He did not say this. He said, "what we can say can be said clearly". Big difference. — god must be atheist

Mine was an inference. I wrote,

He says what can be said at all can be said clearly, and what we cannot talk about we must pass over in silence. Of course, what we can talk about is therefore only what can be said clearly.

the first of which is from Pears/McGuinness. So, if P can be said at all, it can be said clearly. Of course, he knows people speak nonsense, so he is referring to logically responsible speech, not simply what can be iterated. Thus, when I refer to "what we can talk about" the reference is W's" what can be said in full logic compliance.

But he is wrong. You can say things that can't be said clearly. A clear example of it is talking to a blind man about colours. The speaker can say it; to the listener it will never be clear.

It is clear to the speaker though. Is that sufficient to say that W was wright? No, because he did not identify the respect in which the said thing was clear: to the speaker, or to the listener.

Bad, bad, mistake by Wittgenstein. Apparently he was not very clear when he said what he wanted to say. — god must be atheist

Alas, Wittgenstein was not that stupid to make such an obvious mistake. Here, the matter is about how an analysis of logic and the world play out.

I'm speaking in scientific terms of religion as an evolutionary, political and sociological phenomenon. God knows what you're doing! — counterpunch

Evolution and politics? This has not entered philosophical thinking. What I am doing looking into the existential basis of religion, on this point. It is simply a matter misplaced analysis: talk about teleology and watches and caveman curiosity is outside discussion about what the enduring nature of religion is. Curiosity and invention are always there, but here it is a question of what is there that inspires this.

I just suggested that the concept of a Creator God may be responsible for the "creative explosion" that is, the development of a truly human mode of thought; abstract conceptualisation, and forward facing strategies for survival. That's in addition to God's role as objective authority for multitribal social law. To show the concept any more regard I'd have a join a negro spiritual choir! — counterpunch

Well, that's a far cry from not knowing anything at all as you said earlier. But if you wish to see the point made here, you will have to at least acknowledge that negro spiritual and its basis. Yes, people get together, sing about their troubles all the time, and there is no need for a review of black history. I am saying, if can put aside for a moment the presumptions of knowing, the matter of God and religion are grounded deeper than this. Religion certainly does come to us embedded in the culture, but it is the underpinnings of culture that philosophy deals with, and the underpinnings of our affairs in general, scientific or otherwise. Look at the negro spiritual song, the hymn of abandonment and deliverance. Abandoned from what, delivered to what? It is not the world of mere curiosities, but a condition that haunts our existence: the "why are we born to suffer and die" question which places the matter in metaphysics for philosophy.
Not to get too far afield from the original idea: Wittgenstein draws a line between what can and cannot be said given logical constraints and sense making. Religion is a case in point.

You realise I suppose that you're asking a modern man; stood on the shoulders of giants who invented modern medicine, anti-biotics, indoor plumbing and electric lights - by thinking in scientific terms, to imagine the suffering of someone who lacked those things, in order to show your need for God in suffering and moral absence? Just in case you don't see it, it's wildly ironic. — counterpunch

You have to see that being good at making things work is entirely different from religious concerns. A pragmatist, of course, puts all knowledge affairs in pragmatic interpretation, but they, like Wittgenstein, know full well that the "other side" of an interpretation is transcendence.. No one, e.g., can "speak" the color yellow. And it is here that the focus is. No one gives damn about the qualia yellow, but ethics, metaethics, the "qualia" of ethical matters which is the horror, the wretchedness, the suffering, as such: these are metaphysical issues that scream for redemption.

Look, you have to look at this from the angle of a metaethical concern: It is not about what science can say about such things, it is about what cannot be said. The "presence" of suffering, like the color yellow, cannot be said. People who cry out to God are not simply "curious"; I mean, are you serious?

My purpose is to employ the gifts bequeathed to me by the struggles of previous generations, to secure the future for subsequent generations - by knowing what's true, and acting morally on the basis of what's true. When humankind gets there, we'll get there - wherever there is. I don't pretend to know things I don't know, but I do think there's a clear path to follow! — counterpunch

And right you are! But such gifts are the product of analysis and competent thought, and this follows issues as they are presented. There may be a future to make, but to do this well in a field of inquiry it needs proper analysis. The future of religion, if you like, is at stake here. Superficial analysis will not do to liberate human thinking from its primitive past. Philosophy needs to go where the issue is and make sense out of it so as to dispel the myths and foolishness, for philosophy is our future's new religion. Existential philosophy can provide the explanatory basis for the human religious condition at the level of basic assumptions.

Of course, one would have to read this to know what it is about. Science journals will not help you.

Morality is fundamentally a sense, fostered in the human animal by evolution in the context of the hunter-gatherer tribe. Chimpanzees have morality of sorts; they groom each other and share food, and remember who reciprocates, and withhold such favours accordingly. Moral behaviour was an advantage to the individual within the tribe, and to the tribe composed of moral individuals. It's only when hunter-gatherer tribes joined together - they needed God as an objective authority for moral law. The idea that man in a state of nature was an amoral, self serving individualist; Nietzsche's ubermensch - fooled by the weak, is false. Man could not have survived were that so. He already had a very well honed evolutionary moral sense when the need arose to make that innate moral sense explicit. That's religion. It has politics at its core. — counterpunch

The barn door this misses is, I will admit, not that obvious to someone who simply has ready to hand facts. One is being asked to look more deeply, and yes, there is such a thing.

Yes, religion IS politics. But to call this is core begs the question: what is the core of politics? Politics is a system power struggles. Power to do what? Control society, it people, culture, economics and wealth and so on. Such questions as these inevitably end up as value questions. The why's of anything rest with ethics, then metaethics: people seek some kind of joy, satisfaction, thrill, elation, bliss, consummation of desire, and so on. THAT is why people do what they do, putting the incidentals aside.

What these are is unspeakable, which is Wittgenstein's point. The world "shows " us this, but this will not be contained in language.

Sorry Wayfarer. I'll butt out. I'm not making any progress with Constance anyhow. The more rational and specific I get, the more emotionally esoteric she becomes. I'd best quit before she starts speaking Aramaic and sending me innards in the post! — counterpunch

Do I detect a hint of sexism in this? Or perhaps this is an irrational feminine suspicion.

I think of of W and philosophers in the analytic or ordinary language tradition as having, and serving, a particular purpose. That purpose was therapeutic. That purpose was to point out that certain of what had been called the problems of philosophy weren't actually problems, but instead arose from various misconceptions having to do with the confused and obscure use of language. W referred to showing the fly the way out of the bottle, and avoiding the bewitchment of our intelligence by the use of language. Carnap wrote of pseudo-problems in philosophy, and memorably commented on Heidegger's quasi-mystical writings. J.L. Austin in Sense and Sensibilia, Gilbert Ryle in The Concept of Mind showed how philosophers had created problems and puzzles by treating, e.g., minds as if they were objects or things separate from the world.

So when they refer to words as being nonsense, or meaningless, I think they refer specifically to words as used by philosophers in writing philosophy. Carnap, for example, thought that Heidegger's almost occult references to "The Nothing" which only encounter when "suspended in dread" were nonsense as philosophical statements, as are other metaphysical statements, and could not be treated as descriptions of state of affairs, but could be conceived as expressions of attitude towards living; or perhaps as theology, or perhaps as a kind of poetry or artistic in some sense, in which case they wouldn't be nonsense.

When it comes to "reconstruction" of philosophy, which it seems many thought was necessary in the 20th century, I personally honor the efforts of Wittgenstein, Carnap, Ryle, Austin and others, but ultimately prefer those of Dewey. He argued against the dualisms and metaphysical presuppositions which had been enshrined in philosophy, but also felt that distinctions such as fact/value and is/ought were inappropriate. Ethical statements were not meaningless, though efforts to arrive at asummum bonum to guide conduct were misguided. Ethical judgments could be made reasonably, could be made better, just as practical value judgments could, by the application of intelligent method (which he called "inquiry" generally). He didn't come to the conclusion philosophy was futile, but thought its focus shouldn't be on the traditional "problems of philosophy" and should instead be on "the problems of men."

Do I detect a hint of sexism in this? Or perhaps this is an irrational feminine suspicion. — Constance

There's no assumption on my part that you're a raving nutter because you're a woman. To my mind, you're a raving nutter first, and incidentally, a woman. Did you play an 'ism' card to shore up your weak argument? Wish I had 'ism' cards to play. Sadly, they don't give them to straight white males. Everyone else, but none for straight white males.

Evolution and politics? This has not entered philosophical thinking. What I am doing looking into the existential basis of religion, on this point. It is simply a matter misplaced analysis: talk about teleology and watches and caveman curiosity is outside discussion about what the enduring nature of religion is. Curiosity and invention are always there, but here it is a question of what is there that inspires this. — Constance

I can just about scrape some vague sense of a meaning from this. Purple prose has its place - Constance, but here, I'd rather you said what you meant directly. Like I did when you asked:

Take the notion of God: Why would people invent such a thing? What role does it play in describing the world? — Constance

I gave you direct answers to these questions, and you give me some garbled, meaningless one paragraph response. Then accuse me of sexism. WTAF!

Well, that's a far cry from not knowing anything at all as you said earlier. — Constance

No, it's not. I don't know if God exists. But I know the concept of God exists. You asked "why would someone invent such a thing?" I answered - and then you say:

"that's a far cry from not knowing anything at all as you said earlier."

We're done here. Either, you're not intellectually capable of understanding what I'm saying, or you are making absolutely zero effort to understand, or are deliberately misunderstanding. I don't care which. The consequence is the same. There's no point continuing the discussion.

“Knowledge has three degrees – opinion, science, illumination. The means or instrument of the first is sense; of the second, dialectic; of the third, intuition.”
— Plotinus

Language is a tool limited by the dialectic. Opening to the experience of intuition or noesis requires moving beyond language and opening to the reality of experience or what is above the line in Plato's Divided Line analogy

The secular world ignores what those recognizing our source know is the source of real knowledge and Man's highest potential for reason.

The bottom line is that a person should know when to be quiet so as to get out of their own way.

what we cannot talk about we must pass over in silence. — Constance

Here's another thing he did not speak clearly about. This section has two meanings, and from the context (that has been given here) does not clarify his intended meaning.

Now, this does not lead to a self-contradiction by W. He says that things that can be said can be said clearly; but not necessarily. They can be said in a obscure way, too.

Alas, Wittgenstein was not that stupid to make such an obvious mistake. Here, the matter is about how an analysis of logic and the world play out. — Constance

I showed you his mistake, and you don't prove I am wrong, (unless a reference to an unidentified point by some philosopher's work is a good counter-argument) you just say it is not a mistake because Wittgenstein was not stupid.

So, if P can be said at all, it can be said clearly. — Constance

I gave you an example where it is only valid if you place the reference arbitrarily to one respect; but in a different respect, where you can place the reference also arbitrarily to, the statement gets rendered to be invalid.

You came back with an incomprehensible quote to that. Please say what you want to say CLEARLY. If you don't, you are not living up to W's point, which you are trying to prove is true; you give a real life, living, perfect example of the opposite.

Please remember and if you can help it, please accommodate this need: I have no education in philosophy. I am a reasonable thinker, but referencing a philosopher in the literature and not saying the actual point of the author's work that you invoke in your argument will confuse me and will do (possibly) many other users of this site.

So when they refer to words as being nonsense, or meaningless, I think they refer specifically to words as used by philosophers in writing philosophy. Carnap, for example, thought that Heidegger's almost occult references to "The Nothing" which only encounter when "suspended in dread" were nonsense as philosophical statements, as are other metaphysical statements, and could not be treated as descriptions of state of affairs, but could be conceived as expressions of attitude towards living; or perhaps as theology, or perhaps as a kind of poetry or artistic in some sense, in which case they wouldn't be nonsense. — Ciceronianus the White

Which is not how Heidegger intended it to be taken, and I consider this kind of thing to be exactly at issue here. Heidegger is leaning on Kierkegaard (as was Sartre and then the whole tradition of phenomenological ontology), and this is not intended to be poetic (merely) nor merely in the abstract of presupposition, though this is how is works logically, I mean, time is conceived apriori as a structure of foundational experience (all along keeping in mind that even such terms central to the analysis are hermeneutically derived, not metaphysically posited). Rather it is a phenomenological description that highlights alienation, that is the palpable experience of dread or anxiety that marks the division of freedom between past and future. (This "fleeting nothingness" I have read is taken up by Wittgenstein as well, though I can't remember where I read it.) At any rate, this matter IS meant to be "treated as descriptions of "state of affairs". I see it like this: Many talk about what cannot be spoken clearly, but their talk is not meant to be poetic, but a provisional description, and hermeneuticsthematically removes the brakes from logical standards of acceptability.[/b] Everything is indeterminate at the level of basic questions. Derrida will later take this to its logical end, nullifying all knowledge claims (at this level).

Strictly drawn lines are for anal retentive analytic types who wrap their garbage in well tied bow knots.

When it comes to "reconstruction" of philosophy, which it seems many thought was necessary in the 20th century, I personally honor the efforts of Wittgenstein, Carnap, Ryle, Austin and others, but ultimately prefer those of Dewey. He argued against the dualisms and metaphysical presuppositions which had been enshrined in philosophy, but also felt that distinctions such as fact/value and is/ought were inappropriate. Ethical statements were not meaningless, though efforts to arrive at asummum bonum to guide conduct were misguided. Ethical judgments could be made reasonably, could be made better, just as practical value judgments could, by the application of intelligent method (which he called "inquiry" generally). He didn't come to the conclusion philosophy was futile, but thought its focus shouldn't be on the traditional "problems of philosophy" and should instead be on "the problems of men. — Ciceronianus the White

There is an article by Simon Critchley that criticizes Rorty for trying to straddle the fence on ethics, as if strong liberal views were compatible with a pragmatist conception of knowledge. One can be led an affirmation of the values in play, the literature, the fine thinking about nuanced human dilemmas, and the like, but pragmatism cannot make one drink. It is Dostoevsky's Ivan all over again. This issue will not budge without some metaphysical presence in the assumptions.
Rorty thought Dewey was among the top three most important philosophers of the 20th century. He knew better than I, but he did give me my views on our everydayness Heidegger's ready to hand. And it was Dewey's Art and Experience that helped me understand this. Pain little attention to Ryle and the rest. I have always found, with the exception of Quine, analytic writing to be wrong minded.

We're done here. Either, you're not intellectually capable of understanding what I'm saying, or you are making absolutely zero effort to understand, or are deliberately misunderstanding. I don't care which. The consequence is the same. There's no point continuing the discussion. — counterpunch

Read some philosophy you twit!

Read some philosophy you twit! — Constance

Don't do that. Don't pretend this on on me. I could see you had a lot going on, and I offered to butt out. You responded anyway, and you fucked up. You're not following the argument because you're having three arguments all at the same time. Your response was poor quality. I'm owed an apology not an insult.

I gave you an example where it is only valid if you place the reference arbitrarily to one respect; but in a different respect, where you can place the reference also arbitrarily to, the statement gets rendered to be invalid — god must be atheist

Hmmmm If I take your meaning, you say that addressing another with talk about colors requires a certain assumption about the interlocutor, which is, for one thing, that s/he is not blind. So you're implying that Wittgenstein needs to be clear about the assumptions in place regarding conditions of clarity: one can speak with perfect clarity, but if it is only clear on one side of the conversation, then clarity is lost.

If this is not your point, let me know.

Of course, W does assume something about basic conditions of making ideas clear, but these are assumption always already in place in all conversations, and to account for them all to be understood, one would spend an eternity explaining contexts of explanatory possibility. The other also needs to be competent in t he language spoken, within hearing distance, capable of reasoning well enough, and so on.

How his assumptions about an interlocutor are arbitrary you would have to tell me.

You came back with an incomprehensible quote to that. Please say what you want to say CLEARLY. If you don't, you are not living up to W's point, which you are trying to prove is true; you give a real life, living, perfect example of the opposite. — god must be atheist

Maybe Wittgenstein can make the point best:

.......for in order to be able to draw a limit to thought, we should have to find both sides of the limit thinkable (i.e. we should have to be able to think what cannot be thought).

He is telling us that our world is structured BY logic. If you think, you think propositionally, a conditional statement like, "if it rains, then you should bring an umbrella" is commonplace, but it has a logical structure that has nothing to do with rain, the wet stuff. It is a form of thought WE bring into the world, impose on the world, construct facts out of. Stray from logic and you stray from sense making.
So consider the above. Even to imagine the unthinkable IS ITSELF unthinkable, to say X is unthinkable is to already give X thought. W looks closely as to how this works across the board, how we talk in philosophy about the world (can you imagine what is NOT the world?), reality, meta-anything. He thinks if we just reign in extravagant language that is senseless on a rock bottom logical level, we can be free of centuries of bad thinking.

Read some philosophy you twit! — Constance

:up:

Rather it is a phenomenological description that highlights alienation, that is the palpable experience of dread or anxiety that marks the division of freedom between past and future. (This "fleeting nothingness" I have read is taken up by Wittgenstein as well, though I can't remember where I read it.) — Constance

The divide between past and future is intrinsic to our being. The attitude of dread, not so much.

Sometimes there is joy in that divide.

Alienation, dread, anxiety - these are the obsessions of urban European academics. There's more to it.

In his biography of Wittgenstein, Monk is at pains to point out that what is unsaid is of the utmost importance.

The unspoken becomes the subject of discussion in religion and theology, and immediate it becomes ridiculous. Not just for proposing absurdities such as "something a greater than which cannot be conceived" or the Holy Trinity, but in insisting on what we ought to do each Sunday.

The unspoken becomes the subject of discussion in the philosophy lecture and immediately it becomes ridiculous. "I think therefore I am", Transcendental Idealism, absolute idealism... But to their credit philosophers are less incline to genuflect.

In the first war Wittgenstein volunteered as a forward observer, spending long nights in the freezing cold, in the most dangerous activity he could find. He said he never felt so alive.

In the second war he voluntarily left the shelter of Cambridge to work as a hospital orderly.

There's an anecdote that while he was visiting neighbours, the wife of his host asked what he would like for refreshment. Her husband chastised her, saying "Don't ask; just do" Wittgenstein applauded, saying this was the whole of ethics caught in a phrase.

What we cannot talk about we must pass over in silence, but not in inaction.

Meaning as use; meaning as doing.

At any rate, this matter IS meant to be "treated as descriptions of "state of affairs". I see it like this: Many talk about what cannot be spoken clearly, but their talk is not meant to be poetic, but a provisional description, and hermeneuticsthematically removes the brakes from logical standards of acceptability.[ — Constance

As a description of a state of affairs, though, "The Nothing" does nothing for me. It doesn't communicate or express dread in any sense. In fact, it seems preposterous. On the other hand, I can understand what "dread" and "alienation" mean without much effort, and I can even understand, more or less, what is intended by "suspended in dread" as I think it can work, though clumsily, as a metaphor. A poet wields metaphor much more adroitly, though. I don't think anything is gained by resorting to such terminology when normal words suffice.

Then again, if I want to understand what dread is, or I'm seeking a strong description of dread, I don't think I'd ask a philosopher. I'd more likely ask a psychologist or an artist. I think, with Wittgenstein I suppose, that certain things must be shown to be understood or evoked. There are some things philosophers aren't good at, and when philosophers aren't good they're very bad. As Cicero said, "There's nothing so absurd that some philosopher hasn't already said it."

I've always wondered whether problems with translation account for some of my lack of sympathy for certain philosophers, and wish I was more familiar with languages other than English.

I think Rorty misunderstands Dewey in certain respects as do other neo-pragmatics, treating him as a kind of postmodern figure before postmodernism, and am more aligned to such as Susan Haack and Sydney Hook when it comes to interpreting him. Larry Hickman does a good job in his analysis of Dewey, particularly when it comes to his views on technology. I think the difficulty people have with his views on ethics arises from the fact that he's more concerned with developing an effective and intelligent method on which to make ethical judgments (any judgment, really) than determining what's inherently good and bad and acting accordingly. But when it comes to "everydayness" (if I understand what you mean by that) Dewey was there, and so was James, long before Heidegger.

The divide between past and future is intrinsic to our being. The attitude of dread, not so much.

Sometimes there is joy in that divide.

Alienation, dread, anxiety - these are the obsessions of urban European academics. There's more to it. — Banno

Way more! It takes a commitment to literature, frankly. Not an easy thing to do, especially with analytic philosophy dominating so in the US and GB. I won't begin to defend it, for it would be useless. But I will say it begins with wonder, a primordial wonder. The wonder turns to shocking revelation that there is no foundation to our existence, and nihilism asserts itself. Nihilism is very disturbing only if one thinks about it. Ethical nihilism is, by my thinking, impossible. Call this dread: the meeting of deep suffering and no foundational redemptive recourse.
The joy? Absolutely! This, I think, is what Buddhism is about.

The unspoken becomes the subject of discussion in religion and theology, and immediate it becomes ridiculous. Not just for proposing absurdities such as "something a greater than which cannot be conceived" or the Holy Trinity, but in insisting on what we ought to do each Sunday. — Banno

I read that he was like Willard Quine, very religious, but firm in the belief that philosophy had no say in the matter. Quine, a great philosophical mind, was a Catholic, of all things. But Wittgenstein did break the rule occasionally, writing, "What is Good is Divine too. That, strangely enough, sums up my ethics."
Of course, he would have to disown this as nonsense. I am sure he had no inkling as to what could be said that hovered contextually close to the taboo on language. I mean, if he can say, "the good lies outside the space of facts" I think this opens the field to a wide variety of proximate thinking and since I am a fan of Husserl through Derrida, I think, I wonder how out of bounds he would think they are. Then Levinas, if you have read anything by him, is something of an architectonic master of the proximate around the unspeakable. Yet analytic philosophers, following W's lead, shut off all such thinking as
a "seduction of language".

The unspoken becomes the subject of discussion in the philosophy lecture and immediately it becomes ridiculous. "I think therefore I am", Transcendental Idealism, absolute idealism... But to their credit philosophers are less incline to genuflect. — Banno

I subscribe to things you are dismissing. I don't mind at all arguing about it. My idea of a good time.

In the first war Wittgenstein volunteered as a forward observer, spending long nights in the freezing cold, in the most dangerous activity he could find. He said he never felt so alive.

In the second war he voluntarily left the shelter of Cambridge to work as a hospital orderly.

There's an anecdote that while he was visiting neighbours, the wife of his host asked what he would like for refreshment. Her husband chastised her, saying "Don't ask; just do" Wittgenstein applauded, saying this was the whole of ethics caught in a phrase.

What we cannot talk about we must pass over in silence, but not in inaction.

Meaning as use; meaning as doing. — Banno

And I say there is a lot that can be said about metaethics, the value of value, as he put it. not so much in volume, but rather in enlightened thought.

The joy? Absolutely! This, I think, is what Buddhism is about. — Constance

I did try to draw a parallel between Wittgenstein’s apophatic silence, and Buddhism, in an earlier post - I’m curious as to why this elicited no comment from you.

Of course, W does assume something about basic conditions of making ideas clear, but these are assumption always already in place in all conversations, and to account for them all to be understood, one would spend an eternity explaining contexts of explanatory possibility. The other also needs to be competent in t he language spoken, within hearing distance, capable of reasoning well enough, and so on. — Constance

I am not sure if this is W's assumption or your addition to the set of assumptions you imbue W's points in order to deflect criticism. I admit I never read W. But you have. So have you seen this assumption written anywhere, by him, or do you think it is left to the reader to assume that this assumption exists? This is an important point. Has the meaning in the quote ever been expressed by W, or is it the reader who assumes this assumption exists?

How his assumptions about an interlocutor are arbitrary you would have to tell me. — Constance

Answer: in my example, he places the clarity of speech and understanding on the speaker, not on the listener. Once he places the onus of clarity of understanding on the listener, W's claim is falsified. Or can be falsified under certain circumstances. Therefore he arbitrarily places the onus of understanding the clear communication on the speaker, not on the listener. This is an arbitrary placement.

.......for in order to be able to draw a limit to thought, we should have to find both sides of the limit thinkable (i.e. we should have to be able to think what cannot be thought).

He is telling us that our world is structured BY logic. — Constance

I am sorry, Constance, but he is not saying that. In fact, this entire new topic you introduce is a completely incongruous statement or claim to my objection.

(And aside from your bringing up another issue, which I can only think you do because you want to obscrue the issue I had brought up. this interpretation of yours can not at all be inferred from W's quote. There is a common domain between your interpretation and W's claim, but one does not flow from the other, and one does not encompass the other. You are freely winging it, making wild claims that are not valid. I, however, do not wish to continue this new vein of discussion, because I first wish to close the discussion between you and me by coming to a common understanding, before opening up another discussion.)

I have to admit one more thing: I think Wittgenstein's models are false, his insights are wrong, and his claims are not true. It is a hype that got him into reverence by many thinkers, but any thought I've heard others attribute to him has holes, large, huge, gaping holes in logic or in reasoning. It is only blind faith in his intellect that makes people bow to him and try to explain everything he has said in terms that makes sense; while in reality he is a nincompoop, a come-hither idiot of philosophy.

As a description of a state of affairs, though, "The Nothing" does nothing for me. It doesn't communicate or express dread in any sense. In fact, it seems preposterous. On the other hand, I can understand what "dread" and "alienation" mean without much effort, and I can even understand, more or less, what is intended by "suspended in dread" as I think it can work, though clumsily, as a metaphor. A poet wields metaphor much more adroitly, though. I don't think anything is gained by resorting to such terminology when normal words suffice. — Ciceronianus the White

And you've read Kant, Kierkegaard, Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre and the rest, and understand their analyses of the structure of experience, but none of this rings a bell? I have thought about this often. I can't explain it but can only say people are different in the, if you will, unnamed regions of the self. Very different. Heidegger introduced (derivatively) the idea of human dasein, which is a social, intersubjective network of language and shared institutions (see John Haugeland's take), but in order to see his Kierkegaardian "leap" is to step out of this and put question to the whole thing, even language itself. To me it is a consummation of what I have always intuited. On the other side of the Atlantic, there is analytic rigor and commitment to Wittgenstein's "clarity". I read Dennett's essay on qualia a while ago and there is was, competent, well thought out and actually helpful, but dramatically missing the point, to me. The point is to understand more deeply the actuality that is at its core meaningful. Dennett thinks of qualia as a nonsense term, and he is right! But I know this term by another name: presence, and the philosophy of presence goes back to Husserl, Fink, then Kierkegaard (and Hegel, whom I have little interest in).
There is no agreement on this in Continental philosophy, which makes it an issue. But the point is, I guess, that the concept is played out, essentially the same idea, of very different ways and the existentialists, and postexistentialists take it to its analytical end. Same goes with Quine's Radical Translation. He despised Derrida, but his conclusion seems in the same ball park.

Then again, if I want to understand what dread is, or I'm seeking a strong description of dread, I don't think I'd ask a philosopher. I'd more likely ask a psychologist or an artist. I think, with Wittgenstein I suppose, that certain things must be shown to be understood or evoked. There are some things philosophers aren't good at, and when philosophers aren't good they're very bad. As Cicero said, "There's nothing so absurd that some philosopher hasn't already said it." — Ciceronianus the White

It's a good point. Dread has always been a poor concept to describe the "feeling" of that penetrating understanding that we are thrown into a world, not of digital realities, but actuality, where reason is undone. To me, this is an extraordinary thing, but the dread of it issues from the, I dare call it, objective need for redemption. Redemption is a moral term, and the world is morally impossible as it stands before us. This is not a psychological matter, an emotional deficit or deformity on my part: it is at the very core of our actuality. In my view, that likely appears extreme you, this ethical matter, which wittgenstein calls nonsense to talk about at this level, is first philosophy.

Cicero had never read Levinas.

I think Rorty misunderstands Dewey in certain respects as do other neo-pragmatics, treating him as a kind of postmodern figure before postmodernism, and am more aligned to such as Susan Haack and Sydney Hook when it comes to interpreting him. Larry Hickman does a good job in his analysis of Dewey, particularly when it comes to his views on technology. I think the difficulty people have with his views on ethics arises from the fact that he's more concerned with developing an effective and intelligent method on which to make ethical judgments (any judgment, really) than determining what's inherently good and bad and acting accordingly. But when it comes to "everydayness" (if I understand what you mean by that) Dewey was there, and so was James, long before Heidegger. — Ciceronianus the White

I think you're right about that, and I wonder if Heidegger read Dewey. I've read some, but never studied really, and it is from Dewey I get the clearest picture of knowledge: pragmatic, end looking; a concept is reducible to the pragmatic engagement that produced it, like infantile matching sounds to events, people, things. This makes knowledge into an event, and this is Heidegger. Time is a pragmatic event that puts the past "consummations" (a Dewey term) into effect to solve occurrent problems.

But my thoughts are that this goes deeper, begs questions, because this spear in my kidney and the excruciating pain is not a problem solving event. My interpretative stand certainly is, but the ontology of the pain is simply given, qualia, presence. This Kierkegaard laid out long ago.

I did try to draw a parallel between Wittgenstein’s apophatic silence, and Buddhism, in an earlier post - I’m curious as to why this elicited no comment from you. — Wayfarer

Sorry. I don't know where you said this. What did you say?

I am not sure if this is W's assumption or your addition to the set of assumptions you imbue W's points in order to deflect criticism. I admit I never read W. But you have. So have you seen this assumption written anywhere, by him, or do you think it is left to the reader to assume that this assumption exists? This is an important point. Has the meaning in the quote ever been expressed by W, or is it the reader who assumes this assumption exists? — god must be atheist

Okay, but first, what do you think? It seems like you want to bring inquiry into the assumptions of communication possibilities, as if before W can speak to us about what is or is not "speakable" he must first confirm the conditions for speaking at all are met. Is this where you are?

Answer: in my example, he places the clarity of speech and understanding on the speaker, not on the listener. Once he places the onus of clarity of understanding on the listener, W's claim is falsified. Or can be falsified under certain circumstances. Therefore he arbitrarily places the onus of understanding the clear communication on the speaker, not on the listener. This is an arbitrary placement. — god must be atheist

An interesting answer. Should have read it before the above. Of course, the same onus is on you as you write to me in this post. Since I don't know where you are going with this I will just lay out what I think is an answer: First, I have not read all of Wittgenstein and never will. I just don't aspire to this. But I do know he has a position on private languages and intersubjective verification. But putting aside what he might say, it sound lie you're asking, what IS that standard of verifiability that makes speech and communication possible? Quine and Derrida tell me absolute verification is a myth. I think we live in private interpretative worlds, and to me, at the most basic level, you are a "theory" to me, a very, very effective theory, but the language that is deployed when address you is both public (in theory) and private (yet another theory). The point is, this world of mine subsumes others and there "otherness" with a baseline for all being hermeneutics. Even my references to myself are hermeneutical. The thought that thinks the thought, observes it, questions it, is a great, great mystery to me. Frankly, it is THE mystery. But even as I entertain this AS a mystery, I am still bound to hermeneutical delimitations.

For me, when inquiry bottoms out, I am left with what is NOT interpretation, and the study of the "space" where actuality meets language, where the generative beginning of meaning and phenomena meets itself is where philosophy needs to be. Wittgenstein seems to be unaware of this, but then, he never read Eugene Fink's Sixth Meditation or Jean luc Marion's On Being Given.

(And aside from your bringing up another issue, which I can only think you do because you want to obscrue the issue I had brought up. this interpretation of yours can not at all be inferred from W's quote. There is a common domain between your interpretation and W's claim, but one does not flow from the other, and one does not encompass the other. You are freely winging it, making wild claims that are not valid. I, however, do not wish to continue this new vein of discussion, because I first wish to close the discussion between you and me by coming to a common understanding, before opening up another discussion.) — god must be atheist

Opening such a discussion is entirely welcome. Not winging anything, as I know. And not at all aware of wild claims.

I have to admit one more thing: I think Wittgenstein's models are false, his insights are wrong, and his claims are not true. It is a hype that got him into reverence by many thinkers, but any thought I've heard others attribute to him has holes, large, huge, gaping holes in logic or in reasoning. It is only blind faith in his intellect that makes people bow to him and try to explain everything he has said in terms that makes sense; while in reality he is a nincompoop, a come-hither idiot of philosophy. — god must be atheist

An odd thing to say given that, as you say, you haven't read W. Calling him a nincompoop is will get you nowhere. The proof is in the arguing. The only question I have is, what have you read that makes you think so and why?

The proof is in the arguing. — Constance

You claimed in several places that you don't understand my arguments and you disagree with my references. So that's that, we can' t argue if you are incapable of comprehending what I say.

The word nincompoop you understood.

You claimed in several places that you don't understand my arguments and you disagree with my references. So that's that, we can' t argue if you are incapable of comprehending what I say.

The word nincompoop you understood. — god must be atheist

I don't know what you're talking about. Put a proposition on the table, give it some support, and I will respond.

And you've read Kant, Kierkegaard, Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre and the rest, and understand their analyses of the structure of experience, but none of this rings a bell? — Constance

In truth, I've read some Kant and some Heidegger and some Sartre; my old copy of Being and Nothingness is probably somewhere in my house with other old books. Some of this rings a bell, but is not of great concern to me.

I'm almost hesitant to admit it given the popularity and vulgarization of Stoicism these days, but I accept as wise the Stoic view (roughly stated) that we shouldn't allow matters outside our control to disturb us, and our concern should be mastering what's in our control, and we should strive to act accordingly. Accepting that, what rings a bell as you say doesn't have visceral significance to me--it isn't something which drives me to despair or distraction, nor do I feel a need to explain or understand philosophically why we're here if that means discovering the hidden meaning and purpose of our existence. It isn't clear to me we can do so by thinking, no matter how hard we try.

The Stoic view of us as parts of nature and our relation to nature has similarity to the view accepted by Dewey there are other similarities with Pragmatism as well (John Lachs wrote an interesting book called Stoic Pragmatism).

But my thoughts are that this goes deeper, begs questions, because this spear in my kidney and the excruciating pain is not a problem solving event — Constance

According to Dewey, we only think when we encounter problems; we're reflective when we encounter circumstances which we seek to control or change. Otherwise, we conduct ourselves largely by impulse and habit. James said, as I recall, that for the most part the world, to us, is a kind of blooming, buzzing confusion which takes focus only when we feel the need to pay attention to it. We feel pain and though pain itself isn't a problem solving event, reducing or eliminating it is. What is it about pain that we must otherwise understand or think about? Why, as a general matter, we should feel it? Theology has a ready answer via Original Sin--but why is this a philosophical concern?

It takes a commitment to literature... — Constance

"The wonder turns to shocking revelation that there is no foundation to our existence, and nihilism asserts itself" - only for those with time on their hands...

Middle class people get bored and read books to ease the boredom...

Yet analytic philosophers, following W's lead, shut off all such thinking as
a "seduction of language". — Constance

It would be an error to think that because they do not discuss the ineffable, they say nothing about it.

I have Badiou's Wittgenstein's Antiphilosophy at hand. He finishes by talking of Wittgenstein's "latent despair". I suspect Badiou only understood half of what was going on.

This post on ‘the silence of the Buddha’ and whether it is comparable in principle to Wittgenstein’s aphorism.

Nihilism is very disturbing only if one thinks about it. Ethical nihilism is, by my thinking, impossible. Call this dread: the meeting of deep suffering and no foundational redemptive recourse.
The joy? Absolutely! This, I think, is what Buddhism is about. — Constance

The world doesn't need to be saved. That's positive nihilism. Is that Buddhist?

In truth, I've read some Kant and some Heidegger and some Sartre; my old copy of Being and Nothingness is probably somewhere in my house with other old books. Some of this rings a bell, but is not of great concern to me. — Ciceronianus the White

Heidegger's Being and Time is the seminal work. If I had kept reading analytic philosophy I would not have left it. It was accidental that I came across Rorty, who referred me to Heidegger and Derrida. The bell is for me a kind of revelation.

I'm almost hesitant to admit it given the popularity and vulgarization of Stoicism these days, but I accept as wise the Stoic view (roughly stated) that we shouldn't allow matters outside our control to disturb us, and our concern should be mastering what's in our control, and we should strive to act accordingly. Accepting that, what rings a bell as you say doesn't have visceral significance to me--it isn't something which drives me to despair or distraction, nor do I feel a need to explain or understand philosophically why we're here if that means discovering the hidden meaning and purpose of our existence. It isn't clear to me we can do so by thinking, no matter how hard we try. — Ciceronianus the White

Well, if one day you decide to look into it: Heidegger had high hopes for Buddhism, thought that it could discover a new language of deep intimacy with something primordial within that has been lost through ages of bad thinking. In fact, if someone were genuinely interested in what the "existence" part of existentialism is, I would say, read Husserl's Ideas and meditate. It is not about explaining things as one would explain a combustion engine. It is a "method" which Husserl calls the phenomenological reduction (epoche), not unlike meditation, if you think about it. His Cartesian Meditations is accessible and interesting, but his Ideas is more rigorous. In his private letters he writes that many who follow his method come to understand religion better.

According to Dewey, we only think when we encounter problems; we're reflective when we encounter circumstances which we seek to control or change. Otherwise, we conduct ourselves largely by impulse and habit. James said, as I recall, that for the most part the world, to us, is a kind of blooming, buzzing confusion which takes focus only when we feel the need to pay attention to it. We feel pain and though pain itself isn't a problem solving event, reducing or eliminating it is. What is it about pain that we must otherwise understand or think about? Why, as a general matter, we should feel it? Theology has a ready answer via Original Sin--but why is this a philosophical concern? — Ciceronianus the White

This is the shortcoming of pragmatism, and Wittgenstein knows this when he lauds action, for ethics will not be explained, but it does make its appearance, "shows" itself, and I think this is exactly where he was on this, in all of its absoluteness, which we cannot discuss, in the injunction not to do , or to do something. It is what John Caputo calls the "weakness of God" (my interpretation of Caputo, at any rate). We can clearly see that, say, being burned alive is far more than a factual affair, something that fits neatly and exhaustively in a theory like evolution or some other set of contingencies. Something irreducible in the givenness of the pain. This is what W had in mind when he prohibited talk on ethics: the metaethical "badness". Something central to all my philosophical thinking. Can't explain it, but the injunction is clear, the clearest thing I can imagine. Straight from God (W did affirm divinity, not to put too fine a point on it).
Metaethics is foundational for an exposition on what it means to be a person and it was Wittgenstein who showed me this.