'all [individual things], though in different
degrees, are...animated” - that's what Spinoza says and that's exactly panpsychism.

Your point is well taken that 'philosophy itself is not (equipped to effectively engage) in the 'theoretical explanation' business." In the paper I linked to, Chalmers says he doesn't want to give up on developing testable models. Toward that end, he seems to point toward the sort of work Tononi and Seung are doing with information systems as possibilities. What I was trying to wonder about is: If those efforts bear fruit, isn't that going to change the parameters of the models Chalmers says could handle the "easy" parts?

There is a divine spark in all of us and I call that God. But it emerges from matter. Anything can become actual from potentiality

All answers to the question of if God is conscious for Spinoza is correct. He thought we had to think of him as conscious intellect, but also that we know nothing of His inner life. Its like the difference between a canine constilation and an actual dog. We can call the former a dog but stars tell you nothing definite about Fido

I agree that Spinoza emphasizes that a vast sea separates human experience from whatever that might mean for the God we are in. But Spinoza goes to a great effort to explain the difference as a category mistake rather than simply a measure of how tiny my mind is compared to God's in the style of Descartes and Anselm.

If those efforts bear fruit, isn't that going to change the parameters of the models Chalmers says could handle the "easy" parts? — Valentinus

Probably.

@180 Proof I credit you more than most with recognizing that S is just another man behind the curtain. But do you? It seems to me that S's kataphasis is, seeming positive, in essence denies. That leaves what it affirms. "God. Or nature." In templating the two so that either might overlay the other, we're left with what manifestly is v. what manifestly is not. Nature. But not as an is but an is-ing, a being, the process of itself. Which is everything, and nothing.

And how does this fare with Kant's critique of metaphysical speculation? It appears to be the effort and attempt to capture the insubstantial and ineffable in a net of language. And the only thing language captures is itself, and that only with much hard work.

So it seems to me, that as with democracy, S's no good at all, but still better than all the rest.

There is a divine spark in all of us and I call that God. But it emerges from matter. — Gregory

So that's exactly materialism, the only difference is that in materialism there's no ''divine spark".
But something divine from matter...

He thought we had to think of him as conscious intellect, but also that we know nothing of His inner life. — Gregory

Conscious intellect - now if a thing is conscious... how in the world isn't personal as well? It doesn't even have to be meta-conscious. That's idealism.
So far, I've seen S being considered ''The father of the German idealism''; on wikipedia and most of the sources he was a panpsychist; even though almost nobody mentions him as a materialist, there is a possibility.

I personally believe he tried to find something like a magic formula impossible to falsify, so he took elements from everywhere and left space for interpretation. I see no difference between him and those who say ''It depends how on your interpretation of the Bible".

I'll drink to that on Paddy's Day. :up:

Sláinte, tw :party:

To make things clearer.
You cannot adopt both a mainstream religion and sponozism. Except that, you can be an idealist and argue Spinoza was a great idealist, you can argue he was a panpsychist, and of course you could also say he was a materialist, I've seen even people arguing his metaphysics had dualist aspects in it.
He was against religious dogma, but other than that, he tried to reconcile the goat, the cabbage and the wolf.
That's just my opinion SO FAR.

Whether extension for Spinoza can have life, I do not know. We have souls ("thinking") that he says does not come from extension (matter) however. Intellect comes from the attribute of thinking. So no he is not an idealist or a materialist

The divine part of our subconscious is dependent on matter but superior to it in a sense by way of emergence

My comment would be there is no effective difference, much like Kant's critique of the ontological argument-- one can say there is a necessary real. Or one can say there is a necessary unreal. Only in this case, the difference is only a flavour of description, since this ontological argument is not referencing a difference of possible, counterfactual states (God exist vs God does not exist). Real or unreal, one is merely making an argument for a distinction of absolute infinitity. Either side is just as committed to a positive claim about a distinction known.

I would actually extend such analysis to other philosophers who give ontological arguments. Even those who do make a confusion for the question of whether God exists or not. No doubt they are mistaken, but the mistake is not a presupposition.

Rather, they have confused one distinction they are trying to describe, the necessary infinite, with another distinction they care about, an existing finite entity of a deity of some kind. Insofar as this goes, I don't think anyone ever holds a postion of presupposition. I think the critique philosophers are making presupposition is one of the biggest mistakes in the canon. They aren't presupposing, but confusing one thing for another.

The divine part of our subconscious is dependent on matter but superior to it in a sense by way of emergence — Gregory

Ahh... ok. Dependent on matter in the sense of ''a bullet in your brain will have some efects''?

So no he is not an idealist or a materialist — Gregory

Here's the thing frustrating me because I don't understand it: you're mentioning the attribute of thinking, which is one of the infinite attributes. My question is why are there infinite attributes - did something cause them, or they just are?
a. if something caused them, my issue with this is that whatever that is, it cannot create thought and consciousness if it possesses 0% consciousness. Here, you're saying that God's intellect is conscious, so it makes sense, but many (as you've seen in this OP) won't agree with that.
b. nothing caused them, they're there because they're there and they act the way they do because they act the way they do. It assumes to many things.

Panpsychism, in the sense you are thinking, is too reductive for Spinoza. Spinoza says all things are animated even when experience does not exist at all.

This sort of panpsychism makes the same sort of reductive error as a reductive materialist: just as the materialist claims mind is "just the brain", this panpsychism claims mind is "just experience".

Spinoza point is everything is always animated in mind. Even when thinking or experiencing beings do not exist, reality still has its significance in concepts, in the meanings which might appear to experiences. Mind is not experience and is given without experiences.

Mind is not experience and is given without experiences. — TheWillowOfDarkness

Then we call it ''mind'' in virtue of what?

Itself. It is mind.

This is why there is no hard problem for Spinoza. Matter does not create mind. Both matter (attribute of extension) and mind (attribute of thought) are necessary.They are never created or caused to come into existence from their absence.

Experiences are just some modes of both matter (in that they are existing things, caused from others) and mind (in that they have a certain meaning in concepts and logical relations).

1. Why call it mind? I see no reason. Why not ping-pong?

2. I don't really understand this ''are just some modes of matter and mind''. For me, it sounds like: some combinations of atoms form/are rocks which don't have experience, and other formare humans who have experience. How come this combination doesn't give rise to experience and that gives rise to experience? It seems like the answer is: ''It just does''. How do you get from non-experience to experience? Using this way of answering things, when asked how come two different substances interact, one could answer ''they just do''.

Now it's very important for me to mention that I don't have the intention here to deny S by using the hard problem, or even to argue that the hard problem exists or not, if it has a solution or not.

1. Why call it mind? I see no reason. Why not ping-pong? — Eugen

He explains this in the Ethics:

If intellect belongs to the divine nature, it cannot be in nature, as ours is generally thought to be, posterior to, or simultaneous with the things understood, inasmuch as God is prior to all things by reason of his causality (Prop. xvi., Coroll. i.). On the contrary, the truth and formal essence of things is as it is, because it exists by representation as such in the intellect of God. Wherefore the intellect of God, in so far as it is conceived to constitute God's essence, is, in reality, the cause of things, both of their essence and of their existence. This seems to have been recognized by those who have asserted, that God's intellect, God's will, and God's power, are one and the same.

tl;dr-the divine intellect is the clockwork of the universe, its thoughts are the formation of patterns and what it means to be patterned in any way, it unfolds inexorably, an unstoppable force, as anything that could stop it would be part of it.

1. We are talking about is mind, not ping pong. If we talked about ping pong, we would be describing something else entirely. Why call it mind? That's what we are trying to talk about.

2. It means experiences are of both matter and mind, rather than being a substance opposed to matter. It is not a question of combination because every experience is its own thing, a mode of matter and mind. Whether that experience be of a human or of a rock.

The point is S denies the hard problem. If you think there is a hard problem, you disagree with Spinoza.

That is very helpful to me. The absolute infinity doesn't have a dancing partner in an Antinomy.
*Valentinius smacks forehead*

If you feel that Spinoza should have known of the "hard problem" then either you think he was wrong or you believe he thought God was conscious. BECAUSE he shrouded God in mystery, the second option is open

The point is S denies the hard problem. If you think there is a hard problem, you disagree with Spinoza. — TheWillowOfDarkness

Ok, that clarifies things. Thanks :smile:

If you feel that Spinoza should have known of the "hard problem" then either you think he was wrong or you believe he thought God was conscious — Gregory

Let me present it from a different angle. For the sake of the argument, let's assume the hard problem and/or the combination problem are both true. In this case, in your interpretation of S, can spinozism still resist?

For example, in TheWillowOfDarkness's view, if the hard problem is true, then spinozism is wrong.

Like a rainbow from God's substance, everything comes from God's attributes. Modes are phenomena and attributes are noumena. So your soul comes right from God's rainbow (the "thinking" color) so yes, it resists the hard problem. Assuming (here's the caveat) that God's inner life is conscious. I think for Spinoza it is

Ok, if God's conscious, we can definitely agree the hard problem dissapears.
But if we take the other interpretation, where God has 0 will, 0 consciousness, 0 intelligence, can S still be right IF the hard/combination problem is true?

Of course not

Thanks, man!

To make things clear - in your own interpretation of S, assuming the hard problem/combination problem were true, would spinozism still work?

I am not sure what you think the "hard problem/combination problem" to be.

In the essay I linked to previously, Chalmers says our experience of consciousness cannot be reduced to a function of our present scientific models developed through hypothesis and experimentation. In your comments made so far, I can't make out how the truth or falsity of that statement establishes the basis to evaluate the philosophy of Spinoza.