Also, please make no mention of deductive arguments since these can only be made in theory with each premise of a deductive argument ultimately being justified through induction for all practical examples.

Also, please make no mention of deductive arguments — forrest-sounds

D'oh.

But "spuriously deductive" is the only gloss of "fallacious" that you could use to plausibly incriminate all of induction.

If not, what form does a good inductive argument take. — forrest-sounds

Sure. But https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Inductive_reasoning

Sure. But https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Inductive_reasoning — bongo fury

I see, so you mean to say that a good inductive argument consists of linking a Wikipedia page.
Jokes, though I will read that page probably helpful at some level.

Haha. Ok, more specifically:

habit/custom — bongo fury

Inductive arguments can not show their conclusion to be true, they can at best raise suspicion about the truth of some claim. — forrest-sounds

They show that their conclusion is probably true (for practical purposes). Of course one may doubt that through sceptical arguments like the problem of induction, but nobody can go through their normal everyday life without acting as if some beliefs were more likely to be true than others, using induction.
This does not apply to most other beliefs “justified” by circular reasoning or some fallacy such as appeal to authority, or ad populum.

Also, please make no mention of deductive arguments since these can only be made in theory with each premise of a deductive argument ultimately being justified through induction for all practical examples. — forrest-sounds

I'm not sure about that. It's possible that mathematical knowledge, for instance, doesn't need to be justified by induction. The same seems also to apply to the truths of logic.

Inductive arguments can not show their conclusion to be true — forrest-sounds

True, inductive reasoning is not deductively valid. But inductive reasoning is a different form from deductive reasoning and has its own standards.

I think there may be two things going on. First, you are assuming a fixed version/goal of "truth" through substantiation (perhaps it is fair to say, proof). This is basically a deductive argument beginning with a theory of truth, about a standard for reasoning based on knowledge. There are other versions such as what is right, and what is appropriate (or felicitous, as Austin says--who would call the singular goal of substantiated truth, the "descriptive fallacy"). The arguments for these even have different criteria, possible outcomes, etc.; one would be a moral argument (we may not agree; I may have to put myself out there as "proof" of my act); and another being an argument about the workings of our lives/concepts. Austin and Wittgenstein use an induction form of argument for a generalized criteria (Wittgenstein calls it the "grammar" of, say, believing, or, Austin's example, excuses). It is based on descriptions of examples ( and contexts) of what the implications are when we say "...". The claim is universal but the "substantiation" is only that you can see the same thing for yourself.

Now that being said, secondly, maybe we can agree that, since the goal may be different, we can not judge inductive reasoning by the bar you presume. Can we simply say that there is better and worse reasoning? That generalizing without examples, taking everything to be like one thing, etc., is just doing a poor job of inductive reasoning?

I'm not sure about that. It's possible that mathematical knowledge, for instance, doesn't need to be justified by induction. The same seems also to apply to the truths of logic. — Amalac

Yes, that's why I stated for all practical examples.

There's always room here for someone who wants to argue that all arguments are fallacious.

Unfortunately.

To my experience, it's kind of a habit of philosophers on online forums to claim that arguments are somehow fallacious in general. This, I suspect, relates to a preference for Logic within philosophical argumentation, which only contextually is apt within certain debates.

For instance, an argumentum ad passiones, or "appeal to emotion", may not belong in a debate about the propositional functions used in Bertrand Russell's "On Denoting", but may not be fallacious in one about something like the systemic elimination of people who have been classified as being "insane".

That aside, there are so many fallacies that I think that it'd difficult for a person to conceptualize an argument that wasn't in violation of one of them. Wikipedia defines fallacies as "reasoning that is logically incorrect, undermines the logical validity of an argument, or is recognized as unsound." Whether or not an argument is logically valid doesn't always tell you as to whether or not it can be considered to be good. I've only taken an introductory Logic course, but, to my understanding, validity merely denotes that there is no possible world where the premises of an argument are considered as true and the conclusion false. It only means that the conclusion follows from the premises. It seems as if this can be the sole determinant of the quality of an argument when general discourse is often too complex for straightforward Logical paradigms to be meaningfully applied. It would be absurd for a person to critique as a speech by Elie Wiesel by suggesting that it does not necessarily follow from either his appeal to human compassion or characterization of the Holocaust as having been catastrophic that genocide is not permissible. You will, however, see people claim that this or that argument is somehow fallacious online on a nearly daily basis.

Addendum: To expostulate upon said example, let us assume that the premises, that human beings should compassionate and the Holocaust was catastrophic, are true, which I should hope would be a safe assumption to make. Within the realm of High Fantasy, it is often the case that the merciless slaughter of entire races, such as orcs, is not only acceptable, but even considered to be noble, which, to me, is indicative of a certain lack of ethical consideration within High Fantasy, but, according to the basic rules of Logic, could be cited as evidence that a speech by Elie Wiesel is fallacious, as there is a possible world where the premises are true and the conclusion false, thereby rendering it to be invalid. I, here, am making a reducto ad absurdum, which, within certain Logical theories or Buddhist methodology isn't always considered as a fallacy, but, were anyone to bring this up in a passing conversation about a speech by Elie Wiesel, people would generally assume that they have made an extraordinary lapse of reason, if not that they were somehow nefarious, and rightfully so. Despite this, within a variegated set of online conversations where Logical reasoning is only so apt, this Wikipedia page seems to be the sole reference as to who it is that is considered to be correct.

It seems to me that the problem of induction is properly mitigated rather than solved. In order for us to even comprehend the problem to begin with, we have to first place a certain level of faith in the workings of the understanding—that we perceive the problem correctly is believed out of faith. Faith in the workings of the understanding however entails to some degree, I suspect, faith in induction itself—since it’s so fundamental to understanding.

They show that their conclusión is probably true (for practical purposes). Of course one may doubt that through sceptical arguments like the problem of induction, but nobody can go through their normal everyday life without acting as if some beliefs were more likely to be true than others, using induction. This does not apply to most other beliefs “justified” by circular reasoning or some fallacy such as appeal to authority, or ad populum. — Amalac

Well thought through. And I agree. The so called "problem of induction" has always seemed like pompous nitpicking.

Now that being said, secondly, maybe we can agree that, since the goal may be different, we can not judge inductive reasoning by the bar you presume. Can we simply say that there is better and worse reasoning? That generalizing without examples, taking everything to be like one thing, etc., is just doing a poor job of inductive reasoning? — Antony Nickles

Your presentation is really clear and well thought out.

Your presentation is really clear and well thought out. — T Clark

As most times, pretty sure I stole most of those arguments, but thanks.

When in fact all arguments are so, that is no argument can substantiate its own conclusion. — forrest-sounds

I'm not sure that is correct. A priori arguments are such that by mere definition of the words and concepts used (in the premise/proposition) that the conclusion is always going to be either true or false with a higher degree of certainty. In everyday common usage or general terms, that would be considered resolution of something using pure objectivity, or pure reason. I know you didn't want us to mention deduction but... .

Lazy because it allows one to dismiss arguments by nature of their form alone, without having to contend with the meaning and purpose of an argument. And dishonest because one does so without ever stating that all arguments are in fact equally poor in this respect. — forrest-sounds

Did you happen to have an example of what you were thinking about when you did the OP? For instance, of course there are all types of induction methods having varying degrees of probability that are very intriguing to parse through. I can appreciate your concern.

Some argue that all deduction is boring in that no new or real novel kinds of knowledge gets realized. Ironically, that's only partially true, hence the need for induction (and other things).