Could you describe what you mean by being and becoming? — unintelligiblekai

In the context of the metaphysics of time, eternity etc , thinking is a process but being is a state. When I think my mental state changes with time but the me to which the mental state refers remains the same (paradox 1)

When we look at logic, particularly a priori mathematical structures, we know that the regressive nature of physical existence (neurons protons sub atomic particles etc) can ultimately be described mathematically, in an unchanging abstract form (math). That a priori truth does not change with the passage of time, but the world and the things in it are constantly changing.

The only thing constant is change itself (paradox 2).

(In philosophy, abstract mathematics is directly associated with a platonic reality, and mathematics itself has incredible effectiveness in describing our reality, hence we find ourselves facing the paradox of an unchanging truth --math/a priori/eternal truths-- and a temporal/changing world in which we live.)

Here is a model of time that I find quite convincing, by the German philosopher Gerold Prauss from his paper The Problem of Time in Kant. In: Kant’s Legacy: Essays in Honor of Lewis White Beck. Edited by Predrag Cicovacki. I hope the loose arrangement of the quotation snippets is understandable:

*Drawing as the sketching of a line is in fact nothing other than a certain extension of pigment. For the geometrician it is, nonetheless, the depiction of an ideal geometrical object in the sense that a line as an ideal geometrical object is different from extended pigment in the same way that an ideal geometrical point is different from a dot.*

*I assume this in order to construct or generate an ideal geometrical object that is an intermediate between point and line. If the dynamic generation or construction of an ideal geometrical line can, indeed, be depicted as an extension of an ideal geometrical point, then I pose the question: When I carry out this operation on a blackboard by means of a piece of chalk and a sponge, what does it lead to? With a piece of chalk in one hand, in one motion I undertake to do what I do when I draw an ideal geometrical line; with the sponge in the other hand I immediately follow behind the piece of chalk, so that all that remains is the drawing of an ideal geometrical point and that it never becomes a drawing of an ideal geometrical line.*

*The answer must come out to the following: what I thereby draw and depict is an ideal object, just as it is an ideal geometrical point or an ideal geometrical line that I generate or construct. But this ideal object is neither an ideal geometrical point nor an ideal geometrical line in the abovementioned sense. For this ideal object is neither a point in contradistinction to a line, nor a line in contradistinction to a point. As an intermediate between the two, it is in a sense both of them. As the process of its construction shows, this ideal object is nevertheless a possible object; as such, it is like an ideal point and an ideal line existent in the geometrical sense.*

*For a spatial onedimensional line cannot at all arise by these means. Furthermore, from this process no other possibility can arise but to pay attention to the drawing itself. And for this reason no other ability is required which one person has and others may not. This operationalization leads furthermore to an objectivization of precisely that which we actually gain as an ideal object when we only pay attention to the drawing itself, namely that ideal intermediate between point and line.*

*He for whom obtaining this model of time by means of a piece of chalk, a sponge, and a blackboard is not sufficiently precise, can generate it for himself in an absolute and exact way by means of a simple postulate. It involves no contradiction to posit the following: let us assume the dynamic generation of an ideal geometrical line in one motion by means of the dynamic extension of an ideal geometrical point. Such an extension would fix a direction of this extension as well as the direction opposite to it. Since such an extension is contingent, we can also allow the following assumption: let such an extension take place in one motion, so that—at the same time—precisely as much extension arises in one direction as vanishes in the opposite direction. This postulate leads absolutely and exactly to the same result of an ideal geometrical intermediate between point and line, as does the time-model discussed in the text.*

*The ideal object that has the structure of time exists only while I set the piece of chalk and the sponge in motion in the above-mentioned way and continuously keep them in motion; that is, it exists only while there is this sort of motion. If there is no such motion, there is also no ideal object as a model for time.*

*Only the chalk that is being continuously rubbed off belongs to the drawing of my model of time, and not the piece of chalk, or the sponge, or the blackboard. They are only the means for the depiction of this model of time. It can now even be imagined that we have a transparent blackboard, so that I can manage to depict this model of time from the opposite side. It can also be imagined that this blackboard is transparent only in the sense that the chalk being rubbed off is visible, and not the piece of chalk or the sponge. In that case, everyone who is not aware how this motion is produced, must take it for the relative external motion of a chalk-point; everyone must take it as something identical that is in motion across the blackboard and, with reference to this blackboard, as something moving, and vice versa.*

*Yet everyone who is properly informed can take this motion only for what it is: for the constant coming into existence and ceasing to exist of a continually new chalk-point. This point, however, is precisely not something identical in motion across the board and thereby also not something moving against that board. Nor is it the other way around: the blackboard is not moving against the point. It is exactly through this, however, that this motion continuously becomes a sign of the very peculiar motion of that ideal intermediate of point and line, or point and extension. If this very peculiar motion cannot be a relative external motion, this can in a positive sense only mean that it must be an absolute internal motion. It is that point which possesses extension only inside itself, and therewith this complete dynamism of something as motion.*

*What appears in this process is, again and again, just one single point and never a still further point, and thus also never yet another point. And nothing is changed by the fact that this point constantly has extension in itself, through that absolute inner motion of its auto-extension.*

Here is a short summary of Prauss' theory of time:

Inspired by Gerold Prauss, Cord Friebe speaks of time as “extended in a point”, however. I find this an intriguing notion, worthy of closer attention. On the one hand, it seems to capture an important truth. Take my drawing a line on the blackboard. The result is a line of chalk extended in space but with no visible temporality. Only during my action of drawing it is there a perceived time sequence, instantly becoming lost at each and every moment of its proceeding. (Truls Wyller - Kant On Temporal Extension: Embodied, Indexical Idealism)

Fantastic reply thank you. — unintelligiblekai

A pleasure to participate in your thread. The OP stimulated a host of fascinating responses. Appreciate the time and care :sparkle: