The Will is closer to thing-in-itself than Representation as it's only conditioned by one of the categories, time, and not the other ones. However, later Schopenhauer disavows and walks back on the identification of Will as Thing-in-itself and returns to the thing-in-itself being unknown - an unknown which is nevertheless non-dual.
And there is no quadruple aspect theory. Will is the ground of the phenomenon. Platonic Ideas are encounters with and glimpses of the thing-in-itself through art, or mystical experiences. The thing-in-itself is the unknown ground or source of the Platonic Ideas and of the Will. So it's still double aspect - Phenomenon composed hirearchically of Will and then the other Representations, and Thing-in-itself. — Agustino
Ultimately yes, hence why you experience it in time.If the thing in itself is the noumenal and Will is not it, but rather merely "close to it", then is Will phenomenal? — John
Yes, your brain is working well in logical deductions.It must be part of the phenomenal if it is "conditioned" by "only one of the categories", or even one of the categories, because the categories, although they are themselves transcendental "condition" only the phenomenal, not the noumenal. — John
They are glimpses of the noumenon, they are obviously still individuated, hence why they are not thing-in-itself. The thing-in-itself qua thing-in-itself is not experienced as an empirical state. The Platonic ideas can be experienced, but not as phenomenon (the subject-object distinction breaks off during such experiences - they are merely the grades of the objectification of the thing-in-itself).And what about the platonic ideas? are they noumenal? If they are then how can there be more than one idea. — John
They are different in degree of objectification/individuation of the thing-in-itself. One substanceAnd if all four the noumenal (timeless) the ideas ( timeless) the Will ( temporal only) and the phenomenal ( temporal and spatial) are different form one another, then how are there not four ontological categories? — John
That was a quick job. I'm waiting for another one.Unless you can give cogent answers to these questions you should be beginning to see why Schopenhauer's ontology is a hopeless mess that doesn't need to be refuted by any geometry; it refutes itself. — John
Yes you do experience its effects. And if space isn't curved, and space is an a priori form provided by the mind, where the hell are those curved effects coming from? Unless you can answer this question you can say bye bye to your Kantianism.But you have not shown that any experience, as opposed to merely inferences from mathematical models and observations, does refute Euclidean geometry. We infer that space is curved; we do not experience it as curved. — John
Hegel regurgitation!You haven't given any cogent account at all of how something completely timeless and undifferentiated can manifest itself in either individual spatio-temporal forms, or in timeless forms or in a temporal Will or in temporal wills — John
Yes we can. Have a look here ;) it's called a convex mirrorI'd go one further. Sometimes we do perceive it outright. We draw examples of it all the time. It's even possible someone could see it out in the world. All it would take in an aura of plane, lines, etc. in the right places of someone's visual experience-- much like seeing any other part of the world. — TheWillowOfDarkness
You're trying to ask what causes the thing-in-itself to be so and so - that's stupid, nothing causes it, because causality applies only for the objectification of the thing-in-itself (the empirical states) not for the thing-in-itself qua thing-in-itself.But where in an utterly undifferentiated timeless unity do those forms come from. This is the perennial Parmenidean problem with monistic conceptions of reality. — John
You haven't given any cogent account at all of how something completely timeless and undifferentiated can manifest itself in either individual spatio-temporal forms, or in timeless forms or in a temporal Will or in temporal wills. This is why I reject any form of monism as incoherent. — John
But where in an utterly undifferentiated timeless unity do those forms come from. — John
The old trope - there's no explanation but I'll go on believing it >:OHow would I know? Perhaps God put them there to confuse us...or perhaps the science is simply wrong and will be corrected in the future, when we have more information (if the species can manage to survive that long). — John
John has forgotten that the principle of causality which he presupposes in asking the question applies only to the phenomenon (empirical reality) not to the thing-in-itself.The monism itself is the answer. In being timeless and undifferentiated,all of the many changes in the world have no impact on how it is expressed. If individual spatio-temporal forms affected it, it would be differentiated and no longer by timeless. — TheWillowOfDarkness
delete - was off topic — Agustino
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