Yes, what they say could be true. There's a very good book on this topic called The Gap by Thomas Suddendorf, he covers "killjoys" and "romantics", it's very interesting.

Fine, for the sake of argument, let's grant them concepts more or less similar to ours. This doesn't touch the problem of innateness. Whatever a dog represents as a ball or food, isn't learned, it's represented, learning doesn't arise.

In either case representations aren't learned. They grow in the mind.

Whatever a dog represents as a ball or food, isn't learned, it's represented, learning doesn't arise.

In either case representations aren't learned. They grow in the mind. — Manuel

I’m not sure I understand the distinction you’re making between the act of representing a feature of the world , and learning. Isn’t all representation a creative act? Or are you arguing for innate hard-wired categories as an explanation of instinctive behavior?

You have access to nothing whatsoever outside of your own mentation.

Because nobody does. All things are experienced from the first person subjective experience. Unless you're claiming you do, in which case, that's something that carries a burden of proof.

Even from the first-person point of view we come into direct contact with the outer world. I think the burden of proof lies with those who claim otherwise.

Isn’t all representation a creative act? Or are you arguing for innate hard-wired categories as an explanation of instinctive behavior? — Joshs

Maybe I'm not being clear to myself! :)

I personally don't see those two options you provided as mutually exclusive. I suppose that the latter is what I have in mind. It's more or less classical rationalism, with some distinctions, of course.

The world and the phenomena in it, incite and orient our mind to recognize such objects as being such objects: a book as a book, a river as a river and so on. There's something "out there", which activates some part of our innate capacities such that we say that the object we see is a river. However, the river need not exist. Again, we could imagine a child living in the desert or in the snowy mountains, which has never seen a river, but knows what it is. It's a bit like never seeing snow prior to a certain age, yet you know what it is when you first see it in the actual world (as opposed to on TV, or seeing a picture, etc.)

What I think is wrong in this tradition is to think we can exhaust the ideas by merely thinking about them. For that we need to investigate the object which produces these effects in us. If we knew enough we wouldn't even need to investigate anything, but we don't know enough.

I think that Colin McGinn covers this pretty well in his recent book Inborn Knowledge: The Mystery Within. I think this innate knowledge is a mystery, then again, everything is under closer examination.

Even from the first-person point of view we come into direct contact with the outer world. I think the burden of proof lies with those who claim otherwise. — NOS4A2

My favorite quote from Hume:

“ For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe any thing but the perception…. If any one, upon serious and unprejudic'd reflection thinks he has a different notion of himself, I must confess I can reason no longer with him. All I can allow him is, that he may be in the right as well as I, and that we are essentially different in this particular. He may, perhaps, perceive something simple and continu'd, which he calls himself; tho' I am certain there is no such principle in me.”

It’s true that we perceive all of the above, but the idea that we perceive “perceptions” and not the physical world is a step too far for me. This is the mistake of nominalizing, changing the grammatical character of an adjective or verb into that of a noun. Nominalizing allows us to construct scenarios where one will observe observations, perceive perceptions, be conscious of consciousness, as if these nouns represented things and substances.

My aim with the Hume quote was to show that the assumed pure
interiority of consciousness falls apart when analysed closely, because when we search for ourselves what we find is always reshaped by exposure to an outside. If you want to call that outside ‘physical’ then you’re maintaining a kind of dualism between interior and exterior. I prefer ‘phenomena’ or appearances’ to physical objects( as Nietzsche wrote, there is nothing behind those appearances) , because it indicates the indissociable reciprocal depends of interior and exterior, making mind embodied and embedded in a world , which itself is co-constructed by its relationships with embodied mind. In this view of mind-body-environment no clear-cut interior or exterior can be discerned.

when we search for ourselves what we find is always reshaped by exposure to an outside — Joshs

Where do you find yourself at all? All there is is the things that are there...

Where do you find yourself at all? All there is is the things that are there... — Heiko

That’s an interesting question. There’s a consensus forming among a community of phenomenologically influenced writers in philosophy of mind that self-consciousness is intrinsic to all awareness. I am not only are aware of smelling the rose, I am aware that it is I use smell the rose. Ther is what, after Nagel, they call the feeling of what it is like to experience anything, a quality of for-meness’ that attaches to all my encounters with the world. Social constructionists take the opposite view , arguing that the self is just a socially created construct.

You have access to nothing whatsoever outside of your own mentation. — Dharmi


How do you know that? — frank


Because nobody does. — Dharmi


So, it follows that the nobodies you refer to are not "outside your mentation"? — Janus

So, I would say all things exist in the Mind of God. The only things I in particular have access to is the things in my personal mentation. But I'm not a Solipsist. God's Mind is what underlies the energetic flux of reality we experience. — Dharmi

But then God must be "outside your mentation" unless he dies when you die. If you are not a solipsist, then you accept that others are also outside your mentation, no?

I am not only are aware of smelling the rose, I am aware that it is I use smell the rose. Ther is what, after Nagel, they call the feeling of what it is like to experience anything, a quality of for-meness’ that attaches to all my encounters with the world. — Joshs

Of course you can just say it is that way. You say it is your encouters therefor there must be you - but where is the proof? Maybe the warmth just IS warm.

- but where is the proof? Maybe the warmth just IS warm. — Heiko

You are not only aware of the warmth. You are also aware of the mode of subjective access to the experience. Did you experience it directly or recollect it, or did you just fantasize about warmth? One is not only aware of an experience but can report what personal modality the experience arose from.

You are not only aware of the warmth. — Joshs

This again is an assumption. It just is warm.

You are also aware of the mode of subjective access to the experience. — Joshs

Experience? Do you mean the existence of the warmth? I try not to make an assumption here.

One is not only aware of an experience but can report what modality the experience arose from. — Joshs

So you relate the existence of the warmth to "modalities"?

Do we access existence or do we construct it? Does our knowledge mirror an independent world or do we construct that world , contribute to its development? Is knowing copying an outside or is it an interaction that transforms what we see? — Joshs

We both access it and construct it, albeit not consciously. Much happens prior to experience if experience is taken to denote conscious awareness; we cannot talk about that except to allude to it. It is not a matter of "either/ or"; our knowledge does mirror an independent world in a sense, but not in the naive realist sense.

Our knowledge is mediated by that which exists prior to our awareness. Knowledge is not "copying an outside", it you are thinking of that outside as being already conceptually shaped. And knowledge is an interaction. But if you want to say "it transforms what we see" you have already presupposed that there is something there to be transformed, and some seeing which is unmediated.

So you relate the existence of the warmth to "modalities"? — Heiko

We all do, according to studies. And what about the use of the world ‘I’ here? We can talk about the feeling of warmth in the abstract , in third personal terms, i. which case ‘I’ is irrelevant. But when I have a personal feeling of warmth, does it makes sense to ask the question, ‘is it ‘I’ who is feeling warm’?

We all do, according to studies. — Joshs

But this was not exactly the initial question.

And what about the use of the world ‘I’ here? — Joshs

Is that also related to "modalities"?

We can talk about the feeling of warmth in the abstract , in third personal terms, but when I have a personal feeling of warmth, does it makes sense to ask the question, ‘is it ‘I’ who is feeling warm’? — Joshs

It makes sense to ask if it is warm. If you say "it is", where is you?

It makes sense to ask if it is warm. If you say "it is", where is you? — Heiko

There is a difference in meaning between ‘it is warm’ , which doesnt necessary require a subjective experience ( I could be looking at a thermostat) and proclaiming that it is I who feel warm. And what about my pain?Does it make sense to ask if it is ‘I’ who am in pain? Is my pain the same thing as ‘there is pain’?
My own arguments in favor of the idea that all experience has a ‘for-menses’ quality about it is a bit different from what I’ve been describing. These accounts depend on the idea of a certain felt sense of ‘ ‘ me ness’.
My own account is based on the argument that all of our sensory, perceptual , cognitive and affective experiences are defined i relation to our prior goal oriented understanding. We recognize the new in relation to pre-existing schemes of sense. So the ‘self is always changing but there is an ongoing integrity and unity to it. What I experience is always a variation on a prior theme for me.

There is a difference in meaning between ‘it is warm’ , which doesnt necessary require a subjective experience ( I could be looking at a thermostat) and proclaiming that it is I who feel warm. — Joshs

There is.

And what about my pain?Does it make sense to ask if it is ‘I’ who am in pain? — Joshs

Not if you are a solipsist, for example.

Is my pain the same thing as ‘there is pain’? — Joshs

That also depends on certain assumptions.

Hume: 'when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe any thing but the perception…. If any one, upon serious and unprejudic'd reflection thinks he has a different notion of himself, I must confess I can reason no longer with him. All I can allow him is, that he may be in the right as well as I, and that we are essentially different in this particular. He may, perhaps, perceive something simple and continu'd, which he calls himself; tho' I am certain there is no such principle in me.” — Joshs

A commentary on the elusive nature of 'the knower' from the Upaniṣads:

Yājñavalkya says: "You tell me that I have to point out the Self as if it is a cow or a horse. Not possible! It is not an object like a horse or a cow. I cannot say, 'here is the ātman; here is the Self'. It is not possible because you cannot see the seer of seeing. The seer can see that which is other than the Seer, or the act of seeing. An object outside the seer can be beheld by the seer. How can the seer see himself? How is it possible? You cannot see the seer of seeing. You cannot hear the hearer of hearing. You cannot think the Thinker of thinking. You cannot understand the Understander of understanding. That is the ātman."

Nobody can know the ātman inasmuch as the ātman is the Knower of all things. So, no question regarding the ātman can be put, such as "What is the ātman?' 'Show it to me', etc. You cannot show the ātman because the Shower is the ātman; the Experiencer is the ātman; the Seer is the ātman; the Functioner in every respect through the senses or the mind or the intellect is the ātman. As the basic Residue of Reality in every individual is the ātman, how can we go behind It and say, 'This is the ātman?' Therefore, the question is impertinent and inadmissible. The reason is clear. It is the Self. It is not an object. 1 — Brihadaranyaka Upaniṣad

My aim with the Hume quote was to show that the assumed pure
interiority of consciousness falls apart when analysed closely, because when we search for ourselves what we find is always reshaped by exposure to an outside. If you want to call that outside ‘physical’ then you’re maintaining a kind of dualism between interior and exterior. I prefer ‘phenomena’ or appearances’ to physical objects( as Nietzsche wrote, there is nothing behind those appearances) , because it indicates the indissociable reciprocal depends of interior and exterior, making mind embodied and embedded in a world , which itself is co-constructed by its relationships with embodied mind. In this view of mind-body-environment no clear-cut interior or exterior can be discerned.

I would suggest it’s not so much dualism as it is pluralism, the simple act of distinguishing oneself from the vast amount of objects beyond the self. In my own view the self begins and ends at the exterior surface, which can be discerned from simple observation and direct contact. It cannot extend any further outward or inward, and any notion of the self that violates this principle is illusory.

So I'm offering my system, and I'm asking you to tell me what's wrong with my system. You haven;t done that, you're just rejecting it for some unknown reason that you haven't explained yet. — Dharmi

If that's what you think you either haven't read me or are not able to understand. You sound like a Christian apologist except with Deepak Chopra instead of Jesus. No thanks.

In my own view the self begins and ends at the exterior surface, which can be discerned from simple observation and direct contact. It cannot extend any further outward or inward, and any notion of the self that violates this principle is illusory. — NOS4A2

Sounds simple but may not be so. Have you heard of the research on extended cognition? Drawing a boundary based on the physical body is somewhat arbitrary, since cognition is not a calculating computer in a bag of bones.
Cognition, like other organismic functions is interactive exchanges of activity with an environment. We eat , we breath, we excrete. Should the functioning body not include the oxygen we take in, and the aspects of our surrroudinga that keep our nerve and muscle cells from atrophying? Our perceptual-motor systems that power our actions in the world as well as allowing us to
perceive it in the first place cannot even be properly defined from a functional point of view without taking into account the complete interactive body-environment cycles. These are not machines that are designed first and then plopped into a world. Drawing a contour around an anatomical body and calling it self is artificially separating what was never separate to begin with.

I haven’t heard of the research of extended cognition, but no I do not think we should include everything that goes into the lungs into the notions of self. There is not doubt we are situated in an environment, that we interact with it, use it and learn from it. But I do not think such a brute fact should imply our minds or cognition or some other abstraction extends beyond our body, as if I could locate my being in the water I drink. Again, I don’t quite know enough about the thesis of that theory, but the name is enough to cause me to recoil.

I don’t need to draw a contour around my anatomy when that contour is already defined by the surface of my being and the nature of my form. There is nothing artificial about this. All I need do is point to myself to confirm this, in my view.

I'm a Panentheist, not a Pantheist. But, that's fair. If you aren't interested, you're not interested. Apologetics has nothing to do with it, we're talking about honest philosophy, which you're obviously not interested in.

All I need do is point to myself to confirm this, in my view. — NOS4A2

Pointing to oneself and recognizing this as a unity body requires an intersubjectively shaped concept of one’s body. Before looking in a mirror, a child’s model of their body is piecemeal. The reflection for the fist time shows the body as a unitary phenomenon, but it also requires that the child recognize that others see them in this way, from the outside in. Schizophrenics often lose the ability to know where their body leaves off and the world begins, and many brain injuries can change our sense of whether and how our limbs belong to us. Now can this be? It is because concepts concerning the unity of the body involve complex correlations of perceptions and actions in the world. The unity of the body is an achievement , not a given.

my mind is not a physical thing with physical characteristics, like size, shape, weight, volume, etc. that I'm not making an assumption when I say my mind is not a physical thing. — RogueAI

Good point.

Now let's get back to the beginning. You assert, and I agree, that the only empirical thing that is proven in an a priori way is "I think therefore I am" or "My thoughts prove that my mind exists". This is absolutely true.

On the other hand, we both agree, that the physical world is doubtful that it exists.

My addition to this latter agreement is, that our senses tell us the physical world exist, but our senses can't be trusted. They may give us illusionary signals, true or false, we don't know.

So... we are unsure of the physical world because there is no way we can prove or ascertain that it exist. It may exist in the form we perceive, or it may not exist, or it may exist in a form that is completely different from what we perceive. At any rate, there is an assumption involved in each of the three scenarios, because of the lack of certainty.

This proves that the idea-world exists without any doubt, and the physical world does not.

All the above are true if we can guarantee that the mind is not physical, but only part of the world of ideas.

How can we guarantee that? That is the million dollar question. Our first clue that the physical world is independent of our scrutiny. This is due to the untrustworthiness of our senses.

If we can't rely on our senses to prove the physical world; can we rely on our senses to know that the mind is not physical? No, we can't. We have a mind; if it were physical, then we could sense it, but our sense can lie to us. If it were not physical, then we would not need to rely on our sense to realize that the mind exists, since we use it daily to generate thoughts.

But this is a slippery slope. If we can't rely on our senses to tell the objects and events in the physical world, and we can't rely on our senses to tell if something is in the world of ideals, then we actually are at a loss of knowing if our mind is physical or in the world of ideals.

So I put the question to you, again, @RogueAI: what makes it so sure for you that the mind is not physical? You say you can't measure it or smell it or weigh it. But can you measure, weigh, or smell anything else AND be sure that your perception is that of reality? If you can not measure, weight or smell, it does not mean the thing is not physical... it just means that your senses are not reliable.

I suggest to you therefore, that the mind is either physical (not part of the brain, but a physical entity of which we have no knowledge or concept), entity, or else a non-physical entity; but to declare that the mind is not physical with the confidence level of 100%, is a fallacy. Because, like I said, physical reality can't be known if we experience it as it is or differently.

If we can't rely on our senses to prove the physical world; can we rely on our senses to know that the mind is not physical?

I don't need my senses to know that my mind is not physical, in the sense that materialists/physicalists use the word. It's simply not in that category of things, because it's missing physical characteristics. You're saying it could have those physical characteristics, except my senses could be fooling me, but I don't need my senses to know my mind isn't a physical object. I don't need to try and smell it to know it doesn't have an odor, or try and look at it to know it doesn't have a shape.

You're proposing the mind might be a physical thing that's not the brain (I assume you're not talking simulation theory or Boltzmann Brains). If you say that the mind is some physical thing we have no conception of I have a feeling your physicalism is going to turn into idealism. In any case, if the materialist has to claim the mind might be a physical non-brain non-computer thing... I don't think that's very convincing.

I wish you would address my thought experiment about the two ancient people talking meaningfully about their mental states. If you believe the mind is identical some physical thing, your position commits you to claiming they are also talking meaningfully about some physical thing they know nothing of. You would be on much firmer ground claiming the mind is not a physical thing but is caused by a physical thing.

I don't need my senses to know that my mind is not physical, in the sense that materialists/physicalists use the word. It's simply not in that category of things, because it's missing physical characteristics. — RogueAI

You use physical categories to help you decide that the mind is not physical. It lacks weight, volume, smell, etc. So it IS physical characteristics that you use to determine that it is not physical. However, physical characteristics are of objects in the physical realm, our knowledge of which is not reliable, because our senses can lie.

Therefore it is conceivable that the mind is physical; and the only reason you don't experience it is that your perception of it is distorted.

I think this is the biggest achievement of Descartes "cogito ergo sum": that it determines that physical things can and do exist, in case the mind is a physical thing. It is just as likely to be physical as non-phyiscal, as there is no indication as to its origin, to its working modus,that excludes the possibility of the mind being physical. I think (and I know you don't agree, which is fine with me) that it is a fallacy to exclude the possibitlity of the mind as being physical. The brilliant thing is that it does not have to be: "cogito ergo sum" works both ways, whether the mind is physical or not.

I wish you would address my thought experiment about the two ancient people talking meaningfully about their mental states. — RogueAI

Where do I find the description of this thought experiment of yours?

In this thread.