Drive by philosophy?

Challenging anti-Ariellean sentiments, pending refutation.
Goes way back, to 1078 I think, hence why I posted it in this group.
Take it with a smile. ;) Or not.

2. Ariel would be grrreater if not just fictional — jorndoe

What's the basis for this? Is a real detective greater than Sherlock Holmes? I think not! Is existence not more so a limitation and an impediment?

What's the basis for this? Is a real detective greater than Sherlock Holmes? I think not! Is existence not more so a limitation and an impediment? — unenlightened

She does exist, though, at least. (Check link in opening post.)

Venture into a seaside grotto, where you’ll find Ariel amongst some of her treasures. She has gadgets and gizmos aplenty, and she’s always happy to make new friends – especially human ones!

^{Source: Meet Ariel at Her Grotto}

Surely real is grrreater than fictional. For example, it means she can also assert her grrreatness herself, independently of human fiction writers.

_{(PS, should this have been posted elsewhere?)} :D

Challenging anti-Ariellean sentiments, pending refutation.
Goes way back, to 1078 I think, hence why I posted it in this group.
Take it with a smile. ;) Or not. — jorndoe

I would take it with a smile if I got the joke. I don't even know who you're shooting at.

To insert some Hegel here, we can say that an essence is both limited, and finite. It is limited in the sense of physical constrains, but also finite in that it isn't everything, and begins and ends. The former is an other relation, and the latter a self-relation.

Say for instance that we want to say that Sherlock Holmes can fly. We can achieve this in one of two ways. We can either change his physical circumstances, or we have to change the thing that he is. We can put him on a plane in modern times, or in some sense his very being must be altered. When we change him to be able to fly, then his limitations become different. No matter where we put Sherlock Holmes, he cannot fly unaided, survive in space, or something like that because of the thing he is. None of that it included in his identity -- and it is this that determines his physical limitations.

So... I would suggest the obvious, that "greatest" here has to just be an evaluation, and can't be a quantifiable difference in affectiveness or potency, or ability, as the capabilities of a thing are implied in its very essence. Existence isn't a predicate.

I do believe jorndoe is riffing off of St Anslem's proof of God.

Now that said... weirdo reclusive defiant hoarder with only animal friends with no consideration at all whatsoever for others. Isn't tricked or anything, seeks out, and signs a contract in plain english knows what she's in for, doesn't give a shit about talking to her prince at all enough to think of writing a note... and then is unwilling to deal with the consequences of any of her actions, and just gets saved from them by her dad and boy friend...

But is he doing so with any degree of seriousness? If not, this should not be posted in the philosophy of religion section.

Damn right.

I would suggest the obvious, that "greatest" "grrreatest" here has to just be an evaluation, and can't be a quantifiable difference in affectiveness or potency, or ability, as the capabilities of a thing are implied in its very essence. — Wosret

Just pointing out the subtle difference here. :)

Existence isn't a predicate. — Wosret

OK OK, I concede. (Logicing, reification, predicate ontologization, ...)
Unless there are any defenders?

Ariel is still grrreat though. And you can meet her, too.

Surely real is grrreater than fictional. — jorndoe

That Ruth is stranger than Richard is itself a happy fantasy. No! Fiction wins every time, and on every measure. It is more potent, more satisfying, more congenial, more complete and more consistent. You have been deceived by fake news. And there is the proof of it.

That Ruth is stranger than Richard is itself a happy fantasy. No! Fiction wins every time, and on every measure. It is more potent, more satisfying, more congenial, more complete and more consistent. You have been deceived by fake news. And there is the proof of it. — unenlightened

Hrmph. Ariel might slap you for reducing her to animated fiction if she weren't so grrreat.

You're going to have to expand on this "grrreat" concept.

Right, it's just another ontological argument.

1 defines and names Ariel — what's meant by Ariel here — quiddity (definitions are often demanded in arguments).
2 gives a partial metric on grrreater, so that Ariel also can assert (her grrreatness) herself, independently of human fiction writers, self-aware sentient alive, perhaps even has "free will" (though a bit circular here).
3 then follows from 1 and 2 by reductio ad absurdum.

Roughly the usual format of ontological arguments.
Would proponents of Anselm also have to accept Ariel (or vice versa)?

Forgot:
I'm using "fictional" and "real" as contrasts here.
And fictions also exist, they're just not real.
Sorry for any confuzzlement.

She only can't speak because of a magic spell, not because she's fictional. That's like saying that a hypothetical 100 pound weight is actually weightless because it isn't real.

Or worse yet, that there isn't actually any different at all between Ariel before and after she is muted.

To further expand, what's implied in the way you're talking is that Ariel is really thoughts in people's head, pictures, pixels on screens, words on pages, recorded sound vibrations by people pretending to be her and such, and then you're equivocating this with what Ariel actually is supposed to be.

There's no criterion for what 'maximally great' means in respect of fictitious creatures. There's no way of adjudicating what 'maximally great' might be. (Mermaid beauty contest? Who would be called on to judge?) The fact that this thought experiment could be mistaken for something meaningful, is what's meaningful.

1. define Ariel as a maximally grrreat mermaid
2. Ariel would be grrreater if not just fictional

Premise 2 contradicts the definition of Ariel. If Ariel is maximally grrreat then she cannot possibly be made grrreater. Taking this into account, we can conclude that it is therefore impossible for Ariel to ever become non-fictional, or premise 1 is somehow false.

Let me take a different approach:

1 Quixflooper is defined as maximally zanquacious

2 Quixflooper would be more zanquacious if not just gonksploosh

By defining Quixflooper as less zanquacious due to being Gonksploosh in premise 2, you have either contradicted the definition of quixflooper as maximally zanquacious from premise 1, or it is actually impossible for quixflooper to be more zanquacious (by being non-gonksploosh), and here "more zanquacious" refers to some hypothetical impossibility because Quixflooper cannot possibly be non-gonksploosh.

1 theological horse is defined as maximally dead
2 theological horse would be more dead if not just fiction

Therefore, theological horse cannot be non-fiction? Seems like it follows to me...

1. define Ariel as a maximally grrreat mermaid
2. Ariel would be grrreater if not just fictional
3. therefore Ariel must be real, since otherwise 1 is contradicted — jorndoe

1. Ariel is the maximally great mermaid
2. If Ariel does not exist then Ariel is not the maximally great mermaid
Therefore,
3. Ariel exists

A clearer rendition follows:

1. Ariel is the maximally great mermaid
2. If Ariel is the maximally great mermaid then Ariel exists
Therefore,
3. Ariel exists

Perfect! Even Bertrand Russel gave his seal of approval exclaiming "Great God in Boots!—the ontological argument is sound!"

However...

1. X is a maximally great argument that proves Ariel doesn't exist
2. If X is a maximally great argument that proves Ariel doesn't exist then X exists
Therefore,
3. X exists
4. If X exists then Ariel doesn't exist
Therefore,
5. Ariel doesn't exist

To further expand, what's implied in the way you're talking is that Ariel is really thoughts in people's head, pictures, pixels on screens, words on pages, recorded sound vibrations by people pretending to be her and such, and then you're equivocating this with what Ariel actually is supposed to be. — Wosret

That is all that Ariel is and that is all the Wosret is.

Seems pervy to choose a cartoon mermaid as the example here. I'd suggest gay Peter instead.

Ariel just wants to be part of your world

The wosret is many things.

The wosret is the sadness that lingers in an empty field that was just previously a trailer park but for the tornado that cleared it of all struggling life.

There's no way of adjudicating what 'maximally great' might be. (Mermaid beauty contest? Who would be called on to judge?) — Wayfarer

Why? Cartoon Donald Trump, of course.

Someone suggested that my original formulation may imply both real and fictional, which (in the use here) contradicts.

So, I tried this alternative:

1. define Ariel as a maximally grrreat mermaid
2. a real mermaid is grrreater than a fictional mermaid
3. therefore Ariel must be real, since otherwise 1 is contradicted

Here 2 gives a partial metric on grrreatness, where a real mermaid is independent, self-aware, sentient, alive, which a fictional mermaid is not.

Antinatalists not included; they'll just say that independent self-aware sentient alive is bad. :)

a hypothetical 100 pound weight is actually weightless because it isn't real — Wosret

2 Quixflooper would be more zanquacious if not just gonksploosh — VagabondSpectre

:D You guys crack me up. Love these posts (whether intended as funny or not).

There's no criterion for what 'maximally great grrreat' means in respect of fictitious creatures. There's no way of adjudicating what 'maximally great grrreat' might be. (Mermaid beauty contest? Who would be called on to judge?) — Wayfarer

The intent here was a metric on grrreatness that spans fictional and real.
Moreover, so that grrreatness(real) > grrreatness(fictional).

Here 2 gives a partial metric on grrreatness, where a real mermaid is independent, self-aware, sentient, alive, which a fictional mermaid is not. — jorndoe

Ariel does have all of those attributes. She's fictionally independent, fictionally self-aware, fictionally alive. An empirical concept, and an ideal/imaginary one are not distinct in some attributable way that bares on the concepts themselves, that's why we have to go out and look for things.

You're just equivocating between two different concepts of "Ariel".