Let's start with this: for the purposes of your discussion, what do you say metaphysics is?

That's already a difficult question, with different people taking metaphysics to mean different things.

As I understand it metaphysics is the study of the most general features of the world and it essentially involves experience and language. Experience, obviously, otherwise we'd not be typing anything. And language because we need to express our thoughts in some manner in discussions of this kind.

I'd put my neck out and say that a good deal - but by no means not all - of metaphysics is a priori, that is, we need not go to the world and do empirical experiments about it, though we are not prevented from doing so, of course. So it is largely conceptual.

We just need our concepts and the world. So issues like whether God exists or not don't require much empirical experiments, nor do experiments tell us if the world is fundamentally mental or non-mental. For these we must rely on arguments that articulate our intuitions.

That's my approximation of metaphysics.

As I understand it metaphysics is the study of the most general features of the world — Manuel

Which, as you might say, is "already a difficult question." Because there are no features in the world, general or otherwise. In perception, sure. But the real problem lies with the general. What is a general anything? Ans.: why just no thing at all, but an idea about some things.

And off to the races. It's not-so-easy to have a sound discussion when it's ground has no substance. But as discussion of ideas, why not? But then how do you get back to the world?

I know none of this is helpful, but it does leave the problem of definition. But I would have you say not what metaphysics is, because that is problematic, and as well there are more substantial definitions, but nothing remotely like you've described. Instead, you decide. After all, your discussion. And when you've said, then the rest of us can pick at it, making it strong if it's any good.

As to analysis of language to solve problems, I do not even think analysis is usually necessary. All that is necessary, at least at first, is for people to have a decent handle on understanding the words they're using, and then the ideas they're creating with them. That alone solves most problems. And what's left might even be genuinely interesting.

I know none of this is helpful, but it does leave the problem of definition. But I would have you say not what metaphysics is, because that is problematic, and as well there are more substantial definitions, but nothing remotely like you've described. Instead, you decide. After all, your discussion. And when you've said, then the rest of us can pick at it, making it strong if it's any good. — tim wood

I see your point and it is valid to a large extent. Let me see if I can work around the definition issue by offering example of topics which are considered to pertain to metaphysics:

The ground of existence: is it non-mental, mental, neutral and so on.
The nature of the self: do they exist, if so, do they exist apart from the body.
Free will: Do we have it or don't we? Are we determined by causal forces or do we "interrupt" them in an act of freedom
Identity: Do objects have an identity or do we give them identity entirely? If so do we pick out the identity of object by its physical characteristics or by mental continuity?
Causality: Does it exist or should we speak of habits or tendencies in nature?
The nature of reality: Do we access it directly or are we stuck with appearances?

And so on. Honestly, I think it would be best if people take metaphysics to mean whatever they think they understand it to mean when they think of the word, minus New Age interpretations. Because today, I think it is basically impossible to speak of metaphysics without extremely substantial epistemological input.

So the best I can do is to say metaphysics is what we call a certain series of questions that fall under that name. So are the topics I named substantial or are they a problem of us using words incorrectly?

I will be honest and admit that the 'another poster' is he whom this present member is in the habit of addressing with the perpendicular pronoun.

First, a bit of weaselling out of my provocation. It's not so much that there are no metaphysical issues, as that the problems we call metaphysical are characterised by conceptual confusions, and hence the path to dealign with them is in conceptual analysis with an eye to untying the knot of confusion. This to avoid the prejudice that such analysis belittles philosophical issues by treating them as just word puzzles. Yes, it treats them as word puzzles, but our words are directly in touch with what is true and with the world; so drop the just.

This thread must run on multiple levels. At the bottom it might appear to be a thread about the mind-body problem, but it's other purpose is to discuss the right way to do metaphysics. Is that a problem? Can the very same thread be about two different things?

I don't see any issues with that. indeed, that's rather the approach we might take to the mind-body problem. We can talk of various neurones firing in such a way that a signal is sent down one's spine, stimulating the muscles in such a way that they variously contract so that the shoulder and elbow move... and we can talk about deciding to move one's arm, and the arm moving.

And here we have two different ways of talking about the very same thing.

And why not? Once you become aware that it happens, you might find further examples elsewhere. Try it for yourself.

SO the question arrises, yes, OK, but which is it really - neurones or intent?

And that might be the metaphysical knot - the view that one description must have primacy.

And the strategy, the way of doing metaphysics, would be to probe deeply into any alternative solution to see if it does reduce mind to matter, or matter to mind.

So there's a start.

The discussion has to be related to Aristotelian metaphysics in some way. That’s where I found Edward Feser’s writing useful. Yes, he’s probably a stuffy reactionary, but being a neo-Thomist, his discussions of metaphysics are informed by the traditional terminology and concepts. It helps to provide a common set of definitions which are very hard to come by in this topic.

Allied with that, in my opinion, is the necessity of understanding the question in terms of the history of ideas - of the role of the medievals and the transition to modernity, the changes in the background assumptions that underlie it, and so on.

The discussion has to be related to Aristotelian metaphysics in some way — Wayfarer

Why?

For the reasons I gave - that ‘metaphysics’ was devised in respect of Aristotle, and it has a meaning in that context. Which is not to say ‘Aristotle was right!’ But to give the discussion a focus and a set of common definitions. Otherwise it’s like nailing jello to the wall.

I was going to offer this blog post by Feser as a neo-Thomist, neo-Scholastic defence of metaphysics.

SO the question arrises, yes, OK, but which is it really - neurones or intent?

And that might be the metaphysical knot - the view that one description must have primacy.

And the strategy, the way of doing metaphysics, would be to probe deeply into any alternative solution to see if it does reduce mind to matter, or matter to mind.

So there's a start. — Banno

They both play a role. I think the problem here is to ask how do neurons relate to a willed action of raising my arm. I can hit my shoulder at a particular angle and my arm will raise. I can also move it. I don't doubt that neurons play a very big role here, and a puzzling one at that.

As to what really is going on, is suggested by what you yourself said: it depends on what aspect of the world you want to analyze. Do you want to speak of manifest reality where people raise there arms to hail a cab? Then I think it makes sense to speak of will.

Do you want to talk about how this is realized in the body? Then you can speak of neurons and physiology.

I think that mind is molded matter. So I'd take that question as meaning how does some matter, my arm, reduces to another piece of matter, my mind or vice versa. Unless you have a specific meaning for the word mind which would be different. Then we can talk about that. I think the terms experiential for mind and non-experiential for what we usually call body, is potentially less confusing.

But maybe not.

And you're right, my mistake, I try to avoid using "just" - it's very misleading.

I'm not keen. It would tie us to a preconception of what metaphysics is, unnecessarily.

But you go for it, I'll just watch.

...manifest reality... — Manuel

So what's that, then? A clear and obvious reality? A reality that is taken for granted, or is at hand, perhaps?

If we drop the word "manifest", what would change? There would presumably still be taxies. I don't see that we need "manifest reality" in order to will one's arm to move to hail a cab. The wording just doesn't obviously help.

...another piece of matter, my mind... — Manuel

But your mind does not have a mass. So it is not a form of matter.

I try to avoid using "just" — Manuel

It's a good indicator of something fishy going on.

This topic was prompted by another poster: to state it simply are there legitimate metaphysical questions as opposed to problems related to language use?
That is, is the long history of metaphysics one in which, by analysis of language use alone, we may dissolve such problems? — Manuel

It's not so much that there are no metaphysical issues, as that the problems we call metaphysical are characterised by conceptual confusions, and hence the path to dealing with them is in conceptual analysis with an eye to untying the knot of confusion — Banno

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/544066

I try to avoid using "just"
— Manuel

It's a good indicator of something fishy going on. — Banno

That reminded me of Daniel Dennet's 'surely':

The “Surely” Klaxon

A “Klaxon” is a loud, electric horn—such as a car horn—an urgent warning. In this point, Dennett asks us to treat the word “surely” as a rhetorical warning sign that an author of an argumentative essay has stated an “ill-examined ‘truism’” without offering sufficient reason or evidence, hoping the reader will quickly agree and move on. While this is not always the case, writes Dennett, such verbiage often signals a weak point in an argument, since these words would not be necessary if the author, and reader, really could be “sure.” — Dennett: seven tools for critical thinking

Just saying...

it's other purpose is to discuss the right way to do metaphysics — Banno

Is there a 'right' way to 'do' metaphysics?
Is there an easy or a hard way...a 'just right' way..
Superficial or deep and wide-ranging...
https://www.wikihow.com/Study-Metaphysics
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/metaphysics/
What kind of metaphysics...
An SEP search - 1290 documents.
Feminist, Arab & Islamic, Chinese, Aristotle...

I have already mentioned it in the thread from which the discussion about this emerged, but I think that it is relevant to your discussion too. I read A J Ayer's book, ' Language, Truth and Logic' recently and it points to the way in which it is not possible to speak of metaphysics in the way in which we talk about the facts about the empirical world. The author does not dismiss a priori knowledge, but does suggest that it is often used in ways which create tautologies.

Ayer argues that metaphysics is about speculation, and that is its limitation. He suggests that he is not trying to say that people should not make speculations, or be discouraged from having certain beliefs, such as believing in God, but that they present difficulties in arguing for them as metaphysical realities because they cannot be spoken of as definite facts. I think that his argument does come into play in the whole process of asking metaphysical questions.

"All I ask is for two things: 1) what metaphysical problems do you think can be resolved by analyzing our language and 2) which metaphysical questions are actually substantive?"

I have a few worries about the challenge and here is one of them:

It looks like a false dichotomy. A metaphysical problem could perhaps be *both* substantive *and* resolvable by analysing our language. At any rate, we should not assume that no problem can possibly be both until we're reasonably confident that it is so.

All I ask is for two things: 1) what metaphysical problems do you think can be resolved by analyzing our language and 2) which metaphysical questions are actually substantive? — Manuel

1) One is "the problem of solipsism". See Witty's "Private Language Argument". Another is "the problem of induction" (i.e. causal relations, causality). See Popper's The Logic of Scientific Discovery.

2) I can only think of What necessarily is not real, or impossible objects/worlds (i.e. membership rule/s for the Null Set)? A question (re: my apophatic conception) of negative ontology.

All I ask is for two things: 1) what metaphysical problems do you think can be resolved by analyzing our language and 2) which metaphysical questions are actually substantive? — Manuel

It looks like a false dichotomy. A metaphysical problem could perhaps be *both* substantive *and* resolvable by analysing our language. — Cuthbert

Yes. Problems and questions related to identity and the nature of self come to mind.
I was intrigued to discover that there is a 'Feminist Metaphysics'.

It should thus not come as a surprise that there could be a specifically feminist metaphysics, where the question of prime importance is to what extent the central concepts and categories of metaphysics, in terms of which we make sense of our reality, could be value laden in ways that are particularly gendered.

In this way, feminist theorists have asked whether and, if so, to what extent our frameworks for understanding the world are distorting in ways that privilege men or masculinity. What, if anything, is eclipsed if we adopt an Aristotelian framework of substance and essence, or a Cartesian framework of immaterial souls present in material bodies ?
— SEP: Feminist Metaphysics

Value laden concepts need to carefully analysed as to real life implications.
The words we use - to make sense of current reality - often skew the way we think about and treat our selves and others.

So, both substantive questions and language analysis involved but as to any being dissolved or resolved...

So what's that, then? A clear and obvious reality? A reality that is taken for granted, or is at hand, perhaps?

If we drop the word "manifest", what would change? There would presumably still be taxies. I don't see that we need "manifest reality" in order to will one's arm to move to hail a cab. The wording just doesn't obviously help. — Banno

It's Sellars distinction. I think it's a good one. Manifest reality deals with mental entities. Science, if our theories are correct, deal with mind-indepdent entities.

But your mind does not have a mass. So it is not a form of matter. — Banno

Hmmm, that's not clear to me. It certainly comes from mass, we just don't know how the mass realizes this feat of experience. I can't well take my mind out of my brain and confirm that it has no mass. It may seem to have no mass, I'm not sure it doesn't.

Then again, you may be correct.

It's a good indicator of something fishy going on. — Banno

Yes. It trivializes something which shouldn't be treated this way.

Instead, you decide. After all, your discussion. And when you've said, then the rest of us can pick at it, making it strong if it's any good. — tim wood

Agreed. Can’t have an answer consistent with a very specific question, without a proper ground being given for it. Always best to separate the sophists from the dialecticians.

Yes and that approach makes sense. I suppose what's left if empirical evidence is not available, is to rely on the plausibility of the arguments. But we also use intuition here and this depends on our sensibilities as in one may prefer idealism because one thinks the mind creates the world or some other such view.

I can only think of What necessarily is not real, or an impossible object / world (i.e. membership rule/s for the Null Set)? A question (re: my apophatic conception) of negative ontology. — 180 Proof

I think I remember parts of that argument. It's interesting, but too technical for me to be able to reply intelligently.

I was intrigued to discover that there is a 'Feminist Metaphysics'. — Amity

Well, I'd like to think reason is neither masculine nor feminine as applied to these types of topics. It gets muddied in political affairs at times. But I had never heard of feminine metaphysics, but I'm not even surprised.

The point of me asking for a person to give an example of a metaphysical problem dissolving through language use and one which does not is simply to see if people are willing to point to one example in which analysis or clear use of words can put a problem to the side tends to show that philosophy of language can be useful.

Sometimes certain people tend to make all problems of philosophy a problem of using a word incorrectly. I think that's taking it way too far. On the other hand, if someone says philosophy of language is useless, then I think that's clearly wrong.

Many of these problems are substantive, but I'd be suspicious if someone said that not a single problem in the long list of these issues is one which was framed incorrectly.

But people have somewhat different ideas as to what constitutes metaphysics...

This is a well-written and thought through post. It's a good idea for a discussion.

On the other hand, I have beaten my ideas on metaphysics to pulp in previous discussions throughout my time on the forumm. The thought of getting involved in a new one gives me the purple flurps. @tim wood and I share some understanding on this issue. I'll let him speak for me.

perpendicular pronoun — Banno

I was not familiar with this term. I will store it in my library for future use. Thanks.

Sure. No problem. If I had to be repeating my views on this topic for 5 years, I'd be hesitant to repeat myself again. :up:

the purple flurps — T Clark

Ah, the internet. In less than a minute I can learn not only something new - that at first sounds like a disturbing effluvium from orifices to remain unnamed - but also what it is where it comes from and from Youtube videos how to make it - no effluvent orifices required.

And, R.G. Collingwood makes a compelling argument that metaphysics, which cannot be a science of being because there can be no such science, is instead - and what he finds in Aristotle - the historical science of identifying the presuppositions that ground the thinking of different people(s) at different times. Historical because different people at different times presuppose different things, and what they presuppose is determinative of the shape and substance of the subjects they ground. And a science because such presuppositions are a matter of historical fact. An Essay on Metaphysics, https://www.amazon.com/Essay-Metaphysics-R-G-Collingwood/dp/1614276153/ref=sr_1_3?dchild=1&keywords=an+essay+on+metaphysics&qid=1622395700&sr=8-3

All I ask is for two things: 1) what metaphysical problems do you think can be resolved by analyzing our language and 2) which metaphysical questions are actually substantive? — Manuel

I prefer to define the term "metaphysics" to describe the subject matter of Aristotle's second volume of his post-iron-age encyclopedia of knowledge -- but not as it was later interpreted by Catholic theologians. Volume 1, now referred to as "The Physics", was describing the material world as known by direct observation of Nature (Science). Then, volume 2, now known as "The Metaphysics", analyzed the immaterial aspects of the world (human nature), as known by rational inference (Philosophy).

But the Catholic Scholastics later interpreted those non-physical features of the natural world as super-natural & spiritual. Hence, the term "Metaphysics" came to be associated with Theology instead of Science. That's why, when I discuss the non-physical realities (Ideality), I spell it with a hyphen "Meta-Physics", to indicate that I'm not talking about Magic, Mysticism, or Religious Doctrines. Basically, it's anything that is not accessible to the 5 senses, but only to the sixth sense of Reason (inference). For example, the Quarks that are supposed to be the building blocks of sub-atomic matter, "have never been observed empirically" (Science), but are inferred theoretically (Philosophy). Hence, I would say that Quarks & other hypothetical particles are meta-physical, They exist in a limbo realm of insubstantial Ideas, beyond the reach of Sensation, but not of Reason.

Therefore, I think all Meta-Physical (theoretical) questions are grist for the philosophical mill. Yet not all of them have any "substantive" effect on the material world, but may have "significant" effects on the human Mind (memes). Metaphysical questions are not resolved by practical experimentation, but only by philosophical argumentation, or mathematical calculation. Which means that, ultimately, they are subjects of belief & faith, not fact. And the arguments will seldom convince believers to change their opinions.

For example, the children at Medjugorje in Bosnia, claimed they "saw" the Virgin Mary. But their parents, at first didn't believe them. Yet, now the site of the "sighting" is a popular destination for millions of faith-driven pilgrims. That is "Metaphysics" in the Catholic sense. On the other hand, investigations into the "substance" of intangible Consciousness have recently become a popular topic for Neuroscientists, as well as New Agers. And that is a valid subject for philosophical research -- including linguistic analysis, even though any "substantive" conclusions will remain subjective, and may be accepted or rejected based on prior beliefs.& attitudes toward Meta-Physics or Metaphysics. :smile:


Quark :
any of a number of subatomic particles carrying a fractional electric charge, postulated as building blocks of the hadrons. Quarks have not been directly observed but theoretical predictions based on their existence have been confirmed experimentally.

Massless Particles :
But an object with zero energy and zero mass is nothing at all. Therefore, if an object with no mass is to physically exist, it can never be at rest. Such is the case with light.
https://wtamu.edu/~cbaird/sq/2014/04/01/light-has-no-mass-so-it-also-has-no-energy-according-to-einstein-but-how-can-sunlight-warm-the-earth-without-energy/
Note -- Other essentially massless particles are neutrinos, gravitons, & gluons. And their physical existence is inferred from theory, not directly observed. Even further down the rabbit-hole are Strings, that may never be empirically provable, and yet mathematicians imagine them as ghostly mathematical objects in a dimension far-far-away from the "real" world.

The point of me asking for a person to give an example of a metaphysical problem dissolving through language use and one which does not is simply to see if people are willing to point to one example in which analysis or clear use of words can put a problem to the side tends to show that philosophy of language can be useful. — Manuel

Philosophy of language useful ?
I had severe mental cramps when I briefly studied that many years ago. Fodor's L.O.T. Language of Thought ! I have avoided it just as much as metaphysics. Until now.
However...I will take this opportunity to explore again, from a different perspective.

Sticking with the Feminist theme, which I think can be broadened to issues of power, and control of minority groups. As related to metaphysical questions and concepts of identity and self in social experience. What our categorisations of reality are based on.

Fricker (2007) argues that there is a distinctive kind of injustice that has to do with the inability to properly understand and communicate important aspects of one’s social experience: she calls this hermeneutical injustice. According to Fricker, people in a position of marginalization are prevented from creating concepts, terms and other representational resources that could be used in order to conceptualize and understand their own experiences, especially those having to do with being in that position of marginalization. People in a position of power will tend to create concepts and linguistic representations that help to conceptualize the experiences and phenomena that matter to them, rather than the experiences and phenomena that matter the most to people in a position of marginalization — SEP: Feminist philosophy of language

Feminists like Spender and Catherine MacKinnon (1989) argue that male power over language has allowed them to create reality. This is partly due to the fact that our categorizations of reality inevitably depend on our social perspective: “there is no ungendered reality or ungendered perspective” (MacKinnon 1989: 114). Haslanger (1995) discusses this argument in detail. — As above

For me, this kind of discussion is useful to explore contemporary issues. Of practical concern.

I think it also relates to that perpendicular pronoun ...the I that he referred to:

I will be honest and admit that the 'another poster' is he whom this present member is in the habit of addressing with the perpendicular pronoun. — Banno

Although I thought the I in question was more laid back than that.
Would he prefer a 'we'...

For example, the Quarks that are supposed to be the building blocks of sub-atomic matter, "have never been observed empirically" (Science), but are inferred theoretically (Philosophy). Hence, I would say that Quarks & other hypothetical particles are meta-physical — Gnomon

I'm aware this topic enters into the whole realism vs anti-realism debate. I would still be careful in saying that the stuff posited by science is a metaphysical entity. We can of course debate if science is metaphysics or not. One can make a case that part of science is metaphysics, sure. But I wouldn't tell the physicist that I have special knowledge regarding his field.

Yet not all of them have any "substantive" effect on the material world, but may have "significant" effects on the human Mind (memes). Metaphysical questions are not resolved by practical experimentation, but only by philosophical argumentation, or mathematical calculation. — Gnomon

I largely agree on your last point here. Matter looks and feels substantial to us, which it is. But at bottom, it isn't. So we have two views on the nature of matter, our common sense conception of regarding tables and chairs and then we have what physics tells us about matter. This brings forth epistemological consideration on top of metaphysical ones.

I had severe mental cramps when I briefly studied that many years ago. Fodor's L.O.T. Language of Thought ! I have avoided it just as much as metaphysics. Until now. — Amity

It can be dense. And many aspects of Wittgenstein are difficult too. Nevertheless going back to Thomas Reid, one can see him discussing similar topics as Wittgenstein develops later on, in a pretty straightforward manner.

Also, listening or reading Chomsky's non-technical work and Bertrand Russell on many topics not limited to language, are useful in this regard. For philosophical matters, philosophy of language need not go beyond trying to be careful and clear and to not get stuck on a word or a phrase.

Wittgenstein says this nicely: "A picture held us captive. And we could not get outside it, for it lay in our language and language seemed to repeat it to us inexorably." This can be interpreted in many ways, I take it to mean that we should avoid being held captive if we do not proceed with the way we are phrasing and/or thinking about a question.

As related to metaphysical questions and concepts of identity and self in social experience. What our categorisations of reality are based on. — Amity

Sure, there's truth in that. In Spanish we have pronouns for objects, which is weird if you think about it. In French too. I don't know how different my experience of the world is in one language vs another.

people in a position of marginalization are prevented from creating concepts, terms and other representational resources that could be used in order to conceptualize and understand their own experiences, especially those having to do with being in that position of marginalization — SEP: Feminist philosophy of language

Yes, when it comes to power, the issue of gender is clear-er to see.

And we've seen examples of phrases such as "Black Lives Matter" or "#MeToo", which have been quite useful in changing aspects of the society.

I think your premise is right, some but not all metaphysical questions are in fact simply language questions. But it is interesting that you have your examples perfectly backward.

The mind body problem is not just some people making associations with matter and "unthinking stuff". If that's all there was to it, the problem would have dissolved a long time ago. It is an inquiry into how two seemingly unrelated domains, matter and thought, are related. This is about as unlinguistic a metaphysical question as you can get.

However, questions of identity are in fact a perfect example of a linguistic question posing as metaphysical. Whether John's cremated body "is" or "isn't" the same as the once living one is entirely up to language and convention. Some languages and cultures may say yes, some no. Others may call John different after he had a stroke. There is simply no ontology which dictates the boundaries of words. These boundaries are ultimately human contrivances.

At least, the above is a plausible approach to tackling the problem, and is a good example of a metaphysical problem being attacked as merely linguistic.

If that's all there was to it, the problem would have dissolved a long time ago. It is an inquiry into how two seemingly unrelated domains, matter and thought, are related. This is about as unlinguistic a metaphysical question as you can get. — hypericin

My example was bound to be controversial. I don't think I could come up with an uncontroversial example. I think you said it: "seemingly unrelated" - they seem unrelated. It doesn't follow that they are unrelated. Action at a distance looked seemingly unrelated to matter, or so Newton thought when he discovered it.

I should point out, by way of clarification that by saying a problem is linguistic, I don't mean to say that you are using words is a "merely" incorrect manner. The words we use have the content we give them. In this respect, it is thought that "matter" does not appear to have the properties of thinking.

If one takes this to be a property of the thing we refer to when we use the word "matter", then of course problems will arise such that the "mind body problem" arise, phrased in this manner. I think Newton showed - as Chomsky pointed out - that we have no conception of "body" anymore.

So word-use is related to thinking, and this plays a huge role in any question we phrase. But if we change the association of the word, the problem may appear in a new light.

There is a lot of content to this debate which is not a matter of "mere" words, such as the problem of consciousness, or the problem of matter, etc.

There is simply no ontology which dictates the boundaries of words. These boundaries are ultimately human contrivances. — hypericin

Sure. "John" is after all a mental construction which we project on a specific person. In this respect it's an ontology of everyday life, I think, which includes trees, rivers and so forth, but does not include atoms or chlorophyll. These latter components don't appear to us in everyday life absent certain equipment to detect or interact with them.

But it is still an important issue. As in if John has a stroke and doesn't behave or think at all as he used to, we'd say he's a different person. What do we do if the John prior to the stroke committed a crime but his trial is to occur after the stroke?

Should we punish post-stoke John?

Wittgenstein says this nicely: "A picture held us captive. And we could not get outside it, for it lay in our language and language seemed to repeat it to us inexorably." This can be interpreted in many ways, I take it to mean that we should avoid being held captive if we do not proceed with the way we are phrasing and/or thinking about a question. — Manuel

Wittgenstein is another one I have trouble with.
However, I do appreciate this quote - very much - and would like to know more about it - source ?
It speaks to me of a way we are held - our minds fettered - by ourselves and not thinking outside our own bubble or experience of life.
A narrowness of sticking to a particular narrative, perhaps not of our own making. And not realising why or the potential consequences/implications.

Acceptance of repeated traditional ideas of what it means to be an X or Y. A reluctance to embrace the new as we evolve or progress. The difficulties of examining who we really are...and what we do about it...change or stay safe...how much freedom do we have...

From previous thread:
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/544094

Austin's Philosophical Papers.
Also,
How not to be a chucklehead — Banno

Grateful to @Banno for recommendations, as requested by @Tom Storm.

Given the critical role of language and definitions in ordinary discourse, I am not surprised that the context and usage of words can play such a critical role in managing apparent contradictions and ambiguities in narratives involving metaphysics.

Can you recommend an easy to understand essay or paper exploring the process you used above? I tried reading Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations but it is beyond me. — Tom Storm

The Aeon chucklehead article by Nakul Krishna, edited by Nigel Warburton is an easy read.
This excerpt - shows the benefit of repeating questions to clarify philosophical density:

When the French philosopher Gabriel Marcel announced impressively to one of Oxford’s philosophical clubs that human freedom was the ‘ontological counterweight to death’, Austin invited him to explain what he meant.
The request, made with his characteristic courtesy, was followed up repeatedly with appeals for further clarification.

Marcel ended up saying he meant that the fact we are going to die makes all our earthly doings ultimately futile, but we carry on in full awareness of this by investing some things with value by an exercise of free will. Was this true? Maybe, maybe not, but at least that question could now be intelligibly posed. — Aeon essay on J.L. Austin

My bolds.

Thinking about what we mean.