there a moral obligation to contribute to organizations working to alleviate poverty until doing so involves sacrificing something of comparable moral significance. — owain

While I agree that the stated goal is noble, his prescription is ineffective towards reaching it. Those resources, instead of being contributed, can also be invested which will likely provide a greater return at a later date which can then be used to help charitable organizations. If we just agreed to live subsistence-level existences and donate everything past that sure we'd contribute some to charity, but we'd be able to contribute a lot more if that wealth was allowed to vest over time.

EDIT: I'd also suspect that those who are able to make and maintain finances and cash flows would be much better equipped to help charities and non-profits actually raise funds in the real world.

However I do think it is counter-intuitive that it is morally required to treat strangers on the other side of the planet the same way as you would treat your family. — owain

It is also patently wrong. It just makes a mockery of family: your mom and dad and siblings should be no more special to you than some stranger half-way around the world. Who are they to tell you that (unless you've had abusive parents)? I love my parents and I owe them.

Don't make ridiculous demands of people.

Singer would say that buying a birthday present for your child is immoral, because a birthday is not of comparable moral significance. — owain

I feel terrible for his kid now.

However I do not think it is immoral to buy your child a birthday present. — owain

Good, it's not. Provide for your family, make your children happy sometimes. These are good things. Don't let other people tell you otherwise.

One writer said I have felt helpful for in connection with thinking about the concern for family in relation to the universal is Edward O Wilson, a sociolobiologist. He introduced the idea of an expanding circle. This idea is that we begin from the concern for ourselves and family in our consideration of welfare and gradually move outwards to wider spheres, to meet the needs of others. I find that his argument seems to make sense in addressing the tension and the needs of our family and immediate circle of friends in relation to the larger scope of humanity.

Personally, one difficulty which I see if people are too insular in focusing on their own family is what happens to the individuals who have no family to turn to or support them? That is how I see the link between our obligations to organisations which address poverty. I don't know if my answer is of any use to you, but, hopefully, you will get lots of responses.

"there a moral obligation to contribute to organizations working to alleviate poverty until doing so involves sacrificing something of comparable moral significance."

Owain, this is essentially the Principle of Utility; the greatest happiness of the greatest number. Faced with a moral choice, you have to decide: what should I do, to guarantee the best possible outcome for the greatest number of people? Which outcome is the least of all evils?

Unfortunately, this principle cannot give you concrete answers to the specific moral difficulties which arise in your life, because only you can evaluate the outcomes of your actions. Don't waste your time phoning a talkback line; only YOU can evaluate the options.

There was a guy from Nazareth, a homeless Palestinian fundamentalist, who preached "Do as you would be done by". If you follow this guy and his teaching to its logical conclusion, you must treat familes from the other end of the planet the same way you would treat your own.

thank you very much this was great help.

Thanks, very interesting idea.

that you very much for your help.

One writer said I have felt helpful for in connection with thinking about the concern for family in relation to the universal is Edward O Wilson, a sociolobiologist. He introduced the idea of an expanding circle. — Jack Cummins

I first heard that from Justice Scalia (he probably stole if from Wilson). Anyway, as I have oft opined, there is frequently the case where that which is (ostensibly) further out actually presents less of a threat and more of a benefit than that which is (ostensibly) closer in. An element of biodiversity a thousand miles away from me, like a snail darter, for example, is probably better for me and mine, and poses no threat, than is, say, a human being that wants to drain the snail darter's water and build a McMansion there.

This whole idea that we must support a human because, well, because he's human, is BS. For all the flowery, touchy-feely language that we surround this issue with, let me cut to the chase and tell you what the quiet part is: "I won't object to the shit you're doing as long as you look the other way while I do it too."