The relationship between descriptive and prescriptive domains

Pfhorrest

The facet of my philosophical views that has perhaps gotten the most push-back on these forums is my view on the relationship between the parts of philosophy like metaphysics and epistemology, which I broadly call the descriptive side of philosophy, the side concerned with reality, truth, facts, etc; and the parts of philosophy like ethics and political philosophy, which I broadly call the prescriptive side of philosophy, the side concerned with morality, goodness, norms, etc.

I'm curious if it's just a few vocal people here who disagree so vehemently, rather than the dominant opinion, and also more generally where people fall in their views on the relationship between these two domains.

To elaborate on what I mean by the four poll answers below:

"They are separate and starkly different" - This is the option for views like Stephen Jay Gould's non-overlapping magisteria (NOMA), his view that matters concerning reality are the domain of science, with its methods, and matters concerning morality are the domain of religion, with its completely different methods, and the two cannot be mixed nor approached separately in the same way. You don't have to subscribe specifically to Gould's NOMA here, you don't have to think the two sides are science and religion exactly, but anyone who thinks anything in that ballpark should go with this option.

"There is only the descriptive domain" - This is the option for views like scientism, in the sense of attempts to reduce all questions, even questions about ethics, politics, etc, to questions of fact, which is to say, descriptive questions, questions about reality, that are to be answered by the methods of science. But again, you don't have to subscribe specifically to scientism here, you don't have to think that science exactly is the correct method of figuring out what is real, but anyone who thinks that questions about morality are just a subset of questions about reality should go with this option.

"There is only the prescriptive domain" - This is the option for views like some forms of social constructivism, the kind that would say that "reality is a social construct", claiming that all assertions of supposed facts are in actuality just social constructs, ways of thinking about things put forth merely in an attempt to shape the behavior of other people to some end, in effect reducing all purportedly factual claims to normative ones (as in claiming that all of reality is merely a social construct, such constructivism reframes every apparent attempt to describe reality as actually an attempt to change how people think and so behave, which is the function of normative claims). But again, your view doesn't have to be specifically such constructivism to pick this option, just anything that frames claims about reality as just as value-oriented as claims about morality.

"They are separate but still similar" - This is my view, and to be honest I'm not really familiar with any named philosophies or philosophers who espouse something like it. To put it shortly, I think that the questions of what is real and what is moral are inherently separate, respecting the is-ought or fact-value distinction, much like Gould's NOMA; but I think that similar methodologies can and have been applied to both of them, both in ways that I don't approve of (religions have applied their dogmatic methodologies to claims about reality just as much as they have to claims about morality), and in ways that I endorse (I think that a methodology analogous to the scientific method can be applied to questions about morality just as well as science is applied to questions about reality -- which is where I frequently encounter the push back that prompted me to ask this poll).

Please also elaborate below on why you answered as you did. Thanks!

fdrake

Missed the option that the distinction isn't worth making?

Metaphysician Undercover

↪Pfhorrest

Where's the "other" option? I would say that they definitely have a different meaning, as "is" and "ought" have different meanings. But it's one philosophy, metaphysics, which deals with them both, so they are of the same domain.

Tobias

I would agree with your view Pfhorrest, but not by proposing the scientific method for normative questions. I think a philosophical method can be applied to both without compromising the is / ought distinction. Both normative considerations (why punish murderers for instance) and scientific considerations (The universe is 13.8 billion years old, (I googled it so it is true...) ) contain presuppositions. It is philosophy's job in my opinion to uncover these presuppositions, including actually the is / ought distinction itself. the distinction is itself philosophical, though not of course irrelevant. Therefore I do also agree with metaphysician Undercover above.

counterpunch

None of the above.

tim wood

What @Tobias said, and, separate but similar, at least in the sense of having some overlap. And this the common-sense of the thing. The others being absolute alternatives, and absolutist claims seeming always to fail in the application of themselves to themselves.

And btw, imo first-rate OP.

Pfhorrest

Missed the option that the distinction isn't worth making? — fdrake

Where's the "other" option? I would say that they definitely have a different meaning, as "is" and "ought" have different meanings. But it's one philosophy, metaphysics, which deals with them both, so they are of the same domain. — Metaphysician Undercover

That would be one of the middle two options, each of which considers there to be only one domain. But in that case I’m curious how one would characterize that domain, in a way more fundamentally descriptive, or prescriptive, in the senses of those terms used by those who distinguish the two.

It’s like materialism and idealism as positions in philosophy of mind, both of which say that mind and body are not different kinds of things, but differ on what the one nature of both of them is like.

I think a philosophical method can be applied to both without compromising the is / ought distinction. Both normative considerations (why punish murderers for instance) and scientific considerations (The universe is 13.8 billion years old, (I googled it so it is true...) ) contain presuppositions. It is philosophy's job in my opinion to uncover these presuppositions — Tobias

My question here is basically about what you take those presuppositions to be. Are they radically different for the two sides, exactly the same for both (and if so what way are they like), or “separate but equal”.

To illustrate what I mean by that “separate but equal” thing: in my philosophy I apply the same exact principles to both reality and morality, but two of them manifest as different more familiar principles when applied to the different domains. The principle I call “universalism”, applied to descriptive questions, basically means anti-solipsism (or any other kind of metaphysical relativism), or in other words, realism; but applied to prescriptive questions, it means anti-egotism (or any other kind of ethical relativism), or in other words, altruism. Likewise, the principle I call “phenomenalism” breaks down into empiricism about descriptive matters, and hedonism about prescriptive matters.

None of the above. — counterpunch

Care to elaborate?

And btw, imo first-rate OP. — tim wood

Thanks!

fdrake

That would be one of the middle two options, each of which considers there to be only one domain. But in that case I’m curious how one would characterize that domain, in a way more fundamentally descriptive, or prescriptive, in the senses of those terms used by those who distinguish the two. — Pfhorrest

I don't think it fits into the middle options. Those options are two ways of collapsing the distinction to one pole, rather than undermining the theoretical apparatus that would make the distinction in the first place. eg pragmatist considerations regarding what it means for something to be a fact containing behavioural commitments for that fact, a reciprocal co-constitution thesis like you might find from a Heideggerian, or Anscombe's virtue-ethical attacks on the distinction.

SophistiCat

where people fall in their views on the relationship between these two domains. — Pfhorrest

Facts are what prompts and couches our moral responses. In my experience, most people don't care about the alleged gap between the two, because in their minds they are linked by firmly held intuitions and moral theories. So things - events, situations, people, anything towards which we can have a moral attitude - may as well have inherent moral properties. I am not sure where that would fit in your classification, but it's considered to be a form of moral realism.

bert1

I've been wanting to think this issue through since Pfhorrest started making this point. I'm unsure of the subject.

I voted for the third option but only because I'm a panpsychist and I think the way the world is is possibly the result of a negotiation between subjects. But I could have voted for any option - each has its argument.

In favour of the first option, I have been wondering if the fact that I am me and not another one (or no one in particular) makes a difference. In matters of fact, it does not matter who is making the scientific observation. The whole idea of science is that it doesn't matter who does it. We should get the same result. Whereas in matters of ethics it (arguably) does matter. From a God's eye view, everyone's suffering is of equal importance. But for me, one person's suffering is of massive significance compared to all the others. That one is bert1. So there's an asymmetry that doesn't exist (does it?) with the descriptive stuff. I can think of some rebuttals to this, so I could be wrong. I'm undecided on the subject.

baker

The facet of my philosophical views that has perhaps gotten the most push-back on these forums is my view on the relationship between the parts of philosophy like metaphysics and epistemology, which I broadly call the descriptive side of philosophy, the side concerned with reality, truth, facts, etc; and the parts of philosophy like ethics and political philosophy, which I broadly call the prescriptive side of philosophy, the side concerned with morality, goodness, norms, etc.

I'm curious if it's just a few vocal people here who disagree so vehemently, rather than the dominant opinion, and also more generally where people fall in their views on the relationship between these two domains. — Pfhorrest

I don't see how it is possible to separate between ethics and metaphysics -- thinking that they are unrelated.
I think metaphysics dictates ethics; ethics must have a metaphysical foundation. What one believes that should be done must have a foundation in how things really are.

counterpunch

None of the above.
— counterpunch

Care to elaborate? — Pfhorrest

Glad to. Thanks for asking.

To my mind, the organism evolves in relation to a causal reality, and has to be 'correct' to survive. From the structure of DNA, to physiology, to the behaviours of animals, all are crafted by the function or die algorithm of evolution to be correct to reality, or are rendered extinct. To illustrate the point we might ask: why does a bird build a nest before it lays eggs? Does it know and plan ahead? Unlikely. Rather, all the bird like creatures that didn't are extinct. This is behavioural intelligence crafted by the function or die algorithm of evolution.

Human evolution begins with primate tribal groups - and it's here we see the origin of morality. Chimpanzees have morality of sorts. They share food and groom each other, and remember who reciprocates, and withhold such favours accordingly. A moral sense is advantageous to the individual within the tribe, and to the tribe composed of moral individuals. Assuming humans were little different in the early stages of their evolution, the origin of morality is a behaviourally intelligent evolutionary response to the environment, and manifests as an innate moral sense.

Human beings developed intellectual intelligence, and much later joined together to form multi-tribal social groups. At this point they needed an explicit moral code - so that, any dispute would not split the social group into its tribal elements. They justified social rules (think Moses coming down the mountain with the ten commandments and uniting the tribes of Israel) with reference to God. Society required faith in God, and consequently the origin and nature of morality was forgotten. Morality became objectivised - and it's this objectivised morality that is a separate magisterium to reality, truth, facts etc. Whereas, the moral sense is a consequence of the truth relation between the organism and a causal reality, and a innate part of human understanding.

In light of this, consider Hume's famous observation:

"In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always remarked, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs; when of a sudden I am surprised to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not."

Putting aside the usual implication of this argument, it's what human beings do - and cannot help but do when presented with a list of facts. We see the moral implications of those facts. Facts are not a separate magisterium to us, because we are imbued with an innate moral sense, in turn a behaviourally intelligent, evolutionary response to a causal reality.

This much, I'm fairly certain about. But to get speculative, it gets interesting when considered in relation to the Anthropic Principle - which states that in order for intelligent life to exist, the universe must have qualities that allow for the existence of intelligent life. If morality is a behaviourally intelligent response to a causal reality, one could draw the implication that the universe has moral qualities.

Banno

↪Pfhorrest

Isn't the distinction obviously one of direction of fit? An "is" statement will be felicitous if what is said were modified to match what is the case. An "ought" statement will be felicitous if what is the case is modified to match what was said.

Pfhorrest

Isn't the distinction obviously one of direction of fit? An "is" statement will be felicitous if what is said were modified to match what is the case. An "ought" statement will be felicitous if what is the case is modified to match what was said. — Banno

That's how I think of it, yeah, but it seems apparent that not everybody else does; and even those who do, who agree that they are fundamentally different kinds of statements, sometimes differ on what can or should be said or done regarding the two different kinds (e.g. Gould vs myself).

bert1

Isn't the distinction obviously one of direction of fit? An "is" statement will be felicitous if what is said were modified to match what is the case. An "ought" statement will be felicitous if what is the case is modified to match what was said. — Banno

That's very interesting. I hadn't thought of it like that.

Banno

but it seems apparent that not everybody else does; — Pfhorrest

...those trapped by erroneous notions of meaning, who would benefit from looking at what is being done with the words they misuse.

Wayfarer

it gets interesting when considered in relation to the Anthropic Principle - which states that in order for intelligent life to exist, the universe must have qualities that allow for the existence of intelligent life. If morality is a behaviourally intelligent response to a causal reality, one could draw the implication that the universe has moral qualities. — counterpunch

:up: That's an interesting idea.

The problem with Darwinism as an ethos, is that there is no inherent purpose other than propogation. Due to the historical situation in which it arose, evolutionary biology has displaced religion as a kind of secular creation story. It is underwritten by the assumption that the origins of life, whilst not known, are likely fortuitious, a consequence of not-yet-understood chemistry. But your implication is intriguing.

Whereas, the moral sense is a consequence of the truth relation between the organism and a causal reality, and a innate part of human understanding. — counterpunch

But facts under-determine the possibie outcomes. People can see the same facts, and have completely divergent opinions about what they mean. This does not happen with animals, because animals can't engage in hypotheticals.

Consider the fact that human action ranges to the extremes. People can perform extraordinary acts of altruism, including kindness toward other species — or they can utterly fail to be altruistic, even toward their own children. So whatever tendencies we may have inherited leave ample room for variation; our choices will determine which end of the spectrum we approach. This is where ethical discourse comes in — not in explaining how we’re “built,” but in deliberating on our own future acts. Should I cheat on this test? Should I give this stranger a ride? Knowing how my selfish and altruistic feelings evolved doesn’t help me decide at all. Most, though not all, moral codes advise me to cultivate altruism. But since the human race has evolved to be capable of a wide range of both selfish and altruistic behavior, there is no reason to say that altruism is superior to selfishness in any biological sense.

In fact, the very idea of an “ought” is foreign to evolutionary theory. It makes no sense for a biologist to say that some particular animal should be more cooperative, much less to claim that an entire species ought to aim for some degree of altruism. — Richard Polt

bongo fury

...those trapped by erroneous notions of meaning, — Banno

Haha, count me as one of 'em (if you didn't already) :rofl:

To be fair, "wrong" brings to mind countless specific descriptive indications: examples of actions or behaviours that are indicated, described, denoted, labelled, pointed at, by the word.

Sure, those are cases to be proscribed, and alternatives prescribed. Right and wrong are roughly co-extensive with prescribable and proscribable, respectively. That doesn't stop an ethical choice from being one of correct description: finding appropriate descriptive application (pointing) of the ethical words. — bongo fury

Banno

↪bongo fury

:wink:

counterpunch

↪Wayfarer

The problem with Darwinism as an ethos, is that there is no inherent purpose other than propagation. Due to the historical situation in which it arose, evolutionary biology has displaced religion as a kind of secular creation story. It is underwritten by the assumption that the origins of life, whilst not known, are likely fortuitous, a consequence of not-yet-understood chemistry. But your implication is intriguing. — Wayfarer

I disagree. It's a consequence of omitting a causal reality from evolutionary theory as a form of selection, but it's rather obvious when you think about it, that heat, cold, sunlight, time, chemistry, entropy - all these physical environmental factors impose requirements upon organisms, and so - evolution produces organisms that are correct to reality on a number of levels. Genetic, physiological, behavioural and intellectual. If you're wrong - you're gone.

But facts under-determine the possible outcomes. People can see the same facts, and have completely divergent opinions about what they mean — Wayfarer

That's because morality is a sense, like a sense of humour, or the aesthetic sense. There's considerable overlap between individuals, but there's no definition of what's funny or beautiful. Similarly, as Scanlon concludes: "working out the terms of moral justification is an unending task."

In fact, the very idea of an “ought” is foreign to evolutionary theory. — Richard Polt

So then you, or Polt - would deny that chimpanzees have morality of a sort, and that it's advantageous to the individual within the tribe - and an advantage to the tribe composed of moral individuals? Jane Goodall would strongly disagree. Is she wrong?

Banno

They are separate and starkly different
No, since both are statement and hence about things. We can take what ought be the case and make it the case. They are about the same thing.

There is only the descriptive domain
...as if we could not change what is the case. The denial of efficacy.

There is only the prescriptive domain
The denial of a world that is independent of how we want it to be.

They are separate but still similar
Similar only in that they are both attitudes to states of affairs; the way we decide what is the case is not like the way we decide what ought be the case.

Wayfarer

If you're wrong - you're gone. — counterpunch

Right - but that can only ever amount to either utilitarianism or pragmatism.

And 'intellectual' is in a different category. If you're a predator, you're adapted to an environment and to predation as a means of survival. Animals are generally adapted to an ecological niche, an environment. The intellect can either be adaptive, or maladaptive - if h. sapiens brings about environmental catastrophe that results in billions of deaths, then it's maladaptive. But even that is not the point - to compare intellect with physical faculties is to miss the point - it opens cognitive horizons that are not available to non-rational animals.

I don't know if Jane Goodall is wrong, or what she would be wrong about. I do vaguely recall she documented some pretty appalling violence in chimp tribes, including infanticide and killing of adults. Don't see how that has any bearing on whether chimps are or are not moral.

180 Proof

@Pfhorrest –

I selected the second option because prescriptive domains supervene on (a/the) descriptive domain (i.e. oughts/ought nots are enabled by can/not-constraints) in so far as facts are theory/value/ought-laden (i.e. socially selected and not 'constructed') from which normativity – hypothetical imperatives – can be derived (pace Hume) e.g. hygiene nutrition & exercise, clinical medicine, ecological sustainability, safety engineering ... institutional facts (e.g. money, mail delivery, traffic lights-signs, insurance, organized sports, markets, etc). In other words, unlike the OP's last option where the domains parallel or mirror each other (or overlap tangentially?), prescriptive domains (e.g. why) seem to me special cases of (the) more general, encompassing, descriptive domain(s) (e.g. how) – however, not that prescriptions are reducible to descriptions, but rather that the latter constitutes the sufficient condition for (i.e. materiality, embodiment, manifestation of) the former. And so I prefer (nonreductionist) scientific / moral naturalism to (reductionist) 'scientism'.

Banno

↪Wayfarer

I'm a bit surprised to find you apparently agreeing with the anthropic principle here, after our chat on Knowledge, Belief, and Faith: Anthony Kenny.

The anthropic argument is posited as an answer to the question of why the world is so suitable for life. The argument is that there are innumerable ways in which the world might have been but we find ourselves as a matter of fact in a world that is suitable; and points out that we could not have found ourselves in any other sort of world, because any other sort of world would not have produced us... Because we are in a suitable world, it is not just possible but necessary that there must be such suitable worlds. — Banno

...that last move, here bolded, is the error Kenny attributes to Dawkins - I had understood you as agreeing with it.

counterpunch

Right - but that can only ever amount to either utilitarianism or pragmatism. — Wayfarer

I would have thought 'truth' was the take home concept in terms of an "inherent purpose other than propagation."

And 'intellectual' is in a different category. — Wayfarer

Only human beings have intellectual intelligence.

The intellect can either be adaptive, or maladaptive - if h. sapiens brings about environmental catastrophe that results in billions of deaths, then it's maladaptive. — Wayfarer

No. Just incorrect to reality.

to compare intellect with physical faculties is to miss the point - it opens cognitive horizons that are not available to non-rational animals. — Wayfarer

I don't know what this means? But, only humans are intellectually intelligent. Animals are behaviourally intelligent. Intellectual intelligence is built upon behavioural intelligence, in turn built upon physiological intelligence - right down to the structure of DNA. The organism has to be correct to reality.

I don't know if Jane Goodall is wrong, or what she would be wrong about. I do vaguely recall she documented some pretty appalling violence in chimp tribes, including infanticide and killing of adults. Don't see how that has any bearing on whether chimps are or are not moral. — Wayfarer

You seemed pretty certain in your previous post that:

In fact, the very idea of an “ought” is foreign to evolutionary theory. — Richard Polt

So what are you saying? Where, in your philosophy - do 'oughts' come from?

Wayfarer

I don't know what this means? But, only humans are intellectually intelligent. Animals are behaviourally intelligent. — counterpunch

'What it means' is that humans can contemplate 'what if....'; they can undertake different courses of action; they can consider the outcome of those courses of action. They can wonder what consequences their actions will have on others. And they can think about the meaning of it all, wonder what it was that brought them into this life, and whether there is any sense in it. And so on. My view is, as soon as h.sapiens becomes, well, sapient, then they're in a different category to non-rational animals, because they then live in a meaning-world, not simply a natural environment.

So what are you saying? Where, in your philosophy - do 'oughts' come from? — counterpunch

I'm trying to point out that evolutionary biology, per se, does not provide any particular grounds or rationale for ethical decision-making. It is a truism that if creatures are not adapted to their environment then they will perish; in that sense they need to be a 'good fit'. But that doesn't provide any basis for ethical decision-making, other than the obvious. We've slotted evolutionary biology into the role formerly occupied by virtue ethics and our other ethical codes, but it doesn't necessarily do the job. It's not equipped for it, and trying to make it fit results in biological reductionism.

As to what should drive ethical decision-making - obviously a huge question. Pragmatically, I would agree with a lot of what you say about the urgency of tacking climate change. But then ask yourself this: how can the Western industrial capitalist model, based on an untenable projection of never-ending growth on a finite planet, be reconciled with the likelihood of vast resource shortages and environmental disruption? What kind of life philosophy ought we to adopt to deal with these constraints? I think we need to learn to cultivate something other than endless consumption and endless growth. What kinds of philosophies could that draw on? So that's one element.

↪Banno

I think the anthropic cosmological principle supports the attitude of natural theology. The fact that Dawkins, et al, need to appeal to the notion that there might be endless other universes in order to defray that argument rather serves to strengthen my view, rather than weaken it.

counterpunch

'What it means' is that humans can contemplate 'what if....'; they can undertake different courses of action; they can consider the outcome of those courses of action. They can wonder what consequences their actions will have on others. And they can think about the meaning of it all, wonder what it was that brought them into this life, and whether there is any sense in it. And so on. My view is, as soon as h.sapiens becomes, well, sapient, then they're in a different category to non-rational animals, because they then live in a meaning-world, not simply a natural environment. — Wayfarer

Agreed.

I'm trying to point out that evolutionary biology, per se, does not provide any particular grounds or rationale for ethical decision-making. It is a truism that if creatures are not adapted to their environment then they will perish; in that sense they need to be a 'good fit'. But that doesn't provide any basis for ethical decision-making, other than the obvious. We've slotted evolutionary biology into the role formerly occupied by virtue ethics, but it doesn't necessarily do the job. It's not equipped for it, and trying to make it fit results in biological reductionism. — Wayfarer

What are your grounds for deciding if a joke is funny? Or deciding if a painting is pleasing to the eye? There are no grounds, per se. There are identifiable regularities, and considerable agreement among people that a joke is funny, or a painting is pleasing. But humour and aesthetics are a sense - and so is morality. I explained this above.

As to what should drive ethical decision-making - obviously a huge question. Pragmatically, I would agree with a lot of what you say about the urgency of tacking climate change. But then ask yourself this: how can the Western industrial capitalist model, based on an untenable projection of never-ending growth on a finite planet, be reconciled with the likelihood of vast resource shortages and environmental disruption? — Wayfarer

Limitless clean energy from the molten interior of the Earth.

What kind of life philosophy ought we to adopt to deal with these constraints? — Wayfarer

Accept that science is true, and act accordingly.

I think we need to learn to cultivate something other than endless consumption and endless growth. — Wayfarer

I disagree.

What kinds of philosophies could that draw on? So that's one element. — Wayfarer

Mine.

Wayfarer

Accept that science is true — counterpunch

Meaning what, exactly? There is no single authoritative source or oracle by the name of 'science'. Science is multi-faceted, always evolving. I think what you're advocating is actually scientism, which is the view that science is authoritative in ways it cannot be.

There are identifiable regularities, and considerable agreement among people that a joke is funny, or a painting is pleasing. But humour and aesthetics are a sense - and so is morality. I explained this above. — counterpunch

Here's the nub of the issue. But it both subjectivises, and trivialises, morality - it reduces them to an individual matter - essentially a matter of opinion. And this is precisely the issue that the OP is dealing with.

Mine — counterpunch

I haven't discerned one.

Pfhorrest

Similar only in that they are both attitudes to states of affairs; the way we decide what is the case is not like the way we decide what ought be the case. — Banno

This is the kind of opinion that I meant to be covered by the first option, not the last.

counterpunch

Meaning what, exactly? There is no single authoritative source or oracle by the name of 'science'. Science is multi-faceted, always evolving. I think what you're advocating is actually scientism, which is the view that science is authoritative in ways it cannot be. — Wayfarer

I think there's enormous consensus on the shape and nature of a middle ground scientific understanding of the world around us - insofar as it relates to securing a prosperous, sustainable future. We know enough we need to know to know.

Here's the nub of the issue. But it both subjectivises, and trivialises, morality - it reduces them to an individual matter - essentially a matter of opinion. And this is precisely the issue that the OP is dealing with. — Wayfarer

As opposed to what? On the basis of our moral sense, we form and express opinions, not least by voting for politicians, who express their opinions in the formation of laws, that allocate values in society, and we have systems to punish transgressors. There's no inherent problem with morality being a sense.

I haven't discerned one. — Wayfarer

No, you haven't! I went to such pains to explain it, and whoosh!

counterpunch

↪Pfhorrest

Well Pfhorrest, what do you think? You asked if I care to elaborate. Was it just to antagonise Wayfarer?

The relationship between descriptive and prescriptive domains

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