Contrary to many misinterpretations, Husserlian phenomenology is not an idealism but a radical subject-object interactionism. — Joshs
Excellent link. This is from The Concept of Anxiety, a seminal work. As you read through this text you find Sartre, here, Heidegger there.Actually Kierk argued the opposite here in this short read: https://www.brainpickings.org/2017/04/18/kierkegaard-concept-of-anxiety-time/ — 3017amen
The reason concepts of time were at issue around 1859 is that Darwin published Origin of Species that year, in turn based on a geological concept of time - that proposed a hugely ancient origin of the earth and lifeforms fossilized in rock layers. — counterpunch
the trick is to become a knight of faith, which is to live in the present and embrace the past and the future in this lived present. — Constance
Okay. I would genuinely like to know. Some of Husserl is very accessible, like Cartesian Meditations and others. Ideas get rather technical, but it is here I think you can see how phenomenology works. I haven't read Logical Investigations. On my list. — Constance
Whereas retentions and protentions in the early lectures were defined as retaining the primal impression, or projecting a new primal impression, respectively, in Husserl’s later research manuscripts, the primal impression is considered the line of intersection between retentional and protentional tendencies that make up every present phase of consciousness. Even in his earlier account Husserl had claimed that primal presentation is not self-sufficient, rather it operates only in connection with retentions and protentions. In the Bernau Manuscripts, however, Husserl seems to suggest that the complicated interlacing of retentions and protentions is constitutive of primal impression. Not only is primal impression not self-sufficient, it is a constituted product rather than something that makes a constitutive contribution of its own. — “The Past, Present and Future of Time-Consciousness: From Husserl to Varela and Beyond”, Shaun Gallagher (in Constructivist Foundations, November 2017)
We live in time, I would argue, such that past and future are subsumed under the present, or, rather, such that our experience of the past moving into the future is a reality in the giveness of the presence. — Constance
Sure, no worries Constance. K makes the point of both phenomena occurring from within the human condition, hence is emphasis on dread. (Logically, it breaks the rules of excluded middle.) Our existence is such that without However, it seems when discussing that which is present, the question becomes how big is that sliver of present(?). — 3017amen
Using simple English, to be human is to be an action verb--human Being. Time is required for our existence. Things are constantly moving, changing, et.al . as required to sustain life. Eternity (no time) seems unimaginable. However, in theory, Einstein said it was possible, out there... . — 3017amen
Too, in the aforementioned Platonian sense, we get to play with eternity from time to time. Whether it's through the phenomenal humanistic experiences that we engage in, or from experimenting with mathematical entities... — 3017amen
Using simple English, to be human is to be an action verb--human Being. Time is required for our existence. Things are constantly moving, changing, et.al . as required to sustain life. Eternity (no time) seems unimaginable. — 3017amen
It occurred to me that I really didn't address this: Heraclitus 's world of flux, one has to ask, why is this exclusive of affirming the present? WE are the ones who look at the stream on time as a logical succession, but the term "stream" belies this, for it possesses no boundaries at all. The law of the excluded middle is a positivist's way of misapprehending the world entirely — Constance
"positing the spirit" is to pull away from normal discourse, not just in thought, but existentially, and indeed from all that creates separation from God: — Constance
For K, to "posit spirit" is to posit sin, for in this positing one realizes that what we call time is possessed by the eternal present, which is God, the soul. — Constance
Why is the eternal present God, rather than God-sin as the inseparable poles of every present? — Joshs
Something I wrote on Caputo;
“to maintain a faith in experience as a fluctuation between moments of agential intending is to believe that one is `justified' in locating discrete moments nameable abstractively as God, faith, justice, transcendence opposing themselves to discrete moments identifiable as injustice, evil, nihilism. Caputo wants to argue that the `trace' does not knock out the name of God, but Derrida's trace does knock it out, or rather, splits it in two by preventing there simply being such a thing as a temporary (even if just for an instant) semantic unity nameable as God, love, transcendence, justice, liberation.” — Joshs
Where am I? Who am I? How came I here? What is this thing called the world? What does this world mean? Who is it that has lured me into the world? Why was I not consulted, why not made acquainted with its manners and customs instead of throwing me into the ranks, as if I had been bought by a kidnapper, a dealer in souls? — Kierkegaard, Repetition, 1843
Where do we find ourselves? In a series of which we do not know the extremes, and believe that it has none. We wake and find ourselves on a stair; there are stairs below us, which we seem to have ascended; there are stairs above us, many a one, which go upward and out of sight. But the Genius which according to the old belief stands at the door by which we enter, and gives us the lethe to drink, that we may tell no tales, mixed the cup too strongly, and we cannot shake off the lethargy now at noonday. — Emerson, Experience, 1844
“Where do we find ourselves? In a series of which we do not know the extremes, and believe that it has none. We wake and find ourselves on a stair; there are stairs below us, which we seem to have ascended; there are stairs above us, many a one, which go upward and out of sight. But the Genius which according to the old belief stands at the door by which we enter, and gives us the lethe to drink, that we may tell no tales, mixed the cup too strongly, and we cannot shake off the lethargy now at noonday.” — Antony Nickles
"Where am I? Who am I? How came I here? What is this thing called the world? What does this world mean? Who is it that has lured me into the world? Why was I not consulted, why not made acquainted with its manners and customs instead of throwing me into the ranks, as if I had been bought by a kidnapper, a dealer in souls?" — Antony Nickles
The past simply continuing into the future, the abstraction of our self from this moment "annihilates the concept" as K says. The word is dead, and we are quiet (our life is, desperately). But there is an instant which makes all things new; when time is full (of possibilities Wittgenstein might say). We may need to be adverse to expectation (Emerson), convert our interest in our concepts, atone for the unspoken, redeem our judgments--to give them new life and power over our present deliberation. It is we, at this moment, that are responsible, now, before we define our life with our culture, our expression, our action. When duty calls us, we must answer for our current state, beyond our (past) knowledge, or suffer the sin of that lost chance. If we are to say our original sin was the creation of the past--our desire for certain knowledge of it--then our Eden is the sight of the sun at the top of Nietzsche's ladder, at noonday as Emerson says. — Antony Nickles
And so is the "eternal present" ever-present? or, if it is, is it that we are only at times aware of it, or have the opportunity to rise to the occasion of it? Not that we may not be brought up at any time by society for our action or inaction, but are we to be held to the grindstone by ourselves at all times (as if every second was subject to sin, our grief endless)?
This leads me to also comment on your question: "Is there REALLY a past or future AT ALL?" We could say the past is outside of our self: knowledge, language, culture. And the future is the implications and consequences and judgments from that past. Our default aspect to the present is unrecognized consent, complicity, blindness, inattention, alienation. We fail to shake off our lethargy (or apathy) when our moment arrives. That is to say, the past and the future are ALL that exist; before we are thrust (drawn) into the present to face our eternal, if yet unconnected, unlived, self (Emerson speaks of a "next" self). — Antony Nickles
One element that has not been mentioned as yet in this discussion of The Concept of Anxiety is how the "single individual" is the one who has to face the prospect of the "eternal." The limit to psychology often mentioned in the book is directly related to the "inward reserve" needed to be the one who can make a choice.
The "generational" inheritance of sin described at the beginning is related to a model of the good parent who helps their child deal with this element. The book is a manual of religious education along with whatever else it may be. — Valentinus
Honestly, perhaps it cannot be defined. But does it help you to know that the Vedic Mystics already knew that the Earth's diameter on the equator is 8000 miles. Long before it could be measured. — TaySan
Man, then, is synthesis of psyche and body, but is also a synthesis of the temporal and the eternal. That has often been stated. I do not object to it at all, for it is my joy and dearest occupation to ponder over that which is quite simple.
As for the latter synthesis, it is immediately striking that it is formed differently from the former. In the former, the two factors are psyche and body, and spirit is the third, yet in such a way that one can speak of a synthesis only when spirit is posited. The latter synthesis has only two factors, the temporal and the eternal. Where is the third factor? And if there is no third factor, there really is no synthesis, for a synthesis that is a contradiction cannot be completed without a third factor, because the fact that the synthesis is a contradiction asserts that it is not. What, then, is the temporal? — Translated by Reidar Thomte
However, the tormentor of inclosing reserve may also relate himself selfishly to his own inclosing reserve. About this I could write a whole book, although I have not been, according to the custom and the established convention among the observers of our day, in Paris and London, as if by such visits one could learn something great, more than chatter and the wisdom of traveling salesmen. If an observer will only pay attention to himself, he will have enough with five men, five women, and ten children for the discovery of all possible states of the human soul. What I have to say could indeed have significance, especially for everyone who deals with children or has any relation to them. It is of infinite importance that the child be elevated by the conception of lofty inclosing reserve and saved from the misunderstood types. In an outward respect, it is easy to determine when the moment arrives that one dares let a the child walk alone; in a spiritual respect, it is not so easy. In a spiritual respect, the task is very difficult, and one cannot exempt oneself by employing a nursemaid or by buying a walker. The art is that of constantly being present, and yet not being present, so that the child may be allowed to develop himself, and at the same time one has a clear view of the development. The art is to leave the child to himself in the very highest degree and on the greatest possible scale, and to express this apparent relinquishing in such a way that, unnoticed, one is aware of everything. If only one is willing, time for this can very well be found, even though one is a royal officeholder. If one is willing, one can do all things.
And the father or the educator who has done everything else for the child entrusted to him, but has failed to prevent him from becoming closed up in his reserve, has at all time incurred a great liability. — Same translation as above, starts within section (IV 393)
The art is that of constantly being present, and yet not being present, so that the child may be allowed to develop himself, and at the same time one has a clear view of the development. The art is to leave the child to himself in the very highest degree and on the greatest possible scale, and to express this apparent relinquishing in such a way that, unnoticed, one is aware of everything. If only one is willing, time for this can very well be found, even though one is a royal officeholder. If one is willing, one can do all things. — Same translation as above, starts within section (IV 393)
“to maintain a faith in experience as a fluctuation between moments of agential intending is to believe that one is `justified' in locating discrete moments nameable abstractively as God, faith, justice, transcendence opposing themselves to discrete moments identifiable as injustice, evil, nihilism. Caputo wants to argue that the `trace' does not knock out the name of God, but Derrida's trace does knock it out, or rather, splits it in two by preventing there simply being such a thing as a temporary (even if just for an instant) semantic unity nameable as God, love, transcendence, justice, liberation.” — Joshs
As N said, every philosophy is a kind of specious autobiography. That might also not apply in all cases, but from one existentialist to another, it appears particularly suitable. — ernest meyer
As N said, every philosophy is a kind of specious autobiography. — ernest meyer
I think it is a misunderstanding of Kierkegaard's intention to read being 'present but not present' before a child's inward reserve to mean the same thing as a "hands off" style of parenting that only notices the child's experience when bad things happen. — Valentinus
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