• khaled
    3.5k
    Well the first thing that can be said that distinguishes the two is the view on ontology. For a materialist, there is only one thing that exists, that being matter. For an idealist there is two different kinds of things, "mental stuff" and "physical stuff". How they then interact is a problem an idealist has to deal with with (or not as much if they're an epiphenomonolgist). On the other hand for the materialist, ask him "What is consciousness" and he'll reply that it's a "pattern" usually. Some specific neurological configuration mean "conscious" and most others mean "not consious". That or they'll say the ridiculous "consciousness is an illusion" bs. But the point is they either deal with it through reductionism or eliminitavism, either consciousness is a bunch of physical stuff put together or it doean't exist/is not important to talk about.

    My question then is what really is the difference between idealists and materialists other than the words they use to describe the stuff that exists. Ask both "is consciousness real" and they would say yes (with the eliminitivists saying no). As both "can consciousness interact with the world and cause physical changes". They would say yes (with the epiphenomenalists saying no). Note, a materalist only agrees with this statement because "consciousness" to him is just another material thing. It would be like asking "Can rocks interact with the world and cause physical changes". Ask both "Can the material world affect consciousness" and they'll both say yes (though the idealist will have a hard time explaining how).

    So what really is the difference between the two views? I can't particulary think of any significant question that members of both camps cannot give the same answers to fundamentally other than "Is there is a separate kind of stuff from material stuff that is called mental stuff?" I just never got the idealist materialist split. The idealists seem to be claiming the existence of something that's not needed for explaining anything.

    I still remember asking someone on this site a while ago to define "mind" in such a way that it wouldn't just be part of the definition of "matter" for a materialist. They failed.
  • Wayfarer
    20.6k
    Hope you don't mind this long quote, but I have found it useful in marking out the territory. It's actually from an essay on Buddhist philosophy, but it captures the distinction you're seeking, I think.

    The term "Idealism" came into vogue roughly during the time of Kant (though it was used earlier by others, such as Leibniz) to label one of two trends that had emerged in reaction to Cartesian philosophy.

    Descartes had argued that there were two basic yet separate substances in the universe: Extension (the material world of things in space) and Thought (the world of mind and ideas). Subsequently opposing camps took one or the other substance as their metaphysical foundation, treating it as primary while reducing the remaining substance to derivative status.

    Materialists argued that only matter was ultimately real, so that thought and consciousness derived from physical entities (chemistry, brain states, etc.). Idealists countered that the mind and its ideas were ultimately real, and that the physical world derived from mind (e.g., the mind of God, Berkeley's esse est percipi, or from ideal prototypes, etc.) Materialists gravitated toward mechanical, physical explanations for why and how things existed, while Idealists tended to look for purposes - moral as well as rational - to explain existence. Idealism meant "idea-ism," frequently in the sense Plato's notion of "ideas" (eidos) was understood at the time, namely ideal types that transcended the physical, sensory world and provided the form (eidos) that gave matter meaning and purpose. As materialism, buttressed by advances in materialistic science, gained wider acceptance, those inclined toward spiritual and theological aims turned increasingly toward idealism as a countermeasure. Before long there were many types of materialism and idealism.

    Idealism, in its broadest sense, came to encompass everything that was not materialism, which included so many different types of positions that the term lost any hope of univocality [i.e. a single meaning]. Most forms of theistic and theological thought were, by this definition, types of idealism, even if they accepted matter as real, since they also asserted something as more real than matter, either as the creator of matter (in monotheism) or as the reality behind matter (in pantheism). Extreme empiricists who only accepted their own experience and sensations as real were also idealists. Thus the term "idealism" united monotheists, pantheists and atheists. At one extreme were various forms of metaphysical idealism which posited a mind (or minds) as the only ultimate reality. The physical world was either an unreal illusion or not as real as the mind that created it. To avoid solipsism (which is a subjectivized version of metaphysical idealism) metaphysical idealists posited an overarching mind that envisions and creates the universe.

    A more limited type of idealism is epistemological idealism, which argues that since knowledge of the world only exists in the mental realm, we cannot know actual physical objects as they truly are, but only as they appear in our mental representations of them. Epistemological idealists could be ontological materialists, accepting that matter exists substantially; they could even accept that mental states derived at least in part from material processes. What they denied was that matter could be known in itself directly, without the mediation of mental representations. Though unknowable in itself, matter's existence and properties could be known through inference based on certain consistencies in the way material things are represented in perception.

    Transcendental idealism contends that not only matter but also the self remains transcendental in an act of cognition. Kant and Husserl, who were both transcendental idealists, defined "transcendental" as "that which constitutes experience but is not itself given in experience." A mundane example would be the eye, which is the condition for seeing even though the eye does not see itself. By applying vision and drawing inferences from it, one can come to know the role eyes play in seeing, even though one never sees one's own eyes. Similarly, 'things in themselves' and the 'transcendental self' could be known if the proper methods were applied for uncovering the conditions that constitute experience, even though such conditions do not themselves appear in experience.
    Dan Lusthaus

    I'm inclined to some combination of transcendental and epistemic idealism.
  • khaled
    3.5k
    I don't see the difference between transcendental and epistemic idealism as they're put. And I don't see what's much idealistic about them. At least that excerpt about epistemic idealism didn't seem much different from a materialist would say. There is physical stuff, and we interpret said physical stuff, and there is no point at which we can be 100% sure of our interpretations. I don't see the need to propose 2 different kinds of stuff for the above sentence to be applicable. Because to a materialist, "we" are also physical stuff.
  • Kenosha Kid
    3.2k
    Kudos for finding and posting that in 6 minutes!

    So what really is the difference between the two views?khaled

    A materialist believes that there are material things with no minds, but there can't be mental things without a material basis. A big difference in idealism is that you can have mental things without a material component, at least in principle, and doubtless the most vital example is God. This in turn allows for a kind of coincidence of human mind and human matter, such that we can argue for the primacy of the mental which afaik is a matter of taste, not logic.
  • khaled
    3.5k
    A materialist believes that there are material things with no mindsKenosha Kid

    I can take this two ways. Either you mean there is 2 different kinds of "stuff", material stuff and mental stuff, or I could just take "mind" to mean a certain pattern of material things. I'd say the first interpretation, that there are 2 different kinds of stuff, mental stuff and physical stuff, and objects are made up of a combination of the stuff is already idealistic. Already not what a materialist would say. To a materialist, there is nothing but physical stuff.

    To me, when materialists speak about minds they are speaking of patterns. "Consciousness" is a pattern. "Anger" is a pattern. Etc. So even God, can be seen as some sort of pattern or other (you know the whole "God is everything" kinds of cliches).

    This in turn allows for a kind of coincidence of human mind and human matter, such that we can argue for the primacy of the mentalKenosha Kid

    Again, I think if you say that there are 2 different kinds of stuff, mental stuff and physical stuff, you're already not a materialist.
  • Wayfarer
    20.6k
    That’s what scrapbooks are useful for ;-)

    There is physical stuff, and we interpret said physical stuff, and there is no point at which we can be 100% sure of our interpretations.khaled

    You throw around ‘stuff’ pretty easily, but in the context its meaning ought to be carefully considered. What, I mean, would ‘mental stuff’ actually consist of? The point about our mental stuff, is that it is never known to us as an object. Our own mind is the subject of experience, whereas ‘stuff’ of all kinds occurs or appears to us as an objective reality. We cannot directly know whether what appears to us as other beings really do think, but our own thoughts are indubitable to us, as we can’t even doubt them without thinking (pace Descartes.)

    A further point is that the investigation of matter itself has yielded nothing like an indivisible particle. The candidates for such a thing, such as the quark, are part of the quaintly-named ‘particle zoo’, which is a mathematical construct. The implication of the observer in the interpretation of physics is also by now a well-known aspect of modern science. All of which undermines the assumption of some independently-existing ‘stuff’.
  • Kenosha Kid
    3.2k
    A materialist believes that there are material things with no minds
    — Kenosha Kid

    I can take this two ways
    khaled

    Then I'll clarify. An argument for materialism is that there exist things that are material, like rocks, clouds, rivers, etc. that have no minds; however there are no apparent mental things (like humans) without matter (bodies). Therefore things with minds is a subset of material things.

    Again, I think if you say that there are 2 different kinds of stuff, mental stuff and physical stuff, you're already not a materialist.khaled

    I was describing the difference (as per your question) not my own views. It is difficult to argue against the above apparent subsetting if one cannot give an example of a mental thing that has no material component. If you believe in God or something similar, that could be an example.

    For the record, I'm a physicalist athiest.
  • khaled
    3.5k
    however there are no apparent mental thingsKenosha Kid

    A materialist would not say that humans have any mental things attached if "mental thing" is to mean some other different kind of substance from physical thing. If it means a particular pattern of physical thing then maybe.

    But the question was: What does each position allow you to say that doesn't fit with the other position? Because I can't think of anything.
  • khaled
    3.5k
    You throw around ‘stuff’ pretty easilyWayfarer

    Well at the very least we can agree that minds and matter share one thing. They're both stuff. You seem to have taken stuff to mean physical stuff. Maybe even more general. Both minds and brains are things is that better?

    A further point is that the investigation of matter itself has yielded nothing like an indivisible particleWayfarer

    The implication of the observer in the interpretation of physics is also by now a well-known aspect of modern science.Wayfarer

    You seem to be putting a lot of baggage on the word stuff that I didn't put there. I didn't say that stuff need be indivisible. And I didn't say stuff needs to be constantly defined in absence of an observer.

    There is no inconsistency with being a materialist and at the same time thinking that there is no indivisible particle and also that particles don't sit still when nothing is looking at them. I say this on many threads but what counts as "matter" has changed a lot. Beforehand matter was what you could see and hold. We can't see or hold electrons yet we consider them material nowadays. Heck they don't even have a fixed location yet we call them material. It just seems like whatever role was taken by "mind stuff" has all been sucked out and included in "physical stuff"

    Which again makes me ask the question, What does each position allow you to say that the other cannot hold? Because I can't think of anything. Has the meaning of what is "material" expanded so much that it just encompasses everything now and there is no longer any need for a seperate sort of "mind stuff"? That's what it seems like to me.
  • Mystic
    145
    @khaled Seems to me both camps miss the nuance between living and non living.
    The hard problem Is the result of this false dichotomy.
    Ditto,the excesses of idealism and materialism.
    Physicalism is the way to go. Everything is physical,not material or "ideal."
  • TheMadFool
    13.8k
    My take on the materialism-idealism debate crystallized into a high-definition image about a month or so ago. A bit of an exaggeration there but who's bothered, right? It basically boils down to a single question, which of the two - res cogitans (mind) or res extensa (matter) - can be doubted?
  • Wayfarer
    20.6k
    Both minds and brains are thingskhaled

    Nope. The mind is definitely not a thing. The brain, insofar as it’s a thing, is an object of study for the neurosciences, and is the most complex thing known to science. But operatively, it’s never a thing.

    You seem to be putting a lot of baggage on the word stuff that I didn't put therekhaled

    As you say that ‘stuff is all that exists’, and that both mind and matter are kinds of stuff, then it has to carry a lot of baggage. Otherwise it’s meaningless - not ‘stuff’ but ‘fluff’.

    The point about physicalism or materialism, is the claim that the only real existents are material existents - those entities knowable to the physical sciences, either actually or potentially. Everything else is purported to be able to be reduced to physical things and physical laws. The purported connection between mental states and physical laws is, according to contemporary orthodoxy, evolutionary biology, whereby dumb stuff gives rise to living beings according to physical laws.

    There are many criticisms of physicalism, including the argument from the hard problem of consciousness, the nomological argument, the argument from reason, and so on.
  • Mystic
    145
    @Mad fool Neither can be doubted.
    And mind is not res cogitans,but is also physical and extended.
  • Tom Storm
    8.3k
    The point about physicalism or materialism, is the claim that the only real existents are material existents - those entities knowable to the physical sciences, either actually or potentially. Everything else is purported to be able to be reduced to physical things and physical laws.Wayfarer

    I think many physicalists are slightly more nuanced than this and would say we currently don't have reliable evidence not to accept physicalism as the best hypothesis, but recognise alternative traditions and that religion is deeply rooted in human behaviour.

    Or in Susan Haack's words, that we try to accommodate the grains of truth in various anti-realist positions—and to keep our own, modest metaphysical claims free of unnecessary and indefensible epistemological accretions.
  • Wayfarer
    20.6k
    Physicalism can’t really be ‘nuanced’. If it’s ‘nuanced’ then it’s no longer physicalism. What you’re reporting on is really the various fallback positions that physicalists have had to assume en route to realising they’ve been mistaken all along.
  • TheMadFool
    13.8k
    Neither can be doubted.
    And mind is not res cogitans,but is also physical and extended.
    Mystic

    You obviously haven't been introduced to Deus Deceptor (Descartes), Simulation Hypothesis (Nick Bostrom), and Brain In A Vat (Gilbert Harman), Solipsism (Gorigias), and Maya (Hinduism & Buddhism) to name a few!
  • TheMadFool
    13.8k
    Physicalism can’t really be ‘nuanced’. If it’s ‘nuanced’ then it’s no longer physicalism.Wayfarer

    My thoughts exactly. Just the other day, I was wondering if nonphysicalists would be ready to accept souls/minds as pure energy or some kind of mathematical formula reducible to, like Michio Kaku likes to say, an equation one inch long? This would be nuance as far as I can tell. How do you think physicalists would respond? Surely, they would be up in arms about how energy is physical
  • Tom Storm
    8.3k
    It makes a big difference to me but I guess if you have determined that physicalism is always a variety of Richard Dawkins I can understand the antipathy.
  • khaled
    3.5k
    You still haven't told me what position a materialist cannot hold that an idealist can't or vice versa. What can one say about the world that the other can't? That God exists? That emotions spur us to action? I can't think of anything they can't both say using their respective definitions.

    There are many criticisms of physicalism, including the argument from the hard problem of consciousness, the nomological argument, the argument from reason, and so on.Wayfarer

    Identity theorists don't have to deal with the first one. I find the nomological argument at worst silly and at best irrelevant (because I'm not talking about whether or not God exists). And I think a cursory view of AI will show the problem with the argument from reason.

    Nope. The mind is definitely not a thing.Wayfarer

    "Thing" is the most general word you can use. Yes minds are things. Not material things. Things.
  • Mystic
    145
    @The mad fool I have encountered all of them in some form,and they are all incoherent as espoused by their propagators.
  • Tom Storm
    8.3k
    I can't think of anything they can't both say using their respective definitions.khaled

    Interesting. Is this worth developing? Transmigration of souls? Platonic realm of forms?
  • Mww
    4.5k
    I'm inclined to some combination of transcendental and epistemic idealism.Wayfarer

    Question: what do you think belongs to epistemic idealism, that isn’t already included in transcendental idealism?

    The mind is definitely not a thing.Wayfarer

    If it was, it must be conditioned, hence the possible invocation of infinite regress. Or, in order to relax infinite regress, some condition for mind must be allowed that is itself unconditioned. Better to just let the mind be the unconditioned placeholder, otherwise speculative theory runs away with itself and we end up with nothing.
  • Kenosha Kid
    3.2k
    A materialist would not say that humans have any mental things attached if "mental thing" is to mean some other different kind of substance from physical thing. If it means a particular pattern of physical thing then maybe.khaled

    Materialists don't deny the mind afaik, they just deny that it's fundamentally non-material. You can still talk of minds and mental things like images, thoughts, feelings, but these arise from states of complex systems.
  • khaled
    3.5k
    Yea that’s exactly what I said.

    A materialist would not say that humans have any mental things attachedkhaled

    IF

    if "mental thing" is to mean some other different kind of substance from physical thing.khaled

    But if

    If it means a particular pattern of physical thing then maybe.khaled

    You can still talk of minds and mental things like images, thoughts, feelings, but these arise from states of complex systems.Kenosha Kid

    They don’t “arise from” as that still leaves the door open for a dualist interpretation. They ARE states of complex systems.


    Point is that by the materialist definition you get everything an idealist would want. Emotions that spur people to action, deliberation, free will, the whole suite. I’d say even more easily incorporated than an idealist would have it (because no interaction problems to deal with). So the pragmatist in me wants to know: What’s the actual difference between the two positions? What’s a significant position that cannot be put into materialist/idealist terms (whichever you want) without being contradictory. Existence of God? I’d say you’d be able to come up with a materialistic definition of God that gives him/her everything you’d want normally. Etc.

    What’s something a materialist cannot say about the world that requires they be an idealist. Or vice versa

    Because I’m the type to think that if the answer to the above is “nothing” then the debate isn’t worth a rat’s ass.
  • RogueAI
    2.4k
    For an idealist there is two different kinds of things, "mental stuff" and "physical stuff"khaled

    That's dualism. Idealists believe only mental stuff exists.
  • RogueAI
    2.4k
    What’s something a materialist cannot say about the world that requires they be an idealist. Or vice versakhaled

    A materialist cannot say about the world (with confidence) that consciousness can arise from non-conscious stuff. They can assume and believe it's true, but there is (currently) no explanation for how that can happen, why we evolved to be conscious, or indeed why we should even assume mind arising from mindless stuff is possible in principle. The materialist, again, simply assumes there's not a category error going on.

    The materialist also cannot say (again, with confidence) that non-conscious stuff exists at all. There is no way to verify it. It's simply a belief.
  • Kenosha Kid
    3.2k
    They ARE states of complex systems.khaled

    Extended states, yes. I'm never sure when people say brain states on here whether they mean instantaneous or over time. It is also convoluted: your experience right now does indeed arise, in part, from the state of your memory: that is, if your memory was in a different configuration (state), you would now be experiencing things (extended state) in a different way.

    But yeah I'm comfortable using "state" to mean over time.

    Point is that by the materialist definition you get everything an idealist would want.khaled

    Well, you don't, that's why they're not materialists. Principally, you don't get magical humans. Lots of people don't like being described as a the same sort of thing as rocks, rivers, or even trees, apes, and computers. They find that quite offensive. Bear in mind we're coming from a world that was taught that God made us bespoke, with His divine breath, and made the universe just for us: being ever so special is important to many.
  • NOS4A2
    8.3k


    I think the distinction lies between the belief that the existence of things and substances are either dependent on or independent of the mind.

    I'm more of a pluralist and believe there are many things and substances rather than just one, so I cannot relate to your view of materialism. But I am certainly not an idealist.
  • khaled
    3.5k
    A materialist cannot say about the world (with confidence) that consciousness can arise from non-conscious stuff.RogueAI

    Yes he can. Because consciousness to a materialist is a certain pattern of matter. You can easily tell when things follow said pattern.

    They can assume and believe it's true, but there is (currently) no explanation for how that can happenRogueAI

    The materialist also cannot say (again, with confidence) that non-conscious stuff exists at all. There is no way to verify it. It's simply a belief.RogueAI

    You seem to already have in mind a particular effect called "consciousness" that we cannot detect that arises from matter. That's not how a materialist would put it. To a materialist, again, consciousness is a pattern, not a seperate "secret sauce" added to things that have matter (usually). That's dualistic.

    Consciousness is to a brain what a program is to a PC for a materialist. The program is not a seperate entity that acts on the PC, it's a specific configuration of the PC.
  • Tom Storm
    8.3k
    What difference does/can it make to a person's life to hold an idealist position?
  • RogueAI
    2.4k
    Yes he can. Because consciousness to a materialist is a certain pattern of matter. You can easily tell when things follow said pattern.khaled

    It depends on the materialist. Some believe that mental states are identical to physical states. Some are property dualists. Some are mysterianists (materialists who think we'll never figure out consciousness).

    A materialist cannot say anything about consciousness* with confidence because A), there's no way to prove that matter exists in the first place, and B) even if matter does exist, if consciousness is patterns of matter, why does pattern A give rise to the feeling of stubbing a toe, while pattern B gives rise to the beauty of a sunset, while pattern C gives rise to no experience at all? How does that work? Why are we conscious in the first place? If pattern of matter XYZ gives rise to (or is the same as) experience ABC, and that machine over there looks like it's an instance of pattern of matter XYZ, how do we verify it's having experience ABC?

    Since the answers to those questions are all unknown, any claims materialists make about what consciousness is and how it arises from matter cannot be made with confidence, at least at the moment. Agreed?

    You seem to already have in mind a particular effect called "consciousness" that we cannot detect that arises from matter.khaled

    I think we can detect it, but only in ourselves. I cannot be wrong I'm conscious, but I ultimately have no idea whether you are or aren't and if you are if your consciousness is anything like mine. If you disagree, then explain how a scientist would go about detecting consciousness in a machine.

    That's not how a materialist would put it. To a materialist, again, consciousness is a pattern, not a seperate "secret sauce" added to things that have matter (usually). That's dualistic.

    Again, it depends on the materialist. Let's take you. Do you believe that mental states are identical to brain states? If so, how is it that I can have a song playing in my head, but there's no music in my skull? If mental states are identical to brain states, then my mind weighs a couple pounds and is about the size of both of my fists. Do you really think your mind weighs anything? Isn't the idea that your mind is double-fist sized pretty absurd? And if you don't believe that mental states are identical to brain states, then how are they different?

    Consciousness is to a brain what a program is to a PC for a materialist. The program is not a seperate entity that acts on the PC, it's a specific configuration of the PC.khaled

    This assumes there is a material thing called a brain that exists outside our minds. You need to prove that first before you start talking about what kinds of programs this hypothetical brain can run.

    *I think IIT has some interesting things to say, but only at a trivial level.
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