Translation + stress testing of the bridge translation builds. — fdrake
the inverse question induced by the translation; said the neuroscientist to the folk theorist - does this make any difference on a day to day basis? Does this make a difference therapeutically? — fdrake
One way of framing the issue is that if people behave as if there were a thing, and that behaviour wouldn't work as it does without it functioning as if there were a thing, does it make sense to say that thing exists in some sense? — fdrake
if something behaves as if a model of it were true, then the model can be treated as real/held to be true/is true. Like F=ma or something like that. If the system involved works in accordance**
with F=ma, F=ma is true for it. So that system's behaviour generates a commitment to that it acts in accord with that description of it. — fdrake
We cannot agree on 'what there is' because any determination – ontological commitment – reflects our interests/biases — 180 Proof
I've pursued, therefore, an inquiry based on what we must agree on rationally: the Principle of Non-contradiction. (NB: Even dialetheism or paraconsistent logic implicitly accept the PNC axiom in so far as such systems deny it.) From there I'm working through, or working out, an apophatic modal-metaphysics (or negative ontology à la "negative theology"); and once 'what necessarily is not there' (i.e. the impossibles) is determined as a principle? — 180 Proof
I don't "give up on" anything. As I wrote above in the post to which you're referring, Xtrix:If you can determine what is “necessarily” not there, then why do you give up on determining what is[/u]? — Xtrix
and perhaps you didn't read further down this page to this follow-up wherein more explicitly I address "what there is".
We cannot agree on 'what there is' because any determination – ontological commitment – reflects our interests/biases or some domain with which we're engaged. Thus, the history of incommensurable, divergent, metaphysics. I've pursued, therefore, an inquiry based on what we must agree on rationally — 180 Proof
I don't "give up on" anything. — 180 Proof
(1)Fine. We “can’t agree” about being, but supposedly we “must agree on” PNC? Why? — Xtrix
:fire: :eyes:Anyone who denies the law of non-contradiction should be beaten and burned until he admits that to be beaten is not the same as not to be beaten, and to be burned is not the same as not to be burned. — Ibn Sina
Maybe we shouldn't. Many don't care, yet some do. Reasoning begins with agreement – e.g. grammar – and it's argument / dialectic that negotiates whether or not discourse ends in agreement. My concern is with discursive beginnings (grounds), that is, where we must begin in order to make sense with – translate (G. Steiner) – one another.There’s also the question of why we should care about agreement. — Xtrix
Without agreeing on (conforming to) the PNC, the principle of explosion reduces discursive reason (e.g. your question) to glossolalia — 180 Proof
My own view, which I've been working out is to use Sellar's distinction between the "manifest image" and the "scientific image" as a good provisional distinction, or at least a useful heuristic.
I'd say I have a manifest ontology which includes "everything" and a scientific ontology which tends to be agnostic. What there is in the mind-independent world may well be what physics says there is, but physics is incomplete and is subject to revisions that may make any previous ontology obsolete.
The reason for including a "manifest ontology" is because I think our common-sense world is worth talking about, I want to talk about kings and ships and gods and everything else. Otherwise we would have very little to say. — Manuel
Is the distinction to the effect that manifest ontology = via the senses and scientific ontology = via reasoned understanding based upon experimentation? — ucarr
If you are skeptical to some degree, do you ever apply it to your manifest ontology? — ucarr
Is the distinction to the effect that manifest ontology = via the senses and scientific ontology = via reasoned understanding based upon experimentation?
— ucarr
No. Although it is tempting to put forth such distinctions, as it looks neat and saves us from doing more work, I don't think it holds up. — Manuel
Sellars claims that the scientific image of man is not able to encompass or comprehend the manifest image but that both are equally valid ways of knowing about man. — Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Depends on what you mean by skepticism in terms of scope and depth. A healthy does of skepticism is good, but figuring out what "healthy" amounts to is not easy. — Manuel
Do you think their interrelationship important enough to work out a detailed characterization? — ucarr
Skepticism, as I'm using it here, means withholding judgment on principle until rational examination (and possible experimentation) are conducted. Accordingly, examination evaluates skepticism just as it evaluates truth claims. — ucarr
Does motion have an elementary role within your ontology? — ucarr
Do you think their interrelationship important enough to work out a detailed characterization? — ucarr
When possible, the way we are happens to coincide with some aspects of the way the world is, when these interact, we have a possible science. If not, we don't. — Manuel
If there exist human attributes parallel to the natural world, then, to some extent, humans are not entirely of the natural world, and thus science of the natural world cannot reveal & explain those parts of human. Moreover, human composition is only partly natural. As to the other part, is it super-natural?
Did you intend to imply the above? — ucarr
If there are parts of the world fundamentally unlike human, then human science faces parts of the natural world it cannot understand. — ucarr
Note - Human can embrace immaterial spirit, but that entails non-scientific acceptance of a body/spirit duality. — ucarr
The ability for a thing to move is afforded by Time itself. — punos
I think there is an unfortunate trend to associate the word "nature" and "naturalism" to mean whatever science says there is. — Manuel
...there is clearly more to the world than what science says there is (art, morals, politics, human relations, etc.) — Manuel
I've never heard any scientist attempt to exclude the above from the domain of the natural world.
Do you believe humans to be entirely of the natural world (as I've described it here)? — ucarr
If you do, then you don't believe humans have attributes that don't intersect with the natural world out of which they are created. — ucarr
I believe we have a rather rigidly determined nature and this is what allows us to view the world we we do. But as a consequence, others aspects of the world, we don't have access to. — Manuel
We have, as have other species. The biggest changes emerge rather quickly, instead of slowly over long stretches of time, as is often believed. — Manuel
We could conceivable go through another mutation that endows us with some different mental faculty. It is possible — Manuel
If I had a world of my own, everything would be nonsense. Nothing would be what it is, because everything would be what it isn't. And contrary wise, what is, it wouldn't be. And what it wouldn't be, it would. You see? — Alice in Wonderland
In this thread, do you propound a premise that claims something like saying “the natural world contains parts inscrutable to science”?
Furthermore, is it your view that science is a distinctly human contrivance involving more than simple observation & imitation of natural processes?
I ask these questions because, if so, then there is an unbridgeable gap or break between human identity & the natural world.
By assuming humans are direct products of the natural world, along the lines of Darwin’s Theory of Evolution, I don’t see how this unbridgeable gap could exist, unless humans, in your ontology, are NOT entirely products of the natural world. — ucarr
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