I don't think we truly have free will at all because we have to consider two important facts:
1. Rule of law (we cannot do whatever our free will dictates because it can pass the limits of so)
2. The coliving (free will would sound even selfish because is an act of pure personal interests. Nevertheless, we are forced to live in a community of group that somehow "sacrifice" our own interests to persevering the common one)

I somewhat agree, I believe that we don’t have complete freedom due to certain laws. albeit, I do not think this infringes our free will. We can freely go against the law, though there is punishment for doing so, we are still able to act on our own accord.

To some extent we are forced to compromise our ideals as it may be seen as selfish, but still we have the choice to do so.

I think it all depends on ones definition of what free will is, and whether lack of freedom equates to not having free will

You know the freedom in your Kant quote (“Metaphysics of Ethics”, 1797), relates to jurisprudence, re: “The Science of Right”, not the “free will” related to pure moral philosophy, right?

When speaking of the human faculty of will, we are restrained thus:

“...That element in the question of the freedom of the will, which has for so long a time placed speculative reason in such perplexity, is properly only transcendental, and concerns the question, whether there must be held to exist a faculty of spontaneous origination of a series of successive things or states....” (CPR, 1787.)

As you can see, that which is given as a necessary birthright of humanity, which reduces to free to be, cannot be a mere transcendental wish that something be held as existing, which reduces to free to choose how to be.

I believe we do have free will. Indeed, I think there is nothing we or anyone else among us (with the exception of God, of course) can do to rob us of it. My reason tells me that I am morally responsible for every single decision I make, no matter what the circumstances. And as my reason tells me as well that I could not be morally responsible unless my decisions were truly my own and not the product of antecedent causes, I conclude that my decisions - all of them - are truly my own and not the product of antecedent causes (and thus that I have free will in respect of them).

Those who argue otherwise - that is, those who argue that we lack free will, or have less than our full share of it - are, I contend, demonstrably confused as they consistently allow weaker evidence to overrule stronger.

Free will is not something seen, touched, smelt, heard, or tasted. Our awareness of it comes via our reason. It is our reason that tells us we have it, not our senses. This is why it is not an object of empirical inquiry.

The reason of literally billions of people tells them that their wills are free and that they are responsible for the decisions they make. That is staggeringly good evidence.

It is also worth noting that the majority of philosophers who have thought carefully about this issue have also come to the conclusion that we have free will, despite disagreeing over what possessing it involves.

Clearly then, this premise - 1. We have free will - is extraordinarily well supported by rational evidence.

Yet those who conclude that we lack free will must first defend a controversial thesis about what having free will involves, such as that it involves having alternative possibilities of a kind only indeterminism can provide, or whatever. And then they must go on to argue that we do not have what it takes.

But that thesis - the thesis about what free will involves possessing - will be less self-evident to reason than the thesis that we have free will.

Take the thesis that free will is incompatible with causal determinism ('incompatibilism'). It provides the most common route to the 'no free will conclusion'. The reasoning going as follows:

1. Free will is incompatible with determinism
2. Determinism is true
3. Therefore we lack free will

Well, that's a terrible argument. It's valid, but even if premise 2 is true (and of course, its truth is currently in question), premise 1 is less rationally self-evident than "we have free will".

So even if premise 2 is true (and I'm not saying it is), this would be the rationally more compelling argument to make in light of it:

1. We have free will
2. Determinism is true
3. therefore free will is compatible with determinism.

Needless to say, my views here are, as ever, heavily influenced by Descartes.

An interesting debate on 'compatibalism (limited free will) vs incompatibilism (no free will)':

https://www.skeptic.com/michael-shermer-show/daniel-dennett-gregg-caruso-just-deserts-debating-free-will/

An interesting debate of compatibalism (limited free will) vs incompatibilism (no free will): — 180 Proof

Ignorant as ever. Compatibilism is not the view that we have 'limited free will' (it is the view that free will is 'compatible' with causal determinism - hence the name). And incompatibilism is not the view that we have no free will (it is the view that free will is 'incompatible' with determinism...hence the name).

Neither are views about whether we have free will. They're views about what free will is or is not compatible with. Sheesh!

Well done for trying. But, you know, maybe stop.

Uh huh ... says our most distinguished Dunning-Kruger Club member.

Er, no. First, to be a member of that club you need to 'lack' expertise yet think you have it. I have expertise. Gobs of it. You don't. See? (the answer will be 'no', obviously).

Second: what I said about compatibilism and incompatibilism was true, yes?

Here's your homework, my little Dunning-Krugerite: find out what a 'robust modest incompatibilist' is. And then find out what distinguishes one of those from a mere 'modest' (a.k.a. Valerian) incompatibilist. And then find out what distinguishes both from an 'agent causal' incompatibilist. Then come back and try and say something of philosophical relevance.

Free will is the ability to choose between different possible courses of action unimpeded. — Charlotte Thomas-Rowe

Unimpeded? Of course not.

But we do have a choices in intended course of action. I can choose to run head long into a wall, but my action is impeded. Free choice foes, always define choice in the most ridiculous manner.

I have expertise. Gobs of it. — Bartricks

Proof of your D-KC membership: Those like you who need to say so, don't have it; those like me who don't say so, probably do have it. QED, Fartrix. GFY! :sweat:

thank you for your insight, I will read up on the “the science of right”.

that is a very interesting perspective, thank you for sharing. I was trying to use the quotes as a means to spark the debate on determinism, compatibilism and libertarianism.

I will review this, thank you

:up: Welcome to TPF.

how would you define free will?

how would you define free will? — Charlotte Thomas-Rowe

Will is the ability to move in a given direction. I have a choice in what direction I will move, and I can assure you, whatever path chosen, there will be nothing but impediments. I can choose to run into the wall, or use experience to try to go around it, or over it. One only needs to observe life (as opposed to reading textbooks), to understand the nature of the human mind, and what it means to act like a living human.

Well done for trying. But, you know, maybe stop. — Bartricks

Hows about you and @180 Proof act like adults in front of our new member. Give her a chance to get started before you start sniping at each other.

Everyone views life differently due to whatever circumstances they are in or have experienced and nobody has the same experiences. I do not think everyone is capable of understanding the nature of the human mind. I myself, do not understand.

Would you say someone who lacks education/intellect or experience cannot truly have free will?

Might you further elaborate on “what it means to act like a living human” as that could differ from person to person. What does that mean to you?

Ha, it’s okay! I love to hear everyone views and to learn from them.

Schopenhauer has persuasively shown that free will is an illusion in his essay, On the Freedom of the Will. His other essay, On the Basis of Morality, demonstrates that morality remains coherent despite behavior being determined.

:up:

Everyone views life differently due to whatever circumstances they are in or have experienced and nobody has the same experiences. — Charlotte Thomas-Rowe

Everyone knows that they are choosing. Everyone's life is based upon choosing. It's only after they are "educated", that some begin pretending that they believe otherwise. A (dangerous) game that is being played. Analogizing human life to chemicals. Humans, are interesting.

You don't have to completely understand the human mind, to know that you are making choices, and everything you believe in your life is based upon the choices being made. You don't think that guys like Dennett take full credit for "their accomplishments"? I've never heard of a determinist giving full credit to the Big Bang.

Everyone makes choices. Free Will, as well as Determinism, are philosophers' fables, that they like to talk and write about to no end. In no way, do they describe the human experience.

How are the views up there on your high horse? (You're competing in the condescension finals again this year, I take it?). Do you have anything philosophical to contribute?

For example, what do you think of the viability of robust modest incompatibilism about free will versus agent-causal incompatbilism? Do you think the agent-causalists are correct to hold that without agent-causation the robust modest incompatibilist (and, of course, the modest incompatibilist) have done nothing to supplement the agent's originative control over their decisions beyond what it would be if determinism were true? I certainly think so, but that's just me and I'm sure 180Proof will put me right.

Schopenhauer has persuasively shown that free will is an illusion in his essay, On the Freedom of the Will. — darthbarracuda

How? (Not denying that he did this, just wondering how). For something to be illusory, it must appear to be the case. So, in order for free will to be illusory, we must appear to have it.

If we appear to have it, then that's good prima facie evidence that we do have it.

So, we would need good evidence that the appearances are innacurate.

What's that evidence? It would need to be very good, surely, to defeat such widespread appearances to the contrary?

Ha, it’s okay! I love to hear everyone views and to learn from them. — Charlotte Thomas-Rowe

I hope I didn't seem condescending. 180 Proof and Bartricks are two of our more... pugnacious rambunctious members. I was embarrassed. I try to be kind to new members.

Welcome by the way.

What bothers me about many popular discussions of the topic is people start off assuming it as a given what the controversy is about and whether it's legitimate inquiry, and then all you have to do is give a yes or no answer to the framing "do we have free will" and then continue arguing from your chosen position. I think it's more productive to get to the roots, like what are we exactly interested in? Why did people pose this question in this first place, like what features of human action in the world befuddles them.

The term "free will" sounds a bit too loaded with metaphysical connotations for me personally. I prefer terms like Agency, volition, moral responsibility, they're less cluttered terms to examine.

How are the views up there on your high horse? — Bartricks

From up here I can see that insulting poor defenseless @180 Proof is not legitimate philosophy. I've had my say. Carry on.

Yes.

I am personally agnostic on whether compatibilism or incompatibilism is true, as I think the more important ingredient is possession of an immaterial soul.

I follow Descartes in thinking that we should first get clear about what is clearest and not dismiss the more clear on the basis of the less.

As it is more clear that I have free will than that free will either requires, or does not require, indeterminism, I conclude that I have free will (and conclude that it would be irrational to revise that conclusion in light of the discovery that determinism is true, should that discovery ever be made).

But my reason - which is my only guide to what's what - says that if everything about me is a product of external factors that I had no hand in, then I would not have free will. Contrary to what Sam Harris says, a puppet is 'not' free if it loves its strings.

So, I conclude that my decisions are not wholly the product of external factors that I had no hand in. There are, of course, external factors that play a causal role in me deciding as I do. But there's another ingredient as well: me. I make my decisions, and even if I have been caused to do so by external factors, as long as I am responsible for being the me that I am, then I will still be responsible for those decisions as they will still be 'mine'.

However, if I am a physical object - such as my brain or whatever - then everything about me will be a product of external factors, as I clearly did not create my own body. So if I am a physical thing, then I am not responsible for being the me that I am.

Thus, if I have free will - and my reason assures me I do - then I am not a physical object. My physical body is simply my temporary accommodation, but is no more 'me' than my house is.

Thus, I must be an immaterial soul. Free will requires it.

Compatibilism is not the view that we have 'limited free will' (it is the view that free will is 'compatible' with causal determinism - hence the name). And incompatibilism is not the view that we have no free will (it is the view that free will is 'incompatible' with determinism...hence the name).

Neither are views about whether we have free will. They're views about what free will is or is not compatible with. — Bartricks

This is correct, and I’m very surprised to see @180 Proof get it so wrong.

Et tu, Pfhorrest? :lol:

I never claimed or implied anything in that Fartrix quote of me. I slapped a title on the link to a debate based on the summary of positions at issue given therein. Clearly, s/he is semi-illiterate and refuses to extend the principle of charity to anyone; but I'm surprise at you, Pfhorrest – is Fartrix kin or a lover?