things). This is a way to reconcile our personal values and empiricism, without feeling completely guilty of insincerity. And finally, there are studies, which do not discover, but define what pragmatism should be. These definitions ultimately are provided "as is", with some analytic arguments in some cases and reliance on consensus.I don't see that this is necessarily so. Pragmatics can be more or less self-aware, like anything. — Pantagruel
This is one justification for the everpresent instability in our social fabric. Considering the trial and error approach that is needed for survival, in the long run, involatility is a dying proposition. Nations and empires need to decline after their energy have become spent, the political spectrum needs to reorganize when the socioeconomic forces require it, shifts in perception have to occur when our ethics are challenged. In other words, when it comes to pragmatism, which is, for the time being (possibly for a longer time than we have left), unavoidable part of reality, tragedies, conflicts and some chaos are useful. The question is, can a grounded methodological analysis of pragmatics say anything of merit, aside from examining its internal consistency, like humanities do. Other than that, the only venue worth exploring that I can think is the relationship between pragmatics and nature.On the other hand, instability is not necessarily a bad thing. Systems frequently evolve because of inherent instabilities, or meta-stabilities. — Pantagruel
Get involved in philosophical discussions about knowledge, truth, language, consciousness, science, politics, religion, logic and mathematics, art, history, and lots more. No ads, no clutter, and very little agreement — just fascinating conversations.