How do we know they have been fooled except by further use of them? — Pfhorrest

We don't, which is why I think the senses are a bad guide for moral conduct in the way hedonism seems to prescribe.

I voted the middle options on both questions. Other things are relevant, such as future outcomes/consequences (I.e. long term health vs. short term gratification). And not everyone’s pain/pleasure is relevant all the time. The pain a child experiences due to being made to apologize for doing something wrong is irrelevant, imo. There must be limits to this, of course. The aim should be to ensure the punishment fits the crime.

Also, I think it’s worth saying that pleasure (or excessive pleasure perhaps) often leads to pain. So if what is meant by hedonism is to blindly pursue pleasure/avoid pain, then I disagree with that, and would advocate for something like “rational hedonism” where the consequences of pursuing pleasure/avoiding pain are considered prior to acting, and potential unwanted consequences are weighed against potential desirable ones.

Seems to me that hedonism always wants to avoid this conclusion - to say there’s no real difference between pleasant sensations and eudomonaic happiness (which is the happiness that comes from the pursuit of virtue.) One can, for example, attain happiness in the contemplation of verities, which surely can’t be reduced to sensation alone, and which only a rational mind can entertain.
— Wayfarer
But what would justify this difference? — baker

Eudomonia in Aristotelian philosophy is linked with virtue and with fulfilling your life's purpose (telos). I don't think it's difficult to differentiate those kinds of aims from the hedonistic pursuit of pleasure. Nor do I find it difficult to differentiate the faculty of reason from that of sensation.

all vets are into BDSM. — counterpunch

:lol:

Let's survey some things that make us happy/unhappy: a full belly, friends & family, good health, to name a few. — TheMadFool

We have to consider the religious perspective - that real happiness is not to be found in your worldly circumstances, no matter how propitious, as they are always subject to decay. Of course it's easy to say, but a hard truth to realise, especially when tragedy strikes.

iBuddhists agree with the teachings of other religions, that true lasting happiness cannot be found in this world; nor, the Buddha adds, can it be found on any higher plane of existence, conceived as a heavenly or divine world, since all planes of existence are impermanent and thus incapable of giving lasting bliss. The spiritual values advocated by Buddhism are directed, not towards a new life in some higher world, but towards a state utterly transcending the world, namely, Nirvāṇa. In making this statement, however, we must point out that Buddhist spiritual values do not draw an absolute separation between the beyond and the here and now. They have firm roots in the world itself for they aim at the highest realization in this present existence. Along with such spiritual aspirations, Buddhism encourages earnest endeavor to make this world a better place to live in. — Nyanoponika Thera

At the very least, a religious worldview allows you to 're-frame' the sufferings of mortal life against a background of sustaining virtue.

How do we know they have been fooled except by further use of them?
— Pfhorrest

We don't — Tzeentch

Then how do we know that there is any reason to doubt them?

Other things are relevant, such as future outcomes/consequences (I.e. long term health vs. short term gratification). — Pinprick

pleasure (or excessive pleasure perhaps) often leads to pain. So if what is meant by hedonism is to blindly pursue pleasure/avoid pain, then I disagree with that, and would advocate for something like “rational hedonism” where the consequences of pursuing pleasure/avoiding pain are considered prior to acting, and potential unwanted consequences are weighed against potential desirable ones. — Pinprick

That is all within the domain of what I mean. Hedonism can be far-sighted or short-sighted. If the long-term consequences you’re concerned about are still all about whether you will be suffering or enjoying life in the future, then that’s still a focus on feeling good or bad, pleasure or pain, etc; it’s just a smart way to do so, that doesn’t shoot itself in the foot.

Eudomonia in Aristotelian philosophy is linked with virtue and with fulfilling your life's purpose (telos). — Wayfarer

What is virtue but good character, a propensity to do good things, to bring about a good (or at least better) world?

What is purpose but what something is good for, what good comes as a consequence of it?

And what is good about some consequences, about some state of the world, besides everyone feeling good, nobody feeling bad?

Doing good does feel good, sure, and it is perhaps the highest form of good feeling, the best feeling even, but what is the “good” in “doing good” other than helping people to feel good and not bad?

And what is good about some consequences, about some state of the world, besides everyone feeling good, nobody feeling bad? — Pfhorrest

Aristotelian philosophy generally is teleologically oriented - things have a purpose, a telos, which is the basis for what is considered good - being able to fulfil that purpose is a criterion of what is good. But, of course, teleology was one of the cardinal features of Aristotelian philosophy to be rejected by modernity. So that means that the criterion of what is good is defined by subjective feeling - which leads to ethical hedonism.

We evolved in hunter gatherer tribes that then joined together to form societies and civilisations. In order for society to function; for hunter gatherer tribes to live together - it was necessary to make that implicit morality - explicit; and that's religion. — counterpunch

Evolutionary biology is intended to provide an account of the origin of species. Evolutionary rationales of religion, music, and other aspects of human culture are too often just so stories.

That's an unusual definition then, and not the one this thread is about, an article about which I linked to in the OP. That definition is, shortly put, "what matters, morally speaking, is that people feel good rather than bad, experience pleasure rather than pain, enjoyment rather than suffering", etc. That could be people generally (altruism) or just oneself (egotism); that axis is a different one from hedonism vs... non-hedonism, for which I'm unaware of a good general word. (Let me know if anyone else is!) — Pfhorrest

To show that I am sincerely sorry about the delay, I'll answer your poll:

Is suffering morally relevant?

Yes, suffering is morally relevant. Pleasure, not so much.

Is it everyone's pleasure or pain that's relevant, or only some people's / your own? — Pfhorrest

I have to assume that everyone's suffering is morally relevant to them - whether or not it is relevant to me. I remember some years ago I was sat watching the news. There was a big train crash in South America. A lot of people were hurt - and I was sat there watching, when I heard the woman next door fall down the stairs, and start screaming.

By the time I got to her front door, it was clear she had help - so I left, but the disparity of concern I felt for the woman and her broken leg - over hundreds of people far away whom I would never meet, struck me at the time as surreal. I'm trying to suggest that even while, everyone's suffering is morally relevant, it's not necessarily morally relevant to me - and that's perfectly natural.

Is there a box I can tick for that?

Evolutionary biology is intended to provide an account of the origin of species. Evolutionary rationales of religion, music, and other aspects of human culture are too often just so stories. — Wayfarer

I get your point but what's the alternative? We have to place "religion, music, and other aspects of human culture" in an evolutionary context, because evolution is undeniably true.

I love this passage from Darwin's Dangerous Idea by Dennett:

"The fundamental core of contemporary Darwinism, the theory of DNA-based reproduction and evolution, is now beyond dispute among scientists. It demonstrates its power every day, contributing crucially to the explanation of planet-sized facts of geology and meteorology, through middle-sized facts of ecology and agronomy, down to the latest microscopic facts of genetic engineering. It unifies all of biology and the history of our planet into a single grand story. Like Gulliver tied down in Lilliput, it is unbudgeable, not because of some one or two huge chains of argument that might–hope against hope–have weak links in them, but because it is securely tied by hundreds of thousands of threads of evidence anchoring it to virtually every other field of knowledge."

That is all within the domain of what I mean. Hedonism can be far-sighted or short-sighted. If the long-term consequences you’re concerned about are still all about whether you will be suffering or enjoying life in the future, then that’s still a focus on feeling good or bad, pleasure or pain, etc; it’s just a smart way to do so, that doesn’t shoot itself in the foot. — Pfhorrest

:up:

Aristotelian philosophy generally is teleologically oriented - things have a purpose, a telos, which is the basis for what is considered good - being able to fulfil that purpose is a criterion of what is good — Wayfarer

What is purpose but what something is good for, what good comes as a consequence of it? — Pfhorrest

If what's good is fulfilling your purpose and your purpose is what good you can do, we're left with no idea what either "good" or "purpose" mean, other than that they're related -- which they definitely are. But we need more than that, some criterion by which to tell what something's purpose is, what effects of it are good. What is that criterion besides comforting/pleasing/helping rather than hurting?

Is there a box I can tick for that? — counterpunch

If you think it ought to be morally relevant to some kind of super perfectly ethical person, some saint or hero, even though you personally (like pretty much everyone) fall short of that, then I'd say that's answer #1 to the second question.

But we need more than that, some criterion by which to tell what something's purpose is, what effects of it are good. What is that criterion besides comforting/pleasing/helping rather than hurting? — Pfhorrest

Well, you're against transcendentalism which doesn't leave a lot of options.

I get your point but what's the alternative? We have to place "religion, music, and other aspects of human culture" in an evolutionary context, because evolution is undeniably true. — counterpunch

Not everything about human kind is determined by biology. When we evolved to the point of language, reason, and even (dare I say) spiritual transcendence, then we're no longer definable in purely biological terms; we've 'transcended the biological' is how I put it. And I absolutely don't buy Dennett's ultra-darwinism. He, Dawkins, and several others, personify the tendency of making a religion out of evolution -not in the sense of seeking transcendence through it, but by regarding it as the definition of human possibility. That's as much a consequence of Enlightenment rhetorics than of science as such.

Then how do we know that there is any reason to doubt them? — Pfhorrest

Hopefully one wisens up to this fact as they grow up, through their experiences and gathered knowledge.

Then how do we know that there is any reason to doubt them?
— Pfhorrest

Hopefully one wisens up to this fact as they grow up, through their experiences and gathered knowledge. — Tzeentch

Experiences of what? Knowledge of what? That something felt good at first but later lead to greater suffering? That’s information from your senses again, telling you that your earlier senses didn’t give you the full picture. It’s still your senses you ended up relying upon to tell you that, which is what you just said two posts ago can’t happen.

What is that criterion besides comforting/pleasing/helping rather than hurting?
— Pfhorrest

Well, you're against transcendentalism which doesn't leave a lot of options. — Wayfarer

Can you explain what a transcendental criterion would look like anyway?

Experiences of what? Knowledge of what? That something felt good at first but later lead to greater suffering? That’s information from your senses again, telling you that your earlier senses didn’t give you the full picture. — Pfhorrest

Yes and no.

Sensory experiences combined with our reasoning faculty, where the latter can provide us with an understanding the sensory experiences cannot.

As I’m pursuing an Aristotelian theme,

7. 1. [1177a11] But if happiness consists in activity in accordance with virtue, it is reasonable that it should be activity in accordance with the highest virtue; and this will be the virtue of the best part of us. Whether then this be the Intellect [nous], or whatever else it be that is thought to rule and lead us by nature, and to have cognizance of what is noble and divine, either as being itself also actually divine, or as being relatively the divinest part of us, it is the activity of this part of us in accordance with the virtue proper to it that will constitute perfect happiness; and it has been stated already* that this activity is the activity of contemplation — Nichomachean Ethics

Sensory experiences combined with our reasoning faculty, where the latter can provide us with an understanding the sensory experiences cannot. — Tzeentch

About what, how? So far as I can see, a priori reasoning can only tell us when things are logically impossible because they're contradictory incoherent nonsense. That's useful, sure, but it doesn't get you very far; it can't tell you any contingent things about either what's true or what's good, only about what's (not) possible.

it has been stated already* that this activity is the activity of contemplation — Nichomachean Ethics

On what grounds can we judge whether or not that claim (that contemplation is the highest virtue) is correct? In virtue of what (pun intended) is contemplation the highest virtue? i.e. what makes contemplation so good?

it can't tell you any contingent things about either what's true or what's good, only about what's (not) possible. — Pfhorrest

I disagree. I think such experiences and reasoning can tell us many things that are both true and good for ourselves.

I don't really get the point of the poll. On the one hand, "ethical hedonism" is mentioned at the start, which refers to a metaethical position that I don't really understand (but I confess I don't know much about it). But the poll questions don't seem to be about metaethics - or are they? Taken at face value, the questions seem to be about personal ethical beliefs.

"Do you think that whether things feel good or bad to people is morally relevant at all?" Well, I believe that hurting people is usually bad, and pleasing is often good, so yeah? What else could I say?

Not everything about human kind is determined by biology. When we evolved to the point of language, reason, and even (dare I say) spiritual transcendence, then we're no longer definable in purely biological terms; we've 'transcended the biological' is how I put it. And I absolutely don't buy Dennett's ultra-darwinism. He, Dawkins, and several others, personify the tendency of making a religion out of evolution -not in the sense of seeking transcendence through it, but by regarding it as the definition of human possibility. That's as much a consequence of Enlightenment rhetorics than of science as such. — Wayfarer

I can read your words, but your meaning escapes me. Perhaps if you could explain how - in your philosophy, geographically isolated groups of human beings, all developed music, pottery, jewellery, agriculture, architecture, and so on and on - all the same things done in culturally distinct ways, I could get a better read on what you're implying by denying the role of biological evolution. I think you'd be forced to conclude it makes more sense to extend your idea of evolution, than to suggest some supernatural explanation.

If you think it ought to be morally relevant to some kind of super perfectly ethical person, some saint or hero, even though you personally (like pretty much everyone) fall short of that, then I'd say that's answer #1 to the second question. — Pfhorrest

I didn't invoke the existence of a "super perfectly ethical person" - and I could not answer your question for such a person, if I had! If your question can only be answered in the way you wish, by such a hypothetical person, is it not possible that you're asking the wrong question?

Is it everyone's pleasure or pain that's relevant, or only some people's / your own?
1. Everyone's is relevant
2. Only some people's / mine is relevant
3. Nobody's is relevant (I said "no" above already) — Pfhorrest

I believe the continued existence of humankind matters; and because we're facing global threats we need to cooperate to solve there's no-one who would like to answer "1. Everyone's is relevant" more that I would, but I can't - because philosophically, I'm bound to tell the truth.

I can go so far as to acknowledge that everyone's suffering is morally relevant to them; but for me, morality is an innate sense - not a God given or objective ideal; and from experience, I can tell you that my senses are limited by the horizon. Intellectually, I knew that there were many more people, in the crash in South America, more badly hurt than the woman next door - but the suffering of the woman next door had a greater visceral impact on me.

I think you'd be forced to conclude it makes more sense to extend your idea of evolution, than to suggest some supernatural explanation. — counterpunch

I don't want to fall into the science v religion dichotomy. My view is that when h. sapiens evolved to the point of being language-using, meaning-seeking beings, those capacities aren't meaningfully viewed through the prism of evolutionary biology. It's an over-reach, due to the fact that evolutionary biology has displaced religion as the kind of 'arbiter of meaning'. But, as I say, that's not it's function, even though that's exactly how the Dennetts and Dawkins treat it.

I have no beef with entomology or evolution, but I refuse to admit that they teach me much about ethics. Consider the fact that human action ranges to the extremes. People can perform extraordinary acts of altruism, including kindness toward other species — or they can utterly fail to be altruistic, even toward their own children. So whatever tendencies we may have inherited leave ample room for variation; our choices will determine which end of the spectrum we approach. This is where ethical discourse comes in — not in explaining how we’re “built,” but in deliberating on our own future acts.Should I cheat on this test? Should I give this stranger a ride? Knowing how my selfish and altruistic feelings evolved doesn’t help me decide at all. Most, though not all, moral codes advise me to cultivate altruism. But since the human race has evolved to be capable of a wide range of both selfish and altruistic behavior, there is no reason to say that altruism is superior to selfishness in any biological sense. 1 — Richard Polt

This is germane to the OP also, as viewing ethics through the lens of biology can only ever yield some form of utilitarianism. And that's because there's really only one criterion for success in evolutionary biology, which is successful propogation. Any other kind of end is out of scope for the theory.

I think such experiences and reasoning can tell us many things that are both true and good for ourselves. — Tzeentch

Reasoning PLUS experience can, sure, but you were just doubting the reliability of experience, and when pressed for what grounds we have to doubt it, gave just reasoning alone as an answer.

My point overall is that while the conclusions reached from some experiences can indeed turn out to be wrong, the way we find that out is via more experiences, so it’s still ultimately experience that we’re relying on.

I didn't invoke the existence of a "super perfectly ethical person" - and I could not answer your question for such a person, if I had! — counterpunch

there's no-one who would like to answer "1. Everyone's is relevant" more that I would, but I can't — counterpunch

This second bit here is why I mentioned the super-person the first bit is about. It sounds to me like you’re saying that if you were a better person, you would care about everyone more than you in fact do; thus, that your idea of what a good person would answer is 1.

I bring that up because what I’m asking about is what you think the morally correct answer is, not just what you’re personally emotionally motivated to act on. Like, if you could be a better person, however you conceive “better” to be, what do you conceive that that better you would care about? And it sounds like you conceive that it would be 1.

I don't want to fall into the science v religion dichotomy. — Wayfarer

That's not your call; you are in the midst of a religion versus science dichotomy dating back 400 years. It's not my preferred condition either - but here we are. It needn't have been so. The Church had the opportunity to embrace Galileo as discovering the means to decode the word of God manifest in Creation. But they didn't do that - and so now we are looking toward human extinction. It's not honest to say you don't want this debate - and then go on to bash science all over again.

My view is that when h. sapiens evolved to the point of being language-using, meaning-seeking beings, those capacities aren't meaningfully viewed through the prism of evolutionary biology. It's an over-reach, due to the fact that evolutionary biology has displaced religion as the kind of 'arbiter of meaning'. But, as I say, that's not it's function, even though that's exactly how the Dennett's and Dawkins treat it. — Wayfarer

Could you give an example, because I'm having a very difficult time, pinning down exactly what you mean by "evolutionary biology has displaced religion as the kind of 'arbiter of meaning'" What do you propose instead - as a meaningful prism through which to view human mental capacities? Psychology?


"Evolutionary psychology is not simply a subdiscipline of psychology but its evolutionary theory can provide a foundational, metatheoretical framework that integrates the entire field of psychology in the same way evolutionary biology has for biology."

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evolutionary_psychology

This is germane to the OP also, as viewing ethics through the lens of biology can only ever yield some form of utilitarianism. And that's because there's really only one criterion for success in evolutionary biology, which is successful propogation. Any other kind of end is out of scope for the theory. — Wayfarer

Evolution teaches birds to build a nest before they lay eggs. Think about that. Does the bird know - and plan ahead? Almost certainly not. It's a programmed behaviour - what I call behavioural intelligence. And you think evolution cannot have programmed a behaviourally intelligent moral sense into human beings. Do you seriously suggest that morality is a purely intellectual exercise? Or were we all robbing and raping each other indiscriminately until Moses came down the mountain with his tablets?

Chimpanzees have morality of sorts. They groom each other and share food; and then remember who reciprocates - and withhold such favours accordingly in future. Morality is evolutionary - and no, knowing that fact doesn't tell you what is right or wrong in any given situation - but the moral sense does. You know right from wrong - like you know funny from not funny, or beautiful from ugly; instinctively.

I'm having a very difficult time, pinning down exactly what you mean by "evolutionary biology has displaced religion as the kind of 'arbiter of meaning'" — counterpunch

What I mean is that evolutionary biology, and science in general, now provides the kind of background guide to what intelligent people should believe - in the same way that religious culture used to in times past.

I don't subscribe to your reading of history viz a viz the Trial of Galileo but it is too large a topic to argue in a forum such as this.

And you think evolution cannot have programmed a behaviourally intelligent moral sense into human beings. — counterpunch

If it were programmed, you would expect it to be uniform. Birds, after all, build nests pretty much exaclty the same way every time. Instinctive behaviours are very minutely prescribed.

The point about the human situation is that humans get to decide, in large part, how they should live and what they should do. That gives a huge scope to possible outcomes, signified by the vast range of cultures and behaviours and societies. Our choices are under-determined by our biological descent. Sure, biological descent plays a role , no disputing that, but other factors come into play for h. sapiens, new horizons of the possible become visible that aren't even accessible to our simian forebears. See if you can google Darwinism Applied to Man by the co-discoverer of natural selection, Alfred Russel Wallace - he provides a dissenting view.

Chimpanzees have morality of sorts. — counterpunch

So what? Jane Goddall also mentioned that there were frequent murders, infanticide, cannibalism, and so on.

This second bit here is why I mentioned the super-person the first bit is about. It sounds to me like you’re saying that if you were a better person, you would care about everyone more than you in fact do; thus, that your idea of what a good person would answer is 1.

I bring that up because what I’m asking about is what you think the morally correct answer is, not just what you’re personally emotionally motivated to act on. Like, if you could be a better person, however you conceive “better” to be, what do you conceive that that better you would care about? And it sounds like you conceive that it would be 1. — Pfhorrest

Ideally, I would vote for answer number one - but only on suffering. I don't think pleasure is nearly as morally relevant as suffering. Intellectually, I recognise that suffering matters; whoever it is doing the suffering. But I don't feel it. Instinctually, I find I'm more concerned by the suffering of other people, the closer they are to me. I don't think it a matter of being a better person. I think it stems from the evolutionary prudence of being concerned by things that might afflict me.

What I mean is that evolutionary biology, and science in general, now provides the kind of background guide to what intelligent people should believe - in the same way that religious culture used to in times past. — Wayfarer

Oh, okay. I can live with that.

I don't subscribe to your reading of history viz a viz the Trial of Galileo but it is too large a topic to argue in a forum such as this. — Wayfarer

I would merely ask three questions:
1. Was Galileo tried for heresy?
2. Was that because he made scientific discoveries that contradicted Biblical orthodoxy?
3. Why, around 1635, did Descartes withdraw his treatise on physics from publication?

If it were programmed, you would expect it to be uniform. Birds, after all, build nests pretty much exactly the same way every time. Instinctive behaviours are very minutely prescribed. — Wayfarer

I am just trying to give a sense of the complexity of behaviours that can be attributed solely to evolution; as a basis to suggest that human beings are imbued with a moral sense by evolution in a tribal context. Chimpanzees have this proto-morality. It became more complicated when human being developed intellectual intelligence, and began to express morality in intellectual terms; and more complicated still when hunter-gather tribal groups joined together to form societies and civilisations. But morality is based in evolution.

The point about the human situation is that humans get to decide, in large part, how they should live and what they should do. That gives a huge scope to possible outcomes, signified by the vast range of cultures and behaviours and societies. Our choices are under-determined by our biological descent. Sure, biological descent plays a role , no disputing that, but other factors come into play for h. sapiens, new horizons of the possible appear. — Wayfarer

Consider Hume's famous is/ought argument, and how his understanding might have been different had he been aware of the evolutionary argument for a moral sense - I have described:

"In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always remarked, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs; when of a sudden I am surprised to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not. This change is imperceptible; but is, however, of the last consequence. For as this ought, or ought not, expresses some new relation or affirmation, 'tis necessary that it should be observed and explained; and at the same time that a reason should be given, for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it. But as authors do not commonly use this precaution, I shall presume to recommend it to the readers; and am persuaded, that this small attention would subvert all the vulgar systems of morality, and let us see, that the distinction of vice and virtue is not founded merely on the relations of objects, nor is perceived by reason."

Beyond the part in italics, there would be little to say, because bridging the "is" and the "ought" - is precisely what human beings do. We are capable of appreciating facts, and understand, instinctually, that those facts have moral implications. Galileo's trial insisted, on pain of torture, death and ex-communication - that scientific facts have no moral implications; that moral authority is derived from scripture, and ultimately from a divine source, and 400 years of philosophy has backed that position to the hilt. And it's wrong. Morality is primarily a sense, fostered in the human animal by evolution; and knowing what's true and doing what's right, on the basis of what's true - is where we should be, and we're not. The world is fucked because scientific facts are artificially deprived of moral implication.

I would merely ask three questions:
1. Was Galileo tried for heresy?
2. Was that because he made scientific discoveries that contradicted Biblical orthodoxy?
3. Why, around 1635, did Descartes withdraw his treatise on physics from publication? — counterpunch

‘Merely’? They are very large subjects - topics for a term paper, subject of many books. I will start by saying that I think the trial of Galileo is indefensible and should never have proceeded. But I’ve also learned that there were progressives inside the Roman Curia who said the same, but who lost the argument to the conservatives. Furthermore the arguments revolved around a great deal more than simply religion, there were political and philosophical dimensions to the debate which are largely omitted from the accounts nowadays.

And on the question of why Descartes withdrew his paper - I studied Descartes as an undergrad, wrote a term paper on him, but never encountered this question, can you provide some references for it.

In any case, the conclusion you draw is in line with the conflict thesis. It’s something which is widely assumed but simplistic, in my view. There are many shades of grey on all sides to the debate. Let’s say, there are Catholic intellectuals who would never have dreamed of challenging Galileo, (or Darwin for that matter - Darwinian evolution was never challenged by the Catholic, Anglican or Orthodox Communions, that privilege goes mainly to Southern Evangelicals.)

The upshot is, I don’t accept the ‘science versus religion’ conflict in the black-and-white terms in which you’re attempting to depict it. Sure, there are boneheaded anti-scientific fundamentalists, with whom it is not even worth debating, but there is also secular fundamentalism, which generally manifests as materialism.

I agree with your remarks elsewhere that science is indispensable for saving the planet from climate change. But let’s also not loose sight of the fact that science has developed the means to destroy everything on the planet a thousand times over. It’s a two-edged sword, and it has nothing in it which guarantees morality.

We are capable of appreciating facts, and understand, instinctually, that those facts have moral implications — counterpunch

Indeed we can, but I’m arguing that this ability is only partially explicable with respect to evolution. It’s not ‘instinctIve’ but culturally imbued in us. Bridging in the ‘is’ and ‘ought’ is something human beings often fail to do, both collectively and individually. I’m sure guilty of that.

Morality is primarily a sense, fostered in the human animal by evolution; — counterpunch

Just not buying. This is exactly what I mean by the over-extension of biological evolution to explain faculties which it has little or nothing to say about. Yes, humans evolved, but we can then choose an enormous range of ethical postures, from the diabolical evil to benevolent humanism - all with the same genetic base.

The correct answers are deliberately simple:

1. Yes.
2. Yes.
3. Fear!

The Church burned heretics alive right through to 1792 - 160 years after the trial of Galileo, and well into the Industrial Revolution. In short, science was deprived of moral authority, and whored out to industry - when it should have been recognised as the means to establish true knowledge of Creation.

And on the question of why Descartes withdrew his paper - I studied Descartes as an undergrad, wrote a term paper on him, but never encountered this question, can you provide some references for it. — Wayfarer

""The World" rests on the heliocentric view, first explicated in Western Europe by Copernicus. Descartes delayed the book's release upon news of the Roman Inquisition's conviction of Galileo for "suspicion of heresy" and sentencing to house arrest. Descartes discussed his work on the book, and his decision not to release it, in letters with another philosopher, Marin Mersenne."

In any case, the conclusion you draw is in line with the conflict thesis. It’s something which is widely assumed but simplistic, in my view. — Wayfarer

Simplistic is precisely what I was going for. After all, if I can't get you to answer the question: "Was Galileo tried for heresy?" with a simple: "Yes, he was" - then what hope is there of putting across complex ideas? I'm dumbing it down for you - and you still got it wrong!

The upshot is, I don’t accept the ‘science versus religion’ conflict in the black-and-white terms in which you’re attempting to depict it. — Wayfarer

I'd add colour but it might confuse you. If you can't understand the simple black and white outline argument, then how can you possibly appreciate the hugely complex picture from which these threads are drawn?

I agree with your remarks elsewhere that science is indispensable for saving the planet from climate change. But let’s also not loose sight of the fact that science has developed the means to destroy everything on the planet a thousand times over. — Wayfarer

Okay then, let's see if you can get this outline argument. Don't be confused by the lack of detail. We can do the colouring in later!

Because the Church made science a heresy, it was deprived of moral authority - such that, science has been used in pursuit of industrial and military power, without reference to the understanding of reality science describes. Overlapping religious, political and economic ideologies directed the development and application of technology - and that's why:

science has developed the means to destroy everything on the planet a thousand times over. — Wayfarer

Imagine, if the Church had embraced Galileo - as discovering the means to decode the word of God made manifest in Creation, and science was imbued with the moral authority of God's word. Technology would have been developed and applied in relation to a scientific understanding of reality. We'd have limitless clean energy from magma; and would have avoided or solved climate change. We wouldn't have nuclear weapons and be destroying the planet, because those are the consequences of science used as a tool by religious, political and economic ideologies.

Indeed we can, but I’m arguing that this ability is only partially explicable with respect to evolution. It’s not ‘instinctIve’ but culturally imbued in us. Bridging in the ‘is’ and ‘ought’ is something human beings often fail to do, both collectively and individually. I’m sure guilty of that. — Wayfarer

If morality is culturally imbued - where did culture get morality from? A burning bush perhaps?

I'm dumbing it down for you - and you still got it wrong! — counterpunch

let's see if you can get this outline argument. Don't be confused by the lack of detail. We can do the colouring in later! — counterpunch

where did culture get morality from? A burning bush perhaps? — counterpunch

Q: What do you call a Greek skydiver?

A: Con Descending! :lol: