Is what we have read so fr a lie-to-children or Wittgenstein's ladder? Is Socrates engaged in pedagogy, or is this a necessary logical step in the argument? — Banno

The dialogue of Cratylus approaches your question from a particular point of view. Cratylus claims names are natural entities while Socrates argues that they are assigned values. The argument is not rancorous. Cratylus won't be climbing the ladder with Socrates. Pedagogy is dispensed sparingly.

The best and safest hypothesis according to Socrates is the hypothesis of kinds (eidos or Forms). Two “shares in the reality” of Twoness, one in the reality of Oneness. — Fooloso4

I think that perhaps two in "a half and another half are two" do not refer to some form of Twoness of the number two but to two as individuals, each being "a half"?

to acquire clear knowledge ...
[1] either he must learn or discover the truth about these matters,
[2] or if that is impossible, he must take whatever human doctrine is best and hardest to disprove and, embarking upon it as upon a raft, sail upon it through life in the midst of dangers,
[3] unless he can sail upon some stronger vessel, some divine revelation — Phaedo 85c-d

This epistemic approach might appear to match the powers and methods of the three parts of the tripartite soul. The tuning might then be finding the right balance among the three parts, however way Plato might think that possible.

To know a Form, Socrates has already proposed that [2] cannot possibly be sufficient, with only [3] having any chance of success as anamnesis gained through prodding one's own inner soul/mind and not as originating based on samples of individuals hypothetically grouped from the outside world.

when knowledge comes in such a way, it is recollection? What I mean is this: If a man, when he has heard or seen or in any other way perceived a thing, knows not only that thing, but also has a perception of some other thing, the knowledge of which is not the same, but different, are we not right in saying that he recollects the thing of which he has the perception? — Phaedo 73c

I think that perhaps two in "a half and another half are two" do not refer to some form of Twoness of the number two but to two as individuals, each being "a half"? — magritte

Thanks for your contribution. I am not sure I understand you. But based on what I think you are getting at.

It is the unit, the one, that makes counting intelligible. In one sense a half and a half is two, but in another it is one.

But with regard to twoness:

And you would loudly exclaim that you do not know how else each thing can come to be except by sharing in the particular reality in which it shares, and in these cases you do not know of any other cause of becoming two except by sharing in Twoness, and that the things that are to be two must share in this, as that which is to be one must share in Oneness ... (101c-d)

Note the similarity to the quote from 73e.

He is not claiming that Twoness is a thing known. It is an hypothesis.

From my discussion of recollection at 73 :

'But if that doesn't convince you, Simmias, then see whether maybe you agree if you look at it this way. Apparently you doubt whether what is called "learning" is recollection?'

'I don't doubt it,' said Simmias; 'but I do need to undergo just what the argument is about, to be "reminded". Actually, from the way Cebes set about stating it, I do almost recall it and am nearly convinced; but I'd like, none the less, to hear now how you set about stating it yourself.'

'I'll put it this way. We agree, I take it, that if anyone is to be reminded of a thing, he must have known that thing at some time previously.'

'Certainly.'

'Then do we also agree on this point: that whenever knowledge comes to be present in this sort of way, it is recollection?

He goes on to give an example of recollection:

'Well now, you know what happens to lovers, whenever they see a lyre or cloak or anything else their loves are accustomed to use: they recognize the lyre, and they get in their mind, don't they, the form of the boy whose lyre it is? And that is recollection. Likewise, someone seeing Simmias is often reminded of Cebes, and there'd surely be countless other such cases.'(73b-d)

There seems to be no distinction here between recollection and being reminded of something.

Cebes is unaware of the problem and says that he is completely satisfied with Socrates’ account of the deathlessness of the soul and has nothing further to say. (107a)

Simmias says he has some lingering distrust:

I myself have no remaining grounds for doubt after what has been said; nevertheless, in view of the bigness and importance of our subject and my low opinion of human weakness, I am bound still to have some lingering distrust within myself about what we have said. (107b)

Socrates responds:

Not only that, Simmias. What you say is good, but also our very first hypotheses - even if to all of you they’re trustworthy - must nevertheless be looked into for greater surety. And if you sort them out sufficiently, you will, as I think, be following up the argument as much as its possible for human beings to follow it. And should this very thing become sure, you’ll search no further. (107b)

Socrates is telling them that they should not be so ready to accept what is said as the truth. There seems to be a play on a double sense of human weakness, the limits of human argument and Simmias’ ongoing concern that death means our destruction, that we are too weak to endure. In any case, there is a limit we human beings cannot go beyond, and we should not search further. That limit occurs at death.

Socrates leaves it there for us to sort it out. Generation and destruction are each one and together two, but it is by the division of what is one, that is, the cycle of generation and destruction, that they become two. Socrates has identified two causes: mental and physical. Mind arranges or orders things according to their kind or Form. Things are not Forms, they come to be and perish. We can now see the difference between Socrates’ unlearned or ignorant hypothesis and the one that has replaced it. The first used only Forms and could not account for things coming to be and perishing. It was a static model that did not allow for change. But change itself needs an account. The two accounts must be unified, made one, by the good, that is, by an account of why it is best that things are as they are. This has not been done.

The discussion of generation and destruction is guided by two considerations that at first may seem odd to have conjoined: physical causes and number. The overarching question of the dialogue is what will happen to Socrates. The concern is that the unity that is Socrates will be destroyed. In order to address this Socrates divides his unity into a duality, body and soul. It is by this division of one into two that he attempts to demonstrate his unity in death.

According to Cebes’ argument, body and soul are each one and together are two, each separate and distinct. Weaving is an ordering or arrangement. Arrangement or ordering, an activity Socrates attributes to Mind. The act of weaving requires something physically acting on something else that is physical. A disembodied soul cannot be a weaver. Unless the two are one, the man Socrates is cut in two.

Simmias’ account is physical. Body and soul are not separate entities, they are one. A harmony. But harmony is one from many. An attunement is an arrangement. A purely physical account is not adequate either. This is why Socrates initially rejected physical causes but later reintroduced them after the introduction of Mind. Physical things cannot order themselves without Mind.

The problem with Simmias’ account is that if body and soul are one then the destruction of the body is the destruction of the soul. Socrates attempts to separate them in order to save the soul, but can only do so by blurring the distinction between the Form Soul and a soul. If Soul is imperishable it does not follow that Socrates’ soul is. The human soul is átopos, literally, without place, unclassifiable,. It is not a Form and not a physical thing. If there is no distinction between Soul and Socrates’ soul, then it would not be Socrates’ soul that is undying. The fate of Socrates in death is not assured by the fate of Soul. Just as the snow is destroyed at the approach of heat, Socrates’ soul is destroyed at the approach of death, while Snow and Soul remain unchanged Forms.

He turns back to stories that have been told:

We are told that when each person dies, the guardian spirit who was allotted to him in life proceeds to lead him to a certain place, whence those who have been gathered together there must, after being judged, proceed to the underworld with the guide who has been appointed to lead them thither from here.(107e)

The trustworthiness of the story is not questioned. This seems to be because arguments have come to its end, and stories are all that is left. In his last minutes Socrates turns from Hades to the Earth. It is here that he has been all along. (61d)

His tale of the Earth mixes science and myth. The Earth is a sphere in the middle of heaven balanced at rest without support or force. It is very large and we live in only a small portion of it, “like ants or frogs around a swamp”. Many other peoples live in many other similar parts.

Everywhere about the earth there are numerous hollows of many kinds and shapes and sizes into which the water and the mist and the air have gathered. The earth itself is pure and lies in the pure sky where the stars are situated … We, who dwell in the hollows of it, are unaware of this and we think that we live above, on the surface of the earth. It is as if someone who lived deep down in the middle of the ocean thought he was living on its surface. Seeing the sun and the other,heavenly bodies through the water, he would think the sea to be the sky; because he is slow and weak, he has never reached the surface of the sea or risen with his head above the water or come out of the sea to our region here, nor seen how much purer and more beautiful it is than his own region, nor has he ever heard of it from anyone who has seen it.

Our experience is the same: living in a certain hollow of the earth, we believe that we live upon its surface; the air we call the heavens, as if the stars made their way through it; this too is the same: because of our weakness and slowness we are not able to make our way to the upper
limit of the air; if anyone got to this upper limit, if anyone came to it or reached it on wings and his head rose above it, then just as fish on rising from the sea see things in our region, he would see things there and, if his nature could endure to contemplate them, he would know that there is the true heaven, the true light and the true earth, for the earth here, these stones and the whole region, are spoiled and eaten away, just as things in the sea are by the salt water. (109b - 110a)

There are similarities and differences between this story and the allegory of the cave in the Republic. In both stories humans are unaware of their true condition and believe that what they see is the whole of things as they are. The cave images are human artifacts, but what is seen in the hollows is by the nature of our condition.

What the humans say is based on what is seen or experienced. Because of the limits of our experience there are natural limits to our arguments. Myths have no natural limits. In both stories there is an image of an ascent to the truth, a journey from here to There. We have no experience of death and so Socrates’ arguments are not strong enough to transcend that limit. His myths of death, the journey from here to There, are myths about the ascent to truth.

It is only in myth that Socrates can find what is sought in argument: the good. Why it is best that things be as they are. In the myth we find:

The climate is such that they are without disease, and they live much longer than people do here; their eyesight, hearing and intelligence and all such are as superior to ours as air is
superior to water and ether to air in purity; they have groves and temples dedicated to the gods, in which the gods really dwell, and they communicate with them by speech and prophecy and by the sight of them; they see the sun and moon and stars as they are, and in other ways their
happiness is in accord with this. (111 b-c)

But the question of the good of the whole is not complete without the inclusion of human actions:

Such is the nature of these things. When the dead arrive at the place to which each has been led by his guardian spirit, they are first judged as to whether they have led a good and pious life. (113d)

Those who are deemed to have lived an extremely pious life are freed and released from the regions of the earth as from a prison; they make their way up to a pure dwelling place and live on the surface of the earth. Those who have purified themselves sufficiently by philosophy live in the future altogether without a body; they make their way to even more beautiful dwelling places which it is hard to describe clearly, nor do we now have the time to do so. (114c)

Immediately following this story Socrates says:

No sensible man would insist that these things are as I have described them, but I think it is fitting for a man to risk the belief—for the risk is a noble one—that this, or something like this, is true about our souls and their dwelling places … (114d)

Myths do not reveal the truth. And yet Socrates tells them myths. They are not a substitute for arguments, but argument has its limits. Simmias was not fully convinced by Socrates’ arguments. He was no longer distrustful of the arguments, but still has some lingering distrust within himself. (107b) Throughout the dialogue Socrates has referred to myth as a means of self-persuasion. Here again he says that one should “sing incantations to himself, over and over again”(114d)

Crito asks about final instructions. Socrates says they should take care of their own selves.(115b)

Socrates goes into a chamber to bathe. What should we make of this? Why care for his body when the whole time he has been treating it without regard and even with contempt?

Despite all that Socrates has said to convince his friends that what is happening is a good thing, they are distraught:

So we stayed, talking among ourselves, questioning what had been said, and then again
talking of the great misfortune that had befallen us. We all felt as if we had lost a father and would be orphaned for the rest of our lives. (116a-b)

Socrates, on the other hand, did not appear to be troubled at all as he took the cup and drank.


Perhaps the appropriate question is not whether this is a comedy or a tragedy but rather the question of how we choose to persuade ourselves. One might wonder how this can be seen as a comedy. To begin to answer that question we might consider that Socrates himself did not regard his life or its end as a tragedy. This is so not because of what happened but because of how he judges. Argument cannot reveal the good, why it is best that things are as they are. Socrates seems to have persuaded himself and wants to persuade others that what is best is to be persuaded that what is is best.

Being told he could not, as he ironically requested, pour a libation (117b), he says:

“I understand but I suppose I am allowed to, and indeed should, pray to the gods that my emigration from here to There may turn out to be a fortunate one. That’s just what I am praying for - and may it be so!” And with these words he put the cup to his lips and downed it with great readiness and relish. (117c)… these were his last words—"Crito, we owe a cock to Asclepius (118a)

Much has been written about what this means. Asclepius is the god of medicine. This suggests that there has been a cure or recovery. Some interpret this to mean that Socrates has been cured of the disease of life. But he says “we” not “I”.

In the center of the dialogue Phaedo said that they had been “healed” of their distress and readiness to abandon argument. (89a) In other words, Socrates saved them from misologic,about which he said "there is no greater evil than hating arguments". (89d)

There is one other mention of illness. In the beginning when we are told that Plato was ill. We are not told the nature of the illness that kept him away, but we know he recovered. Perhaps he too was cured of misologic. Rather than giving up on philosophy he went on to make the “greatest music”. Misologic is at the center of the problem, framed by Plato’s illness and the offer to Asclepius. And perhaps conquering the greatest evil is in the end a good reason to regard this as a comedy rather than a tragedy.

The Theaetetus, so often taken as an argument for knowledge as justified true belief, ends with no such conclusion. We are left with the same doubt here; not a lack of progress, but the absence of closure. The task left to those present is to continue the discussion.

It was this that caught my eye in your comments on reincarnation, and that had me encouraging you to produce this thread. I find an uncertain Socrates far more agreeable than a dogmatic Socrates.

Thank you for your efforts. I trust the thread was worth your while, perhaps in terms of ordering your understanding, perhaps in terms of addressing the various comments here.

You are right, The Theaetetus, as well as many of the other dialogues, ends in aporia. What is less well known or agreed upon is that there are also aporia in Aristotle. Some recent work addresses this.

In my opinion, and I am not alone, Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle were all zetetic skeptics - driven by the knowledge that they did not know to inquire.

Another thing worth pointing out in the Theaetetus is that there is no mention of recollection. It would be here, in a dialogue devoted to knowledge, that one would expect to find it if it was something he accepted.

I trust the thread was worth your while ... — Banno

It was an enjoyable challenge trying to make sense of the dialogue and putting all the pieces together. No doubt, there are pieces I left out. Perhaps only those who have a fondness for Plato would find my commentary of interest, but in my opinions the details matter. I know that there are some here who admire Plato who did not appreciate what I had to say because it runs counter to their own assumptions. But running counter to assumptions is fundamental to Socrates and Plato.

I do not know if anyone read it but chose to remain silent. I hope so.

Thanks again. It's amusing to see the putative Father of Philosophy engaging in anti-philosophy.

I learned a lot.
The absence of Plato in the discussion is very strange set against the work to make the dialogues a report of what Socrates said. There is something about the distance from what happened that frames the dialogues.

I learned a lot. — Valentinus

I am glad to hear that.

I do not know if anyone read it but chose to remain silent. I hope so. — Fooloso4

I've been following along, and thanks for your patient explication. This thread has taught me to pay more attention to the detail - particularly the objections from the various interlocutors, and the subtlety of some of the distinctions made in the arguments. Also one thing I do commend is your emphasis on interpreting the texts on their own terms and being aware of hidden interpretive agendas. (Although I think I'm probably one of those you have in mind when you say that you challenge my own assumptions, but I'm also confident that if I concentrate hard enough, I wouldn't have too much trouble defending them. )

I wonder if you're familiar with Katja Vogt. She is a contemporary professor of philosophy at Columbia. She's the author of the SEP article on ancient skepticism.

I bought her book, Belief and Truth, on the basis of the abstact on her website -

In Belief and Truth: A Skeptic Reading of Plato, I explore a Socratic intuition about the difference between belief and knowledge. Beliefs, doxai, are deficient cognitive attitudes. In believing something, one accepts some content as true without knowing that it is true; one holds something to be true that could turn out to be false. Since our actions reflect what we hold to be true, holding beliefs is potentially harmful for oneself and others. Accordingly, beliefs are ethically worrisome and even, in the words of Plato’s Socrates, “shameful.” As I argue, this is a serious philosophical proposal. It speaks to intuitions we are likely to share, but it involves a notion of belief that is rather different from contemporary notions. Today, it is a widespread assumption that true beliefs are better than false beliefs, and that some true beliefs (perhaps those that come with justifications) qualify as knowledge. Socratic epistemology offers a genuinely different picture. In aiming for knowledge, one must aim to get rid of beliefs. Knowledge does not entail belief. Belief and knowledge differ in such important ways that they cannot both count as kinds of belief. As long as one does not have knowledge, one should reserve judgment and investigate by thinking through possible ways of seeing things.

although I found it a very hard book to read, in part because it's one of those academic texts where the footnotes seem to make up about two thirds of every other page, and I didn't make a lot of headway with it at the time. I will go back to it.

However, I think there's an underlying tension between scepticism ancient and modern. I think that it's because modern sceptics tend to be scientific sceptics - for many, scepticism implicitly pertains to non-scientific claims, the natural target of which is religion, which is invariably depicted in terms of unjustified belief, whereas those claims that can be tested against empirical evidence can be regarded as justified. That seems the natural faultline in today's culture.

But I think the ancient sceptics were sceptical in a completely different way, that is, they were sceptical of the testimony of the senses. Which means that, in some sense, they are sceptical of the reality of the empirical world. insofar as this is something only ever known by the senses. For instance, Vogt says in the SEP article:

In the Timaeus, Plato argues that an account of the natural world can only be ‘likely’: it is an eikôs logos. Most generally speaking, the idea here is that certain explananda are such that theorizing about them can do no more than mirror their, comparatively speaking deficient, nature. This idea has ancestors in Xenophanes and Parmenides, and it plays a crucial role in the Timaeus (Bryan 2012).

So that might be a form of scepticism, but it's nothing like today's scientific scepticism, I would contend. Likewise, as is well-known, it is thought that Pyrrho of Elis, an important source of ancient scepticism, was influenced by the Buddhist philosophers of Gandhara who taught the 'doctrine of cessation' which was very similar to his 'doctrine of ataraxia' (see Everard Flintoff, Pyrrho and india). But because in today's culture, we identify Buddhism with religion, then it is naturally assumed that it must be a form of belief, and so, must be incompatible with scepticism.

Also, there's another couple of passages in the Phaedo that I would like to revisit, (although I'm finding it difficult to concentrate on it, as I have many other balls in the air right at the moment.) But I will certainly be appending some more questions and comments on the text.

Thanks @Fooloso4 for providing this commentary and replying to comments/questions.

It was an enjoyable challenge trying to make sense of the dialogue and putting all the pieces together. No doubt, there are pieces I left out. Perhaps only those who have a fondness for Plato would find my commentary of interest, but in my opinions the details matter — Fooloso4

I have no particular fondness for Plato - he gives me such a hard time !
You are right, the details matter and, of course, you have left pieces out (otherwise it would be a book !). They possibly contain some less important details...but then again...
I can't help thinking about the issue of 'suicide' which we quickly passed over, here:
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/534770
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/534835
Perhaps it was discussed later and I missed it ?

All in all, it helped me gain a far greater understanding than I had before.
Admittedly, not difficult given my beginner's starting point.

I trust the thread was worth your while, perhaps in terms of ordering your understanding, perhaps in terms of addressing the various comments here. — Banno

I look forward to a dialogue about this dialogue. — Fooloso4

As noted, I have struggled on a few levels: To read the text, analyse and understand it. At the same time as keeping up with the commentary and comments. Also, discovering the whole spectrum of interpretations...
For me, the pace was about as twice as fast as I would have liked.
I will still keep on...and hope this thread does too...

This thread has taught me to pay more attention to the detail - particularly the objections from the various interlocutors, and the subtlety of some of the distinctions made in the arguments. Also one thing I do commend is your emphasis on interpreting the texts on their own terms and being aware of hidden interpretive agendas. — Wayfarer

Likewise. Also, this:

there's another couple of passages in the Phaedro that I would like to revisit, (although I'm finding it difficult to concentrate on it, as I have many other balls in the air right at the moment.) But I will certainly be appending some more questions and comments on the text. — Wayfarer

I have been following the text and audio files as recommended:

http://www.faculty.umb.edu/gary_zabel/Phil_100/Plato_files/310585462-Plato-Phaedo.pdf — Fooloso4

https://librivox.app/book/4421

Different translations.
So, after audio 2 of the 8 files, I decided to list a rough correspondence to the text :

2. ends at 70b-d > ( c. 20 mins)
3. 70d - 78b > pp 16-26 ( 24m)
4. 78b - 84b > 26-34 ( 21m)
5. 84c - 95a > 34-46 (33m)
6. 95a - 102a > 46-54 (17m)
7. 102b - 108c > 54-63 (21m)
8. > final segment (27m)

I hope this encourages any other beginner trying to read or follow/participate in the discussion.

I do not know if anyone read it but chose to remain silent. I hope so. — Fooloso4

I am sure that, given the view count (1.3K) there could well be a few...

Also, as linked to earlier:

Outline of the Dialogue

The Philosopher and Death (59c-69e)
Three Arguments for the Soul’s Immortality (69e-84b)
The Cyclical Argument (70c-72e)
The Argument from Recollection (72e-78b)
The Affinity Argument (78b-84b)
Objections from Simmias and Cebes, and Socrates’ Response (84c-107b)
The Objections (85c-88c)
Interlude on Misology (89b-91c)
Response to Simmias (91e-95a)
Response to Cebes (95a-107b)
Socrates’ Intellectual History (96a-102a)
The Final Argument (102b-107b)
The Myth about the Afterlife (107c-115a)
Socrates’ Death (115a-118a) — IEP article Plato: Phaedo

* the audio files are great and help identify the tones, especially those of humour...
Best not to read in bed - unless suffering from insomnia - they have a hypnotic quality :yawn:

Accordingly, beliefs are ethically worrisome and even, in the words of Plato’s Socrates, “shameful.”

I don't know the context but this seems to be overstating the problem. Belief should be critically examined but where it cannot be replaced by knowledge it is all we have to work with. In the quest for knowledge saying that it is shameful might be a rallying cry but Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle all begin with the examination of opinion and end it aporia; thereby providing knowledge that we do not know.

You are right about their zetetic skepticism being something different from modern skepticism. Modern skepticism, as I understand it, occurs as the result of representational theories of perception. What we see are representations in the mind. We cannot step outside these representations to determine whether things are as we represent them. It also differs from Pyrrhonian skepticism. The goal of zetetic skeptic is not the suspension of judgment. It is an inquiry into what seems best or most likely to be true, while fully aware that what seems to be may not be what is.

I can't help thinking about the issue of 'suicide' which we quickly passed over — Amity

The issue arises because of Socrates' choice to stay in Athens and drink the poison rather than flee. To some this seems like suicide, but it is questionable whether not doing everything you can to save your life amounts to suicide. In the Crito Socrates gives his reasons for his decision to stay.

At the end he does not simply calmly drink the poison, he:

downed it with great readiness and relish.

I don't think this is an indication of suicide but rather his eagerness to find out what happens next, if anything. And, of course, if death is nothingness then he won't find out.


There is also another issue: if being dead is so much better than the prison of life why not escape. Socrates appeals to the gods and our being their servants, but I do not know if there is a better argument to be found in the dialogue.

I will still keep on...and hope this thread does too... — Amity

I am thinking of following up with something more diagrammatic, an overview.

Thanks for more about the issue of 'suicide'. I am still pondering...

I am thinking of following up with something more diagrammatic, an overview. — Fooloso4

I hope this encourages any other beginner trying to read or follow/participate in the discussion.
I do not know if anyone read it but chose to remain silent. I hope so.
— Fooloso4
I am sure that, given the view count (1.3K) there could well be a few... — Amity

Yes, that might be helpful. As you know, I am not a complete 'beginner'. However, every time there's a book discussion I certainly feel like one as I try to navigate the path to understanding.
Would be great to have a World Wide Map. The Hitchhiker's Guide to the Galaxy starring Plato and friends.

If you take this path, then this is where you end up. Great scenery but tough hill to climb.
There's a short cut here...for those less able.
Isn't that what Plato did - catering for 2 types of audience - Arguments v Myths ?
What is the final destination - why - what motivation is there to set out in the first place ?
All types of travellers...

So, any cartographers out there ?
Can you draw a picture of the highly structured overview: 'The Examined Life: Notes on Plato's Phaedo' by Sean Hannan (free pdf) ?

He writes in sections and subsections.
For example:
1. Background
a. to f.
2. The Final Conversation Begins (57a- 62e )
a. Setting the Stage
i. to vii.
b. The Highest Art
i. to v.
Etc, etc...

A sample from page 1.

1. Background
a. The Phaedo tells the story of Socrates’ final days. Taking place after the events
depicted in the Euthyphro, Apology, and Crito, this dialogue serves as his swansong.
b. Whereas the Apology had a fairly straightforward structure, consisting mainly of
Socrates’ monologues to the citizens of Athens (with a bit of back-and-forth with
Meletus thrown in), the Phaedo is a full-blown dialogue. In fact, it operates as a
dialogue on multiple levels. First we have the framing dialogue, which consists of the
eponymous main character Phaedo’s account of Socrates’ final words, which he gives
to Echecrates and others on his way home from Athens. Then we have the dialogue
recounted by Phaedo, which takes place between Socrates and those who were with
him in his final hours.
c. First, let’s take a closer look at the framing dialogue. Phaedo (the character) is on his
way back from Athens after attending the trial and execution of Socrates. As he
approaches his hometown of Elis in the Peloponnese, he runs into a group of
Pythagoreans, the most vocal of which is Echecrates. These men are dubbed
‘Pythagoreans’ because they follow the teachings of Pythagoras. While most of us are
familiar with his theorem, Pythagoras had much more to say on the topics of
philosophy and mathematics. For our purposes here, we should only note these
Pythagoreans would’ve been especially open to the mathematical examples Phaedo
tells them Socrates made use of in his final conversation—e.g., the difference
between odd and even numbers, etc.
d. We shouldn’t glide past this framing dialogue too swiftly, although it can be easy to
forget it’s there. The fact that Phaedo runs into Pythagoreans is itself potentially
meaningful. It could, among other things, suggest that the version of Socrates’ ideas
he’s sharing with them has already been re-shaped to suit their interests...
— Sean Hannan: Notes on Plato's Phaedo

I think @Fooloso4 you have set yourself another challenge - I look forward to whatever draws people in...or connects the dots :cool:

No sensible man would insist that these things are as I have described them, but I think it is fitting for a man to risk the belief—for the risk is a noble one—that this, or something like this, is true about our souls and their dwelling places … (114d) — Fooloso4

I think you are using the wrong translation.

Socrates says:
“… when death attacks the human being, the mortal part of him dies, it seems, whereas the immortal part departs intact and undestroyed, and is gone, having retreated from death […] And so, more surely than anything, Cebes, soul is immortal and imperishable, and all our souls really will exist in Hades” 106e -107a

Cebes replies :
“For my part, Socrates, I’ve nothing else to say against this, nor can I doubt the arguments in any way”. 107a

Simmias agrees, but still has some doubts:
“… I’m compelled still to keep some doubt in my mind about what has been said” 107b

Socrates has the final word:
“As it is, however, since the soul is evidently immortal, it could have no means of safety or of escaping evils, other than becoming both as good and as wise as possible”

Concerning the myth he tells of Hades, Socrates says:
“… since the soul turns out to be immortal, I think that for someone who believes this to be so it is both fitting and worth the risk – for fair is the risk – to insist that either what I have said or something like it is true concerning our souls and their dwelling places” 114d

For some strange reason you keep leaving out "However, since the soul turns out to be immortal".

Conclusion: Socrates does not doubt the immortality of the soul or its journey to Hades.

Here's another translation:

“Now it would not be fitting for a man of sense to maintain that all this is just as I have described it, but that this or something like it is true concerning our souls and their abodes, since the soul is shown to be immortal, I think he may properly and worthily venture to believe; for the venture is well worth while"

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=plat.+phaedo+114d


μὲν οὖν ταῦτα διισχυρίσασθαι οὕτως ἔχειν ὡς ἐγὼ διελήλυθα, οὐ πρέπει νοῦν ἔχοντι ἀνδρί: ὅτι μέντοι ἢ ταῦτ᾽ ἐστὶν ἢ τοιαῦτ᾽ ἄττα περὶ τὰς ψυχὰς ἡμῶν καὶ τὰς οἰκήσεις, ἐπείπερ ἀθάνατόν γε ἡ ψυχὴ φαίνεται οὖσα, τοῦτο καὶ πρέπειν μοι δοκεῖ καὶ ἄξιον κινδυνεῦσαι οἰομένῳ οὕτως ἔχειν—καλὸς γὰρ ὁ κίνδυνος—καὶ χρὴ τὰ τοιαῦτα ὥσπερ ἐπᾴδειν ἑαυτῷ, διὸ δὴ ἔγωγε καὶ πάλαι μηκύνω τὸν μῦθον. ἀλλὰ τούτων δὴ ἕνεκα θαρρεῖν χρὴ περὶ τῇ ἑαυτοῦ ψυχῇ

You neglect to include the following from this translation:

and he ought to repeat such things to himself as if they were magic charms

Whether or not the soul has been shown to be immortal is a basic question of my essay. I show how and why each of the arguments fail. It is because the arguments fail that he used myths to persuade, charms and incantations.

Note how many of the translations you cite include the idea that it is worth the risk to believe. If something has been proven to be true there is no reason to risk believing it is true.

I do not know if anyone read it but chose to remain silent. I hope so. — Fooloso4

I followed the text, and only your commentary on it, for which I offer respect. Silently.

Thank you. I am familiar with some of the secondary literature but chose to read the dialogue itself by itself without recourse to it. My intention was in part to demonstrate how a Platonic dialogue can be read; or at least one way it can be read.

Whether or not the soul has been shown to be immortal is a basic question of my essay. — Fooloso4

That's precisely why it doesn't seem right to leave out statements like "since the soul is shown to be immortal" from the translation unless you have a good reason or explanation for it, which you don't seem to have.

Why does the statement "the soul is shown to be immortal" bother you so much as to exclude it from the translation? Freudian slip, perhaps? And it isn't for the first time that you "misread" the text.

Socrates has already shown at 72a - 73a why it is logical to believe in the immortality of soul and rebirth.

Socrates says:
"We agree in this way too that living people have come to be from the dead no less than dead people from the living" 72a

Cebes agrees:
"... and in my opinion what you're saying is completely true" 72d

To which Socrates responds:
"I think that is exactly how it is" 72d

Simmias continues to doubt:
"But Cebes, what are the proofs for this?" 73a

etc.

Obviously, Socrates has no hard proof, but he has presented convincing arguments which are accepted by Cebes while Simmias is still doubting. And even Simmias in the end is nearly fully convinced.

On the whole, what the dialogue is showing is that the philosopher should accept a belief only after rationally examining and analyzing it. That's the only way to acquire knowledge instead of relying on opinion or belief. But some will never be totally convinced. That is all. There is absolutely no need to read too much into the text.

That's precisely why it doesn't seem right to leave out statements like "since the soul is shown to be immortal" from the translation unless you have a good reason or explanation for it, which you don't seem to have. — Apollodorus

Read it in context. The myth is about the soul's immortality. It is followed by the statement above calling the truth of the myth into question. Once again, I do not include it because he did not show the soul's immortality. To repeat that the soul is immortal is to sing the incantation.

Socrates has already shown at 72a - 73a why it is logical to believe in the immortality of soul and rebirth. — Apollodorus

You have not bothered to read what I said about that argument. It does not show that it is logical, but you have to follow the argument to see that. I did. A statement is not an argument.

Obviously, Socrates has no hard proof, but he has presented convincing arguments which are accepted by Cebes while Simmias is still doubting. And even Simmias in the end is nearly fully convinced. — Apollodorus

Yes, Cebes accepts it. He accepts everything Socrates says, even when it should be clear to a thoughtful reader that he should not. In fact, Socrates himself makes it clear that he should not. Both Cebes and Simmias are followers of Pythagoras. They come into the discussion believing in the immortality of the soul. The fact that at the end Simmias is less certain does not show that the arguments convinced him, just the opposite.

On the whole, what the dialogue is showing is that the philosopher should accept a belief only after rationally examining and analyzing it. — Apollodorus

Then why the need for myth? Again, all of this is discussed.

That's the only way to acquire knowledge instead of relying on opinion or belief. — Apollodorus

But in the end all they have is opinion and belief. They do not have knowledge of the fate of the soul.

There is absolutely no need to read too much into the text. — Apollodorus

It is not reading into the text, which was something you were quite anxious to do. It is carefully reading the text. But clearly you think there is no need to read the text at all.

Once again, I do not include it because he did not show the soul's immortality. — Fooloso4

Your approach is odd. It's normal to bring something personal to interpretation, but it's not normal to edit a work based on your views.

But in the end all they have is opinion and belief. They do not have knowledge of the fate of the soul. — Fooloso4

They do have an account of the fate of the soul which Cebes agrees with and even Socrates says that it may not be exactly like that but it's worth insisting that either the described situation or something similar is true.

Nowhere does he reject the account. He concludes with the remark:

"Now as for you, Simmias, Cebes and you others, you will each make the journey [to Hades] some time hereafter" 115a

Why would Socrates conclude with that remark if he didn't believe in his own account?

Read the essay.

Then why the need for myth? Again, all of this is discussed. — Fooloso4

Not "discussed", more like misinterpreted.

Plato is using mythos and logos but nowhere does he suggest that one should be reduced to the other.

Socrates’ account of Hades is simply given to complete his interlocutors’ understanding of the issue and to contrast it with Aeschylus’ Telephus:

“So it turns out that the journey is not as Aeschylus’ Telephus says. He says that a straightforward “path” leads to Hades, whereas it seems to me to be neither straightforward nor single …” 108a

Very clear and it requires no reading into whatsoever, unless you want to put a spin on it.

and he ought to repeat such things to himself as if they were magic charms — Fooloso4

Why do you think this undermines the assertion of the immortality of the soul? Soon afterwards, Socrates says a man ‘should be in good cheer’ about his life, if he ‘has rejected the pleasures and ornaments of the body, thinking they are alien to him and more likely to do him harm than good’ (114e). And then exhorts Crito to follow his instructions carefully, so that he too might enjoy a similar fate.

Could it not be the case that the exhortation to ‘repeat such things to himself’ is so as not to loose sight of the importance of the ‘care of the soul’? (Perhaps even as a mantra.) I find that a much more cohesive explanation, than the idea that Socrates (and Plato) are covertly signalling doubt about the immortality of the soul.

Could it not be the case that the exhortation to ‘repeat such things to himself’ is so as not to loose sight of the importance of the ‘care of the soul’? I find that a much more cohesive explanation, than the idea that Socrates (and Plato) are covertly signalling doubt about the immortality of the soul. — Wayfarer

Absolutely. This is also suggested by Simmias' habit of forgetting things.

I can understand that @Fooloso4 is an atheist and all that, but his "interpretation" is simply an unacceptable farce.

Why do you think this undermines the assertion of the immortality of the soul? — Wayfarer

I don't. It is the arguments that fail. In the absence of reason he uses myths and charms as a means of persuasion.

Could it not be the case that the exhortation to ‘repeat such things to himself’ is so as not to loose sight of the importance of the ‘care of the soul’? — Wayfarer

But it is in life that he exhorts them to care for their soul. No one knows what happens in death.

I find that a much more cohesive explanation, than the idea that Socrates (and Plato) are covertly signalling doubt about the immortality of the soul. — Wayfarer

We need to follow the arguments are draw conclusions or be persuaded by charms or incantations.



.

My view is that many current interpretations of Plato intentionally deprecate the religious aspects of his philosophy, as incompatible with the secular outlook of modern culture. Platonism's absorption into Christianity hasn't helped there, because secular critics of Christianity can easily dispose of the baby with the theological bathwater.

That said, I'm sure Plato is determinedly NOT religious in a Christian, 'God fearing' sense, as 'a person of faith'. I think he would utterly scorn such an attitude. He was, as has been correctly stated, enquiring after knowledge and was contemptuous of mere belief. But the kind of knowledge he sought is demonstrably nearer to a kind of spiritual illumination than to today's scientific naturalism, even though his (and Aristotle's) philosophy were the precursors of it.

We need to follow the arguments are draw conclusions or be persuaded by charms or incantations. — Fooloso4

Had it ever occurred to you that you may not have understood the arguments?