Kant and Hume emphasized the importance of scientific knowledge in many of their writings, specially the extraordinary achievements of Isaac Newton. And the same can be said about Bertrand Russell and the Science of his time. He even wrote an introductory book on the Theory of Relativity. Yet they didn't ignore the problem of induction, why? — Amalac

Is that a rhetorical question?

Because they thought the foundations of Science important. Kant even believed that he found a satisfactory solution to the problem (whether he actually solved the problem of induction or not is a controversial and difficult question). Because to ignore problems that are inconvenient or annoying for one's beliefs was for them an act of intellectual treachery. And I try to follow them in this respect. — Amalac

I do not doubt their piety - but rather suggest that they existed within a socio-economic and political context in which a massively powerful institutional body maintained, for a very long time, that science was dubious at best, and this established a direction of thought, and the philosophical endeavours of these great minds occur within the course of this narrative, to the exclusion of alternate narratives.

I see it everywhere I look; manifestations of the same thing, in the way technology is misapplied for profit; in literature, film and TV since Mary Shelley; mad scientists by the score, and God loving flag waving heroes - pushing the nerd aside to save the day. Its in climate change denial - and worse, green approaches that blame the consumer - and propose we eek out our existence somehow, rather than meet with and overcome the problem. They are all looking down the wrong end of the telescope.

If you start from a position that science is (in some significant sense) true, things make a lot more sense. For example, consider the fact that the discovery of penicillin has saved more lives than were lost in all the wars, ever! And you speak of intellectual treachery? For me the absolute foundations of scientific knowledge are an interesting diversion from the main event; which is, discovery of the means to systematically establish increasingly valid knowledge of reality/Creation; and to apply that knowledge to create technologies that function within a causal reality. I can be reasonably satisfied the principles upon which the technologies are based are true... insofar as the technology works. That's a reasonable definition of truth - whereas, I would argue it was required that Hume, Russel, Kant and many others, could not be satisfied with reasonable definitions, and there are vested interests in concluding the opposite.

Naturalism doesn’t really begin with foundational questions but with the observation of how objects behave. — Wayfarer

Ok, we observe that a rock falls to the ground if we let it go from a certain height, that is the fact we observe. Technically, we have not deduced that it falls due to gravity and not due to something else yet.

That it is due to gravity that it falls is a reasonable interpretation of that fact based on scientific evidence. By following the evidence, we conclude that it is reasonable to suppose that its falling was caused by gravity, or at least that it is very likely caused by that. So far so good.

But the problem arises when we ask: will other rocks or the same rock also fall like that in similar circumstances in the future? Do we have any rational justification for this claim, or at least for the view that it will probably happen?

But the problem arises when we ask: will other rocks or the same rock also fall like that in similar circumstances in the future? Do we have any rational justification for this claim, or at least for the view that it will probably happen? — Amalac

When that problem arises, we decide to believe that other rocks will fall, but as soon as we find a rock that does not fall, we shall revise our belief.

there is no rational justification. It is instead a question of belief, and as beliefs go, there are false ones and correct ones. As long as a belief is fulfilled, we hold it; once a belief is found to be wrong, we abandon it (or improve on its features, details, mechanisms).

Is that a rhetorical question? — counterpunch

Yes, that is why I followed with “Because(...)”

I do not doubt their piety - but rather suggest that they existed within a socio-economic and political context in which a massively powerful institutional body maintained, for a very long time, that science was dubious at best, and this established a direction of thought, and the philosophical endeavours of these great minds occur within the course of this narrative, to the exclusion of alternate narratives. — counterpunch

They were to some extent conditioned by the beliefs of their time in their investigations yes, but maybe they would have felt genuinely interested in the problem of induction, and thought it important even if those beliefs had been diferent. How do we know that this is not the case?

If you start from a position that science is (in some significant sense) true, things make a lot more sense. — counterpunch

I think Science is true in a pragmatic sense, is that significant enough for you?

For example, consider the fact that the discovery of penicillin has saved more lives than were lost in all the wars, ever! — counterpunch

Of course I don't deny that Science has produced great things. But one can hold that Science (at least the Science that we know can't be used for evil) is useful, without having to believe that it is true in an epistemological sense (think scientific instrumentalism).

Of course I don't deny that Science has produced great things. But one can hold that Science (at least the Science that we know can't be used for evil) is useful, without having to believe that it is true in an epistemological sense (think scientific instrumentalism). — Amalac

I don't know the definition of scientific instrumentalism or what you mean by "true in an epistemological sense", but maybe you got it now. Science observes and reports. There is no room in scientific investigation to answer questions such as "Why is gravity wrong?" or "why does time go in one direction only?", or "who created the idea to have negatively, positively, and neutrally charged atomic particles?"

You see, there is epistemological sense, and epistemological sense. One answers the "why", and the other, the "how". Science is the "why". Religion and spirituality attempts at the "how", but most (if not all) sacred religious texts, on which most of the religious humanity relies for answers to their questions, were not only not god-inspired, but also written by imbecilic philosophical dilettante, so they are full of holes.

I think Science is true in a pragmatic sense, is that significant enough for you? — Amalac

Again: Science won't explain to you whether god created the world or not. This may, for you, take some significance away from science, but there is enough left in it still. Like explaining what lightning is, and helping to discard the belief that lightning is thrown by god at people who sin.

If science employed rational justification beyond what is enough for its own purpose, then it would fall victim to the Munchausen effect. But science stops its reasoning in answering questions from going on BEYOND what is immediately needed for an explanation.

But see, though we would call someone who believed that the sun won't rise tomorrow or that he'd be able to fly in a couple of days by moving his arms really fast an insane person, there is nothing logically impossible about those things happening. They are conceivable.

Of course there is no reason to believe that the sun won't rise tomorrow, but it seems that there is also no reason to believe that it will rise (besides pragmatic reasons).

So if we look at it from the angle of pure logic, the choice between believing that the sun will rise tomorrow or that it won't resembles the choice between believing that a coin will land on heads after flipping it, or that it won't.

But the choice is illusory: since we are accustomed from early infancy to believe that it will rise, no one can get rid of this habit easily, and to attempt to do so would contradict basic human psychology. — Amalac

Sure, and that all sounds perfectly consistent with critical rationalism. We can’t know for sure what patterns phenomena in the universe follow. But we’re rationally allowed to think that they follow the patterns they seem to follow — or to not think that, if for some reason we’re inclined not to. And we can be sure when the universe does NOT follow a particular pattern.

It’s the swans thing. We can’t ever be sure that all swans are white, but we’re not irrational to think they are if it seems so, and we can be sure that NOT all swans are white, given a black swan.

I don’t mean to derail your whole thread about the trilemma with this debate about critical rationalism, especially when I already have a separate thread about critical rationalism that also touches on its relationship to this trilemma:

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/9571/critical-liberal-epistemology

You see, there is epistemological sense, and epistemological sense. One answers the "why", and the other, the "how". — god must be atheist

Please forgive me if I do not understand what you mean by this: are you saying that truth in an epistemological sense answers both the “why” and the “how”?

Religion and spirituality attempts at the "how", but most (if not all) sacred religious texts, on which most of the religious humanity relies for answers to their questions, were not only not god-inspired, but also written by imbecilic philosophical dilettante, so they are full of holes. — god must be atheist

Not sure why you bring up religion all of a sudden, but I don't disagree.

Again: Science won't explain to you whether god created the world or not. This may, for you, take some significance away from science, but there is enough left in it still. Like explaining what lightning is, and helping to discard the belief that lightning is thrown by god at people who sin. — god must be atheist

Again: Not sure why you bring up God all of a sudden. And it seems you misunderstand something: I'm an atheist, so the fact that Science can't explain whether or not God created the world doesn't take away any significance from Science in my opinion.

Sure, and that all sounds perfectly consistent with critical rationalism. — Pfhorrest

Good! Then we are in agreement. (How often does that happen in a philosophy forum?)

I don’t mean to derail your whole thread about the trilemma with this debate about critical rationalism, especially when I already have a separate thread about critical rationalism that also touches on its relationship to this trilemma: — Pfhorrest

Sounds interesting, I'll check it out later.

I don't know the definition of scientific instrumentalism or what you mean by "true in an epistemological sense" — god must be atheist

“True in an epistemological sense” as opposed to “true in a pragmatic sense”.

“True in an epistemological sense” as opposed to “true in a pragmatic sense”. — Amalac

"True in a kitchen faucet sense" is also the opposite to "true in a pragmatic sense." In other words, you gave no guidance how to understand "true in an epistemological sense", because "true in a pragmatic sense" has precisely infinite number of opposites (limited in number only by the bounds of language and by the number of the meanings carried by the language).

The three things you say that you don't understand in my previous post neatly cancels out the post by you that I don't understand.

This could be viewed as a happy event.

Let's celebrate.

:party: :cheer: :100: :sparkle: :cheer: :party:

True in an epistemological sense: Can be rationally justified by a chain of reasoning.

True in a pragmatic sense: Is useful for achieving certain ends we consider valuable.

Didn't we already make it clear that we don't disagree about this?

True in an epistemological sense: Can be rationally justified by a chain of reasoning.

True in a pragmatic sense: Is useful for achieving certain ends we consider valuable.

Didn't we already make it clear that we don't disagree about this? — Amalac

Thank you, Amalac. May I make just one tiny change in the second definition, to inlcude that pragmatic sense also involves a chain of reasoning? For instance, it is pragmatic to feed chicken, if you eat chicken, because feeding the chicken will achieve a culinary end which you consider valuable.

Or it is pragmatically sensible to go to school, learn how to read and write, learn psychology and chemistry and math, and physics, and learn how to manipulate chemicals, and learn the math that underlines theory of chemistry, and then become able to concoct chemicals so you can make Aspirin, which is useful in treating pain, which people buy for money, which someone else has invented, and used chemicals to produce paper from rags, and someone had learned how to make rags, etc etc.

Good! Then we are in agreement. (How often does that happen in a philosophy forum?) — Amalac

Rarely in my experience. :up: :clap: :100:

Thank you, Amalac. May I make just one tiny change in the second definition, to inlcude that pragmatic sense also involves a chain of reasoning? For instance, it is pragmatic to feed chicken, if you eat chicken, because feeding the chicken will achieve a culinary end which you consider valuable.

Or it is pragmatically sensible to go to school, learn how to read and write, learn psychology and chemistry and math, and physics, and learn how to manipulate chemicals, and learn the math that underlines theory of chemistry, and then become able to concoct chemicals so you can make Aspirin, which is useful in treating pain, which people buy for money, which someone else has invented, and used chemicals to produce paper from rags, and someone had learned how to make rags, etc etc. — god must be atheist

Sure, I don't disagree with that addition (so long as we know that there isn't a significant chance for that knowledge to be used for evil purposes). It's also hard for me to tell if you are being sarcastic for some reason.

would you say that those are the basic beliefs of Science and that it fits in the horn of foundationalism, or would you say that it is wholly outside of the trilemma? — Amalac

I would say that these are some of the absolute presuppositions of science. They do not need to be actively "believed"; all one needs to do with them is to assume them true. Like axioms.

Of course I don't deny that Science has produced great things. But one can hold that Science (at least the Science that we know can't be used for evil) is useful, without having to believe that it is true in an epistemological sense (think scientific instrumentalism). — Amalac

I think we are converging on a common understanding. Science does not fall victim to the Munchhausen effect, because:
1. Only those things fall victims to it, that attempt to prove something; science does not prove anything
2. 2.1., 2.2., 2.3., and 2.4., things that Pfhorrest said, which is beyond my pay grade and finally
3. You assert that science does not relate to epistemology, instead, it is a pragmatic scrutinizer. As a pragmatic scrutinizer, it is exempt from needing to show causality beyond the scope of what is necessarily and sufficiently needed to explain relationships in movements in the physical (and mental/emotional) worlds.

Only those things fall victims to it, that attempt to prove something; science does not prove anything — god must be atheist

Yes, there we go. It's all clear now (and I thought we already reached an understanding during our first exchange).

If Science doesn't claim to know that it is more likely for the sun to rise tomorrow, then I have no complaints.