Making images of something means making images of the objects represented, not making the objects themselves. — Apollodorus
Religious people do not think that when making images of deities they make the deities represented by the images. — Apollodorus
A statue of Zeus was an artistic representation of the God residing on Mount Olympus, not Zeus himself. — Apollodorus
Once again, follow your own statement. If a speech about the Gods has a true form, then it has a true form. — Apollodorus
No, the onus is on you to show that I don’t read the dialogue. — Apollodorus
Once again, the issue is not the reality but Socrates’ belief in it. — Apollodorus
Exactly, investigate the truth of beings, i.e., realities, not imaginary things. — Apollodorus
“Putting something down as being true” means believing it to be true. He is talking about realities. — Apollodorus
An opinion can be right opinion. — Apollodorus
Of course he doesn’t. He speaks through his characters. — Apollodorus
In that case, the claim that Socrates or Plato do not believe in God/s is an assumption without support. — Apollodorus
Anyway, as I said, the Sun is a God and the Good is (1) said to be the creator of the Sun and (2) is likened to the Sun. — Apollodorus
L. Strauss, On Plato’s Republic — Apollodorus
It's appropriate for founders to know the models according to which the poets must tell their tales.
That may very well be what religious people believe. — Fooloso4
Perhaps the true form of speech about the gods is that they do not exist. — Fooloso4
Investigate the truth of beings through speech. A speech about beings is not the reality of beings. — Fooloso4
Yes, he is talking about reality — Fooloso4
And it could be a wrong opinion. Without knowledge we cannot determine whether it is right or wrong. — Fooloso4
His makes his characters speak. — Fooloso4
The dialogues raise questions about the gods that are never resolved. The gods are absent from the discussion of what you call metaphysical reality in the Republic. — Fooloso4
Where in the dialogue does it say that the sun is a god? — Fooloso4
“Which one can you name of the divinities in heaven as the author and cause of this, whose light makes our vision see best and visible things to be seen?” “Why, the one that you too and other people mean for your question evidently refers to the Sun.” “Is not this, then, the relation of vision to that divinity?” (Rep 508a).
“This [the Sun], then, you must understand that I meant by the offspring of the Good which the Good begot to stand in a proportion with itself: as the Good is in the intelligible region to reason and the objects of reason, so is this [the Sun] in the visible world to vision and the objects of vision.” (Rep 508b - c ).
Socrates and Adeimantus are not agreeing to what the gods actually are or even if they are but rather to what the stories of the gods, that is, what the theology should be if the city is to be just. — Fooloso4
Perhaps. But you have no evidence that this is the case. — Apollodorus
A talk about a reality is a talk about a reality, i.e. a talk about something that is a reality. — Apollodorus
If without knowledge we cannot determine whether an opinion is right or wrong then we cannot claim that it is wrong without evidence to show this to be the case. — Apollodorus
If the questions about the Gods are never resolved then you cannot insists that they are. — Apollodorus
According to some, Plato taught "animism" and "atheism". Is that true?
I have told you this many times. — Apollodorus
And if they agree what the theology of the city should be, then there is a theology that is agreed on. — Apollodorus
Nothing changes when you repeat your opinions about what you believe the poets believed yet again. — Fooloso4
It is not talk about something that is a reality, it is talk about a hypothetical. — Fooloso4
Yes, he is talking about reality. — Fooloso4
But you now confirm that the Forms are hypothetical. — Fooloso4
The beings are hypothetical. — Fooloso4
With fanatical frequency you have returned to that question. — Fooloso4
Right, we have discussed this. — Fooloso4
A theology of false speeches — Fooloso4
After over two thousand years of Plato scholarship a great deal of disagreement remains. — Fooloso4
"Which one can you name of the divinities in heaven as the author and cause of this, whose light makes our vision see best and visible things to be seen?” “Why, the one that you too and other people mean for your question evidently refers to the Sun” (508a)
How about you, @Apollodorus? — Valentinus
"So, do we have an adequate grasp of the fact—even if we should consider it in many ways—that what is entirely, is entirely knowable; and what in no way is, is in every way unknowable?" (477a)
"Knowledge is presumably dependent on what is, to know of what is that it is and how it is?"
"Yes."
"While opinion, we say, opines." (478a)
"If what is, is knowable, then wouldn't something other than that which is be opinable?" (478b)
"To that which is not, we were compelled to assign ignorance, and to that which is, knowledge."
"Opinion, therefore, opines neither that which is nor that which is not." (478c)
“... although the good isn't being but is still beyond being, exceeding it in dignity (age) and power."(509b)
"You," I said, "are responsible for compelling me to tell my opinions about it." (509c)
“... in applying the going up and the seeing of what's above to the soul's journey up to the intelligible place, you'll not mistake my expectation, since you desire to hear it. A god doubtless knows if it happens to be true. At all events, this is the way the phenomena look to me: in the knowable the last thing to be seen, and that with considerable effort, is the idea of the good …” (517b-c)
"So, do we have an adequate grasp of the fact—even if we should consider it in many ways—that what is entirely, is entirely knowable; and what in no way is, is in every way unknowable?" (477a) — Fooloso4
“... although the good isn't being but is still beyond being, exceeding it in dignity (age) and power."(509b)
A way of life that rejects the complacency and false piety of believing one knows the divine answers. — Fooloso4
Curiously, and again from later Christian platonism, there is a theme of 'unknowing' - for example the mystical meditation guide 'The Cloud of Unknowing'. I think this sense of 'the good being beyond knowing' is rather easily accomodated in that framework. — Wayfarer
God’s essence is entirely unnameable since it is also completely incomprehensible. Therefore we name it on the basis of all its energies, although with respect to the essence itself none of those names means anything different from any other. For by each name and in all names together nothing other is named except that which is hidden and whose real identity is unknown to all
- St Peter of Damaskos, Book II, Twenty-Four Discourses, XXIII, Holy ScriptureThe saints neither know the whole of God’s purpose with regard to every object or scriptural text, nor on the other hand do they write down once and for all everything that they do know. This is because in the first place God is beyond comprehension, and His wisdom is not limited in such a way that an angel or man can grasp it in its entirety. As St John Chrysostom says with regard to a certain point of scriptural exegesis, we say about it as much as should be said at the moment, but God, in addition to what we say, knows other unfathomable meanings as well. And, in the second place, because of men’s incapacity and weakness it is not good for even the saints themselves to say all that they know, for they might speak at too great a length, thus making themselves offensive or unintelligible because of the confusion in their reader’s mind.
Bearing in mind the passages in Phaedo about the fact that the ideas have no opposite — Wayfarer
then in some fundamental respect, they truly are - as I think the quotations indicate. — Wayfarer
Do you happen to recall that term? — Wayfarer
I often read the expression of 'beyond being' in relation to Platonic philosophy and also in Christian theology. However, I think it ought to be translated as 'beyond existence', because I don't think that 'being' and 'existence' are necessarily synonymous terms in the context of philosophy. Transcendent beings, should there be such beings, are not existent in the same sense that phenomena are existent, as they don't arise and pass away, as do phenomena. — Wayfarer
Curiously, and again from later Christian platonism, there is a theme of 'unknowing' - for example the mystical meditation guide 'The Cloud of Unknowing'. I think this sense of 'the good being beyond knowing' is rather easily accomodated in that framework. — Wayfarer
I often read the expression of 'beyond being' in relation to Platonic philosophy and also in Christian theology. However, I think it ought to be translated as 'beyond existence', because I don't think that 'being' and 'existence' are necessarily synonymous terms in the context of philosophy. Transcendent beings, should there be such beings, are not existent in the same sense that phenomena are existent, as they don't arise and pass away, as do phenomena. — Wayfarer
… but their very existence (to einai) and essence (ousia) is derived to them from it, though the Good itself is not essence but still transcends essence (ousia) in dignity and surpassing power (509b)
There is an expression in Plato's dialogues which I read of recently, but I can't recall what it is or bring it to mind. It's an expression about the status of sensable things - that they neither truly are, nor are not, but are a kind of mixture of being and becoming. Do you happen to recall that term? — Wayfarer
. Socratic philosophy proceeds by rational inquiry, by the critical examination of opinion, that is, dialectic. — Fooloso4
Do you mean "expression" or "term"? The Republic has τὰ διπλάσια ta diplasia, “the double or ambiguous things” from διπλάσιος diplasios, “twofold” (Rep 479b - d).
The fact that the sensibles partake of opposite properties including being and not-being makes them imperfect appearances as opposed to the perfect Forms. — Apollodorus
Much of Thomas Aquinas' writing is dialectical in form. The emphasis on 'salvation by faith alone' came with Protestant fideism. — Wayfarer
Therefore we ought to try to escape from earth to the dwelling of the Gods as quickly as we can; and to escape is to become like God, so far as this is possible; and to become like God is to become righteous and holy and wise (Theaetetus 176a – b).
“But as many as received him, to them gave he power to become the sons of God” (John 1:12).
“He called them gods, unto whom the word of God came” (John 10:35).
“The people who are right with God will shine like the sun in their Father's kingdom” (Matthew 13: 43).
“So try to be like God, because you are his own dear children” (Ephesians 5:1).
The soul’s salvation is the consummation of faith (cf. 1 Pet. 1:9). This consummation is the revelation of what has been believed. Revelation is the inexpressible interpenetration of the believer with the object of belief and takes place according to each believer’s degree of faith (cf. Rom. 12:6). Through that interpenetration the believer finally returns to his origin. This return is the fulfilment of desire. Fulfilment of desire is ever-active repose in the object of desire. Such repose is eternal uninterrupted enjoyment of this object. Enjoyment of this kind entails participation in supra-natural divine realities. This participation consists in the participant becoming like that in which he participates. Such likeness involves, so far as this is possible, an identity with respect to energy between the participant and that in which he participates by virtue of the likeness. This identity with respect to energy constitutes the deification of the saints. Deification, briefly, is the encompassing and fulfilment of all times and ages, and of all that exists in either. This encompassing and fulfilment is the union, in the person granted salvation, of his real authentic origin with his real authentic consummation. This union presupposes a transcending of all that by nature is essentially limited by an origin and a consummation. Such transcendence is effected by the almighty and more than powerful energy of god, acting in a direct and infinite manner in the person found worthy of this transcendence. The action of this divine energy bestows a more than ineffable pleasure and joy on him in whom the unutterable and unfathomable union with the divine is accomplished. This, in the nature of things, cannot be perceived, conceived or expressed.
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