You define content as if it were a single property, yet later talk about different content. In order for two 'contents' to differ, they must themselves be composed of properties which differ. I'm asking what these properties are. — Isaac


I'm sorry but this legitimately read like word salad. I have no clue what you're saying. — khaled

Sorry about that. I'll try again. Let's say the content of a cup is a property of the cup. So cup A contains milk, cup B contains water. There's a reason why milk and water are different contents and it's to do with the properties of milk and water. Milk 'contains', or is made of, complex protein and lipid molecules, water is made of hydrogen and oxygen. Why is 'hydrogen and oxygen' different to 'complex proteins and lipids'...gain due to the different make-up of those things. eventually, I suppose, we get to some non-material property changing (I'm no physicist, so I won't speculate). what I'm asking is if one person has content A and another has content B what is the property of the content which makes A not B? Why are A and B not just the same thing? They can't differ in their consequences (they're non-physical epiphenomena, they have no physical consequences. So what are we measuring, to establish that A and B are two different experiences (in terms of content)?

as my example shows, the content of experience can change even if the V4 area doesn't at all. All it takes is some glasses. — khaled

If you add the glasses, the V4 area will change. It does.

The example I gave still has the change taking place in the visual system so is not evidence that any physical change (such as toes) can be responsible for content determining difference: I would agree. I would also add however that the human body is very integrated. Almost anything will cause a change in the visual system. — khaled

That's just not true in the sense we use the term. That's what I mean by a 'leaky' cascade. Despite the small streams of signal chains which enter and leave the main route, it's absolutely obvious which is the main route. Obvious enough to label. If you don't accept fuzzy edges to labels, then you're not going to be able to use the vast majority of language. It's like saying we can't use the word 'cup' because there are a few edge cases were it's not clear if it's a cup or a vase.

The neural signal cascade is clear enough, and has distinct enough boundaries for use to legitimately say what neural processes are part of it and which aren't, to the same degree (if not better) than you could say experience X is and experience 'of red' and not just 'of everything'.

If someone were to put on color inverting glasses from birth. And these color inverting glasses we couldn't detect for some reason. Would we be able to tell they had them on? — khaled

Yes. But that answer is obvious, so I'm sure that's not quite what you had in mind. I could tell by looking at them. I could tell by examining their eyes (if the 'glasses' were some sort of bio-mechanical device).

You can obviously access your own sensations. I meant/implied how can you access other people's sensations (rather than their behaviour). — Luke

Other people's sensation are behaviour if you include (as you did), neural activity in 'behaviour'. Sensations are the modelling of signals sent from various nerve endings.

...with the advent of neuroscience we can start to piece together neural correlates. — Isaac


Neural correlates are not behaviours? This is still inference. — Luke

All knowledge is inferred.

If sensations were public, then you wouldn't have to make inferences about them. — Luke

Of course you would. All public knowledge is inferred too.

No-one ever fakes pain. — Isaac


If you wish to abuse language to make a philosophical point. Otherwise, people fake being in pain. — Marchesk

How do you know?

what is the property of the content which makes A not B? — Isaac

Then it is the same as Unenlightened's question: "What is does red look like". I can't answer that. Not for lack of properties but for an inability to express the difference. You tell a me what red looks like first. The contents of our experience never enter the conversation so we have no words for them.

However what causes A to be different from B is a difference in physical causes.

I could tell by looking at them. I could tell by examining their eyes — Isaac

Remember:

And these color inverting glasses we couldn't detect for some reason. — khaled

But another question while you're at it: Would the person with the color inverting glasses act any differently to the person without them? Assuming they've had them on their whole life and they don't take them off.

That's just not true in the sense we use the term. That's what I mean by a 'leaky' cascade. Despite the small streams of signal chains which enter and leave the main route, it's absolutely obvious which is the main route. Obvious enough to label. If you don't accept fuzzy edges to labels, then you're not going to be able to use the vast majority of language. It's like saying we can't use the word 'cup' because there are a few edge cases were it's not clear if it's a cup or a vase.

The neural signal cascade is clear enough, and has distinct enough boundaries for use to legitimately say what neural processes are part of it and which aren't, to the same degree (if not better) than you could say experience X is and experience 'of red' and not just 'of everything'. — Isaac

Ok. I'll take your word for it.

I did a bit more thinking and: I concede. We can specify what physical differences are responsible for both content determining and structure determining differences. Though we haven't done so yet. So practically private. For now.

How do you know? — Isaac

Well I managed to skip school a few times by faking pain.

How do you know? — Isaac

Really? You don't know?

I was thinking in terms of the cognitive structures the brain produces internally to make sense of the world. But yeah, animals don't need language to understand smells and colors. I wouldn't consider them symbols, though. — Marchesk

Ah, shame, maybe. Not an opportunity to agree roughly where it is we disagree. I was reminded of Goodman's argument that colours often function symbolically, i.e. refer to themselves and each other, by exemplifying: being samples, examples. Typically, for us humans, colour-words are deeply implicated in the classifications resulting therefrom. (So that G equates exemplification by an object of a colour-word to exemplification of that word's extension, a class of objects or illumination events.) But they wouldn't be required in principle.

So, far from exemplifying (!) "anthropocentric", I was willing to be drawn into speculation about the colour experience of "non-linguistic" animals, on that basis.

Although, as you would probably guess, I'm sceptical about samples in the head. About, e.g., now that I think of it,

Rather, blue the qualia is a sign that signifies 470nm light. — hypericin

But ok, perhaps that doesn't describe yours or @Luke's or @khaled's or @Olivier5's position?

(Although @hypericin might recognise exemplification as the relevant mode of signification.)

We can specify what physical differences are responsible for both content determining and structure determining differences. Though we haven't done so yet. So practically private. For now. — khaled

Yeah, I can agree on practical privacy, but (I'm going to take what might have been an agreement and ruin it here) I think they're just as private to you than they are to the neuroscientist - in the sense in which we're talking about them here.

As an ontologically real entity, I don't think there's a feeling that you can access either that represents an epiphenomenological response to 'red'. The best I would concede is a feeling that represents what you think of as your response to red, right now. It may be different in the next few seconds and you may be wrong about it being in response to red (using the public definition of 'red'). The neuroscientist can't see either because they're at the other end. They can see exactly what is in response to 'red' (tracing the main neural cascade from the cone cells), but they can't link that the the detail of how you're feeling because the links are too complex. So if there is an epiphenomenological qualia of 'red', no-one knows what it is.

Really? You don't know? — Marchesk

I know. What I'm trying to draw out is why you don't.

I know. What I'm trying to draw out is why you don't. — Isaac

I don't believe you.

don't believe you. — Marchesk

Look, you said to Luke...

I really don't get the behaviorists. It's so clear to me how they're wrong. — Marchesk

Which, aside from striling me as being a bit silly (as if behaviourists hadn't thought of that), set up this ludicrous notion that if someone faked pain we have no behavioural method of telling, that we'd have to get our fMRI scanners out as our only resort.

It's such a seemingly silly idea that it intrigues me how you managed to sustain it without hitting that exact notion I presented - "No one ever fakes pain". Because, presumably lacking your own fMRI, how would you ever find out they did, if not by their behaviour.

set up this ludicrous notion that if someone faked pain we have no behavioural method of telling, that we'd have to get our fMRI scanners out as our only resort. — Isaac

No, the issue is that pain can be faked successfully, not that we have no way of potentially finding out after the fact.

Because, presumably lacking your own fMRI, how would you ever find out they did, if not by their behaviour. — Isaac

Behavior is often an indicator of private experience as an inference, but it's not always, and it's usually incomplete. The takeaway from this is that behavior is not consciousness, because you can have behavior absent the experience, such as when someone fakes being in pain. Or make a robot that acted as if it had pain sensations, without any circuitry mimicking the neurological underpinning for pain in animals.

No, the issue is that pain can be faked successfully, not that we have no way of potentially finding out after the fact. — Marchesk

His is that an 'issue'. I don't see how it has any bearing on either behaviourism (which can take subsequent behaviour into account), or on privacy (which can still be undermined by identifying your 'neural underpinnings', as you put it).

I'm not seeing the relevance of the fact that people can pretend to be in pain for a limited period (and to a limited extent - micro expressions, auto-defensive recoil etc).

The takeaway from this is that behavior is not consciousness, because you can have behavior absent the experience — Marchesk

Don't see how that follows at all. I can raise my arm as part of catching a ball, or I can just raise it. Does that make 'catching a ball' no longer a physical act? We can do some of the behaviours of being in pain, or we can do all of them. That we can do only some doesn't have any bearing at all on what doing all of them would constitute

We can do some of the behaviours of being in pain, or we can do all of them. That we can do only some doesn't have any bearing at all on what doing all of them would constitute — Isaac

Or we can do none of them. The experience of pain isn't a behavior. Behavior is often a result of being in pain, but not always. We can also perform all of the pain behaviors without being in pain, depending on how good of an actor one is.

Therefore, no set of behaviors is the experience of being in pain.

which can still be undermined by identifying your 'neural underpinnings', as you put it). — Isaac

That only works we can correlate with experiences we already have.

The best I would concede is a feeling that represents what you think of as your response to red, right now. It may be different in the next few seconds and you may be wrong about it being in response to red (using the public definition of 'red'). — Isaac

Good enough. Not exactly sure what you mean here but it has "feeling" in it so that will do. Everyone who has tried to define qualia or experience has called it something along the lines of "What it feels to X"

So if there is an epiphenomenological qualia of 'red', no-one knows what it is. — Isaac

Of course you know what it is silly! It is:

a feeling that represents what you think of as your response to red, right now. — Isaac

If you're making the argument that what comes to mind when we think of "red" is not constant, sure, no disagreement there. From anyone I think. But it is largely similar. The banner for this site is not red for instance. What it feels like to drink orange juice radically changes after brushing my teeth is perhaps a better example.

They can see exactly what is in response to 'red' (tracing the main neural cascade from the cone cells), but they can't link that the the detail of how you're feeling because the links are too complex. — Isaac

The only point of disagreement here would probably be that I would add: Nor will they ever grasp that detail until they experience it.

What "red looks like to you" right now is something they can only know by making sure they have an identical brain state for the most part. The only way you get the same epiphenomena is by getting the same relevant physical conditions. Note here I'm assuming to "Know" the epiphenomena is to experience it.

A blind neurologist will never know that red is. Though he will know the physical condition under which the epiphenomena manifests.

A blind neurologist will never know that red is. Though he will know the physical condition under which the epiphenomena manifests. — khaled

Reminds me of a short science fiction story in which a cryogenically intelligent alien is recovered from deep space and is restored to life. It's some kind of marine life that has no eyes or ears, making heavy use of chemical detection sensory organs instead. The humans overseeing the restoration remark that it will make communication very difficult, since the creature doesn't experience the world the way humans do. And indeed, the creature, being more technologically advanced, creates a hybrid human from DNA it sampled to act as an intermediary that it could interface with.

Rather, blue the qualia is a sign that signifies 470nm light.
— hypericin

But ok, perhaps that doesn't describe yours or Luke's or @khaled's or @Olivier5's position? — bongo fury

Yes, I interpret colors as biological signs (like the genetic code is a set of biological signs). Colors code not exactly for wavelength in fact, more precisely for the levels of excitation of three types of cone cells in our retina. Each type of cone cells has a certain range of wavelengths exciting it so there is a lose correlation between wavelengths and colors. But there are many different combinations of those three 'feeds', beyond the 'pure' colors of the rainbow, and of course we don't have a type of cone cell per color (that would be uneconomical). Just three types of cone cells for all the colors. Orange, purple, yellow, brown etc. are 'composite' types of colors that are produced when two or three types of cone cells are excited at the same time in the same region of the retina.

No-one ever fakes pain. — Isaac


If you wish to abuse language to make a philosophical point. Otherwise, people fake being in pain.
— Marchesk

How do you know? — Isaac

What color is this table? — khaled

But isn't what you are really experiencing is number of polygons?

Not even those are the same shade from end to end.

Some of those polygons are grey at one end, cream at the other. The larger one - what might be called the "table top" - varies from almost white in the middle to black at the edge.

But isn't what you are really experiencing just coloured dots on a screen? There is only the illusion of a table.

But this is not a table, it is a picture of a picture of a table.

Asking what colour the table is not a simple request for elementary information. It of course involves a vast presupposition of ontology and of language. A shared ontology, a public language.

There's a conceit to talk of the experience of the table.

Edit:

A blind neurologist will never know that red is. — khaled

The same conceit is seen here. As if there is only one real "knowing what red is". @unenlightened already shoed us a friend who despite not being able to see red as we do, went for more than twenty years "knowing" what red is.

All knowledge is inferred. — Isaac

How are your own pain sensations inferred? From what are they inferred?

What about motives. Is that also partly intersubjective?

The experience of pain — Marchesk

...as if there were only one experience of pain. Do you notice how this very phrase grossly simplifies the situation?

"The experience of pain is private" can only be understood by ignoring most of what we know about pain!

When we ask about motive, we're asking about the purpose for an action. What did you want? What was your reasoning?

I understand your goal oriented behavior only to the extent that I understand my own.

The experience of pain is private" can only be understood by ignoring most of what we know about pain! — Banno

Again, this puts pain somehow beyond the individual. As if it's a cloud people touch.

How?

It looks to me that you are reading too much into what was said.

Convention says I know your pain by thinking of my own. I've never had a heart attack, but I know what pain is, and I can imagine it in my chest. I extrapolate.

If pain is public, then I'm not imagining how the heart attack victim feels, I'm actually feeling the same pain (which doesn't happen thank god).

Pain becomes something beyond me.

Convention says I know your pain by thinking of my own. — frank

Well, there's you problem, right there.

Well, there's you problem, right there. — Banno

It works very well for me. I'm sorry it's giving you fits.

As yourself: "What would Banno argue here?"

It will save us many words.

Convention says I know your pain by thinking of my own. — frank

What would Banno say about this?