But what is he talking about? Why is he saying that?

That's one way to interpret it. There are others. — frank

Alright. What are some of the other possible interpretations then? Let's try and be constructive here.

The Euthyphro dilemma isn't in Euthyphro? — frank

The Euthyphro dilemma as it is referred to today is not the problem that Socrates posed to Euthyphro.

Socrates question: "Is the pious loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because it is loved?" leads to the subsequent versions of the Euthyphro dilemma. Euthyphro says he does not understand the question. It is not for him a dilemma because he does not even understand what the difference is between the two. Euthyphro's claim as it stands - "What is loved by the gods is pious, and what is not loved is impious." (6e) is inadequate. The problem is made clear by his initial response to Socrates question, what is the idea of the pious and impious. (5d) His answer is that what he is doing is pious. (5d) He assumes that the gods love what he is doing because he is pious and that he is pious because he is doing what the gods love. When Socrates introduces the question of the just he shows the inadequacy of Euthyphro's answers.

Alright. What are some of the other possible interpretations then? — Olivier5

Euthyphro may have no agenda than to be pious. Being impious could bring disaster down upon his house, so he may want to attend to it before he embarks on a project.

There are endless scenarios where he thinks he doing what's right. Chaining someone up and leaving them to die is pretty horrific.

So perhaps what Socrates reveals is not iniquity, but the shifting ground beneath our certainty.

Think about the dilemma this way:

Do we love money because it's valuable? Or is it valuable because we love it?

Notice the unresolvable circularity? As if it might be both.

Socrates question: "Is the pious loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because it is loved?" — Fooloso4

Yes. That's the dilemma. I was starting to think you might be suffering from dementia or something (I really did).

Euthyphro may have no agenda than to be pious. Being impious could bring disaster down upon his house, so he may want to attend to it before he embarks on a project. — frank

But then, what is the metaphysical or moral message of that interpretation? Do all you can to cleanse yourself/your house/your city of impiety, even if you need to prosecute your own father?

In context, that sounds unlikely to me, coming from Plato, a student and admirer of Socrates, met in the dialogue at the door of the tribunal prosecuting him for impiety. And if Euthyphro is justified, why is he presented as somebody who cannot even explain piety to Socrates?

Think about the dilemma this way:

Do we love money because it's valuable? Or is it valuable because we love it?

Notice the unresolvable circularity? As if it might be both. — frank

IDK. In economic terms, the monetary value of anything is a complex function of desire, utility and availability, and yes it is iterative (rather than circular), but this kind of thinking seems too relativist for Plato. He is all about eternal absolutes. More probably he is telling us something about the inherent desirability and universality of justice vs the relativity of religious practice.

But then, what is the metaphysical or moral message of that interpretation? Do all you can to cleanse yourself/your house/your city of impiety, even if you need to prosecute your own father? — Olivier5

This is what the Athenians did to Socrates. The sentenced him to death to cleanse their city of his influence. We know this had a profound effect on Plato.

But he would have known that the scapegoating that swept the city was coming from innocent superstition energized by the pain and dishonor of defeat.

There's no need to villainize Euthyphro. You can if you want to, but the dialogue works fine if Euthyphro just isn't thinking things through.

If he does, he may decide that justice does call for the prosecution of his father.

IDK — Olivier5

And that is priceless, right?

In economic terms, the monetary value of anything is a complex function of desire, utility and availability, — Olivier5

I wasn't talking about what you can buy for money. I'm talking about money itself. It's an abstraction just like piety. In fact in some ways, they play similar roles.

So what do you think? Do we love money because it's valuable? Or...

I held off answering him. You provided a better answer than I would have.

I think Euthyphro did have an agenda. He could have done what his father did and asked an exegete, an official who expounded the sacred and ancestral laws of the city. Instead he brought it to a public forum to demonstrate his own expertise in such matters. He says:

... whenever I say something in the assembly concerning the divine things ... I have spoken nothing that is not true ... they envy all who are of this sort. (3c)

He is blindly convinced that he knows divine things and that what he is doing is right. In addition, he makes a public display of it.

As to his family, he tells Socrates that they are indignant and that they tell him that it is impious for a son to proceed against his father for murder. But he claims they:

knowing badly, Socrates, how the divine is disposed concerning the pious and impious. (4 d-e)

This is what the Athenians did to Socrates. The sentenced him to death to cleanse their city of his influence. We know this had a profound effect on Plato. But he would have known that the scapegoating that swept the city was coming from innocent superstition energized by the pain and dishonor of defeat. — frank

And according to your interpretation, Plato would have agreed with his teacher Socrates' scapegoating.

I'm talking about money itself. It's an abstraction just like piety. — frank

Unlike piety, money can be quantified, stored, stolen, changed, and exchanged against physical goods and services. I see it as a very practical thing and not an abstraction.

And according to your interpretation, Plato would have agreed with his teacher Socrates' scapegoating. — Olivier5

Not at all. He just would have known that Socrates was the victim of superstition.

Unlike piety, money can be quantified, stored, stolen, changed, and exchanged against physical goods and services. I see it as a very practical thing and not an abstraction. — Olivier5

You're avoiding the question?

He is blindly convinced that he knows divine things and that what he is doing is right. In addition, he makes a public display of it. — Fooloso4

We already know that. What we don't know is what you think the point of this thread is.

You said the point is not to show that belief in God in not necessary for being good, even though the OP states this to be "the question that engendered this post":

I never intended for the discussion of the dialogue to be proof that belief in god is not necessary for being good. — Fooloso4

You said it is to "discuss the dialogue" and that the dilemma "is not part of the dialogue":

It is not part of the dialogue, which is what this thread was intended to be focused on. — Fooloso4

And yet, you keep mentioning it. So, I think people are entitled to ask what exactly it is you want to discuss.

We have already seen that obsessing about the alleged "five-year gap", cannot lead anywhere except to further unfounded speculation. Hence my suggestion to discuss something more constructive and, if possible, more interesting and more intellectually rewarding.

Yes. That's the dilemma. I was starting to think you might be suffering from dementia or something (I really did). — frank

Exactly. That's the dilemma that, allegedly, he "doesn't want to discuss", yet he keeps mentioning it.

Not only that, but it seems rather weird not to discuss it when Socrates and Euthyphro discuss it from one end of the dialogue to the other.

Not at all. He just would have known that Socrates was the victim of superstition. — frank

And he would have written a dialogue about it, right? Where this Euthyphro superstitious character would be a fool, unable to justify himself...

You're avoiding the question? — frank

I've already answered it. I think that Plato is not looking for tradable, relativist value, like money, but for absolutes that are absolutely desirable. He doesn't think that piety is inherently and absolutely desirable. Rather is is like money: a tradable good. A means to an end. And the real absolute end, for which piety is only a means, is proposed to be justice.

We already know that. — Apollodorus

From many of your posts it is evident that you don't or until some point did not.

You said the point is not to show that belief in God in not necessary for being good, even though the OP states this to be "the question that engendered this post": — Apollodorus

Do I need to explain to you what engendered means? This topic and the one that engendered it are two different things. One started out one way shifted to general opinions on the relationship between God and morality. This one started by looking at the dialogue Euthyphro and some of us have been doing our best to keep it on topic.

You said it is to "discuss the dialogue" and that the dilemma "is not part of the dialogue": — Apollodorus

As some posts here show, what is generally thought of as the Euthyphro dilemma is not what is found in the dialogue. See my response to frank: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/555554

obsessing about the alleged "five-year gap" — Apollodorus

It is this kind of misrepresentation that leads me to ignore you. What is the point? Do you really think such tactics are persausive?

I think Euthyphro did have an agenda. He could have done what his father did and asked an exegete, an official who expounded the sacred and ancestral laws of the city. Instead he brought it to a public forum to demonstrate his own expertise in such matters. — Fooloso4

Or to use his expertise.

From the dialogue, we can assume that Euthyphro thinks he is quite skilled at manipulating this particular tribunal. So bringing the case there could be highly tactical. I mean, he probably lost already in some first jurisdiction in Naxos, and is bringing the case to a higher court that he thinks he has good chance of overcoming.

And he would have written a dialogue about it, right? Where this Euthyphro superstitious character would be a fool, unable to justify himself... — Olivier5

Yes. This line of discussion started with my saying that we don't have to see Euthyphro as a villain. I think you're agreeing that he might have just been superstitious with a little consciousness of his social standing in the mix. These two qualities would have made him pretty average.

A means to an end. And the real absolute end, for which piety is only a means, is proposed to be justice. — Olivier5

True. And how do we know about the ideal of justice?

Not only that, but it seems rather weird not to discuss it when Socrates and Euthyphro discuss it from one end of the dialogue to the other. — Apollodorus

They do not discuss it from one end of the dialogue to the other. Socrates quickly dispatches it.

The dialogue comes to an end when Socrates once again asks him what piety is. There can be no dilemma where the terms have not been adequately determined.

Starting on page one what is called the "Euthyphro Dilemma" is not what is found in the dialogue.

Here's Dr William Lane Craig (one of the more competent).

Dr. Craig:

For those that aren't familiar with it, the question is: does God will something because it is good, or is something good because God wills it? — Tom Storm

These two qualities would have made him pretty average. — frank

The average person does not say he is an expert on divine matters. Euthyphro would deny that he is superstitious. It is his assumption that he knows what he does not know about such things that is at issue. He does not simply hold this misguided belief he acts on it.

This is what the Athenians did to Socrates. The sentenced him to death to cleanse their city of his influence. We know this had a profound effect on Plato. — frank

That's a very good point actually. And, of course, the Athenians believed that what they were doing was right. Moreover, to be fair, they offered to acquit him if he desisted from engaging in any further mischief, which he refused.

There's no need to villainize Euthyphro. You can if you want to, but the dialogue works fine if Euthyphro just isn't thinking things through. — frank

Of course it does work fine. It is a very short dialogue and it seems out of place to read too much into it and resort to pure speculation as a substitute for legitimate conclusions as @Fooloso4 apparently tends to do.

By contrast, my own suggestion is far more plausible. We know that Plato believed in Ideas or Forms and in intuition (noesis) as a faculty of the soul (nous) which philosophy aimed to awaken and develop.

The dialogue contains terms like "idea", "form", and "pattern" which, in anyone even remotely familiar with Plato, would lead to an intuition of coherence or associative memory. The time required for the association with Platonic Forms to be retrieved by the mind would depend on the reader's intelligence and training (some may have to re-read the text several times), but the association is clearly intended, it can hardly be accidental.

Of course other interpretations are theoretically possible, but they are to be regarded as necessarily of a lower order, value, and interest. They are more likely to occur among the lower social and intellectual strata or among the metaphysically untutored.

I think you're agreeing that he might have just been superstitious with a little consciousness of his social standing in the mix. These two qualities would have made him pretty average — frank

Average, and therefore worthy of some scorn by the wise... But I think you are not picking up the clues Plato left about Euthyphro's venality and ruthless ambition. The text does not exclude ulterior motives for prosecuting his own father, and perhaps I agree with "Fooloso4" that the mention of Naxos implies some ulterior motive.

how do we know about the ideal of justice? — frank

You tell me.

But what is he talking about? Why is he saying that? — frank

That's a question that he himself seems unable or unwilling to answer. We are forced to draw our own conclusions.

By contrast, my own suggestion is far more plausible. — Apollodorus

What suggestion is that? That the moral of the dialogue is "there are forms and ideas"?

Sounds a bit dry.

Average, and therefore worthy of some scorn by the wise... But I think you are not picking up the clues Plato left about Euthyphro's venality and ruthless ambition. The text does not exclude ulterior motives for prosecuting his own father, and perhaps I agree with "Fooloso4" that the mention of Naxos implies some ulterior motive. — Olivier5

Sure. You just asked what the alternative interpretation is. That's it. Athenians were heavily into appearance, whatever we might think if that. It wasn't evil, it was just their culture.

how do we know about the ideal of justice? — frank


You tell me. — Olivier5

I think Plato is about to hatch some Forms which we know about from birth, but uncover through experience.

By contrast, my own suggestion is far more plausible. We know that Plato believed in Ideas or Forms and in intuition (noesis) as a faculty of the soul (nous) which philosophy aimed to awaken and develop. — Apollodorus

I think we all agree on this.

What suggestion is that? That the moral of the dialogue is "there are forms and ideas"? — Olivier5

Plato was upper-class and he wrote for the educated upper classes. He also believed in a tripartite soul reflecting the three classes of Athenian society, etc.

What if his dialogues have several layers of meaning intended for different social, intellectual, and spiritual classes, such as (1) the unawakened, (2) the awakened, and (3) the wide-awakened or enlightened?

According to this scheme, @Fooloso4's interpretation would seem to pertain to the lowest social/intellectual/spiritual class of readers. Obviously, this is just a hypothetical suggestion. But I believe it to be true.

Your interpretation is quite trite though, and could potentially apply to any of Plato's work. Looks more like the traditional conceptual frame of reference for Plato than an interpretation. It's Plato 101. He believed in forms.

All this brouhaha for that?

Anyway, whatever rocks your boat...

This. In lieu of his own interpretation one of his many cut and paste. This one from Lloyd Gerson:

Socrates in Euthyphro does not just want to know what the Form of Piety is; he also believes that there is such a thing as Piety that is the instrumental cause of the piety in pious things [see 6D 10 – 11 — Apollodorus

The key is the theory that the Forms are instrumental causes.

First, the passage cited. Socrates is asking what the pious itself is:

that eidos itself by which all the pious things are pious

Gerson takes this to mean something that causes pious things to be pious. But Socrates goes on to say:

... it is by one idea that the impious things are impious and the pious things pious.

That one thing that is the cause of the pious would then be the cause of the impious. But what he means is that:

... this idea itself is, so that by gazing at it and using it as a pattern, I may declare that whatever is like it, among the things that you or anyone else may do, is pious, and whatever is not like it is not. (6e)

A pattern is not an instrumental cause, it does not cause anything to be like it. It is, rather, that by which we can identify something as being of that kind.

I think Plato is about to hatch some Forms which we know about from birth, but uncover through experience. — frank

Correct. It must be remembered that for Plato to learn was to remember. Therefore, Plato's dialogues are meant to stimulate the soul's innate memory leading to intuitive perception of metaphysical realities such as the Forms and, eventually, recognition of one's own essential divinity.

But I believe it to be true. — Apollodorus

Well, that settles the matter. You go from demanding proof of everything I say to what you believe to be true.

The divisions of the tripart soul do not correspond to your division of the unawakened, the awakened, and the wide-awakened or enlightened.

A pattern is not an instrumental cause, — Fooloso4

The term "pattern" (paradeigma) refers to Platonic Forms which, as you yourself admitted, were known to Plato and his immediate disciples at the time he wrote the Euthyphro.

You can't deny established historical facts. Though you may, of course, try.