You describe "obligatory" as following one's own intuition. But then you do not understand "good" in the sense of what one wants. Aren't they essentially the same thing? When you follow your own intuition you are doing what you want to do. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yeah correct. I just think intuition as it relates to negative ethics are obligatory than ones related to positive ethics because without the negative, you don't have room for everyone's different positives. More likely your positives aren't mine, but our negatives are closely aligned so we can have our versions of positives intact.

If what you are saying is that the coming into being of a person is not something chosen by that person, therefore the person is forced into being, then I have no problem with this. — Metaphysician Undercover

Cool.

There are many things about this existence which are beyond our capacity to choose, and are forced upon us. That's just reality, and like birth, death is forced on us as well. But there are very many things which are forced on us in between, because our powers of freedom to choose are very limited. — Metaphysician Undercover

Right, but all of these "de facto" forces you mention only come about from the original force in the first place. This essentially makes my point that the original force is making people "play the game" of all these other de facto forces.

I have a real problem with this sort of negative ethics, (don't do this, and don't do that), because it requires all sorts of definitions and criteria. How can you even speak of these matters in terms of "unnecessarily", and "unnecessary suffering"? We are talking about acts of free choice here, so everything chosen is unnecessary. But then we can't avoid "messing with other people" because we exist in relationships, and we can't avoid suffering because of that great magnitude of force which is beyond one's very limited capacity of free choice. — Metaphysician Undercover

Unnecessary suffering I define here (in terms of the person who will experience this suffering) because unless is trying to lessen a greater harm with a lesser one, there is no need to cause suffering in the first place.

Yeah correct. I just think intuition as it relates to negative ethics are obligatory than ones related to positive ethics because without the negative, you don't have room for everyone's different positives. More likely your positives aren't mine, but our negatives are closely aligned so we can have our versions of positives intact. — schopenhauer1

I see this as a somewhat backward approach. As living beings, we are inclined to act. This is our nature, and we will do so regardless of obligation. So if we take this as a starting premise, and proceed toward listing everything which we ought not do, we could keep listing forever, and keep coming up with more things forever, as people keep finding new things to do which they ought not do. To list all the things which we ought not do is a futile task. If we look the other way, toward what we ought to do, then all we need is general guidance, in broad terms of types of activities which are good, and this will incline us toward the avoidance of numerous bad acts.

This is a simple feature of the difference between the universal and the particular. Consistency between the universal (general law) and the particular is what defines correctness. So if we strive to make the universals consistent with what is morally good, then we have a reasonable argument whenever an act is outside of the universals, that the act is bad. But if the universals describe what is bad, then we lose the capacity to say that an act which escapes the universal is a bad act. This is what gives people the capacity to exploit "loopholes", when the universals dictate what is bad. And people will always find an endless supply of loopholes.

Right, but all of these "de facto" forces you mention only come about from the original force in the first place. This essentially makes my point that the original force is making people "play the game" of all these other de facto forces. — schopenhauer1

Yes, but we cannot characterize any "force" as either good or bad. This is what Plato demonstrated, power on its own is neither good nor bad, it is only how power is used which can be judged in this way. Force is simply what the free will must cope with as a given restriction to one's capacities. We cannot categorize it as either good or bad because it can just as easily be used to support and assist one's actions of bringing about the desired end (good), as it might sometimes act against the desired end. So force on its own must be treated as neutral, even though it restricts one's capacities, it equally enables capacities.

So it is true that procreation is a use of force to bring about the existence of others, but we cannot judge this action as good or bad, just on the merits of "using force", because force is used for both moral and immoral actions. All human acts involve the use of force and we must accept the fact that human beings, as living beings, are inclined to act, and this is not bad. You wouldn't argue that human beings ought not act at all would you? Likewise you ought not assume that the use of force is immoral, because all human acts involve use of force.

Unnecessary suffering I define here (in terms of the person who will experience this suffering) because unless is trying to lessen a greater harm with a lesser one, there is no need to cause suffering in the first place. — schopenhauer1

It's not realistic to attempt to distinguish necessary suffering from unnecessary suffering. Let's assume for the sake of argument, that all suffering is brought about by force, it is not willed by the individual, but imposed by external force. Whether that force is imposed by another (artificially directed at another), or is natural, might be a distinction we could make. We can say that the individual will attempt to avoid natural forces which would bring about suffering, and such suffering brought about by natural forces would be due to a deficiency in the individual's capacities. Now we can direct our attention at the artificial use of force by ourselves, and other human beings, in carrying out actions. Would you agree on two categories of inflicting suffering on others, intentionally acting in a way known to inflict suffering, and accidentally inflicting suffering? Neither of these can be properly classified as "unnecessary", because the accidental would have been avoided if avoidance would have been foreseen as possible, and the intentional is seen as necessary for the sake of some end. So it doesn't make sense to propose a category of "unnecessary suffering" because this would just be defined by arbitrary criteria.

So it is true that procreation is a use of force to bring about the existence of others, but we cannot judge this action as good or bad, just on the merits of "using force", because force is used for both moral and immoral actions. All human acts involve the use of force and we must accept the fact that human beings, as living beings, are inclined to act, and this is not bad. You wouldn't argue that human beings ought not act at all would you? Likewise you ought not assume that the use of force is immoral, because all human acts involve use of force. — Metaphysician Undercover

I think we get a slippery slope here anytime forcing a situation is used, even for the good. If I was to kidnap someone to go to the awesome school of "Metaphysician Uncover" to learn Plato, that would still be wrong, in my opinion as someone's autonomy was limited. In procreation, this is always happening, because though the game of life is the only "game in town" so-to-say, it is still a forced game.

It's not realistic to attempt to distinguish necessary suffering from unnecessary suffering. Let's assume for the sake of argument, that all suffering is brought about by force, it is not willed by the individual, but imposed by external force. Whether that force is imposed by another (artificially directed at another), or is natural, might be a distinction we could make. We can say that the individual will attempt to avoid natural forces which would bring about suffering, and such suffering brought about by natural forces would be due to a deficiency in the individual's capacities. Now we can direct our attention at the artificial use of force by ourselves, and other human beings, in carrying out actions. Would you agree on two categories of inflicting suffering on others, intentionally acting in a way known to inflict suffering, and accidentally inflicting suffering? Neither of these can be properly classified as "unnecessary", because the accidental would have been avoided if avoidance would have been foreseen as possible, and the intentional is seen as necessary for the sake of some end. So it doesn't make sense to propose a category of "unnecessary suffering" because this would just be defined by arbitrary criteria. — Metaphysician Undercover

I struggle with this one too. If I was to take a page from Plato, Not Causing Suffering, would be some sort of ideal. However, in the world of materiality (the world of Shadows on the Wall), there are degrees of not suffering, not simply the ideal itself. Thus if I push someone down a flight of stairs for no reason, that would be worse than if I was to push someone down a flight of stairs because a gun was going to be fired, and the person would be shot. It was suffering, but prevented a greater harm. Procreation is more like the first. It just causes conditions of suffering, for no reason as there was no person beforehand to have to X, Y, Z, rather, you are creating those conditions in the first place. It's like creating a problem for someone else, to watch them climb out of it. So in the world of the shadows, there are degrees and thresholds for which the ideals take place.

So what. If even only half the time, or part of the time it was suffering, if you want to prevent any condition where suffering will occur for another person, and add to that the empirical part of knowing that there are known forms of inescapable suffering and unknown (to the parent) forms of suffering for what the child will suffer, that cannot be mitigated easily, then yes antinatalism would be the best claim. — schopenhauer1

As usual, I think you're not using language correctly.

If there wouldn't be any cars, it would be weird to talk about how the absence of those cars prevented car accidents. No such thing could exist because the existence of a car precedes the possibility of car accidents.

Or how happy we should be that the zombie virus of the Walking Dead doesn't exist so that zombies are prevented.

That simply isn't prevention.

If there wouldn't be any cars, it would be weird to talk about how the absence of those cars prevented car accidents. No such thing could exist because the existence of a car precedes the possibility of car accidents. — Benkei

Yet as long as there are people around who know the consequence of the harm, this objection doesn't matter.

Or how happy we should be that the zombie virus of the Walking Dead doesn't exist so that zombies are prevented. — Benkei

Is it a situation that we know exists and can be prevented? No, because it's a fake thing? Okay, no worries then.

Yet as long as there are people around who know the consequence of the harm, this objection doesn't matter. — schopenhauer1

It's called a reductio ad absurdum, which demonstrates the idiocy of the position. But I see logic and language are lost arts to you.

It's called a reductio ad absurdum, which demonstrates the idiocy of the position. But I see logic and language are lost arts to you. — Benkei

Oh please. "Idiocy" blah blah. Your arguments are all insult with a smidgen of not-thought-out objections.
It's a tired approach and one used too much on this forum.

You haven't shown any of what you said. It's not a reductio because the thing that can be prevented is known. That is my response. You have not found a rebuttal yet, but I'll wait for one other than the claim its a reductio without explanation.

Yes, let's not engage the argument. See, that's the difference I ridicule your position but I still engage the argument ad nauseum. I get to pepper that with snarky comments precisely because your position is idiotic.

I get to pepper that with snarky comments precisely because your position is idiotic. — Benkei

Yet, you haven't answered my rebuttal. Waiting...

educate yourself : https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reductio_ad_absurdum

educate yourself — Benkei

No dude.. I know what it is. You haven't proven that's what I am doing. You are asserting.

You: claim reductio...
I said where? If you are alive and you know the event leads to X, then there is no reductio
You: reductio

Not very fruitful there.

If you are alive and you know the event leads to X, then there is no reductio — schopenhauer1

Lmao. If you don't pursue the conclusion to its extremes then indeed, by definition, you don't have a reductio ad absurdum. Your reply to my reductio is "let's imagine it isn't".

Lmao. If you don't pursue the conclusion to its extremes then indeed, by definition, you don't have a reductio ad absurdum. Your reply to my reductio is "let's imagine it isn't". — Benkei

No.

Are humans alive to know the rule? Yes.

Then the rule applies to those humans. Cool.

Are there no humans around to know the rule? Yes

Then there is no need for the rule. Cool.

What's the problem?

What's the problem? — schopenhauer1

That you don't understand a reductio ad absurdum. :roll:

That you don't understand a reductio ad absurdum. :roll: — Benkei

We can play this game all day :roll: :roll: :roll: :roll: :roll: :roll: :roll: :roll: :roll: :roll: :roll: :roll: :roll: :roll: :roll: :roll: :roll: :roll:

Or you can make a case other than, "You just don't understand". Cop out because you probably don't have much of a case. Oh well. Maybe one of your friends will drop in to help you and provide some more insulting but unenlightening posts, which seems to happen in this forum a lot:

"For fuck's sake, if you weren't so thick-skulled.. idiotic.. ignorant..." blah blah

I think we get a slippery slope here anytime forcing a situation is used, even for the good. If I was to kidnap someone to go to the awesome school of "Metaphysician Uncover" to learn Plato, that would still be wrong, in my opinion as someone's autonomy was limited. In procreation, this is always happening, because though the game of life is the only "game in town" so-to-say, it is still a forced game. — schopenhauer1

I don't think you're quite grasping my use of "force". Force is anything external to the will of the free agent, so it includes all the natural forces described by physics, gravity, energy, etc.. When we act, as free willing agents we use these forces toward our ends. So even speaking to another, giving gifts to another, and other forms of persuasion like this, are instances of using force.

This is why it doesn't make sense to use the blanket assumption that using force to persuade another, is wrong. Then we'd have to discern all the instances of using force in a good way, and somehow describe these as something other than using force. In reality, saying "if you do that I'll kill you", and "if you love me don't do that" are equal in the sense of "using force", because each is a simple statement. However, it is the meaning of what is said which makes one of these a threat, and therefore much worse than the other.

So there is nothing inherently wrong with using force in our interactions with others, and nothing wrong with a "forced game" if this is how you wish to describe procreation, because a forced game might just as well be good as bad. That force might be the force of love.

Thus if I push someone down a flight of stairs for no reason... — schopenhauer1

I don't believe that there is ever such a thing. If you willfully pushed someone down the stairs, then you decided to do that, so you have a reason for having done it. If you have no reason, then it was not willful, and it was an accident. So when you say "procreation is more like the first", the first has been eliminated as not a real possibility. Therefore your characterization of procreation, as like the first, is not acceptable, because the first is not real, and procreation if it is compared with pushing someone down the stairs, is not carried out without a reason unless it is accidental.

I don't think you're quite grasping my use of "force". Force is anything external to the will of the free agent, so it includes all the natural forces described by physics, gravity, energy, etc.. When we act, as free willing agents we use these forces toward our ends. So even speaking to another, giving gifts to another, and other forms of persuasion like this, are instances of using force.

This is why it doesn't make sense to use the blanket assumption that using force to persuade another, is wrong. Then we'd have to discern all the instances of using force in a good way, and somehow describe these as something other than using force. In reality, saying "if you do that I'll kill you", and "if you love me don't do that" are equal in the sense of "using force", because each is a simple statement. However, it is the meaning of what is said which makes one of these a threat, and therefore much worse than the other.

So there is nothing inherently wrong with using force in our interactions with others, and nothing wrong with a "forced game" if this is how you wish to describe procreation, because a forced game might just as well be good as bad. That force might be the force of love. — Metaphysician Undercover

Ok, so this then would be degrees and threshold.. see analogy I used with preventing suffering. Persuading someone with words vs. physically forcing an intractable game, let's say is a huge degree of difference.

I don't believe that there is ever such a thing. If you willfully pushed someone down the stairs, then you decided to do that, so you have a reason for having done it. If you have no reason, then it was not willful, and it was an accident. So when you say "procreation is more like the first", the first has been eliminated as not a real possibility. Therefore your characterization of procreation, as like the first, is not acceptable, because the first is not real, and procreation if it is compared with pushing someone down the stairs, is not carried out without a reason unless it is accidental. — Metaphysician Undercover

Okay, so let's split then reasons vs. causes. Person A caused Person B to fall down the stairs by Person A pushing Person B. Person A's reason was not to help Person B but some reason that was not to save from a greater harm. The reason Person C pushed Person A down the stairs is because there was a bullet, presumably a greater harm.

Ok, so this then would be degrees and threshold.. see analogy I used with preventing suffering. Persuading someone with words vs. physically forcing an intractable game, let's say is a huge degree of difference. — schopenhauer1

It's not like that. You can physically force a person with love and affection. So I'm totally dismissing the degree thing as relevant to good or bad. What I am saying is that one can use force in a good way or force in a bad way, no matter what degree of force is being used. Force on its own is neutral, whether it's a huge force or a small force, and it's how the force is used which is good or bad.

Okay, so let's split then reasons vs. causes. Person A caused Person B to fall down the stairs by Person A pushing Person B. Person A's reason was not to help Person B but some reason that was not to save from a greater harm. The reason Person C pushed Person A down the stairs is because there was a bullet, presumably a greater harm. — schopenhauer1

So person A did a bad thing and person C did a good thing? How does that relate to procreation? Some people don't care about their children, so it's bad for them to procreate? But others do, so it's good for them to procreate?

It's not like that. You can physically force a person with love and affection. So I'm totally dismissing the degree thing as relevant to good or bad. What I am saying is that one can use force in a good way or force in a bad way, no matter what degree of force is being used. Force on its own is neutral, whether it's a huge force or a small force, and it's how the force is used which is good or bad. — Metaphysician Undercover

Again, if you kidnapped an adult to go to the school of MU, because you thought that was the best course for that person, is that wrong? I would say yes.

Some people don't care about their children, so it's bad for them to procreate? But others do, so it's good for them to procreate? — Metaphysician Undercover

No that wasn't the conclusion I was going with. Rather, no one exists prior to birth to even balance a lesser harm with a greater harm. Thus it is purely creating the conditions for harm for someone else (and the good created doesn't matter here as not creating good is not a "bad" when "nothing" exists in the first place).

If the reductio is based on the conclusion that nobody exists and your reply is, it's not a reductio when still someone exists, then quite simply you don't understand the argument. I can show you water but I can't make your drink it.

No that wasn't the conclusion I was going with. Rather, no one exists prior to birth to even balance a lesser harm with a greater harm. Thus it is purely creating the conditions for harm for someone else (and the good created doesn't matter here as not creating good is not a "bad" when "nothing" exists in the first place). — schopenhauer1

I can't see your point. Your premise that no one exists prior to birth is wrong, because it ought to state that no one person exists prior to one's own birth. Therefore your conclusion that nothing exists prior to one's birth is also wrong.

As I said already, we ought to judge morality on the basis of doing good, not preventing bad, for the reasons I explained. The principal result of this reasoning is that "not creating good", (inactivity, which is contrary to living nature), is then actually rendered as bad. Stipulating what is good, which renders what is not stipulated as good, bad, allows us to avoid the loopholes which result from having to stipulate what is bad. The loopholes are in the form of 'if it is not stipulated as bad, then it is not bad'.

If the reductio is based on the conclusion that nobody exists and your reply is, it's not a reductio when still someone exists, then quite simply you don't understand the argument. I can show you water but I can't make your drink it. — Benkei

Again, you are misunderstanding me. If a potential parent exists, whereby the consequent is a new person who suffers, the rule is in play- prevent said suffering. How is that a reductio?

If you are saying there is no one to prevent suffering for then you are the one abusing language because you refuse to recognize the common linguistic and psychogical practice of counterfactuals. Someone would have suffered but didn't.

Following your argument, it would actually lead to a reductio ad absurdum because we would be left with the stupid conclusion that someone has to be born so that they can be prevented from being born so they don't suffer. Clearly if something can perceive that suffering can be prevented prior to that suffering subjects existence, then the conditions are met to prevent that future suffering from occurring.

I can't see your point. Your premise that no one exists prior to birth is wrong, because it ought to state that no one person exists prior to one's own birth. Therefore your conclusion that nothing exists prior to one's birth is also wrong. — Metaphysician Undercover

Not sure the objection. I guess I do mean "a particular person", but how does that change the conclusion. That person that might be born is not "deprived of good" and it does not matter whether "a thing exists that experiences good". Rather what does matter is "a state of affairs did not occur where someone has suffered". This is Benatar's asymmetry- good only matters if one exists already to be deprived of that good. However suffering matters in all circumstances.

The principal result of this reasoning is that "not creating good", (inactivity, which is contrary to living nature), is then actually rendered as bad. Stipulating what is good, which renders what is not stipulated as good, bad, allows us to avoid the loopholes which result from having to stipulate what is bad. The loopholes are in the form of 'if it is not stipulated as bad, then it is not bad'. — Metaphysician Undercover

This has not really answered my question.

Again, if you kidnapped an adult to go to the school of MU, because you thought that was the best course for that person, is that wrong? I would say yes. — schopenhauer1

I think your answer would be no, that person should not be kidnapped, even if the result is a person who has a stronger character. I go back to something deeper going on here- the autonomy of the individual (e.g. contra procreation), and the prevention of unnecessary suffering (e.g. also contra procreation).

In a weird way, this may collapse positive ethics and virtue theory into a hedonic framework where:

IFF negative ethics of autonomy and not causing other people unnecessary suffering is met, then one can be free to choose whatever path one gets a benefit from, which can include character-building programs.

That person that might be born is not "deprived of good" — schopenhauer1

Aren't you making the exact same "non-existence argument" as you are dismissing from @Benkei?

Aren't you making the exact same "non-existence argument" as you are dismissing from Benkei? — Down The Rabbit Hole

No, because in the counterfactual case of "not having the goods of life", preventing this (or rather not starting this on behalf of someone else) is not unethical. Preventing unnecessary suffering is however the ethical part. That is the asymmetry.

Would you say that a person killed has been deprived of life's good? If so, the unborn are not deprived of life's good solely due to their non-existence?

Would you say that a person killed has been deprived of life's good? If so, the unborn are not deprived of life's good solely due to their non-existence? — Down The Rabbit Hole

Because of the other part of the asymmetry- It is only "bad" to be "deprived" of good, if there is someone who exists to be deprived of good.

Because of the other part of the asymmetry- It is only "bad" to be "deprived" of good, if there is someone who exists to be deprived of good. — schopenhauer1

It's only good to prevent suffering if there's someone existing to benefit from that prevention.

Edit: have you figured out the reductio yet or are you going to continue to pretend I don't know what I'm talking about?

It's only good to prevent suffering if there's someone existing to benefit from that prevention. — Benkei

Yes I know this is your beef. But as I said:

If you are saying there is no one to prevent suffering for then you are the one abusing language because you refuse to recognize the common linguistic and psychogical practice of counterfactuals. Someone would have suffered but didn't.

Following your argument, it would actually lead to a reductio ad absurdum because we would be left with the stupid conclusion that someone has to be born so that they can be prevented from being born so they don't suffer. Clearly if something can perceive that suffering can be prevented prior to that suffering subjects existence, then the conditions are met to prevent that future suffering from occurring. — schopenhauer1

And again,

the counterfactual case of "not having the goods of life", preventing this (or rather not starting this on behalf of someone else) is not unethical. Preventing unnecessary suffering is however the ethical part. That is the asymmetry. — schopenhauer1

Does it matter if the counterfactual person is "prevented good"? No.
Now do the same with suffering.
Does it matter that a person is "prevented bad"? I believe, definitely yes.

There is an asymmetry of "no good" and "no bad" for something that does not exist, but potentially can.

Note: "No good" would only matter if the person exists. But not the same with "No bad". No bad is good, even if there was no one around to realize this. Otherwise we get the stupid absurdem:

that someone has to be born so that they can be prevented from being born so they don't suffer. Clearly if something can perceive that suffering can be prevented prior to that suffering subjects existence, then the conditions are met to prevent that future suffering from occurring. — schopenhauer1

At the end of the day, no one is obligated to create "good" but there does seem an obligation to prevent bad (which WILL happen if someone is born at some point).