Start here, you get epiphenomenalism; start there, you don’t. — Mww

I get to the same conclusion wherever I start: epiphenomenalism is for the epiphenomenal among us, those of us who have no impact on anything whatsoever and are quite happy about their own irrelevance. The theory may logically be true for them, as a self-fulfilling prophecy is: they don't matter because they don't want to. But otherwise, it is logically self-contradictory.

Common courtesy mandates a response, so......Thanks. — Mww

I can actually hear your teeth grinding!

True enough. Some logical arguments conclude sound inferences, some do not.

That is the first option: the attempt to makes sense of social constructs (or mental processes) is potentially useful because social constructs (or mental processes) are sometimes reasonable, useful and improvable. — Olivier5

The first option as written was

the study of social constructs concludes that social constructs are possible, reasonable, useful and improvable — Olivier5

...you missed the option that some might not be even improvable (ie be irredeemable nonsense). I suppose you could stretch the meaning of 'improvable' to include changing almost every single aspect but...

The point is, models are not neatly defined, they're fuzzy and nested within one another. Models like 'consciousness' are nested within broader models of 'self', and so on. So I don't think you can make the omelette of this particular improvement without breaking some eggs.

Now THAT’S a comeback worth a decent chuckle right there. I appreciate it.

...you missed the option that some might not be even improvable (ie be irredeemable nonsense). I suppose you could stretch the meaning of 'improvable' to include changing almost every single aspect but... — Isaac

Some social constructs may be based on insufficient empirical evidence but it does not make them total nonsense. They mean something to people. For instance, modern people tend to believe that the life of a baby is worthy of care and protection. It means something to them when a baby dies. Good old Romans disagreed, and routinely abandoned their unwanted newborns on trash dumps, as not yet human anyway. I suppose one could argue the case either way. There is no empirical evidence that one should care for babies. It's a social construct. At best a feeling, right?...

So I don't think you can make the omelette of this particular improvement without breaking some eggs. — Isaac

I wouldn't break the egg of my own consciousness for any omelette, that you very much. You do what you want with yours.

Some say nothing.

Good old Romans disagreed, and routinely abandoned their unwanted newborns on trash dumps, as not yet human anyway. I suppose one could argue the case either way. There is no empirical evidence that one should care for babies. It's a social construct. At best a feeling, right?... — Olivier5

You seem to be arguing against your own point here as you clearly consider our modern ideas of the sanctity of life better, that the Roman idea should be discarded.

Some models are rubbish.

I could model the mirage as an oasis or as an effect of heat on reflected light. One yields a nasty surprise when I rely on it for water, the other helps me to move on in favour of more satisfying sources of water.

Can you think of any examples where models are not improved by increasing their consistency with observed effects?

Some models are rubbish. — Isaac

Of course they are. You're beating around the bush.

You seem to be arguing against your own point here as you clearly consider our modern ideas of the sanctity of life better, that the Roman idea should be discarded. — Isaac

There is no evidence we should care for babies though, that much is true. We do it for other reasons than strictly material. And therefore, not all social construct can be evidence-based. Some are a priori stated.

epiphenomenalism is for the epiphenomenal among us, those of us who have no impact on anything whatsoever and are quite happy about their own irrelevance. The theory may logically be true for them, as a self-fulfilling prophecy is: they don't matter because they don't want to. But otherwise, it is logically self-contradictory. — Olivier5

Way I see it is it is the only way out for a dualist who wants to respect the science. That, or parallelism. Because it is very difficult to convince oneself of interactionism if they want to respect the physics.

I wouldn't break the egg of my own consciousness for any omelette — Olivier5

Your "egg of consciousness" is different from most people's because you don't say "the mind is non physical" or anything like that. I think Isaac is arguing specifically against a dualist model. Then again, idk what your position is.

Some social constructs may be based on insufficient empirical evidence but it does not make them total nonsense. — Olivier5

The model where the mind is non-physical, yet has top to bottom causation, and also mental events are private, clashes with empirical evidence. It's not that we don't have enough evidence to establish it.

There is no evidence we should care for babies though, that much is true. We do it for other reasons than strictly material. And therefore, not all social construct can be evidence-based. Some are a priori stated. — Olivier5

And when an a priori assumption clashes with modern findings which should we favor?

Your "egg of consciousness" is different from most people's because you don't say "the mind is non physical" or anything like that. — khaled

That is correct.

There is no evidence we should care for babies though, that much is true. We do it for other reasons than strictly material. And therefore, not all social construct can be evidence-based. Some are a priori stated.
— Olivier5

And when an a priori assumption clashes with modern findings which should we favor? — khaled

No scientist is going to prove to you in a lab whether or not you should dump a baby in the trash. It's not a scientific question but a social and moral question.

As for old assumptions that do clash with modern scientific observations, well, they should be discarded I suppose. Like materialism and determinism.

Your "egg of consciousness" is different from most people's because you don't say "the mind is non physical" or anything like that.
— khaled

That is correct. — Olivier5

Reductionist? Just curious.

As for old assumptions that do clash with modern scientific observations, well, they should be discarded I suppose. — Olivier5

Like these:

The model where the mind is non-physical, yet has top to bottom causation, and also mental events are private — khaled

determinism — Olivier5

Modern scientific observations don't discard determinism. Probabilistic theories do not discard determinism any more than saying "This coin toss has a 50/50 chance of producing heads or tails" means that we cannot predict the outcome given starting conditions.

Modern scientific observations don't discard determinism. — khaled

Actually they do, but believers still believe!

Reductionist? Just curious. — khaled

Gods forbid! Emergentist, if that's a word

Actually they do — Olivier5

Actually they don't, but believers still believe!

I'm undecided on the issue btw. I don't think determinism/indeterminism matters much.

Emergentist, if that's a word — Olivier5

Strong or weak?

Well, it seems to me like I think and wonder in language, if that's any different. I'm never aware of myself thinking and wondering using neurons.
— Luke

No, I don't suppose you would be. I don't suppose you're aware of your kidney's functioning either, but that doesn't mean they don't. — Isaac

Does this imply you are no longer arguing that I'm aware of my brain signals?

Whatever goes on in your brain, you're going to post hoc re-tell the narrative to fit the model you're expecting it to fit, in this case "all my thoughts were words". — Isaac

I never meant to imply that "all my thoughts are words"; only that I experience/have at least some of my thoughts in words. The main point I was trying to make was that I don't notice myself having thoughts in the form of brain signals; the occurrence of my brain signals is not something I am conscious of as brain signals. Much like the kidney function you mentioned, I don't see or feel the actions of my brain chemicals or neurons, so I don't notice it happening; I am unaware of it.

You think too fast to form full sentences, but we're so embedded in language that the language centres of our brains convert the stuff we think into words as we go assuming we might need to communicate it at any moment. Since the thoughts are too fast, it only has time to select a few key words - hence the incomplete sentences. Your brain (if it has been enculturated to do so) interprets this association as 'thinking in words' and so it suppresses the data with the alternate sequencing because it's not expecting it. You end up with the narrative that you thought in words. — Isaac

This seems like further evidence to support my argument that we are not consciously aware of our brain signals. You speak of our brains "converting" brain signals into language. If we assume that we are already aware of our brain signals, then they shouldn't need to be converted into language in order for us to then become aware of them. Furthermore, we are not aware of them as brain signals, but only as language. Therefore, according to this model, we are not aware of our (pre-linguistic) brain signals.

I'm not disputing that your use is common. — Isaac

You were until now.

What I was trying to highlight is the (what I believe is unjustified) special pleading with which 'awareness' os used differently with regards to the mind than in all other cases. I don't dispute it's common use, I dispute it's revealing anything useful about the way the mind works. — Isaac

What special pleading? I don't follow what connection you are trying to make between the meaning of "awareness" (as 'conscious of') and this alleged "special pleading" with regards to the mind.

Give me an example answer to the question "how are you conscious of your brain activity?" that you would accept as a satisfactory series of steps. — Isaac

I've already offered an answer to this: it can be achieved by viewing the output of a brain scanner so that you can see your own brain signals/activity. That's how one could be conscious of one's own brain signals; otherwise, they are not typically within the realm of one's perception or attention.

I don't think determinism/indeterminism matters much. — khaled

Note that it is a metaphysical question. And yet there are generations of scientists who fetishized determinism, and still today, more than a hundred years after the double slit experiment... So scientists too do metaphysics.

The distinction between strong and weak emergence makes no logical sense. There is no qualitative difference here. Strong emergence is just the cumulative effect of much weak emergence.

Way I see it is it is the only way out for a dualist who wants to respect the science — khaled

Been chewing on this. True that epiphenomena are conceived as fundamentally different from phenomena, like two different substances. So I agree with you that epiphenomenalism is a dualist theory.

We're going round in circles here. You seem to want to insist on only using a language which makes mental functions as they seem to you the same as mental functions as they are. I you cannot find any language tools to differentiate then there's no point in discussing mental functions with other people at all, you already have 100% exhaustive and accurate knowledge of everything in the field, as do I. What possible benefit could us talking to each other about it possibly yield?

I'm trying to find a mutually acceptable language in which to differentiate what seems to you to be the case, from what seems to others to be the case about your mental processes. It seems to you that you're aware of the location of your arm, but it seems to others (who can see your actual arm) that you're not. They want to be able to describe the disconnect somehow. Your actual arm is in location X you report is as being in location Y so the signals leaving your actual arm are not accurately being represented to your conscious awareness. I'm using 'aware of.../not aware of...' here to represent that distinction. Rather than selecting another term more preferable to you, you seem to be just refusing to talk about the distinction at all in terms of your mental processes - rather there's only one mental process and that's awareness of your arm and it's just what, randomly right or wrong sometimes? I don't know what language you want to use to describe the steps in the process where errors can occur and how.

I can't see much value in continuing a discussion in a field where, on every point, you simply must be right by definition because matters as they seem to you are exactly how matters are.

and still today, more than a hundred years after the double slit experiment. — Olivier5

I am familiar with the experiment and many of its variations. It does not pose a threat to determinism. It ends our hopes of actually determining the future, but it doesn’t end the idea that it is determined. Many interpretations of QM are deterministic.

There is no qualitative difference here. — Olivier5

Yes there is. Weakly emerged concepts can be completely reduced to their component parts. Something like “temperature”. We can always talk about “average kinetic energy of the molecules” instead of temperature, and we would make exactly as much sense. Because temperature is precisely a measure of the average kinetic energy of molecules.

With strong emergence, you can’t do that. Which is why I think it’s magical bullshit. “Put 3 candles in these spots and draw this in blood on the ground and you get Lucifer”. No amount of talking about candles or blood will say anything about the resulting devil.

It ends our hopes of actually determining the future, but it doesn’t end the idea that it is determined. — khaled

If we cannot determine the future, the future remains indertermined, at least by us. Whether somebody else, like God, can determine it is immaterial to anything.

With strong emergence, you can’t do that. Which is why I think it’s magical bullshit. — khaled

For me, it is just the accumulation of many weakly emergent events, and nothing more complicated than that.

I agree, but it goes both ways: the state of my mind also determines what I will physically do, like when one decides to do or write something. — Olivier5

I don't understand what you mean by "it goes both ways". The mind, like everything else is both a cause and effect. So the state of some mind is both caused by the state of the world, and the mind can be the cause of some state in the world. That is what I said.

I don't understand the point of using the term, "physical".

The mind, like everything else is both a cause and effect. So the state of some mind is both caused by the state of the world, and the mind can be the cause of some state in the world. That is what I said. — Harry Hindu

I agree with that.

No scientist is going to prove to you in a lab whether or not you should dump a baby in the trash. It's not a scientific question but a social and moral question. — Olivier5

What should be done is irrelevant and imaginary. All that matters is what is done, and what is done by humans is ultimately dictated by natural selection. The fact that most mothers do care for their babies is the outcome of natural selection.

What should be done is irrelevant and imaginary. — Harry Hindu

I suppose you've never found a baby abandoned in a trash dump. These things are rare nowadays, though they still happen. Back in the days of the Roman empire, it was a constant occurrance. And people had to make such choices. "Do I let this baby die or do I rescue him or her?" It was not an imaginary question but a real and frequent one.

What should be done is only known after you do something. Is what you did what you should have done or shouldn't have done? What if that baby grows up to be the next Hitler or Stalin?

I agree with that. — Olivier5

Great. So the problem of the "privacy" of one's experience is shattered when you understand that causation carries information about your "private" experiences. Just like everything else in the world, you know enough about that thing (person), you can understand how they work (think) and predict their behaviors.

That's a good point: we can never know the consequences of our actions in advance, yet people have to make choices in real time. And they ask themselves these moral questions.

Pragmatically speaking, this often implies they go by either their emotions or some set of rules that simplify decision making. Science cannot provide an answer about 'oughts'.

Just like everything else in the world, you know enough about that thing (person), you can understand how they work (think) and predict their behaviors. — Harry Hindu

Indeed, one could even say that people are easier to understand and predict by other people than, say, electrons. This being said, people can also dissimulate their thoughts. You can never be 100% certain that a given report is genuine and truthful. So there is still some privacy to human thoughts, an optional form of privacy: you chose what to publish, and you never publish (make public) every single thought you happen to have.

What if that baby grows up to be the next Hitler or Stalin? — Harry Hindu

Moses?