I find this way of asking as being the product of the educational system, particularly in colleges and universities. Philosophy majors and their teachers aren't themselves philosophers at all. What they're studying is the history of what someone has deemed "philosophy," and so it gets relegated to an academic department.

The "linguistic turn" is basically meaningless. It's a historical construct. Ditto "existentialism," "continental philosophy," "analytic philosophy," and so on. No one really agrees on what these terms mean, and we shouldn't get hung up on them any more than "postmodern" or "post-World War II."

Thinking is what's called for these days -- and that doesn't end. What we need is a different kind of thinking, which is defined by the questions being asked. The questions being asked these days should be in response to our current place in time, our historical situation. To ask "what next?" is a good question, but it could have been asked in any period in history, even during what's now labeled the "linguistic turn."

Only we can determine how history talks about our lifetimes.

Horror! Being! Nothing! All the horrible speculation and pontificating on Being and Nothing that preceded the Linguistic Turn, slouching towards whatever passes for Bethlehem in philosophical circles now, to be hopelessly and pointlessly reborn!

But perhaps I exaggerate.

"Goo goo g'joob ..." :smirk:

What's next (or what should be next) is a bridge between language and practice; a framing of philosophy's place as defending the physical sciences (or else forwarding a better alternative, if there is such a thing); and doing likewise, as we desperately need, for ethical endeavors as well.

The "linguistic turn" is basically meaningless. It's a historical construct. Ditto "existentialism," "continental philosophy," "analytic philosophy," and so on. No one really agrees on what these terms mean, and we shouldn't get hung up on them any more than "postmodern" or "post-World War II."

Thinking is what's called for these days -- and that doesn't end. What we need is different kind of thinking, which is defined by the questions being asked. The questions being asked these days should be in response to our current place in time, our historical situation. To ask "what next?" is a good question, but it could have been asked in any period in history, even during what's now labeled the "linguistic turn." — Xtrix

Nicely put.

I agree. Critical thinking at university was discouraged and dissuaded. Just blindly follow what the professor teaches. I wouldn't write my own opinion in an exam. I'd write theirs. That's how you get good grades.

This website seems to be one of the better platforms for free thought.

what comes after the linguistic turn? — Shawn

The linguistic turn isn't over to my knowledge. Perhaps a transformation it underwent in recent years makes you think that way - it may have changed so much that it has become unrecognizable. The importance of language can't be overstated for the simple reason that it constitutes the very thing philosophy deals with - thoughts. My hunch is language has its own structure, rules, idiosyncracies. limits and these will, if I'm anywhere near the ballpark, turn out to be of utmost significance wherever, whenever, we employ language and that's literally everywhere and every time. In short, language has its own thing going on and that will, in all likelihood, matter to philosophy. Think of it, a certain tool has its own peculiarities that make it perfect for a certain task and hopeless for another. It takes great ingenuity, as many great thinkers have amply demonstrated, to use a tool for a task it isn't designed for.

Let's talk about what we're doing when we say that the linguistic turn is over...

:rofl:

We're all linguistic philosophers now.

But, but, we're all using the internets, and the computer positivists are smiling in their graves with all this formalism in language with Grammarly!

They gave to the world everything including primitives in your latest logical space Operating System.

Do you think Wittgenstein would like Apple more or PC?

What?

I posted this in another thread about logical positivism/atomism/monism being, quite possibly, a precursor to formal languages like programming languages and such?

It's a stretch, and to get back on topic, I suppose that there's some truth to the notion that philosophy in some sense needs innovation rather than criticisms of past philosophers all the time.

What do you think?

By the way...what is the linguistic turn? :chin:

What do you think? — Shawn

I think the OP trite, and hence thoughtless.

I think the OP trite, and hence thoughtless. — Banno

As well as this comment, huh?

A term invented after the fact for an approach to philosophy that began with critiques of the obscure language of the Hegelian thinking of the 19th Century and the discursive narratives that it produced, seeking a return to analysis. The critics held that philosophy should focus on being clear and coherent. There were two threads to the linguistic turn. One was formal, seeking to use the newly developed logic of propositional calculus to set philosophical issues out clearly. The other used natural languages such as English, seeking to clarify issues of ambiguity by an analysis of the complexity of words.

It's roughly congruent with analytic philosophy.

A term invented after the fact for an approach to philosophy that began with critiques of the obscure language of the Hegelian thinking of the 19th Century and the discursive narratives that it produced, seeking a return to analysis. The critics held that philosophy should focus on being clear and coherent. There were two threads to the linguistic turn. One was formal, seeking to use the newly developed logic of propositional calculus to set philosophical issues out clearly. The other used natural languages such as English, seeking to clarify issues of ambiguity by an analysis of the complexity of words.

It's roughly congruent with analytic philosophy. — Banno

:ok:

There seems to be something going on between language and logic. As far as I can tell each is a system in its own right and how can I tell that's the case? Well, I can easily come up with an illogical sentence e.g. C = "I'm a man and I'm not a man" - there's nothing linguistically incorrect about sentence C but logically, it's a cardinal sin. But, what is correct about sentence C and what is incorrect about sentence C? Well, C is syntactically and semantically correct but logically, because sentence C's a contradiction, it's a big no-no. In fact it can be said that language is wholly about syntax and semantics and logic is about semantic relationships. I suppose an entirely new set of conditions apply when language is employed in logic as logic deals with semantic relationships, an entirely different ballgame, instead of plain old syntax and semantics.

Philosophy then with its intimate ties to logic must perforce demand clarity, coherence, avoidance of ambiguity, etc. for these invariably cause problems in working out semantic relationships which is just a fancy way of saying how propositions relate to each other, the crux of arguments, the lifeblood of philosophy.

Considerations such as yours may be behind Wittgenstein's enlarged notion of "grammar". Both formal and natural languages - propositional logic and English, for example - are languages.

Early formal linguistic philosophy sort to render the vagaries of English into propositional form. This is the project of Principia Mathematica and Tractatus logico-philosophicus. It proved to be impossible, but along the way some extraordinary thigns were discovered.

Later formal linguistic philosophy accepted the place of natural languages, but sort to clarify the grammar buy presenting coherent and consistent translations in formal language. T-sentences and possible world semantics are examples of this.

The rough idea is that formal grammars can help us to recognise confusions in our common natural language - like your "I'm a man and I'm not a man".

The various tools of linguistic philosophy now fill the tool bag of most philosophers; at least the good ones. The OP is misguided to say that the linguistic turn is now over; it would be better to say that the linguistic turn is now so ubiquitous that it goes unnoticed.

@TheMadFoolTake a look at this sentence, from elsewhere:

If we are just loads of chemicals grouped together through a random procces, then everything we experience may well be wrong. How do we know that our logical thoughts would actually show any truth in this universe? The answer, if we are just a bunch of chemicals, is that we can’t. Using this logic, science is just an illusion, so is logic. However, we have used science and logic to come to these conclusions, which becomes a paradox. — Franz Liszt

There are a bunch of errors in the formulation fo the issue within this one paragraph. Not errors of fact, but errors of grammar.

Can you see them? Look at the way it deals with "truth".

The OP is misguided to say that the linguistic turn is now over; it would be better to say that the linguistic turn is now so ubiquitous that it goes unnoticed. — Banno

Not really, as nothing profound has actually changed in the field of philosophy. Go ahead and read the afternotes of Rorty's The Linguistic Turn.

Metaphysical questions still take place as often as they used to.

What's next? Perhaps a return to pragmatics?

it would be better to say that the linguistic turn is now so ubiquitous that it goes unnoticed. — Banno

What does that mean?

yup, my grammar is bad :)

But not your knowledge of rhyming slang? :up:

A term invented after the fact for an approach to philosophy that began with critiques of the obscure language of the Hegelian thinking of the 19th Century and the discursive narratives that it produced, seeking a return to analysis. The critics held that philosophy should focus on being clear and coherent. There were two threads to the linguistic turn. One was formal, seeking to use the newly developed logic of propositional calculus to set philosophical issues out clearly. The other used natural languages such as English, seeking to clarify issues of ambiguity by an analysis of the complexity of words.

It's roughly congruent with analytic philosophy. — Banno

Congruent? It's a travesty that logical positivism got shat on and Cambridge wanted to go for common sense philosophy, whilst America steadfast followed the post-war logical positivist boon of philosophers from Europe, invested in or by pragmatisms influence or better stated congruence.

Considerations such as yours may be behind Wittgenstein's enlarged notion of "grammar". Both formal and natural languages - propositional logic and English, for example - are languages.

Early formal linguistic philosophy sort to render the vagaries of English into propositional form. This is the project of Principia Mathematica and Tractatus logico-philosophicus. It proved to be impossible, but along the way some extraordinary thigns were discovered.

Later formal linguistic philosophy accepted the place of natural languages, but sort to clarify the grammar buy presenting coherent and consistent translations in formal language. T-sentences and possible world semantics are examples of this.

The rough idea is that formal grammars can help us to recognise confusions in our common natural language - like your "I'm a man and I'm not a man".

The various tools of linguistic philosophy now fill the tool bag of most philosophers; at least the good ones. The OP is misguided to say that the linguistic turn is now over; it would be better to say that the linguistic turn is now so ubiquitous that it goes unnoticed — Banno

In my humble opinion, we should maintain a distinction between language and logic. Language is, at the end of the day, just a collection of words and a set of rules (grammar) on how to use those words all so that we can think in the broadest sense of that word.

Logic, on the other hand, is about how to think and comes with its own set of rules to be followed in order that we may craft arguments with the express purpose of arriving at truths implied by relationships between thoughts.

That said, it can't be denied that logic has its own language consisting of symbols with very precise meanings and instructions on how to use them correctly to cut through all the logically extraneous linguistic elements of discourse and zero in on an argument if there is one. However I still have misgivings about treating logic as just another language - there's more to it than mere words and rules on how to manipulate those words.

That said, it can't be denied that logic has its own language consisting of symbols with very precise meanings and instructions on how to use them correctly to cut through all the logically extraneous linguistic elements of discourse and zero in on an argument if there is one. However I still have misgivings about treating logic as just another language - there's more to it than mere words and rules on how to manipulate those words. — TheMadFool

Logic takes care of itself. The other issue is that language does (not) have a universal grammar.

Language is, at the end of the day, just a collection of words and a set of rules — TheMadFool

...which is exactly what logic is, also.

And mathematics too, for that matter.

Language is, at the end of the day, just a collection of words and a set of rules
— TheMadFool

...which is exactly what logic is, also.

And mathematics too, for that matter. — Banno

I suppose you're right but if I may say so unpacking "words" and "set of rules" for both language and logic suggests there's a difference between logic and language. In the case of language, "words" and "set of rules" are those linguistic features everyone is more than familiar with but in logic, "words" are entire propositions and the "set of rules" are those that have a bearing on how propositions are related to each other with the emphasis on how the truth/falsity of one or more propositions impact the truth/falsity of another proposition.

That said, it would be very interesting if there's a logical aspect to natural language by which I mean to put forth the possibility that language evolved for logic but not in the sense of a necessity for animals lacking symbolic language are fully capable of logic but in the sense that natural language augments logic. Does natural language bring to the table additional capabilities that enhance logic, make it more powerful?

By way of an answer to the question posed above, take a close look at logically problematic words, words that are vague and ambiguous, plus discourses, spoken, written, that contain inconsistencies. Don't these give you the impression that they were designed to, well, break us out of the oppressive confinement of logic?

Such an interpretation is probably me holding the wrong end of the stick but I remember this one time when I had to put this wooden block into a slot cut out for it and it just wouldn't fit. I almost gave up until I had an idea - I turned the block upside down, lo and behold, the block slid effortlessly into its slot - it was a perfect fit! :joke:

in logic, "words" are entire propositions and the "set of rules" are those that have a bearing on how propositions are related to each other with the emphasis on how the truth/falsity of one or more propositions impact the truth/falsity of another proposition. — TheMadFool

...that's propositional logic, which is the first step. Then logicians break propositions into predicates and individuals, and add "all" and "some"; this development initiated the linguistic turn, since now logicians could access the contents of propositions. Modal logic added "possibly" and "necessarily" to the mix.

Now the field is far broader than even this.

One way of thinking of it is that logic sets out the consequences of what we say. Your "I'm a man and I'm not a man" might be represented in propositional logic as "p & ~p" or in predicate logic as "f(a) & ~f(a)". The consequence is be that any proposition would follow: "(p & ~p)⊃q". It's seeing how this consequence flows from the contradiction that is the beauty of logic.

The suggestion of laws of thought is somewhat misguided. our use of language is not distinct from our thoughts. Logic sets out what happens when we use language in a consistent fashion - which is, after all, what we must do with language; not just any order of words will do for some given purpose.

As side note... we often think of logic as tracing the way truth and falsity moves from one proposition to another; so we talk about how if p is true and if p⊃q is true then q must also be true. This is a very useful way of thinking about logic, but keep in the back of your mind that there are other, less widely applicable, logics that do not assume propositions to be either true or false.

SO I'd suggest that rather than language following from logic, logic follows from language, in that logic sets out what it is to be consistent in one's use of language by setting out the consequences of what one might say.

Hence the broader use of the notion of grammar. A child might say "My are going to shop", and be corrected to "I am going to the shop"; logic performs a similar task, but for grownups: "I'm a man and I'm not a man" becomes, perhaps, "I am a transexual", hence avoiding the explosive consequences.

And that is what philosophical analysis does: it shows us how to spot misguided language, and perhaps to put what we said in a more useable way.

Just as you needed to turn the block in a certain way in order for it to do what was needed, philosophy consists in articulating words with an eye towards the consequences.

So:

If we are just loads of chemicals grouped together through a random procces, then everything we experience may well be wrong.

This just does not follow. Perhaps Franz might be able to provide some additional propositions to make it consistent. But then there is the problem of what Franz takes to be "wrong" here.

How do we know that our logical thoughts would actually show any truth in this universe?

A rhetorical question, but what do we make of it? If the premise of a "logical thought" is true, then so will be the consequent.

The answer, if we are just a bunch of chemicals, is that we can’t.

Well, yes, we can, since if the premises are true so will the consequences be true.

Using this logic, science is just an illusion, so is logic.

Again, this does not follow; adn indeed, if your logic leads you to rejecting logic, you are doing it wrong.

However, we have used science and logic to come to these conclusions, which becomes a paradox.

No, we don't. Using language badly leads to apparent paradoxes. Cleaning it up will dissipate the paradox.

We dissipated the apparent paradox of "I'm a man and I'm not a man" by rephrasing it as 'I'm a transexual". Can we do the same thing for Franz? Perhaps he wants to argue that evolution cannot explain the origins of logic? Or perhaps he is just pointing out that abiogenesis remains an area for study? In either case, what he has written does not support his conclusion.

That's a basic philosophical analysis, intended to bring out that structure, or lack thereof, in Franz's claim. Socrates performed similar analyses. The linguistic turn was a return, a rejection of a distorted form of philosophy that instead of analysis, encouraged discursive rumination. It was a move from making shit up to making shit consistent.