My own approach to this is 'Wittgensteinian.' I don't think 'direct experience' can mean more than a grand feeling here, since meaning is social. I can imagine the language of an inner circle, but it's not clear how to distinguish their claims of access to an exalted (level of ) reality from the ordinary self-flattery of any group ('based' or 'woke' or 'saved' or ....).

I don't want to be too critical, because I think philosophy can be understood as its own (larger, perhaps more welcoming) inner circle of the 'rational' where 'rational' is understood to (among other things) exclude unjustified claims that appeal to varieties of the 'Inner Light.' FWIW, I think rationality is a fuzzy concept, but I know it (more or less) when I see it (a matter of skill and attitude.)

:up:

How does such a sage fit in with the rest of philosophy, if at all? — j0e

They're an awkward fit like sophists, dogmatists and charlatans.

Should we call what the sage has special access to knowledge?

Well, sure, if that's what he calls it. But on what grounds should we believe him? Ye shall know them fuckers by their forbidden fruits – so it is written (or tattooed) somewhere.

Is there a performative contradiction in reasoning in defense of something inherently 'irrationalist' in the sense of declaring itself indecipherable except by the chosen few?

I'll spit on the floor and drink to that.

But on what grounds should we believe him? Ye shall know them fuckers by their fruits – so it is written (or tattooed) somewhere. — 180 Proof

:up:

For, since the reasoning faculties of the soul, which are almost constantly, though not always warily nor wisely employed, would not know how to move, for want of a foundation and footing, in most men, who through laziness or avocation do not, or for want of time, or true helps, or for other causes, cannot penetrate into the principles of knowledge, and trace truth to its fountain and original, it is natural for them, and almost unavoidable, to take up with some borrowed principles; which being reputed and presumed to be the evident proofs of other things, are thought not to need any other proof themselves. Whoever shall receive any of these into his mind, and entertain them there with the reverence usually paid to principles, never venturing to examine them, but accustoming himself to believe them, because they are to be believed, may take up, from his education and the fashions of his country, any absurdity for innate principles; and by long poring on the same objects, so dim his sight as to take monsters lodged in his own brain for the images of the Deity, and the workmanship of his hands. — Locke

https://www.gutenberg.org/files/10615/10615-h/10615-h.htm#link2HCH0001

This might be a bit too foundationalist, but the critical spirit is nice.

They're an awkward fit like sophists, dogmatists and charlatans. — 180 Proof

Somehow we're all drawn to the same forum, literally and metaphorically, despite serious differences.

I think this articulates the spirit that objects to the esoteric.

What censure doubting thus of innate principles may deserve from men, who will be apt to call it pulling up the old foundations of knowledge and certainty, I cannot tell;—I persuade myself at least that the way I have pursued, being conformable to truth, lays those foundations surer. This I am certain, I have not made it my business either to quit or follow any authority in the ensuing Discourse. Truth has been my only aim; and wherever that has appeared to lead, my thoughts have impartially followed, without minding whether the footsteps of any other lay that way or not. Not that I want a due respect to other men’s opinions; but, after all, the greatest reverence is due to truth: and I hope it will not be thought arrogance to say, that perhaps we should make greater progress in the discovery of rational and contemplative knowledge, if we sought it in the fountain, IN THE CONSIDERATION OF THINGS THEMSELVES; and made use rather of our own thoughts than other men’s to find it. For I think we may as rationally hope to see with other men’s eyes, as to know by other men’s understandings. So much as we ourselves consider and comprehend of truth and reason, so much we possess of real and true knowledge. The floating of other men’s opinions in our brains, makes us not one jot the more knowing, though they happen to be true. What in them was science, is in us but opiniatrety; whilst we give up our assent only to reverend names, and do not, as they did, employ our own reason to understand those truths which gave them reputation. Aristotle was certainly a knowing man, but nobody ever thought him so because he blindly embraced, and confidently vented the opinions of another. And if the taking up of another’s principles, without examining them, made not him a philosopher, I suppose it will hardly make anybody else so. In the sciences, every one has so much as he really knows and comprehends. What he believes only, and takes upon trust, are but shreds; which, however well in the whole piece, make no considerable addition to his stock who gathers them. Such borrowed wealth, like fairy money, though it were gold in the hand from which he received it, will be but leaves and dust when it comes to use. — Locke

To be a philosopher (in the newer, critical sense) is (roughly) to share this spirit. Whatever is or should be respected as genuinely existing should be accessible to 'the' (implicitly shared) rational inquirer. It's one thing to claim to be in the inner circle and it's another thing to consider their claims. Those confident of belonging may remain silent, may dodge accusations of the performative contradiction. Others are not, and still others are undecided about such claims.

Consider the perspective of those hearing and not making the claim. If evidence is withheld, if excuses are made, if the cost of entry is too high, then suspicion is natural, if not conclusive. Many (myself include) have more or less written off such claims not as necessarily meaningless but as insufficiently promising to overcome their suspicion.

They're an awkward fit like sophists, dogmatists and charlatans. — 180 Proof

So you don't think Spinoza should be so considered? He is after all placed in that company by the quoted passage.

I pretty much agree with you. Joe, and I have been arguing as much on here for quite a while. I think such "certain direct knowledge" consists merely. must consist merely, in a feeling of certainty.

Such certainty, since it is neither tautologically true nor empirically verifiable cannot be anything other than mere faith, even though it may be accompanied by a feeling of absolute (well. subjective, really even if felt to be absolute) certitude.

Should also bear in mind the 'philosophical ascent', and the parable of the cave.

Meaning that, at the formation of philosophy proper, there was a distinction between the philosopher and the hoi polloi. The philosophers of all schools insisted on the application of reason, the pursuit of virtue, the subduing of the passions, and so on. Of course the details varied tremendously between the schools, that’s what made them ‘schools’. But then along came a powerful social movement that insisted that all people were of equal value in the eyes of God, that all that was required was faith. Not coincidentally, that same movement closed the Platonic Academy. ‘Foolishness to the Greeks’, was, I believe, one of their sayings.

If the 'higher truth' is not empirical (ie, it has no universalizable and predictable effects), and it's esoteric value can only be grasped by the sage, then what would be the point of even discussing the matter, philosophicaly?

It seems that the matter of whether some people can acquire a 'higher truth' has no further elements to discuss beyond the obvious answer "They might, yes, but we'd have no way of knowing".

What I think is of interest is the social role of such claims. Are we to take them at face value and ignore the clear social advantage of claiming higher knowledge which only you can access and such can't even be tested?

In normal circumstances, if a person were, say, to get paid a huge sum of money to perform some otherwise worthy deed we'd at the very least question their motives. The mere existence of a more plausible motive would normally suffice.

Yep. When in doubt just resort to an historical account of how we got here... as if that in any way justified either position on whether we ought to be here.

So the old school philosophers were displaced by more egalitarian religions. What does that historical fact tell us about whether it was good or bad for them to have been treated that way?

If the 'higher truth' is not empirical (ie, it has no universalizable and predictable effects), and it's esoteric value can only be grasped by the sage, then what would be the point of even discussing the matter, philosophicaly? — Isaac

I lean that way myself. I suppose a secondary issue is whether 'our' rational/secular philosophy is its own kind of inner circle in a nonpejorative sense, an inner circle that excludes any other conception of the inner circle. 'Universal' seems key here. Democracy, science, and anti-esotericism seem to fit together. If so, why?

I am probably more likely to engage with you on this thread than your one on Wittgenstein because I have read a lot on esoteric ideas generally. I am just finishing, 'The Secret Teachers of the Western Tradition, ' by Gary Lachman. He has written a number of books, including Rudolf Steiner and Colin Wilson. I began discussing such ideas on the thread in mysticism, but probably my interest is in the esoteric traditions rather than mysticism.I am also interested in the esoteric aspects of religion, including esoteric Christianity.

My own understanding of esoteric is of hidden knowledge. I don't know how Wittgenstein fits into this exactly. I have not looked at the link you provided because I am in a bit of a hurry this morning. I am not sure if your understanding of esoteric is the same as mine, and it will be interesting to see what group of people write in your thread. I am interested in the esoteric but with a certain amount of caution, because it can become about people assuming elite knowledge.

I am a bit busy during today, but I will have a look at your thread again this evening.

We kept the ‘equality’ but ditched ‘before God’. People are equal in the sense that their opinions, likes, preferences, and so on, are all of equal worth, but without the implied commitment to the Christian ethos to ‘love one another as I have loved you’. In the public square the only arbiter of truth is science, but objective truth omits value, which is then subjectived and relativized. That’s about all that needs saying.

My own understanding of esoteric is of hidden knowledge. I don't know how Wittgenstein fits into this exactly....I am interested in the esoteric but with a certain amount of caution, because it can become about people assuming elite knowledge. — Jack Cummins

I don't think Wittgenstein is directly connected, though any charismatic thinker can inspire various 'inner circles' of those who (act is if, understand themselves to) 'really get it.'

I think this thread is largely about the problematic elitist aspect of esoteric knowledge claims. So your concerns would fit in well (as well as your positive impressions of the esoteric.)

That was a quick response. I am interested in the actual pursuit of esoteric knowledge, but also interesting in critical examination of the power structures. So, we should have some potential area for discussion. But, I will read and see how your thread is going this evening, because I had not been planning to write anything on the site this morning at all, but I was interested in this particular thread.

I agree that we kept the equality (equal before God the law ...one of these days.) I suggest that science is only the arbiter for some,some admittedly in high places. But it's not as if we are doing what is ideally rational as human beings, as if scientists run the world. Would that we were more scientific on some issues! All kinds of ideologies pull on the levers of power in a democracy.

:up:

I suppose a secondary issue is whether 'our' rational/secular philosophy is its own kind of inner circle in a nonpejorative sense, an inner circle that excludes any other conception of the inner circle. 'Universal' seems key here. — j0e

Yes, I thinks that's true. A common argument in some aspect of philosophical discussion is to claim that one's opponent doesn't (or can't) 'understand' the issue at hand without having read some work or other which has, as it's subject matter, the issue at hand. But this just repeats the mistake (or deliberate tactic, depending on how charitable one is feeling) of assuming that to have an issue as one's topic is synonymous with acquiring some body of knowledge about that topic. In reality, it is, of course, perfectly possible that despite X having written an entire bookshelf on the subject of Y, they have nonetheless (by virtue of their poor choice of methodology) acquired not a scrap of actual knowledge about Y.

Again, I think it's all too easy, as we see above, to resort to the 'safe ground' of assuring ourselves that science doesn't answer questions of value. But really that's not particularly apposite when we're talking about the various approaches to that which we all agree science doesn't cover.

What I think is of interest is the social role of such claims. Are we to take them at face value and ignore the clear social advantage of claiming higher knowledge which only you can access and such can't even be tested? — Isaac

Yes, the social role is especially fascinating. Even the quote mentions the charisma of its exponents. It's tempting to interpret claims of higher knowledge as the ideology of a ruling class (in times past) or as charlatanism (in pluralistic contexts where the educated are generally wary of taking religion too seriously.) Then there's the sincere florist.

n reality, it is, of course, perfectly possible that despite X having written an entire bookshelf on the subject of Y, they have nonetheless (by virtue of their poor choice of methodology) acquired not a scrap of actual knowledge about Y. — Isaac

:up:

They'd only be sure to have knowledge of those books, which might have its own value but is not the same thing. One can even imagine that false approaches could even be misleading and that 'fresh eyes' would be more helpful.

Would you define knowledge in roughly pragmatic terms? Something like prediction, control, economy, consistent with other theories/tools....? That it's universal suggests a kind of accessibility or repeatability ('POV-invariant.')

Democracy, science, and anti-esotericism seem to fit together. If so, why? — j0e

For the reasons I gave. It was an outcome of Christian social philosophy - equality for all, commitment to truth, and universal salvation, which is cashed out as economic opportunity. But what was lost along the way was the sense of their being real, transcendent, or ‘objective’ values. Pre-modern philosophy believed the Universe was rational in the sense that the order which characterised it was somehow mirrored or reflected in the human intellect. Whereas to the moderns, the intellect is explained in terms of adaptation, there being no higher value than successful procreation and worldly well-being.

It's tempting to interpret claims of higher knowledge as the ideology of a ruling class (in times past) or as charlatanism (in places where the educated are generally wary of taking religion too seriously.) Then there's the sincere florist. — j0e

I think its quite within reason to think it might be all three, even in any one given case. Maybe I'm just being gullible, but it seems unlikely to me that the Catholic priests involved in the child abuse scandals, for example, believed none of their own 'higher knowledge'. But irrespective of that personal conviction, it's without doubt that they also abused that unquestionable authority as a charlatan would for their own personal gain.

I think your hypothetical florist could be both sincere in her belief, and still seekeek to profit from the power it affords her.

I think you are on to something, so I guess I was trying to build a bridge between you and @Isaac.
The Catholic church and Christianity in general lost much of its power, and religion became a private matter. Agreed. Pluralism reigns now. Everyone brews up their own religion or anti-religion. The thought-police aren't allowed to bother us in this private sphere. So the sense of one right way or 'objective' values has presumably decayed (hard to say how variously people actually felt and thought given censorship.)

I do think the theory of evolution has had a significant effect on the human self-image. As you say, the mind is understood to be an evolved/adapted tool. We're the puke of chance? That's different indeed from being made in a god's image or mirroring the essence of the universe. I think you are correct that (this-)worldly well-being is central now. Instead of getting the poor to Heaven, good people want to get them out of poverty. Notions of mental health also tend to be embodied and this-worldly.

But should the sage, if he exists, care? Is the sage political?

Maybe I'm just being gullible, but it seems unlikely to me that the Catholic priests involved in the child abuse scandals, for example, believed none of their own 'higher knowledge'. — Isaac

I agree. Humans are complex indeed.

I think its quite within reason to think it might be all three, even in any one given case. — Isaac

Yes, that makes the best sense now that you mention it (again, complex indeed.)

The question in the OP was...

Should we call what the sage has special access to knowledge? — j0e

The question at hand just now is about values.

You're not explaining how you see your historical accounts answering either of those questions. What relevance has the history of the concept got to whether it is valuable and what we ought to do about it.

The irony is that you've spent a lot of time denying that science can answer value questions, but here you seem to be suggesting that history (a no less empirical investigation) can do exactly that.



We seem to be crossing these two subject matters, as I outlined above. I think it's often very insightful to look at the history of ideas, but I'm not seeing the crossover into assessing their value. I could give a detailed account of how slavery came about, but would it impact on a judgement of whether it was right or wrong?

We seem to be crossing these two subject matters, as I outlined above. I think it's often very insightful to look at the history of ideas, but I'm not seeing the crossover into assessing their value. I could give a detailed account of how slavery came about, but would it impact on a judgement of whether it was right or wrong? — Isaac

I agree. It's off-topic (if also interesting.)

I think history is coming up because it's maybe 'really' about politics. Or largely about politics. Personally I want to live in Denmark and not this red state. I think those who are nostalgic for 'objective values' are sincere in some sense, but what's the political direction? How does it cash out?

But should the sage, if he exists, care? Is the sage political? Conservative / reactionary? — j0e

I think ‘the sage’ is disinterested, in the traditional sense - has no self-interest, sees things as they are without an agenda or desire for a particular outcome. I suppose that is like the philosopher-king of Plato. I think above party politics, more like a head of state or wise counsel.

I’m trying to think of modern exemplars of sagacity. I suppose Neils Bohr might be one. I googled ‘20th century sages’ but all the examples were associated with new age and/or Eastern religion. Sarvapalli Radhakrishnan comes to mind. Even Einstein had a certain sagacity. But it’s a rare quality. Something like ‘the great man’ (which itself now is a non-PC because gender-specific expression).

Other snippets:

In Plato's Symposium Socrates says the difference between a sage and a philosopher (Ancient Greek: φιλόσοφος, meaning lover of wisdom) was that the sage has what the philosopher seeks. While analyzing the concept of love, Socrates concludes love is that which lacks the object it seeks. Therefore, the philosopher does not have the wisdom sought, while the sage, on the other hand, does not love or seek wisdom, for it is already possessed.

:up:

Seems to indicate that ‘the sage’ is superior even to Socrates (and by implication Plato and Aristotle also).

I agree. It's off-topic (if also interesting.) — j0e

I mention it because it's such a common feature of discussion around these esoteric sages.

Have you noticed how time passing is also a distinction between madman and sage? We seem to have this feeling that charlatans (or earnest prophets) can tap into whereby some esoteric knowledge is leant authority simply by being antecedent. It's almost the opposite of scientific progress (where we expect the more contemporary work to be more useful).

There's a strong narrative of 'lost knowledge', 'golden age' etc which philosophy (being more and more replaced by science) is ripe for the exploitation of.

I think those who are nostalgic for 'objective values' are sincere in some sense, but what's the political direction? How does it cash out? — j0e

It depends, I suppose. Like the florist, one can have a sincere belief that ancient values were better yet still be selective about which they promote most strongly for political reasons.

Take 'new age' philosophies for example. Out of all the old 'tribal' ways these philosophies could espouse (egalitarianism, low impact living etc), are we surprised most focus on the art and spiritual practices. The two things one can do without any actual cost to one's modern comforts.

I think the same's true of belief in higher truth of any sort. It's usually filtered to eliminate the costly and leave the beneficial.