And that's confirmed what I thought - you don't have a clue what follows from what, or what it takes for one argument to be the same as another. — Bartricks

1. "The knife is the murder weapon" becomes "the banana is the murder weapon" by variable substitution.
2. "The knife is the murder weapon" is a viable theory.
3. "The banana is the murder weapon" is not a viable theory.
4. Therefore, viability of inductive theories is not preserved by substitution.

No, I'm saying that they're exactly the same argument. Which they are. X causes Y, therefore X is Y. It's stupid.
— Bartricks
A knife is a viable murder weapon. Brain functioning is a viable explanation of mind.

A banana is not a viable murder weapon. Alcohol, apparently just being alcohol, is not a viable explanation of mind. — InPitzotl

And that's confirmed what I thought - you don't have a clue what follows from what, or what it takes for one argument to be the same as another.

And that's confirmed what I thought - you don't have a clue what follows from what, or what it takes for one argument to be the same as another. — Bartricks

So educate me.

Tell me how it works with the body, next to the bloody knife and the bloody banana.

ETA: Are the knife-murder weapon and banana-murder weapon theories on equal ground? If not, why not? According to you, it should be the same argument, so if it's stupid to think a banana is a murder weapon, it should be stupid to think a knife is.

So educate me. — InPitzotl

Not sure I am up to the job.

This argument:

1. Brain event causes mental event
2. Therefore brain event is mental event

is stupid, yes? The conclusion doesn't follow.

Given me an argument in support of the thesis that mental events are brain events (and thus that the mind is the brain) and I'll tell you if it is stupid or not.

is stupid, yes? The conclusion doesn't follow. — Bartricks

No, it's not stupid. Yes, it doesn't follow.

I see a body. Blood everywhere. There's a bloody knife next to the body. There's a bloody banana next to the body.

1. It does not follow that the banana is the murder weapon.
2. It does not follow that the knife is the murder weapon.
3. It is stupid to suspect the banana to be the murder weapon.
4. It is not stupid to suspect the knife to be the murder weapon.

Given me an argument in support of the thesis that mental events are brain events (and thus that the mind is the brain) and I'll tell you if it is stupid or not. — Bartricks

But you're biased. Any reasonable person would agree with the statements above.

But if we agree with these statements, that means we have to disagree on the equivalence of the arguments. So it's no wonder you avoid explicitly talking about bloody bananas.

No matter. I've made the bloody banana the elephant in the room.

No, it's not stupid. Yes, it doesn't follow. — InPitzotl

No, it is stupid. And yes, it doesn't follow.

Why the hell are you talking about knives and bananas? That's not the same argument at all. Not even remotely. Are you on something or do you actually think you're making sense? Sorry matey, but you're beyond my help. You need medication, not education.

Why the hell are you talking about knives and bananas? — Bartricks

Why are these the same argument?

1. Alcohol causes mind event
2 Therefore alcohol is mind
1. Brain causes mind event
2. therefore brain is mind — Bartricks

Like I say, you're beyond my help.

Here's what you need to do. Present an argument -a deductively valid argument - that has 'therefore my mind is my brain' as a conclusion. Do that. I won't hold my breath.

Like I say, you're beyond my help. — Bartricks

I don't need you to think for me. Let me answer since you're avoiding it.

Those two allegedly are the same argument because you've done a substitution.

Here's what you need to do. Present an argument -a deductively valid argument — Bartricks

Wrong tool. This isn't about deduction. This is about evidence.

We're going in circles. You phrase a perfectly valid inductive argument as a deductive argument, and argue that it's stupid on the basis that it doesn't follow.

That's sophistry.

I don't need you to think for me. — InPitzotl

You really do. But as I say at points like this, Dunning and Kruger. Dunning. And. Kruger.

You phrase a perfectly valid inductive argument as a deductive argument, and argue that it's stupid on the basis that it doesn't follow. — InPitzotl

Ah, someone who's done all their learning on the internet. Inductive arguments are not 'valid'. 'Cogent' is the word you're looking for.

The argument was stupid. Someone who thinks it isn't shares that quality with the argument.

Now, do you have a deductively valid argument that has 'Therefore my mind is my brain' as a conclusion? You don't do you? So why are you still here?

You really do. But as I say at points like this, Dunning and Kruger. Dunning. And. Kruger. — Bartricks

Again, you're just nay-saying. The Dunning Kruger effect is a cognitive bias where a person's meta-cognitive awareness of an area is low, and as a result they overestimate their knowledge in the subject.

That does not apply here. What you're doing is building straw men out of valid inductive arguments.

Present an argument -a deductively valid argument - that has 'therefore my mind is my brain' as a conclusion. — Bartricks

But Bartricks... the mind-is-a-function-of-the-brain argument is inductive. Your attempts to conflate the inductive argument with a deductive one is a straw man.

Dunning and Kruger. Dunning. And. Kruger. — Bartricks

Perhaps you think that there cannot be causation between different kinds of object, and thus if our brain events cause our mental events this would be evidence that brain and mental events must be events involving the same kind of object. Well, although I think that the claim that there cannot be causation between different kinds of object has nothing to be said for it - it doesn't seem self-evident and how could one ever offer non-question begging evidence in support of it? - even if it is true, it would not entail the conclusion. It would entail, as I have said, that the mental events and the brain events must be events involving the same kind of object. But it would leave open what kind of object that was - that is, it would leave open whether the object in question is material or immaterial. For one could just as well infer from it that the brain is a mental object - that is, that the brain is not physical, but mental - as the opposite. — Bartricks

Mmmm.

Again, you're just nay-saying. — InPitzotl

Stop misusing ugly phrases.

The Dunning Kruger effect is a cognitive bias where a person's meta-cognitive awareness of an area is low, and as a result they overestimate their knowledge in the subject. — InPitzotl

Yeah, thanks, I know what it is.

That does not apply here. — InPitzotl

It really does.

But Bartricks... the mind-is-a-function-of-the-brain argument is inductive. — InPitzotl

You could turn it into a deductively valid argument if you knew how. (Oh, and well done for making a category error too, just for good measure).

And don't thank me for giving you the word 'cogent'.

Mmmm. — Banno

Try and make some kind of an argument rather than a noise.

You could turn it into a deductively valid argument if you knew how. — Bartricks

Sure. Add a premise near the claim you want to make and presume it. But that exercise is pointless unless you're rationalizing. The point of induction is to try to let the evidence guide you, not to try to derive what you already want to claim.

Dunning and Kruger. Stop playing "I'm teacher". You're not. You don't know what you're talking about, okay. You didn't know that you can turn any inductive argument into a deductively valid one until approx. 5 minutes ago, after you hurriedly looked it up on the internet, yes?

You didn't know that inductive arguments are 'cogent' not 'valid'.

Dunning. And. Kruger.

Now, once more: what's your argument? Lay it out for all to see, and then I'll take you to the cleaners.

I was wondering if you ever got around to addressing the mind-body issue 180 raised - back on page 1? About how an "immaterial mind" interacts with (its) material body.

But leave it. I can see you have your hands full fulminating.

I was wondering if you ever got around to addressing the mind-body issue 180 raised - back on page 1? About how an "immaterial mind" interacts with (its) material body.

But leave it. I can see you have your hands full fulminating. — Banno

Purrrrr.

I do not believe there is a single good argument for the proposition that our minds are our brains. — Bartricks

Doubtless you are quite right, since brains are quite a different things to minds. Arguing that minds are brains would be like arguing that flight was wings, or guts were digestion. It would be confusing the thing done with the thing doing.

Has anyone suggested otherwise?

Grrrr.

Premise: Brain events cause mental events
Conclusion: Therefore mental events are brain events — Bartricks

Goodness, who set out such a ridiculous argument? How silly of them.

Toot toot!

You didn't know that you can turn any inductive argument into a deductively valid one until approx. 5 minutes ago, after you hurriedly looked it up on the internet, yes? — Bartricks

Sorry it took so long to reply; I had to go on the internet and hurriedly look this up:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eKQOk5UlQSc

Now, once more: what's your argument? Lay it out for all to see, and then I'll take you to the cleaners. — Bartricks

You seem to be a bit confused. I'm not arguing for the mind being material. I'm arguing that you're rationalizing instead of reasoning.

Like I say, this argument -

1. Brain events cause mental events
2. Therefore brain events are mental events

shares a property with you. I don't click on links, but good luck with your continuing youtube education programme. Everyone knows that professional philosophers spend most of their days making youtube videos.

Perhaps you think that there cannot be causation between different kinds of object, — Bartricks

Well, no - obviously a bat can cause a ball to move; and they are, obviously, different kinds of objects.

...and thus if our brain events cause our mental events this would be evidence that brain and mental events must be events involving the same kind of object. — Bartricks

...but as you pointed out, brains are soggy, grey things and mental events are quite different.

Funny thing is, when I decide to move my hand, my hand moves.

Well, although I think that the claim that there cannot be causation between different kinds of object has nothing to be said for it — Bartricks

Indeed, as you pointed out, and as I agreed.

But when I decide to move my hand, my hand moves.

...it doesn't seem self-evident... — Bartricks

Indeed; nor necessary; it's obvious twaddle. The bat moves the ball.

and how could one ever offer non-question begging evidence in support of it? — Bartricks

Exactly.

But when I decide to move my hand, my hand moves.

even if it is true, it would not entail the conclusion. It would entail, as I have said, that the mental events and the brain events must be events involving the same kind of object. — Bartricks

Would it? But what about the bat and the ball? They are different kinds of objects, but one can move the other...

But it would leave open what kind of object that was - that is, it would leave open whether the object in question is material or immaterial. For one could just as well infer from it that the brain is a mental object - that is, that the brain is not physical, but mental - as the opposite. — Bartricks

Ah. Immaterial brains.

Can you have still them crumbed and deep fried?

Yet whenever I have asked for evidence that our minds are our brains, the above is all I have been offered. — Bartricks

You may be hanging out with the wrong people, then.

So, my working hypothesis is that there is no good evidence that our minds are our brains. — Bartricks

Sure. But when I decide to move my hand, the damn thing still moves...

There's just a widespread assumption that our minds are our brains — Bartricks

Widespread? Goodness, I hadn't noticed.

There is, of corse, the large and growing literature about how our hands are linked to our brains and how moving one's hand is dependent on nerves in the body and brain, and the considerable growth in Neuroscience. But of course, these folk are not the ones you have been listening to.

By contrast, when it comes to evidence that our minds are immaterial soul there is an abundance of it. — Bartricks

There is? What, all those ghost stories?

Argument 1:

1. It is self-evident to our reason that it makes no sense to wonder what colour, smell, texture or taste, or sound our minds have.
2. It makes sense to wonder what colour, smell, texture, taste or smell any sensible object has
3. Therefore, it is self-evident to our reason that our minds are not sensible objects — Bartricks

Self-evident to our reason. SO much better than it being self-evident to anything else. And it makes sense to wonder about the colour, smell, and texture of those crumbed, fried brains.

Mind you, some minds are more sensible than others.

Another (2):

1. It is self-evident to our reason that it makes no sense to wonder what a sensible object thinks like (it makes sense for me to wonder what the olive will taste like, but it makes no sense to wonder what it hopes).
2. If minds were sensible objects, then it would make sense to wonder what a sensible object thinks like.
3. Therefore, our minds are not sensible objects — Bartricks

This set me to wondering if it made sense to wonder what an insensible object thinks. Or perhaps, what a downright silly object might think.

I do like olives. Even with crumbed, deep fried brains.

Again, I'm not sure all our minds are not sensible. I've met some folk who seem quite practical and realistic.

Another (3):

1. If our reason represents our minds to exist indubitably, but at the same time represents all sensible objects to exist dubitably, then our reason is implying that our minds are not sensible objects
2. Our reason represents our minds to exist indubitably, but at the same time represents all sensible objects to exist dubitably
3. Therefore, our reason implies that our minds are not sensible objects — Bartricks

That Des Cartes fellow - he said something about not doubting one's mind. Did he argue that no one was sensible?

And I've seen objects that are really quite silly, so there exist some objects that are not sensible. SO it seems to me that not all things that exist dubitably are sensible.

If your reason implies that your mind is not sensible, perhaps you ought not pay so much attention to your mind?

Another (4):

1. If I am morally responsible, then not everything I do traces to external causes
2. I am morally responsible
3. Therefore, not everything I do traces to external causes
4. If I am a sensible object, then everything I do traces to external causes
5. Therefore, I am not a sensible object — Bartricks

If instead you are morally irresponsible, would that imply that everything you do traces to external causes? And if not everything you do traces to external courses, and hence you are irresponsible, does that mean you are not sensible?

Goodness this is good. I am learning so much.

Another (5):

1. If my reason represents me to be intrinsically morally valuable irrespective of any of my sensible properties, then my reason is implying I am not a sensible object
2. My reason represents me to be intrinsically morally valuable irrespective of any of my sensible properties
3. Therefore, my reason is implying that I am not a sensible object — Bartricks

I think that sometimes one can be quite valuable while being silly. Monty Python, for example, or Spike Milligan. If they were being sensible they would not be worth watching, would they?