are you claiming "what is it like to go sky-diving?" is something that needs to be eliminated? Or is nonsensical? — RogueAI

No. As Peter Hacker says

it is misconceived to suppose that one can circumscribe, let alone define, conscious experience in terms of there being something which it is like for a subject to have it. It does not matter whether ‘conscious experience’ is understood as ‘experience had while conscious’ or as ‘experience of which one is conscious’. The very expression ‘There is something it is like for a person to have it’ is malconstructed. The question from which it is derived ‘What is (or was) it like for you (or for A) to V?’ is a perfectly licit request for specification of one’s affective attitude at the time to the experience undergone, a specification of ‘how it is (or was) for one’. If there is an answer, then there is something which it is (or was) for you (or A) to V —namely ... (and here comes a specification of the attitudinal attribute). — Hacker

Asking what it's like to sky dive is asking for my affect at the time, the answer is "It was great", or "it was really scary". Asking what it's like to be a bat is not intending such an answer. Nagel would not be satisfied with "it'd be fun", or "it'd be boring".

The idea of consciousness as 'something it's like', is the notion that there's an existent thing (what it's like) on top of the goings on in the brain that constitute the experience of doing something. It's that notion that I'm eliminativist about. I don't think it has any proper referent. The experience of skydiving just is the affect, the memories, the anticipations, the self-narrative etc, all of which have a clear neural basis (in that damage to parts of the brain can remove them). There's no additional thing on top of that.

@Isaac's problem is that he needs to eliminate something, otherwise he can't pretend to be an "eliminative materialist", but he doesn't know what to eliminate... He cannot eliminate conscious mental life, since that would eliminate science as well. He cannot eliminate concepts, such as numbers, for the same reason. He has to eliminate some other stuff, so why not tastes and emotions? Those things have no place in a laboratory anyway... :brow:

His kind of "eliminative" materialism is not in fact self-contradictory, as would be the more radical eliminative claim that minds don't exist. It is merely tasteless.

The idea of consciousness as 'something it's like', is the notion that there's an existent thing (what it's like) on top of the goings on in the brain that constitute the experience of doing something. It's that notion that I'm eliminativist about. I don't think it has any proper referent. — Isaac

Surely there is a subject of experience. The brain doesn't experience anything, unless it is embodied. The reality of the subject of experience is what is at issue. Eliminativism wants to say that the subject can be accounted for, in principle, in objective terms, so as to be amenable to exhaustive scientific description. That is what it is at issue. 'The brain' doesn't sky-dive, or play the piano, or do anything, even though it's true that you obviously can't do these things without a brain. (Although there have been cases of persons with impossibly malformed brains.)

So - the conscious being, the subject of experience, doesn't have a referent *because* it's not objectively describable, not because it isn't real.

Eliminative materialism exists due to the fact that the intrinsically subjective nature of conscious experience or existence, is out-of-scope for objective explanation as a matter of principle.
— Wayfarer

No. This is taking the way the world seems to you to be the way the world actually is. It seems to you as if consciousness was intrinsically subjective, it does not seem that way to others. Eliminative materialism doesn't agree with you about the intrinsic subjectivity and then rule it out of scope. It disagrees with you about the intrinsic subjectivity (or about it's nature, anyway).

This was the whole point I was making in the other thread. You claim that conscious experience is intrinsically subjective as a fact about what is the case. Yet you've derived this 'fact' by introspection alone...using your conscious experience of existence...the very thing you just argued was intrinsically subjective...So how exactly does it deliver you facts about the world which you can claim apply to others. It's just your story, the way things seem to you to be. It's not a description of the way the world is because, as 'science' has proven, measurements of the way the world is are observer dependant. — Isaac

Notice that when you say 'it seems to you that ...', this statement assumes there must be a subject to whom something 'seems' to be the case. There can't be a seeming, without someone to whom it seems. That's the fatal flaw in all Dennett's blatherings about 'unconscious competence'.

And yet, we then go on to read that the reality of one's subjective experience 'It's just your story, the way things seem to you to be.' So, the first-person perspective is dismissed as being 'just a story', even though the first-person perspective is required for there to be a story in the first place. Again, a glaring contradiction.

Finally, it is an obvious mistake is to categorise first-person experience as 'a fact about the world'. It is not 'a fact about the world' at all. It's what must first be, in order for there to be any facts about the world. Which is, incidentally, precisely the meaning of Descartes' cogito.

My brain neither gains mass nor increases in volume. Ergo, my thought about Aphrodite isn't matter! — TheMadFool

The brain (I don't know about mind) ABSOLUTELY gains in mass and volume just as with any other organ. Stuff (blood, chemicals, nutrients, etc, etc,) go in and out of the brain constantly. The only dispute is how appreciable/measurable the changes are. The brain consumes energy (chemical/biological) in its functionality. Therefore, at different times it has different energy levels.

Thought can be anything from an actual identity to a symbolic identity. We know thoughts have expressions at the level of brain functionality (fMRI tests and such). Therefore, it is also probable that thoughts may fall in the category of matter and energy even if not readily appreciable/measurable by specific machines/systems of mass/volume measurement.

On the other hand, thought (and by extension, mind) could be a symbolic thing like beauty which exists as an aspect of expression/perspective/perception and not necessarily an energy/mass identity by itself.

At the moment, in the brain-mind discussion, there are no definitives.

The brain (I don't know about mind) ABSOLUTELY gains in mass and volume just as with any other organ. Stuff (blood, chemicals, nutrients, etc, etc,) go in and out of the brain constantly. The only dispute is how appreciable/measurable the changes are. The brain consumes energy (chemical/biological) in its functionality. Therefore, at different times it has different energy levels. — BrianW

I did consider that possibility - blood flow is the mass equivalent of increased energy consumption - but that still doesn't solve the problem. I'm looking at thinking, or as 180 Proof likes to call it (mind)ing, as a conversion of one form of energy (electrical) into another form of energy (thoughts). We can do work with electrical energy but I've never heard of thoughts being used to do work. What I mean is the action potential in neurons can run a tiny nano-motor but I don't think the thought corresponding to that action potential can pull off a similar feat.

Surely there is a subject of experience. The brain doesn't experience anything, unless it is embodied. The reality of the subject of experience is what is at issue. — Wayfarer

Putting the word 'surely' in front of your assumptions doesn't magically make them more persuasive you know.

the being, the subject of experience, doesn't have a referent *because* it's not objectively describable — Wayfarer

Yet...

It's what must first exist in order for there to be any facts about the world. — Wayfarer

...sounds exactly like a description of it which is purporting to be objective.

Notice that when you say 'it seems to you that ...', this statement assumes there must be a subject to whom something 'seems' to be the case. There can't be a seeming, without someone to whom it seems. — Wayfarer

Yep.

That's the fatal flaw in all Dennett's blatherings about 'unconscious competence'. — Wayfarer

Not even vaguely related.

the first-person perspective is dismissed as being 'just a story', even though that perspective is required for there to be a story in the first place. Again, a glaring contradiction. — Wayfarer

It's not a contradiction in any sense. One is saying that your subjective feeling about the way things are might contradict the hidden causes of those feelings in some way. The second is saying that such a perspective is nonetheless necessary. Something can be necessary without it being accurate. Necessity and accuracy are not the same properties.

it is an obvious mistake is to classify your first-person existence as 'a fact about the world'. It is not 'a fact about the world' at all. It's what must first exist in order for there to be any facts about the world. — Wayfarer

If that necessity is not a fact about the world then what is it a fact about?

the being, the subject of experience, doesn't have a referent *because* it's not objectively describable
— Wayfarer

Yet...

It's what must first exist in order for there to be any facts about the world.
— Wayfarer

...sounds exactly like a description of it which is purporting to be objective. — Isaac

No, not objective. But real!

If that necessity is not a fact about the world then what is it a fact about? — Isaac

Something you're obviously having a great deal of trouble seeing. That is what this Aeon essay is about. As said, it's the substance of Descartes' famous argument, 'cogito ergo sum'.

No, not objective. But real! — Wayfarer

Ah! I see a cause for potential confusion between us (not that I think resolving it will get us far, but we might as well). There's 'objective' as in 'true for everyone' and there's 'objective' as in true in the absence of a subject. For me they're indistinguishable because anything which requires a subject to be true by definition is not necessarily true for everyone (we can't discount the possibility of a subject coming into existence for whom it's not true). Saying a claim is objective is saying that it's true for everyone, not that it doesn't require a subject to hold it. So "not objective. But real" doesn't make any sense as a claim. If something is real (to you) then it is 'not objective but realm, but that's the claim I'm making which you're refuting. If it's 'real for everyone', then it's either objective (doesn't require a subject to think it), or you'd need to defend the additional claim that despite it being a subjective truth it is impossible for a subject to exist for whom it isn't true.

If that necessity is not a fact about the world then what is it a fact about? — Isaac


Something you're obviously having a great deal of trouble seeing. That is what this Aeon essay is about. As said, it's the substance of Descartes' famous argument, 'cogito ergo sum'. — Wayfarer

None of that answers the question. If it's not a fact about the world then what is it a fact about? Shouldn't require an essay to answer.

There's 'objective' as in 'true for everyone' and there's 'objective' as in true in the absence of a subject. For me they're indistinguishable — Isaac

Very good. This is a properly philosophical question. But think about that. Whatever is true 'in the absence of a subject' is by definition unknown. In fact I'm going to call into question that there is a domain of facts that exist in the absence of any subject.

You said before that

as 'science' has proven, measurements of the way the world is are observer dependant. — Isaac

I think that's an over-simplification of the 'observer problem' but it's still relevant to the point.

I think that the presumption that there is a domain of fact that exists irrespective of anyone's knowledge of it is what is described in Kantian philosophy as 'transcendental realism'. This is the belief that 'the world' has an instrinsic or observer-independent reality which we discover or uncover - an observable reality that transcends our knowledge of it. It's the sense that there's a real world 'out there' which you and I both dwell in but which is real irrespective of our knowledge of it:

The transcendental realist therefore represents outer appearances...as things in themselves, which would exist independently of us and our sensibility and thus would also be outside us according to pure concepts of the understanding. — Kant, CPR A369

But remember, we're taking philosophy here, not empirical science. We're dealing with foundational issues in the nature of knowledge. And I think what you're appealing to as 'objective in the absence of any subject' is just the common-sense view that the world is real independent of any act of observation. That is just what has been called into question, in some contexts, by quantum physics; see this post.

So "not objective. But real" doesn't make any sense as a claim. — Isaac

It doesn't make any sense to an empiricist. But consider the nature of mathematical objects, such as number. Mathematical proofs and the like are not objectively true, they're deductively true. I think as mww already said earlier in this thread, the metaphysics of being is more like that, than like an empirical proposition. So let's say there's an empirical domain, the domain of phenomena, which is what appears to us; 'phenomena' means 'what appears'. But what is the nature of mathematical reasoning? What of the inner processes of judgement, that we use all the time to arrive at conclusions about the nature of things? I don't see that, and many other facets of reason, as being empirical in nature. That's where I think a form of dualism is defensible.

Interestingly, Kant himself acknowledges that he is a dualist in this passage:

The transcendental idealist, on the contrary, can be an empirical realist, hence, as he is called, a dualist, i.e., he can concede the existence of matter without going beyond mere self-consciousness and assuming something more than the certainty of representations in me, hence the cogito ergo sum. For because he allows this matter and even its inner possibility to be valid only for appearance– which, separated from our sensibility, is nothing –matter for him is only a species of representations (intuition), which are call external, not as if they related to objects that are external in themselves but because they relate perceptions to space, where all things are external to one another, but that space itself is in us. — Kant CPR A370

If it's not a fact about the world then what is it a fact about? Shouldn't require an essay to answer. — Isaac

It might, if you're not seeing the point at issue! There is an enormous volume of literature on just these kinds of questions. Many books have been written on it.

Honestly, hand-on-heart, not trying to be confrontational or condescending, there really is something you're not seeing in this argument. What it takes is a kind of shift of perspective, something like a gestalt shift.

Whatever is true 'in the absence of a subject' is by definition unknown. In fact I'm going to call into question that there is a domain of facts that exist in the absence of any subject. — Wayfarer

I agree. I don't think a domain of facts absent a subject to have them makes any sense at all. I believe in an external source of facts, but that's just a belief which works for me, I think it's the default position, so I question the true commitment of people who claim they believe otherwise, but yeah, just an assumption. Facts are things subjects know.

what you're appealing to as 'objective in the absence of any subject' is just the common-sense view that the world is real independent of any act of observation. — Wayfarer

I'm not appealing to it. I'm denying it. My claim is that you are appealing to it by elevating the way things seem to you (I have a conscious experience... etc) to the status of a fact about reality. For example...

what is the nature of mathematical reasoning? What of the inner processes of judgement, that we use all the time to arrive at conclusions about the nature of things? I don't see that, and many other facets of reason, as being empirical in nature. — Wayfarer

You're taking your subjective experience of using numbers, seeing other people use numbers, thinking, judging etc. and assuming that the way it then seems to you tells you something about the nature of reality. That's doing exactly what you accuse scientism of doing, ignoring the fact that there's a subject experiencing these things and that the act of doing so interferes with that which is the source of such experiences.

There is an enormous volume of literature on just these kinds of questions. Many books have been written on it. — Wayfarer

And you think this is not true of realism, physicalism, materialism... That many books have been written on a subject has no bearing on its qualities.

Honestly, hand-on-heart, not trying to be confrontational or condescending, there really is something you're not seeing in this argument. What it takes is a kind of shift of perspective, something like a gestalt shift. — Wayfarer

Honestly. How would you defend yourself if I said the same to you?

Outstanding dialogue, you guys. Well done.

You do realize that what you're saying is words are a waste of time, don't you? I'll leave you with that to ponder upon. — TheMadFool

Sure it's a waste ... But do you really think that I am going to ponder on something that a Mad Fool tells me? :)

Sure it's a waste ... But do you really think that I am going to ponder on something that a Mad Fool tells me? — Alkis Piskas

:smile: Remember, I'm only your echo, your reflection!

[deleted]

Outstanding dialogue, you guys. Well done. — Mww

Thanks... though 's latest effort doesn't quite match previous standards.

"[deleted]"... I don't get it... some sort of metaphor perhaps?... Like eliminativist views on the mind, his post is like, 'deleted' from discourse, man?... Woah...Too deep for my shallow positivist block of neuro-jelly to understand no doubt. I cede.

So your eliminative materialist model is generated by neurons in your brain, like some sort of 'woo'? — Olivier5

I double took when I read it myself. The lack of self-awareness is so worrying.

The lack of self-awareness is so worrying. — Ignance

Generally speaking, materialists have very poor self awareness. Which I guess is logical since they don't believe in self awareness.

Asking what it's like to sky dive is asking for my affect at the time, the answer is "It was great", or "it was really scary". Asking what it's like to be a bat is not intending such an answer. Nagel would not be satisfied with "it'd be fun", or "it'd be boring". — Isaac

There is something that it is like to be you (you), and there is something that it is like to be me (me). You would agree? It sounds like you're only objecting about considering what it's like to be things like bats. You concede that "what is it like to be you?" is a question you can answer?

There is something that it is like to be you (you), and there is something that it is like to be me (me). You would agree? — RogueAI

No. The question doesn't even make sense.

You don't know what it's like to be you? You can't grok that?

You don't know what it's like to be you? — RogueAI

It's not that I know or don't know. The question doesn't make sense. "What it's like..." is a grammatical device used to either compare or to describe affect responses to something, it just doesn't apply to 'being me'. The answer (though not the one you're looking for) would be "quite nice, thank you".

It's not that I know or don't know. — Isaac

Are you seriously claiming you don't know what it's like to be you? You can't see the absurdity of that?

Are you seriously claiming you don't know what it's like to be you? — RogueAI

I just explained that. It has nothing to do with knowing or not knowing. The question either doesn't make sense or else I've given you my answer "quite nice generally".

I'm not being mean. I'm just floored that someone can think the question "what is it like to be me?" doesn't make sense. I suspect there's no argument in the world that can get you to change your mind, so I'll stop at this point.