What makes reciprocal altruism work is closer to hedonistic utilitarianism (maximising happiness for all involved) but really is about perpetuating my genome (which is incapable of pleasure or pain, only continuing or dying out). — Kenosha Kid

I’m interpreting this comment to mean that you think it’s valuable or good to perpetuate your genome. Is that an accurate interpretation of this quote from you?

That doesn't counter the likelihood that our morality derives from our social biology, nor is it particularly useful to attempt to build a morality around edge cases, or one that admits every conceivable behaviour. Whatever your thoughts on what morality is, there's a bunch of people who aren't doing that, so that's a doomed exercise. — Kenosha Kid

I think it is useful to have our conception of morality incorporate edge cases as well as stereotypical cases and I think I have a way to define morality games that does just that. I understand morality games to be rhetorical language games and I think that can incorporate all the edge cases that I have mentioned. In addition, I don’t see any good reason to reject my understanding of morality games as it seems like a pretty intuitive understanding of them. My basic argument was intended to be that all moral philosophers are part of the morality game and that there are at least some moral philosophers that don’t believe in and violate every kind of supposed moral duty.

In addition, I think there something else that‘s kinda weird and paradoxical about duties being requirements for being part of the morality game. Namely that it would seem counterintuitive to say that a single violation of a duty permanently prevents someone from being part of the morality game. I would think that you would agree with me that people can be redeemed and brought back into the morality game. But, if violating duties only temporarily make someone not part of the morality game then doesn’t that make duties seem very trivial and unimportant?