Your argument is convincing, but there's a possibility that it may be false, so I'm going to disbelieve it. — Arkady
I don't believe the sun will rise in the east. I know the sun MUST rise in the east, given the mechanics of celestial bodies. It's not a belief. The sun has no choice. — Bitter Crank
Pyrrhonism — darthbarracuda
Then why believe anything? — darthbarracuda
Then by that "guideline" your own argument ought to be disbelieved. Zingy or not, that's the breaks. X-)This is similar to that zingy argument against logical positivism that makes it self-refuting, you know, the whole "well is the statement: 'only empirical statements are meaningful', empirical?". But it's more of a guideline. — darthbarracuda
The colloquial usage of "believing" something is often contrasted with "knowing" it ("I don't believe X: I know X"). But this doesn't really hold philosophical water, as many epistemologists believe knowledge to be "justified true belief" with perhaps some additional qualifiers thrown in to handle epistemic luck in Gettier cases. So, knowledge, far from being dichotomous with belief, entails it.I don't believe the sun will rise in the east. I know the sun MUST rise in the east, given the mechanics of celestial bodies. It's not a belief. The sun has no choice. — Bittercrank
Yes, I had the same thought: in saying that they don't "believe" P, a person is sometimes saying that they don't merely believe P (that is, their belief is justified and/or true, as well). However, this being a philosophy forum, one should probably be more careful in their terminology if they're going to say things along the lines of "I don't believe P: I know P."But "I don't believe X: I know X" means "I don't just believe X: I know X", and this is often how the colloquial use is put. It's very much in line with the JTB definition. When "just" is not used, I think it's implied. On the other hand the JTB definition looks like a clumsy attempt to encapsulate this colloquial use; in the latter, a belief that is true and justified is transformed into something more than a belief--not just a belief that happens to be true and justified but attaining another epistemic state entirely--and a literal understanding of JTB can lose sight of this. — jamalrob
From the basic assumptions of existence (such as cogito, which even that is disputed), to grand metaphysical and ethical theories, to the existence of god, string theory, or whether or not the sun will rise in the east tomorrow; all of these cannot be proven without any doubt.
It is conceivable that we could actually find out something about the way the universe operates that makes the Earth suddenly turn on its axis, making the Sun rise in the west. Whether or not it will actually happen is unknown, but it is conceivable.
Similarly, it is conceivable for a utilitarian to read an argument tomorrow that will disprove utilitarianism.
Because of this, should we hold any positions at all? Sure, we can defend these positions, but it certainly takes a bit of the passion out of the debate if it is irrational to actually believe it is true. — darthbarracuda
Unless you are speaking to an omniscient audience, then any negative answer to your question can only be self-defeating.To try to rephrase my thinking here: If we don't know we are correct (as in, we are not omniscient), then is it reasonable to hold a position as truth? — darthbarracuda
I don't see why not. You seem to be assuming that certainty is necessary for knowledge (a position known as "infallibilism"). But why should we accept this standard for knowledge? Furthermore, is it even possible that there could be an argument for infallibilism that isn't self-defeating—particularly given the fact that you are also assuming that nothing can be known with certainty?To try to rephrase my thinking here: If we don't know we are correct (as in, we are not omniscient), then is it reasonable to hold a position as truth? — darthbarracuda
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