• Swimmingwithfishes
    17
    Is it still a popular view that everything that exists in the world is matter ? And do we have any good reasons to believe that there are non material objects ?

    And do non reductive versions of physicalism entail that there are non material objects ? Also why is biology considered something greater than material or infinitely complex to be knowable and mutable ?
  • Gnomon
    3.8k
    Is it still a popular view that everything that exists in the world is matter ? And do we have any good reasons to believe that there are non material objects ?Swimmingwithfishes
    Materialism still seems to be the default view of most scientists, even after Quantum Physics raised doubts about the "materiality" of fundamental "objects". For pragmatic reasons though, Biologists & Chemists probably continue to think in terms of Materialism, despite the de-materialized picture of Nature drawn by theoretical-mathematical Physicists. The current orthodox model of physical reality has demoted wishy-washy particles, in favor of ethereal Fields, as the foundation of the real world. But many of those post-particle physicists seem to imagine that those amorphous fields are made-up of point-like particles of stuff, even if that "stuff" consists of merely mathematical definitions.

    However, a few pioneering physicists & cosmologists are beginning to "face facts", and to model the world on the basis of "non-material" Mathematics. And they sometimes describe the geometry of reality in terms of the mind-stuff posited by Information Theory. Consequently, my own personal layman's worldview replaces outdated Atomism & Materialism with 21st century Enformationism. In that model, everything in the world is a form of fundamental Information. Hence, ideas & minds are real-but-immaterial objects. That may sound like a preposterous notion, but my Enformationism thesis explores the practical applications of the post-atomic post-matter world-model. :smile:

    If everything is matter, then what is matter? : Matter is not a fundamental building block in our universe, it is an emergent phenomenon resulting from certain elementary particles and force fields interacting with each other through various processes.
    https://www.quora.com/If-everything-is-matter-then-what-is-matter

    Mathematical universe hypothesis : the physical universe is not merely described by mathematics, but is mathematics
    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mathematical_universe_hypothesis

    Virtual Reality : How Close Can Physics Bring Us to a Truly Fundamental Understanding of the World?
    http://bothandblog5.enformationism.info/page35.html

    Introduction to Enformationism : Matter is Energy and Energy is Information
    http://bothandblog6.enformationism.info/page80.html
  • Wayfarer
    22.5k
    I think atomistic materialism became unfeasible with the discovery of quantum mechanics. The idea of there being discrete point-particles which are the ultimate basis of all phenomena was undermined by the discovery of the elusive 'wave-particle' nature of sub-atomic entities, and also the discovery of fields. (What are 'fields', anyway? Are they material?)

    do we have any good reasons to believe that there are non material objects ?Swimmingwithfishes

    How about numbers and logical laws and scientific principles? How are they 'material'? @Gnomon makes these points above, but I would question the sense in which minds (and the like) are 'objects'.

    See Minding Matter, Adam Frank https://aeon.co/essays/materialism-alone-cannot-explain-the-riddle-of-consciousness
  • Gnomon
    3.8k
    but I would question the sense in which minds (and the like) are 'objects'.Wayfarer
    Ha! I suspected that someone might call me on that ironic assertion. But my intention was merely to indicate that Ideas & Minds are themselves sometimes objects of conscious thought. Through introspection, your own Mind can be an object of your thought, even though the observing mind is a subject. Self-reference can be confusing.

    However, if everything is a form of Information, then even the material objects we "see" in our minds are ultimately objects of thought in the Cosmic Mind. The Enformationism worldview does turn some commonsense notions upside-down and inside-out. But then, you can always continue to view your "illusory" objects of thought in the customary manner, if it please you. :joke:

    Object of the mind : An object of the mind is an object that exists in the imagination, but which, in the real world, can only be represented or modeled. Some such objects are abstractions, literary concepts, or fictional scenarios.
    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Object_of_the_mind

    Reality is not what you see : “there is an objective reality. But that reality is utterly unlike our perceptions of objects in space and time.” ___Hoffman
    http://bothandblog6.enformationism.info/page21.html
  • 180 Proof
    15.3k

    Methodological, not metaphysical, materialism no doubt is the worst, least true, intellectual commitment made in human cultural history, except, of course, for all the others tried so far in the last three plus millennia vis-à-vis progressively disclosing how the world (which includes subjects-in-the-world ... as opposed to shibboleth "rational subjects" or "transcendental egos" or "immaterial souls" etc) works.180 Proof
    (pace Gnomon)

    I think atomistic materialism became unfeasible with the discovery of quantum mechanics.Wayfarer
    Perhaps my interpretation of void & its atoms doesn't allow this 'positivist' opinion, Wayf, to convince me.
  • Wayfarer
    22.5k
    Isn't the issue that Democritean atomism allows only a binary choice between atom (existing, 1) and the void (non-existing, 0). Whereas quantum theory's answer to whether a sub-atomic particle exists just IS the wave equation. All it can give you are degrees of likelihood, but that is a reflection of the ontology of the object, not a mere 'degree of ignorance'. Meaning that there are 'degrees of reality' which is something that Democritus could not allow for.

    At its root, the new idea holds that the common conception of “reality” is too limited. By expanding the definition of reality, the quantum’s mysteries disappear. In particular, “real” should not be restricted to “actual” objects or events in spacetime. Reality ought also be assigned to certain possibilities, or “potential” realities, that have not yet become “actual.” These potential realities do not exist in spacetime, but nevertheless are “ontological” — that is, real components of existence.

    “This new ontological picture requires that we expand our concept of ‘what is real’ to include an extraspatiotemporal domain of quantum possibility,”

    https://www.sciencenews.org/blog/context/quantum-mysteries-dissolve-if-possibilities-are-realities
  • 180 Proof
    15.3k
    Isn't the issue that Democritean atomism allows only a binary choice between atom (existing, 1) and the void (non-existing, 0).Wayfarer
    No more than it's an issue in 'field theories' of events (i.e. excitations of the field) existing or not.
  • Wayfarer
    22.5k
    I would have thought that if atoms really are excitations in a field, then it's already looking pretty dim for materialism. You want some kind of material absolute somewhere along the line, preferably at the bottom, don't you?
  • 180 Proof
    15.3k
    Democritus et al did not conceive of atoms as 'grains of stuff' ... but rather merely as indivisible 0-d point-particles (à la discrete positions on any number-line).
  • Wayfarer
    22.5k
    Against which the ancient argument was, if a thing had no dimensions, it had no sides, and if it had no sides, nothing could come into contact with it, and therefore it couldn’t cause anything to happen. Of course the ancients had no conception of fields which appear to enable sub-atomic particles to exert force over a distance. Still, the issue is that the basic definition of matter is the standard model of particle physics, which is said to be inherently incomplete.
  • Count Timothy von Icarus
    2.8k

    It's an extremely popular conception of the world. Even if it has broken down at upon close analysis, it allows for enough practical answers that I don't think it's going anywhere any time soon.

    I don't know that biology is generally considered to be "greater" than material. I'm not sure what you mean there. The popular take in biology, at least at the layman's, undergraduate level, is that biology is very much a material science. You only have to start questioning the material when you get to the fundementals of physics or mystery of subjective experience. This leaves plenty of places so safely explore.

    If you have questions about biological processes, an answer based on materialism is probably what you're looking for, even if it is a polite fiction. It's really enough to get you to accurate predictions. As Dewey said, "truth is the end of inquiry."
  • Tom Storm
    9.1k
    If you have questions about biological processes, an answer based on materialism is probably what you're looking for, even if it is a polite fiction. It's really enough to get you to accurate predictions. As Dewey said, "truth is the end of inquiry."Count Timothy von Icarus

    In some ways, the history of philosophy has been the quest to deny the existence of the real world independent of our minds. Sure materialism is incomplete, like most science, but until there is evidence of a metaphysical world, we are stuck with the only one we can reliably identify.
  • 180 Proof
    15.3k
    In some wa[ys], the history of philosophy has been the quest to deny the existence of the real world independent of our minds.Tom Storm
    :100:

    :up:
  • 180 Proof
    15.3k
    Sure materialism is incomplete, like most science, but until there is evidence of a metaphysical world, we are stuck with the only one we can reliably identify.Tom Storm
    Yeah, and perhaps the metaphysical aspect of reality (whether material or not) is that ontology is inherently incomplete ...
  • Swimmingwithfishes
    17


    What do you mean by "even if it has broken down upon close analysis"
  • TheMadFool
    13.8k
    As per Cartesian skepticism, the only thing we can be certain of is our mind, the rest, the physical world included, could be nothing more than an illusion. How does physicalism or materialism respond to that?

    The bottom line is that we're more confident of a mind than a body. That should mean something.
  • Swimmingwithfishes
    17


    What is the difference between methodological materialism and metaphysical ? Basically is it a difference of principle/practice
  • TheMadFool
    13.8k
    Democritus et al did not conceive of atoms as 'grains of stuff' ... but rather merely as indivisible 0-d point-particles.180 Proof

    How could nothing (0/zero) add up to something?
  • Metaphysician Undercover
    13.1k
    Of course the ancients had no conception of fields which appear to enable sub-atomic particles to exert force over a distance.Wayfarer

    The Pythagorean "aether" is comparable to the modern understanding of "fields". In the Pythagorean cosmology, the heavenly bodies are a manifestation of the aether, just like in the modern system fundamental particles are a manifestation of the field. The principles which apply toward understanding the fields, are principles derived from the understanding of soundwaves, just like the principles applied toward understanding the aether were ratios derived from the understanding of soundwaves.

    The idea that something can exert force instantaneously over a great distance is extremely old, as the sun appears to do this on the surface of the earth. Heating and cooling of the earth's surface appears to be instantaneous as the sun goes in and out of the clouds. But that idea is deeply counter-intuitive, and when we see an event at a distance, and hear it at a delayed time, we question the medium, and the means of transmission, of these force. The fact that the timing of the force of sound is distinct from the timing of the force of light makes us conclude that light has a different medium from sound. But the media are believed to be similar in the sense of both being understood by wave principles, so that the knowledge of the movement of the slower force, which is more easily understood, is applicable to the faster. In modern times, physicists have proposed a number of distinct fields each can be apprehended as a distinct medium by which force is exerted. But these proposals are extremely primitive, and it is quite likely that the distinct forces, and their appropriate media, have not been accurately individuated and identified, because the theories employed do not allow for distinct speeds at high levels. This is evident from the confusion which remains in that field of study.
  • 180 Proof
    15.3k
    Other than set theory, (the number) line and physical space, I don't know ... or how your question follows from anything I've written here, Fool
  • 180 Proof
    15.3k
    I understand the distinction as the difference between (a materialist method) 'how to exclude/filter-out non-materialist (i.e. non-physical, non/super-natural, non-immanent, idealist/anti-realist ...) entities whenever formulating, testing, selecting and revising an explanation of whatever is/seems the case' and (a materialist metaphysics) 'speculating on a priori materialist conditions that are necessary to make any concept whatsoever possible'.
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