In case you may be interested...

Thanks cs, I cannot commit to full participation in a reading group due to lack of time and too many commitments atm, but I would be sure to read through and participate as much as time allows me to.

Cool. Just trying to drum up some interest in carefully reading it...

No worries.

The link you sent goes to an error page. Here's another link:

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.187414

Suggest you limit the reading to Part 1 rather than the whole document. If my memory is correct, that's where the really interesting part is. I'll participate at least as far as rereading that. It may take me a few days to be able to get to even get to the first four chapters. Suggest you provide a list of the words for which:

the reader must adopt these uses — creativesoul

along with definitions.

Thanks for that link. I think I've corrected the one in the OP.

Good suggestions. Collingwood provided his own definitions though. So, one who knows that in order to understand such a piece of writing, one must grant definitions/senses of key terms. Should anyone here wish to argue definitions, they're in the wrong thread.

:wink:

To anyone interested, there's no time limit here or strict reading schedule. It seems that most who've expressed interest prior to and since I posted the OP all share limited time. Given that, I'm in no hurry, and really a careful deliberate reading is required to begin with, so...

Everyone can read at a pace that is best for them...

There's no need for daily participation either. We can all do it at our own leisure.

It does look interesting. I like that it was written before mid-century, it still retains a kind of old worlde charm. I'll try and find time to read substantial parts.

By way of footnote, a recent essay by a philosophical biographer, Ray Monk, on Collingwood's early death, his replacement by Glibert Ryle, and its consequences. How the untimely death of RG Collingwood changed the course of philosophy forever. Paints a very sympathetic portrait.

In the preface Collingwood states...

This is not so much a book of metaphysics as a book about metaphysics. What I have chiefly tried to do in it is neither to expound my own metaphysical ideas, nor to criticize the metaphysical ideas of other people ; but to explain what metaphysics is, why it is necessary to the well-being and advancement of knowledge, and how it is to be pursued.

In the second place I have tried to dispel certain misconceptions about it which have led (and, had they been true, would have led with perfect justice) to the conclusion that metaphysics is a blind alley of thought into which knaves and fools have combined these many centuries past to lure the human intellect to its destruction.

In the third place I have offered to the reader’s attention a few examples of metaphysics itself, in order to show how metaphysical inquiry will be conducted if the principles laid down in the opening chapters are taken as sound.

Thanks. I'd be delighted to see what you think.

:smile:

it still retains a kind of old worlde charm. — Wayfarer

This text is a pleasure to read. Elegant, amusing and precise. Seems like the writings of a true gentleman.

Should anyone here wish to argue definitions, they're in the wrong thread. — creativesoul

Excellent rule.

Skipped ahead to the chapter on modern psychology as the pseudo-science of thought. There are so many quotable quotes in the first few pages alone. Spot on.

By way of footnote, a recent essay by a philosophical biographer, Ray Monk, on Collingwood's early death, his replacement by Glibert Ryle, and its consequences. How the untimely death of RG Collingwood changed the course of philosophy forever. Paints a very sympathetic portrait. — Wayfarer

In a post on another thread, @Olivier5 provided a link to a podcast on Collingwood on "The Philosophers Zone," which is a very good show with lots of interesting guests. Trigger warning - they all have Australian accents.

https://www.abc.net.au/radionational/programs/philosopherszone/voice-in-the-wilderness-rg-collingwood/3148288

grant definitions/senses of key terms. — creativesoul

“criteriological” pg 118.

New one on me. Got a nice ring to it, much cooler than “normative”.

Does Collingwood undermine his own arguments, by begging his own ontological assumptions, when he makes a hard distinction between absolute presuppositions and propositions?

Initially, SEP's article on Collingwood says that the difference between presuppositions and propositions isn't one of content, but one of role:

"Whether a statement is a “proposition” or a “presupposition” is determined not by its content but by the role that the statement plays in the logic of question and answer. If its role is to answer a question, then it is a proposition and it has a truth-value. If its role is to give rise to a question, then it is a presupposition and it does not have a truth-value. Some statements can play different roles. They may be both propositional answers to questions and presuppositions which give rise to questions. For example, that an object is for something, that it has a function may be a presupposition which gives rise to the question “what is that thing for?”, but it may also be an answer to a question if the statement has the role of an assertion. "

So far, so good, for no Positivist could disagree with that; whenever an assertion is understood to be meant presuppositionally it isn't used in a truth-apt sense, but as a temporary conditional assertion upon which a subsequent course of a truth-apt epistemological enquiry is founded. This is to understand a presupposition as being a modest and consciously subjective assertion that is comparable to an axiom or a Wittgenstein 'hinge proposition'. But then immediately after that (emphasis added), the article makes a stronger claim on behalf of Collingwood, saying

"Philosophical analysis is concerned with a special kind of presupposition, one which has only one role in the logic of question and answer, namely that of giving rise to questions. Collingwood calls these presuppositions “absolute”. Absolute presuppositions are foundational assumptions that enable certain lines of questioning but are not themselves open to scrutiny."

At first I wondered if SEP was overstating Collingwood's position. For if the distinction of these types of sentences is one of role rather than content, then presumably he was merely pragmatic and did not think that his distinctions had significant implications with respect to epistemological conclusions, but only with respect to the defence of a plurality of epistemological methodologies, none of which have the capacity to contradict the assertions that the other methodologies arrive at. But then the article makes it clear that his position is even stronger:

" Collingwood’s account of absolute presuppositions generates an interesting angle on the question of scepticism concerning induction. Hume had argued that inductive inferences rely on the principle of the uniformity of nature. If it is true that the future resembles the past, then inferences such as “the sun will rise tomorrow” are inductively justified. However, since the principle is neither a proposition about matters of fact nor one about relations of ideas the proposition “nature is uniform” is an illegitimate metaphysical proposition and inductive inferences lack justification. The principle of the uniformity of nature, Collingwood argues, is not a proposition, but an absolute presupposition, one which cannot be denied without undermining empirical science. As it is an absolute presupposition the notion of verifiability does not apply to it because it does its job not in so far as it is true, or even believed to be true, but in so far as it is presupposed. The demand that it should be verified is nonsensical and the question that Hume ask does not therefore arise:

…any question involving the presupposition that an absolute presupposition is a proposition, such as the question “Is it true?” “What evidence is there for it?” “How can it be demonstrated?” “What right have we to presuppose it if it can’t?”, is a nonsense question. (EM 1998: 33) "


If the SEP is portraying his beliefs correctly, then I think Collingwood has jumped the sharked from making reasonable and modest epistemological commentary, to arriving at a dogmatic position regarding presuppositions that appears to beg the very ontological premises which he claimed philosophy isn't about. For you cannot insist that Hume was mistaken to question the uniformity of nature on the basis of it being an absolute presupposition, without adopting the dogmatic ontological standpoint that absolute presuppositions constitute objective existential claims.

It's useful to keep in mind that RGC claimed for himself expertise in archaeology and history. That is, he found/discovered things and then attempted to make sense of them. A person may take issue with the sense he made, but unless the ground for the claim of the sense is understood, then the criticism very likely is wrong. He did not, in other words, invent the idea of absolute presuppositions, instead he discovered something that he calls absolute presuppositions, then describes them and gives an account of their function. Thus someone who dismisses them out of hand as "nonsense" is in the position of someone who is sure to a certainty that bumblebees cannot fly - that is, a fool made foolish by his own refusal to acquaint himself with any facts of the matter. Remind anyone of anyone?

I have looked at the SEP article. In my opinion its questions and criticisms - at least some of them - reflect a failure of understanding. RGC himself, though, seems very clear and easy to understand. And so it is better just to read him first and then take on the critics.

This text is a pleasure to read. Elegant, amusing and precise. Seems like the writings of a true gentleman. — Olivier5

Indeed, it has been a pleasurable piece of reading at times. Of particular interest to me is that he avoids using inherently inadequate dichotomous terms like "subjective" and "objective", "internal" and "external", "noumenal" and "phenomenal", "object" and "subject", "perception" and "reality", etc.

I'm not at all certain whether or not he is what I would call a gentleman though. I do not have enough evidence before me to make such a declaration.

Actually, now that I'm thinking it over, although he's yet to have admitted this, I'm left with the impression that he has tested his theory out on other people. That would go a long way in explaining the sheerly remarkable level of confidence expressed by him. Now, to be clear, such experiments are not always unacceptable. I mean, not all such endeavors are based upon unacceptable moral grounding or ethical principles involving the deliberate treatment of others. For example, not all people strive to minimize harm. That guiding principle ought be strictly adhered to in that situation(where one is deliberately aiming to reveal another's presuppositions to them) as a matter of moral principle. I know not of Collingwood's.

So, with all this in mind, assuming that this particular essay consists of conclusions drawn from actual behavioural studies of people first becoming consciously aware of their own absolute presuppositions, I still do not know whether or not he let his desire to verify his hypothesis overwhelm his desire to falsify it. I also do not know whether or not he let his desire to confirm cloud his judgment regarding how he was effecting/affecting others. Both of those could possibly mark someone not such a gentleman. There's no doubt about it; if what he claims about how people react when faced with their own absolute presuppositions is true, whether sometimes or all the time(I'm tending to think he's overstated his case), I still do not know whether or not he intentionally avoided unnecessarily harming others during the course of his own experiments just to prove his point, or if he accidentally discovered how certain individuals react when their own thought and belief is being placed under such scrutiny and began recording and studying those circumstances in greater detail as a result. What I am sure of is that there's no anecdotal evidence in the essay to suggest that he witnessed any other reaction aside from one he described; which makes me wonder if he tried to elicit different ones...

If he accidentally discovered the reaction, as compared/contrasted to aimed at provocation thereof, and was the kind of person who cared about the effects/affects that his inquiry had upon others when he forced them to face their own absolute presupposition(I'm thinking of the pathologist), one would think that he would make a concerted attempt at lessening the negative impact. But again, there's simply no evidence to suggest that he even considered the negative consequences that his pursuit had upon others, and as a result, tempered his approach in such a way as to lessen it while retaining the benefits(whatever Collingwood thought they may be). No. To quite the contrary, he seemed to relish in the discomfort of others.

So was he a 'true gentleman'? That question is one that remains unanswered from my vantage point.

I've witnessed those same sorts of situations described by him up close and personal, and there have been times that people do react exactly as he so eloquently described. So there is some truth to what he says, no doubt. However, not all people react like that. The reaction is partly influenced, partly created, partly conformed by the conversation leading up to the exposure of the presupposition, and that much is crucial to properly understand. I mean, I've found that sometimes when someone values another's opinion, and trusts that their words are true, an appeal to the 'right sorts of reasoning' can go a long way in lessening the potentially negative impact that uncovering an absolute presupposition can have. To labor the point:An astute reader can see for themselves that the essay did not paint the picture of a pleasant unveiling, and there was no mention of his own responsibility towards the impact such an event has upon the subject in question. That lack of openly expressed concern towards who he is effecting/affecting concerns me and leaves his gentleness open to question. But alas, I've spent far more time than I initially expected talking about whether or not he is a gentleman. I do not know that. Could be.

I want to say a lot more about the aforementioned the appeal to "the right sorts of reasons" in the paragraph directly above. What I mean to say is that the practical and necessary reasoning required in order to show another's absolute presuppositions to themselves varies according to the individual. I am not of the opinion that everyone is even capable of understanding that they do hold such things if we restricted our endeavor to Collingwood's terminological preferences. There are also times which another can be shown that they are working from absolute presuppositions without inciting such angry resistance.

This essay is the only time I can remember seriously reading Collingwood(although I've seen him mentioned a number of different times over the past decade or so). What I can say with a fair amount of certainty is that if he is claiming that absolute presuppositions are discovered, then that claim alone rests upon it's own absolute presupposition that that which has been discovered existed in it's entirety prior to it's discovery. Talking about a discovery is to make the claim that something or other has been found as it already is/was, existing in it's entirety, at that particular time... the moment of discovery. A claim of discovery itself rests upon exactly that absolute presupposition.

I strongly suspect Collingwood would agree, for he does not strike me as man beyond reproach. He was an archeologist afterall, and clearly seems like he was a reasonable fellow. I do wonder though, upon hearing this articulation, upon hearing me propound his absolute presuppositions for the first time, if he would act in the same manner so described by him when characterizing how other people act when one of their absolute presuppositions was first revealed to them, or if he could be gently led along a path paved by the right sorts of reasons?

No matter really...

Back to reading and glad so many have found interest.

Glad you're reading this. Yes, it's interesting. That term jumped out at me as well. It plays a key role it seems. I've yet to have understood exactly what it picks out to the exclusion of all else. Is it on par with "normative" on your interpretation?

For you cannot insist that Hume was mistaken to question the uniformity of nature on the basis of it being an absolute presupposition, without adopting the dogmatic ontological standpoint that absolute presuppositions constitute objective existential claims — sime

Unless you first hold that absolute presuppositions are not claims at all, they are not propounded by those who hold them, and that what makes them what they are is their function as a basis from which questions arise not their truth value(not whether or not they are true). The uniformity of nature is not something that can be true. So questioning whether or not it is is mistaken. Hume's questioning of that much displays the logical efficacy of the absolute presupposition itself.

To quite the contrary, he seemed to relish in the discomfort of others.

So was he a 'true gentleman'? That remains unanswered from my vantage point. — creativesoul

Having read two-thirds of the piece, I would like to make the following tentative remarks.

One is that I followed his reasoning and adhered to it, by and large. I share his analysis of presuppositions. I'm saying this just so my critiques below are taken for what they are: sympathetic overall.

You are right that there's lots of anger behind the sleek exterior of his prose. He lashes out at certain notions and thinkers in ways that sometimes may antagonize. I do the same here, often, so shouldn't I agree with his style?

The first element of response I find to his polemic tone is that this is an essay, and an essay is brief, written fast, and polemical. It's the nature of the paper and the circumstances of its writing (1940, on a liner sailing to Sydney) that explain the hastiness of some transitions, the approximations here or there, the hurried pace at which the writer proceeds.

The second, perhaps more interesting answer I am trying to figure out now is: Collingwood was on a mission. He took the fate of Western civilization very seriously, one of his assumptions was that it was threatened, and another that western civilization was grounded in good, systematic, logical thinking. Hence his defence of logic and metaphysics is ultimately a defense of civilization.

There is a parallel with Popper writing his defense of liberalism, the Open Society and It's Enemies during the war, in New Zealand. He too is dead serious about the philosophical enemies of liberal, western civilization, which he calls (or idealised as) the open society. And it is easy to understand why. Funny though that Popper lambasts Aristotle in his defense of liberalism, and tends to deride metaphysics as unempirical hence useless, in a facile and superficial way which Collingwood rightly ties to a trope from renaissance anti-scholastic thinking, while trying to rehabilitate poor Aristotle... So the two interpretations are radically at odd with one another.

Any attempt to draw a broad brush macro picture of the history of philosophy and tie this to the situation at the onset of the second world war is bound to get some details wrong. It is bound to be polemical, and urgent in tone. And it is bound to be highly biased.

One could ask whether the question "arises". It presupposes that 1940's geopolitics can be usefully explained or understood as a moment in the development of philosophy, and that philosophers contributed to it... Collingwood thought so and I agree, but my villains are not exactly his. E.g. I agree with Popper that there was a strong element of power-fetishism in Hegel, and that Marxism also contributed in a roundabout way (Mussolini and Hitler copied the mass organization system invented by the communists for instance).

I would add that from Luther to Schopenhauer and beyond, there is no shortage of illiberal German thinkers, rabbid antisemitists, nationalists and other complaisant believers in the superiority of German culture. It is perhaps not a coincidence that Germany was such a highly philosophical country AND YET failed at democracy. Or that Heidegger was a member of the Nazi party. Perhaps a certain strand of German (and other) philosophers did contribute to the rise of Nazism.

Collingwood seems to be faulting other people. Mainly other professors in Oxford, or perhaps also in Cambridge. And beyond of course... broad brush it is, his "enemies" are far less defined than Popper's.

Long story short, RGC is arguing that positivism is the ghost haunting Europe. I am broadly sympathetic to this POV but I agree he's overstating it

To come back to your point, his anger is not focussed enough for a true gentleman, I agree.

One striking contradiction I noted is in his relation to psychology. He is careful to state that it is valid as a science of feelings but not as a science of thought, which is logic and other 'criterioligical sciences'. But when he attacks the anti-metaphysicians, one type after another (ch. XIII), he repeatedly makes use of fear and even unconscious fear as a factor explaining their thought, as expressed in their books. And later on, in chapter XVI he comes back to similar argument about the fear of metaphysics.

In doing so he recognizes implicitly that feelings and emotions can alter and even motivate even our highest philosophical thoughts. Therefore, 1) a science of feelings would be tightly connected to a science of thoughts, not independent, and 2) beside logical presuppositions something else shapes our conscious thoughts: unconscious desires, fears and phobia. The very thesis of Freud...

I've yet to have understood exactly what it picks out to the exclusion of all else. — creativesoul

I’m not sure about “all else”, but in the interest of a science of thought, the text has psychology, which is normative in that its propositions contain judgements by a thinker concerning the correctness of other people’s thoughts, opposed to metaphysics which is criteriological, in that it makes no propositions but retains the power of judgement respecting his own thoughts only.

This all evolves from the Greek understanding that the science of feeling is very different than the science of thought. The former were attributes of the psyche, the latter of the mind; the former was, by Greek standards, what we would call empirical because it has to do with directing towards ends in the form of behavior, and the latter has to do with determination of ends in the form of constructing opinions or knowledge. The latter was considered a theoretical science of thought called logic, the former the practical science called ethics.

Both these are called normative, insofar as “they paid great attention to the task of defining criteria by which they judge their own success” in the field in which they operate. But the judgement of success of one’s own thoughts is never given, if it be granted that thought is sometimes self-refuting, which implies normative in its strictest sense, cannot apply. In other words, success does not belong to a thinker’s faculty of judgement, for if there is a judgement, judgement is immediately successful because of it. Judgement cannot be unsuccessful.

On the other hand, judgement by a thinker respecting his own thoughts, has absolutely necessary fundamental conditions, whatever their name may be, so the appellation “criteriological”, is apt.

Close enough? I skipped some of the finer points, for expediency, so I trust you to correct me if I missed something important.

...it is better just to read him first and then take on the critics. — tim wood

Sound advice. I, myself, have just recently realized that I had spoken too soon earlier.

I'm only through page 77, but I must say that something about this writing is quite striking to me, particularly that Collingwood keeps metaphysics connected to everyday events. I'm very impressed.

One is that I followed his reasoning and adhered to it, by and large. I share his analysis of presuppositions. I'm saying this just so my critiques below are taken for what they are: sympathetic overall. — Olivier5

I too am quite sympathetic. I would like to put his method of analysis to use here; play around with it, so to speak. I've read through around page eighty, but I keep getting the feeling that I need to read what I've already read, yet again. So, I've quite carefully studied the first five chapters reading through them multiple times taking notes and such. The more I read it, the more I actually want to make a concerted attempt at employing his method of analysis. However, I do not wish to do so alone.

Would you be interested in such an endeavor/discussion? As before, I'm very pressed for spare time lately, and do not see that changing anytime soon, so the pace will be slooow.

:wink:

keep getting the feeling that I need to read what I've already read, yet again — creativesoul

Same here. It is a very original and funny text. I like it a lot. And in fact I am already using his technique (which is similar to 'deconstructing') in analysing Collingwood's own presuppositions. That's how I discovered that he had absorbed more Freud than he cared to say.

So yes, I'd be please to experiment further.

I'd be curious to see your work set out.

Near as I can tell - and I'm not satisfied with what I've got - you start with a proposition, or a question, the proposition being the answer to a question. "Where are my keys?" Or, "My keys are on the table." Presupposed are keys, table, location, and also what RGC calls a constellation of relative presuppositions. And what do all these presuppose? And so on and so forth. At some point you get to a WTF! moment. And that, it seems to me, is a clue to the uncovering of an absolute presupposition.

Does your family like you? Presupposed are family and liking. And the answer is maybe they do and maybe they don't. So we go to cases. Does your son, daughter, wife, husband, brother, sister, aunt, uncle, cousin like you? Maybe yes, maybe no. Does your mother love you? WTF! And we may be excused for thinking that mother's love is absolutely presupposed, and indeed is the model for almost all other love. So my process something like that, an attempt at what RGC calls organized thinking. But I am eager for suggestions for improvement of method.

I've tried to use the technique in this post:
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/510890

He lashes out at certain notions and thinkers in ways that sometimes may antagonize. I do the same here, often, so shouldn't I agree with his style? — Olivier5

No, you should not. Generally speaking...


Not - for that reason alone - should anyone conclude that some behaviour or another is acceptable or ethically permissible. If another's behaviour is, was, and/or will be judged as acceptable simply because one does it, then it always and only follows that all actual behaviour is morally acceptable and/or ethically permissible.

That conclusion is quite clearly false. Not all are.






When one agrees with another's behaviour based upon the fact that it is like one's own, then one is - at a bare minimum at least - being consistent. Consistency is admirable for a plethora of reasons. Dependability requires consistency. Dependability is good. However, consistency of behaviour alone does not warrant moral acceptance of that behaviour. Slave traders were consistent enough in their treatment of the enslaved that others could, and did, successfully plan on it continuing, for example. Hitler was consistent in his treatment of any and all perceived enemies of his goals. That's another example.

Now, I'm not saying that all people holding a consistent belief system are equivalent to people who've consistently committed horrible atrocities, or consistently acted in horrific ways. Rather, I'm simply mentioning tha prima facie evidence, I'm just reminding the reader of actual events that prove to us all - well beyond a reasonable doubt - that behavioural consistency alone does not warrant admiration, praiseworthiness, and/or moral consent of that behaviour.







We could also say of one - regarding such situations - that one is practicing what they preach, so to speak. That's a good personality trait to have. There's nothing wrong with that, in and of itself. There's inherent worth/value in dependability. When someone acts in a consistent manner, they are more dependable than someone who is more unpredictable. Here again though, that's not enough. I mean, we could certainly depend upon Hitler's behaviour to be a certain way towards Jewish people and his perceived enemies. Like clockwork. The point, in everyday terms, is that practicing what one preaches does not make the practice praiseworthy and/or acceptable.

So...

To sum it up as briefly and concisely as I can, if all one's behaviour is faultless, then there is no problem whatsoever with them assenting to any and all others' behaviours based solely upon the fact that they share such a propensity.

However, to quite the contrary, if it is the case that some of one's behaviours are in dire need of marked improvement; if any are shameworthy, if any are unacceptable, then there is a problem with one using one's own behaviours as the standard by which to judge the moral permissibility of such behaviours in general.

I would agree with the first proposition if and only if it were further subsequently qualified in the following way...

The claim "Every statement that anybody ever makes is made in answer to a question" would become...

Some statements are made in answer to a question.

For example, "I'm ready for bed" is a statement coming from someone who is ready for bed. Not everyone, when they're ready for bed, asks themselves some question or another which is answered by that statement at that time. Not everyone, when ready for bed, are being asked a question that that statement stands in response to... at that time.

Not all statements are made in answer to a question. Rather, some are.

I'll say one thing though; I strongly suspect that Collingwood is as brilliant as any other philosopher in the history of the world that I have personally had the pleasure of reading.

For now, Collingwood's piece receives reasonably high marks. However, I remain unconvinced that his first proposition is true at each and every point along the evolutionary timeline of human thought and belief(it's not always true). Do not get me wrong here. Collingwood does a fantastic job of describing exactly what many historical metaphysicians were doing, as well as clearly describing what he thinks we ought be doing instead, when he characterizes some historical lines of thinking. He uses the clothesline example to some degree of success to make his point. I agree with most of what he said in so far as it pertains to those peculiar lines of thought historically called "metaphysical", or those typically being articulated when someone in the past was 'doing' metaphysics(playing the sorts of language games commonly called "metaphysics"). No. That's all fine by me. I'm also not troubled by the rough mention of the commonality between metaphysical and scientific thought, even though I'm undecided regarding his arguments regarding that classification.

I'm also quite fond of the endeavor of disentangling thought and later rearranging it. He's talking about metacognition. That is to think about pre-existing thought and belief as a subject matter in it's own right. He mentions that not everyone practices. He's correct, for the most part. He admires systematic thinking. When we take account of our own thought with the sole aim of rearranging them in order of which must take place prior to the next, which is precisely what he does with the "fallacy of many questions" example as well as the clothesline, we are placing them into an order of emergence.

For example, "I'm ready for bed" is a statement coming from someone who is ready for bed. Not everyone, when they're ready for bed, asks themselves some question or another which is answered by that statement at that time. Not everyone, when ready for bed, are being asked a question that that statement stands in response to... at that time. — creativesoul

Perhaps you need to read RGC a little more closely. Because this is a reading thread, I'll simply direct you to the particular text I think applies. Chap. iv, p.26, Def. 2, et seq.