The mind-body problem can be posed sensibly only insofar as we have a definite conception of body. If we have no such definite and fixed conception, we cannot ask whether some phenomena fall beyond its range. The Cartesians offered a fairly definite conception of body in terms of their contact mechanics, which in many respects reflects commonsense understanding. Therefore they could sensibly formulate the mind-body problem…

[However] the Cartesian concept of body was refuted by seventeenth-century physics, particularly in the work of Isaac Newton, which laid the foundations for modern science. Newton demonstrated that the motions of the heavenly bodies could not be explained by the principles of Descartes’s contact mechanics, so that the Cartesian concept of body must be abandoned*...

There is no longer any definite conception of body. Rather, the material world is whatever we discover it to be, with whatever properties it must be assumed to have for the purposes of explanatory theory. Any intelligible theory that offers genuine explanations and that can be assimilated to the core notions of physics becomes part of the theory of the material world, part of our account of body. If we have such a theory in some domain, we seek to assimilate it to the core notions of physics, perhaps modifying these notions as we carry out this enterprise.

The mind-body problem can therefore not even be formulated. The problem cannot be solved, because there is no clear way to state it. Unless someone proposes a definite concept of 'body', we cannot ask whether some phenomena exceed its bounds. — Noam Chomsky, Language and Problems of Knowledge, p. 143-5

Physicalism...is the claim that the entire world may be described and explained using the laws of nature, in other words, that all phenomena are natural phenomena. This leaves open the question of what is 'natural', but one common understanding of the claim is that everything in the world is ultimately explicable in the terms of physics. This is known as reductive physicalism. However, this type of physicalism in its turn leaves open the question of what we are to consider as the proper terms of physics. There seem to be two options here, and these options form the horns of Hempel's dilemma, because neither seems satisfactory.

On the one hand, we may define the physical as whatever is currently explained by our best physical theories, e.g., quantum mechanics, general relativity. Though many would find this definition unsatisfactory, some would accept that we have at least a general understanding of the physical based on these theories, and can use them to assess what is physical and what is not. And therein lies the rub, as a worked-out explanation of mentality currently lies outside the scope of such theories.

On the other hand, if we say that some future, "ideal" physics is what is meant, then the claim is rather empty, for we have no idea of what this means. The "ideal" physics may even come to define what we think of as mental as part of the physical world. In effect, physicalism by this second account becomes the circular claim that all phenomena are explicable in terms of physics because physics properly defined is whatever explains all phenomena. — Wikipedia

Physicalism is a methodological position, that physical explanations ought not involve things spiritual or intensional. — Banno

If physicalism is true, how amazing is it that the mind (physical) can contemplate on that which it is not - the nonphysical?! The mind is clearly uncertain as to whether it's physical or not? — TheMadFool

The Mind-Matter Paradox! — TheMadFool

Either way, it's [The Mad] fool's errand! — Janus

The debate over whether mind is physical or not is as old as the hills. — TheMadFool

It’s not - it’s as old as Descartes’ publication of Method - around 1633 from memory. The medieval would never have conceived the question in those terms — Wayfarer

Correct me if I'm wrong but isn't Innatism, see Plato's Meno, just another way of saying the mind is nonphysical? — TheMadFool

The modern mind-body problem arose out of the scientific revolution of the seventeenth century, as a direct result of the concept of objective physical reality that drove that revolution. Galileo and Descartes made the crucial conceptual division by proposing that physical science should provide a mathematically precise quantitative description of an external reality extended in space and time, a description limited to spatiotemporal primary qualities such as shape, size, and motion, and to laws governing the relations among them.

Subjective appearances, on the other hand -- how this physical world appears to human perception -- were assigned to the mind, and the secondary qualities like color, sound, and smell were to be analyzed relationally, in terms of the power of physical things, acting on the senses, to produce those appearances in the minds of observers. It was essential to leave out or subtract subjective appearances and the human mind -- as well as human intentions and purposes -- from the physical world in order to permit this powerful but austere spatiotemporal conception of objective physical reality to develop. — Thomas Nagel, Mind and Cosmos, Pp 35-36

We are not mindless zombies, nor are we floating ghosts. We are humans. — Kasperanza

Only formulations such as yours, Fool, introduce the apparent paradox. For instance (once again), is digesting non-physical? breathing non-physical? walking non-physical? If not, then on what grounds do you 'assume' minding (e.g. intending, choosing, imagining, emoting, experiencing, remembering-recalling, etc) is non-physical? — 180 Proof

We are not mindless zombies, nor are we floating ghosts. We are humans. — Kasperanza

The modern mind-body problem arose out of the scientific revolution of the seventeenth century, as a direct result of the concept of objective physical reality that drove that revolution. — Thomas Nagel, Mind and Cosmos, Pp 35-36

Do you really have to post YouTube videos MF? Do you think we’re all pre-schoolers? :brow: — Wayfarer

You've missed the point. I don't claim that anything is nonphysical. — TheMadFool

if physicalism [ ... ] that which it is not, the nonphysical

The thing about science, from the little that I know of it, is that it's basically about finding the right mathematical model that fits/explains the observational data. — TheMadFool

Hence the correlation with 'positivism' - 'a philosophical system recognizing only that which can be scientifically verified or which is capable of logical or mathematical proof, and therefore rejecting metaphysics and theism.' Corresponds with the majority of posters on this forum. — Wayfarer

Confusion now hath made his masterpiece. — William Shakespeare

I thought logical positivism was more about empirical verifiability than the hypotheses/theories themselves — TheMadFool

The thing about science, from the little that I know of it, is that it's basically about finding the right mathematical model that fits/explains the observational data — TheMadFool

So, how does empirical verifiability work? — Wayfarer

By finding ‘what fits’. — Wayfarer

Either physicalism is true or nonphysicalism is true! — TheMadFool

If mind-matter are two aspects of the same thing, then there is no paradox. — RussellA

Suppose, I claim, God exists! Empirical verification of my claim would include sensory & instrumental data that match the claim. — TheMadFool

if one starts with the premise that water is different in kind to ice, then one will conclude that water is different in kind to ice. — RussellA

Yeah good luck with that. Invite me to the award ceremony. — Wayfarer

something physical (the mind) is trying to connect as it were with that which it is not, the nonphysical. — TheMadFool

What exactly do you mean by "physical" and "non-physical"?

As already pointed out by others, these terms mean very little... — Olivier5

In the case of science, one piece of the medallion is nonphysical (mathematical models) and the other piece is physical (empirical observation). — TheMadFool