The problem that leaves me with, is whether anyone knows anything at all. — Wayfarer

This overstates the problem.

If all anyone has is opinions, then where is the lodestar? — Wayfarer

Those opinions that seems most likely to be true.

I also had the idea that opinion, doxa, concerned mainly the sensible realm whereas knowledge, noesis, concerned the realm of the ideas. Am I mistaken in so thinking? — Wayfarer

We live in the visible realm. Questions about how we ought to live are about the visible realm. The intelligible realm is about hypotheticals unless one has attained knowledge of the Forms. Socrates denied having such knowledge.

Those opinions that seems most likely to be true. — Fooloso4

If they're true, they're no longer simply opinion.

We live in the visible realm. Questions about how we ought to live are about the visible realm. — Fooloso4

If nor opinion then what?

Then, knowledge!

I think the target of Plato's skepticism is what you designate 'the visible world', which is often referred to as the domain of sense. One aspect of problem of knowledge in Plato's philosophy was that the sensible domain comprises entities which are themselves not proper objects of real knowledge, because they're mutable and subject to decay. As the goal of reason was to discern that which is not mutable and subject to decay, then empirical knowledge was limited as a matter of principle. The grounds for this, given in the Meno, is that one's soul existed in past lives and knowledge is transferred from those lives to the current one. Whereas the ideas were originally acquired in a former state of existence, and are recovered by anamnesis (un-forgetting). The claim is that one does not need to know what knowledge is before gaining knowledge, but rather one has a wealth of knowledge before ever gaining experience. Which is why Platonism is a rationalist philosophy.

We live in the visible realm. Questions about how we ought to live are about the visible realm. — Fooloso4

How would you, for instance, distinguish that claim from positivism? Do a priori truths inhere in the visible realm? Moral principles? If so, where? Are they to be understood as the products of evolution? Etc.

My nascent understanding is that clearly h. sapiens evolved according to the outline of evolutionary anthropology (notwithstanding that it is constantly being re-written), but that in reaching a certain threshhold, denoted by the acquisition of language, imagination, art, and so on, then h.sapiens realises 'horizons of being' that are not reducible to purely biological or evolutionary terms. There's nothing specifically in Darwinian theory which accounts for that, or anticipates it (which was also the view of the co-discoverer of natural selection, Alfred Russel Wallace).

Modern naturalism tends to reductionism, because it will only admit that for which there is an actual or possible scientific explanation, thereby shutting out entire domains of being. Kind of the opposite of anamnesis - instead of un-forgetting, it's re-forgetting. (Hence the expression 'marooned in the present'.)

If they're true, they're no longer simply opinion. — Wayfarer

Absolutely correct. They are right opinion, orthe doxa, which can be used as right guidance, orthe hegesia in our actions. Like knowing the road to Larisa without having been there. So, definitely a form of knowledge:

Socrates
If a man knew the way to Larisa, or any other place you please, and walked there and led others, would he not give right and good guidance?
Meno
Certainly.
Socrates
Well, and a person who had a right opinion as to which was the way, but had never been there and did not really know, might give right guidance, might he not?
Meno
Certainly.
Socrates
And so long, I presume, as he has right opinion about that which the other man really knows, he will be just as good a guide—if he thinks the truth instead of knowing it—as the man who has the knowledge.
Meno
Just as good.(Meno 97a-b).

Incidentally, Socrates in the Phaedo says that we must have got the knowledge of the Forms before we were born (75d) and that we lost this knowledge in the course of being born, but by using our senses we start regaining it (75e).

And he mentions the Forms of Largeness, Health, and Strength, that through training we get closest to knowing them (65d-e) and that by separating ourselves as much as possible from the physical body and sense perceptions we will “hit upon reality” (66a).

So, though higher Forms like Justice, Goodness, and Beauty (65d), are more difficult to grasp, it seems that other Forms such as Largeness (or Magnitude), Health, and Strength, are easier to access and may serve as a model for gaining insight into the others.

so long, I presume, as he has right opinion about that which the other man really knows, he will be just as good a guide—if he thinks the truth instead of knowing it—as the man who has the knowledge.

A discussion of the distinction between conviction (faith) and knowledge from the early Buddhist texts:

The Buddha: "Sariputta, do you take it on conviction that the faculty of conviction, when developed & pursued, gains a footing in the Deathless, has the Deathless as its goal & consummation? Do you take it on conviction that the faculty of persistence... mindfulness... concentration... discernment, when developed & pursued, gains a footing in the Deathless, has the Deathless as its goal & consummation?"

"Lord, it's not that I take it on conviction in the Blessed One that the faculty of conviction... persistence... mindfulness... concentration... discernment, when developed & pursued, gains a footing in the Deathless, has the Deathless as its goal & consummation. Those who have not known, seen, penetrated, realized, or attained it by means of discernment would have to take it on conviction in others that the faculty of conviction... persistence... mindfulness... concentration... discernment, when developed & pursued, gains a footing in the Deathless, has the Deathless as its goal & consummation, whereas those who have known, seen, penetrated, realized, & attained it by means of discernment would have no doubt or uncertainty — Pubbakotthaka Sutta

Bolds added. The issue is, in secular culture, there is no criterion for such an understanding - if it can't be validated with reference to science, then it's categorised as 'mere belief', regardless of the distinctions made within the traditions themselves. There's no modern or secular equivalent for the distinction.

Not only that, but if all opinion, including opinion about opinion, is to be perpetually doubted, questioned, and inquired into, no criteria are available on which to do that, and all results or conclusions are to be doubted, questioned, looked into, and dismissed as "opinion", then is there any point in pursuing this supposedly "examined life" or are we on the road (or shortcut) to a situation where we need to be examined by others? — Apollodorus

There are indeed no universal criteria available. If there were all sufficiently thoughtful people would agree with one another, because the universal criteria would make the metaphysical truth self-evident. What we do have are more less well-cultivated senses of plausibility; it's not an exact science, to be sure. So, when it comes to people's metaphysical beliefs, it's more a matter of taste than anything else.

Those opinions that seems most likely to be true. — Fooloso4


If they're true, they're no longer simply opinion. — Wayfarer

Their being true is not a matter of opinion, but our believing that they are true is. In other words we cannot know with certainty what is true. Socrates' lesson is to learn to live with knowing that you do not know.

Modern naturalism tends to reductionism, because it will only admit that for which there is an actual or possible scientific explanation, thereby shutting out entire domains of being. — Wayfarer

To exclude "entire domains of being" which do not explain anything sufficiently enough to provide reliable, unique, predictions is methodological discernment (i.e. defeasible reasoning) and not "reductionism". The (scientific) naturalist seeks to explain the explicable nuggets she extracts from steaming piles of the inexplicable.

Whereas the ideas were originally acquired in a former state of existence, and are recovered by anamnesis (un-forgetting) ... Which is why Platonism is a rationalist philosophy. — Wayfarer

Does not sound very rational to me. The myth of recollection is fraught with problems. A few quick points: The theme of the Theaetetus is knowledge but there is no mention in the dialogue of a theory of Forms or of recollection. In the Republic neither the story of the ascent from the cave to transcendent knowledge of Forms or the method of dialectic includes anamnesis. In the Apology Socrates says that neither he nor anyone else has knowledge of higher things. In the Phaedo the soul might in the next life that of an ass or an ant.

[Edit: See also the Apology where he claims to not know sufficiently about the things in Hades.(29b) Not knowing the things in Hades undermines the myth of recollection.]

How would you, for instance, distinguish that claim from positivism? — Wayfarer

You asked about the divided line. He makes a clear distinction between the world we live in and the world of Forms.

Do a priori truths inhere in the visible realm? — Wayfarer

That depends on whether you buy into the myth of recollection, but even there the knowledge gained in a previous life includes experiential knowledge.

Moral principles? If so, where? — Wayfarer

That depends on what you regard as a moral principle. As I understand it, they would be hypothetical, things we regard as just, noble/beautiful, and good. But absent knowledge of the just, noble/beautiful, and good what we may take to be a moral principle may be wrong.

h. sapiens evolved — Wayfarer

You have moved far beyond Socrates and the examined life. We are social animals. As such we have certain capacities for living together.

Those who have not known, seen, penetrated, realized, or attained it by means of discernment would have to take it on conviction in others that the faculty of conviction... persistence... mindfulness... concentration... discernment, when developed & pursued, gains a footing in the Deathless, has the Deathless as its goal & consummation, whereas those who have known, seen, penetrated, realized, & attained it by means of discernment would have no doubt or uncertainty — Pubbakotthaka Sutta

This passage shows the author chasing a mirage, "a 'difference' that makes no difference". What could having no doubt or uncertainty be other than conviction?

Their being true is not a matter of opinion, but our believing that they are true is. In other words we cannot know with certainty what is true. Socrates' lesson is to learn to live with knowing that you do not know. — Janus

I agree. Socrates' knowledge of ignorance is not simply a matter of knowing that he is ignorant, it is knowledge of how to live without knowledge of what is "noble and good".(Apology 21d)

The (scientific) naturalist seeks to explain the explicable nuggets she extracts from steaming piles of the inexplicable. — 180 Proof

I really do understand that. Platonism, ancient philosophy generally, existed in a master-student relationship. The teacher passed down understanding of principles many of which can't be written down, or for which the written texts are simply digests or mnemonics. So they provided a structure around the 'steaming piles', they had a 'topography', if you like.

I think I mentioned the other week, an excerpt from the Pierre Hadot entry in the Encyclopedia of Philosophy:

For Hadot, famously, the means for the philosophical student to achieve the “complete reversal of our usual ways of looking at things” epitomized by the Sage were a series of spiritual exercises. These exercises encompassed all of those practices still associated with philosophical teaching and study: reading, listening, dialogue, inquiry, and research. However, they also included practices deliberately aimed at addressing the student’s larger way of life, and demanding daily or continuous repetition: practices of attention (prosoche), meditations (meletai), memorizations of dogmata, self-mastery (enkrateia), the therapy of the passions, the remembrance of good things, the accomplishment of duties, and the cultivation of indifference towards indifferent things (PWL 84). Hadot acknowledges his use of the term “spiritual exercises” may create anxieties, by associating philosophical practices more closely with religious devotion than typically done (Nussbaum 1996, 353-4; Cooper 2010). Hadot’s use of the adjective “spiritual” (or sometimes “existential”) indeed aims to capture how these practices, like devotional practices in the religious traditions (6a), are aimed at generating and reactivating a constant way of living and perceiving in prokopta, despite the distractions, temptations, and difficulties of life. For this reason, they call upon far more than “reason alone.” They also utilize rhetoric and imagination in order “to formulate the rule of life to ourselves in the most striking and concrete way” and aim to actively re-habituate bodily passions, impulses, and desires (as for instance, in Cynic or Stoic practices, abstinence is used to accustom followers to bear cold, heat, hunger, and other privations) (PWL 85). These practices were used in the ancient schools in the context of specific forms of interpersonal relationships: for example, the relationship between the student and a master, whose role it was to guide and assist the student in the examination of conscience, in identification and rectification of erroneous judgments and bad actions, and in the conduct of dialectical exchanges on established themes. — Askesis of Desire

I know you subscribe to many of the ideas in ancient philosophy yourself, but that you want to firewall off anything that you categorise as 'religious', for just the reasons given in that passage.

So all these debates, whenever I pop up with these kinds of ideas, notice how immediately it gets characterised as a religious apologist trying to convert the pragmatic-scientific. That is simply the cultural dynamics that I'm seeking to explain, the background to the 'secularism vs faith' debate. Secular culture, as far as I'm concerned, is a great achievement, but it's place is basically to provide a framework within which one is free to practice any religion or none; It's not actually anti-religious, which is nevertheless how it's interpreted by a lot of people. (Like, there's a movement in Australia to remove the question of religion from the Census, which is typical of 'crusading secularism'.)

I will acknowledge that my own philosophical quest has activated in my psyche some of the tropes and archetypes ('samskara') originating from my own cultural and spiritual history, which is obviously Christian. But at the same time, I am trying to be critically aware of those elements in myself.

I maintain, there is something to understand, some forgotten wisdom, that has been lost in translation to the one-dimensional worldview of secular culture. You can call that religious belief, but I think there's more to it than that. And I hope you can see that i am genuinely trying to be as honest and forthcoming as I can be.

Does not sound very rational to me. — Fooloso4

I understand that. As I said, it's difficult to find any way of rationalising that against the modern secular worldview.

My belief is that many of these ancient myths symbolise truths about the human condition, in terms that were intepreted according to the prevailing culture. Of course the world is not supported on the back of a giant turtle nor do the planets revolve in crystalline spheres. Nowadays the myth of recollected knowledge might be reconceived in terms of heritable understanding that accumulates and is passed down generation to generation (as Noam Chomsky seeks to do). But there's something in that process which is not explicable in purely genetic terms, which I don't think can account for such things as (for example) artistic genius or musical prodigy, and there is indeed 'more in the world than our philosophy has ever dreamed of.'

You have moved far beyond Socrates and the examined life. — Fooloso4

Taking into account 2, 500 years of intellectual history since.

Secular culture, as far as I'm concerned, is a great achievement, but it's place is basically to provide a framework within which one is free to practice any religion or none; It's not actually anti-religious, which is nevertheless how it's interpreted by a lot of people. — Wayfarer

That's an important point so often sidestepped.

So all these debates, whenever I pop up with these kinds of ideas, notice how immediately it gets characterised as a religious apologist trying to convert the pragmatic-scientific. That is simply the cultural dynamics that I'm seeking to explain, the background to the 'secularism vs faith' debate. Secular culture, as far as I'm concerned, is a great achievement, but it's place is basically to provide a framework within which one is free to practice any religion or none; It's not actually anti-religious, which is nevertheless how it's interpreted by a lot of people. (Like, there's a movement in Australia to remove the question of religion from the Census, which is typical of 'crusading secularism'.) — Wayfarer

If you don't mean to be an apologist for any religion or "otherworldlyness", or any kind of claim that there is some special "hidden" knowledge which can be directly accessed by the spiritual elite, then there would be nothing for the pragmatist to complain about. But you certainly do seem to be making such claims.

I agree with you that secular culture should not interfere in people's private choices in regards to religion, but if people make elitist claims to esoteric or religious knowledge on public forums, then they should expect some pushback.

Also, why should the question of religion not be removed from the census? The question is already put as 'optional' anyway. Does the census ask about your political persuasions or literary preferences, for example?

But you certainly do seem to be making such claims. — Janus

I am. As we discussed with Reconstructo, whatever he calls himself nowadays, a few months back:

The "perennial philosophy" is in this context defined as a doctrine which holds [1] that as far as worthwhile knowledge is concerned not all men are equal, but that there is a hierarchy of persons, some of whom, through what they are, can know much more than others; [2] that there is a hierarchy also of the levels of reality, some of which are more "real," because more exalted than others; and [3] that the wise men of old have found a "wisdom" which is true, although it has no "empirical" basis in observations which can be made by everyone and everybody; and that in fact there is a rare and unordinary faculty in some of us by which we can attain direct contact with actual reality--through the Prajñāpāramitā of the Buddhists, the logos of Parmenides, the sophia of Aristotle and others, Spinoza's amor dei intellectualis, Hegel's Vernunft, and so on; and [4] that true teaching is based on an authority which legitimizes itself by the exemplary life and charismatic quality of its exponents. — Edward Conze, Buddhist Philosophy and it’s European Parallels

they should expect some pushback. — Janus

Of course. But I still think there’s a critical way of debating such ideas. Philosophical enlightenment, as referred to by Conze above, really is a faculty, and it really has been on the whole, forgotten. There’s not even a word for it in current English. There are clear historical reasons for that happening, in my view. But as I said, notice the way that it is invariably re-framed as if I’m a Christian evangelist. When Thomas Nagel published Mind and Cosmos in 2012, he got a lot of the same - ‘a friend to creationism’ he was called by the secular thought police, even despite his self-declared atheism. See, he apparently entertains ideas that atheists are supposed to despise. (Not for nothing that Richard Dawkins called Lloyd Rees ‘a quisling’ when the latter received the Templeton Prize.)

There’s a dialectical process underlying all of this - thesis (orthodox Christian belief), antithesis (Victorian atheism), and an emerging synthesis, which is a combination of ‘systems theory’ in science, and post-secularism in philosophy - enactivism, phenomenology and so on. Emphasis on ‘religious experience’, instead of just accepting the prescribed dogmas. That’s what I’m trying to work towards.

Emphasis on ‘religious experience’, instead of just accepting the prescribed dogmas. That’s what I’m trying to work towards. — Wayfarer

Well then, why is your "religious experience" relevant in public discussions of philosophy or natural science? As far as I'm concerned "religious experience" independent of (though not necessarily without or uninformed by) "prescribed dogmas" is mysticism. Why not be silent about that which one cannot speak of intelligibly, rationally or objectively? Why eff 'the ineffable' so promiscuously, sir?

Secular culture, as far as I'm concerned, is a great achievement, but it's place is basically to provide a framework within which one is free to practice any religion or none; It's not actually anti-religious, which is nevertheless how it's interpreted by a lot of people. — Wayfarer

:100:

And I hope you can see that i am genuinely trying to be as honest and forthcoming as I can be.

:up:

Lloyd Rees — Wayfarer

I think you meant Lord Rees. Lloyd Rees was an Australian painter.

A further point about secular culture. The right to practice a religion of choice (provided practitioners do not attempt to force their religion on others) is indeed inherent in it. It is the right not to practice a religion that is, not everywhere but in certain quarters, under threat due to religious indoctrination by parents and teachers, and peer pressure within certain cultural enclaves.

As to so-called higher knowledge; there is no way to independently establish its provenance. Even if you thought you directly saw the nature of reality, and knew the truth about "life, the universe and everything" how could you ever be sure you were not deluding yourself. And even if you were not deluding yourself, how could you convince anyone of the truth of your claimed knowledge without it being that they shared the same insight? And why is it that so-called sages all through the ages have disagreed about the truth regarding life and death (reincarnation vs resurrection, or karma vs divine judgement, for examples).

How could such sages disagree if they were able to directly see the truth in a way that is independent of their cultural biases? That's why I say enlightenment is more of a disposition; a letting of of personal fears and egoistic concerns which stand in the way of living fully than it is the source of any determinable knowledge about anything. It is a knowing how, not a knowing that in my opinion. And of course it has great value as such, and anyone who has achieved such a disposition will certainly be charismatic.

you meant Lord Rees — Janus

Yeah him sorry. Lord Martin Rees. I bought his book, Just Six Numbers, which I'm pleased to report is stultifyingly dull.

It is the right not to practice a religion that is, not everywhere but in certain quarters, under threat due to religious indoctrination — Janus

Yeah lookout, they're coming for you!

How could such sages disagree if they were able to directly see the truth in a way that is independent of their cultural biases? — Janus

You remember the elephant parable.

The situation is complicated by modernity, by the proximity of all of the world's cultures and forms of knowledge rubbing shoulders in the Global Village.

even if you were not deluding yourself, how could you convince anyone of the truth of your claimed knowledge without it being that they shared the same insight? — Janus

I don't expect to, but I hope I can be of some use to those with similar inclinations.

And besides that, there are scholarly and historical arguments for the idea of there being a higher knowledge that has generally been forgotten in the transition to modernity. (Or rather, replaced by empirical science, which deliberately excludes the qualitative dimension - hence the interminable debate about 'qualia' and also the 'is-ought problem' in philosophy of ethics.)

Sources include the SEP article on Divine Illumination. It's not very good, in my opinion, but at least it's there. ('For most people today it is hard to take divine illumination seriously, hard to view it as anything other than a quaint relic' - copy that.) Another couple of fragmentary sources are the Wikipedia entry on higher consciousness and enlightenment (the latter is an index of sorts). Also the Wiki entry on nous (philosophy) :

In the Aristotelian scheme, nous is the basic understanding or awareness that allows human beings to think rationally. For Aristotle, this was distinct from the processing of sensory perception, including the use of imagination and memory, which other animals can do¹. This therefore connects discussion of nous to discussion of how the human mind sets definitions in a consistent and communicable way, and whether people must be born with some innate potential to understand the same universal categories in the same logical ways². Deriving from this it was also sometimes argued, especially in classical and medieval philosophy, that the individual nous must require help of a spiritual and divine type³. By this type of account, it came to be argued that the human understanding (nous) somehow stems from this cosmic nous, which is however not just a recipient of order, but a creator of it.

1. This distinction is often contested here.
2. Hence the central role of universals.
3. Which is what I think 'divine illumination' was supposed to have been connected with.

Platonism, ancient philosophy generally, existed in a master-student relationship. The teacher passed down understanding of principles many of which can't be written down, or for which the written texts are simply digests or mnemonics. So they provided a structure around the 'steaming piles', they had a 'topography', if you like. — Wayfarer

Correct. I think it is essential to understand that philosophy in general has been theistic from its very beginnings in Ancient Greece until recently. Atheistic or anti-theistic philosophy in the West became dominant only recently, from the 1800's to the 1900's with the spread of Marxism, Darwinism, materialist scientism, and Stalinism.

The atheists and anti-Platonists (here represented by Strauss & followers) are now attempting to erase theistic philosophy from the history and memory of mankind. One of their standard tactics is to artificially divide Platonism into separate segments like "Socratic", "Platonic", and "Neoplatonic", after which they declare these to be totally distinct and mutually incompatible.

This tactic leads the anti-Platonists, Platonophobes, or Plato-haters to dismiss anything Platonists say about Socrates or Plato with standard remarks like "Socrates knows nothing" and "Plato says nothing".

Another irrational technique is to insist that Plato should not be interpreted through Plotinus and other Platonists who had direct access to the Greek Platonic tradition, but through Maimonides who learned about Greek philosophy through Arab philosophers living in Spain!

The reason the Platonophobes choose Maimonides as the sole legitimate interpreter of Plato (aside from Marx, Lenin, and Stalin) is that he employed an esotericist interpretation of Greek philosophers according to which they have "hidden or secret teachings", in particular, of a subversive political nature, that only they, the Maimonidists and Straussians, know how to read and correctly interpret.

And this is why it is absolutely imperative to preserve, revive, and promote the memory of the Platonic heritage at all costs.

Plato in antiquity was referred to as "the divine Plato", precisely on account of his metaphysical teachings that were thought to have been divinely inspired. "Illumination" or photismos is central to the Platonic tradition precisely because it describes the elevation and expansion of consciousness that follows "purification", katharsis, and culminates in enlightenment proper or "deification", theosis in which the philosopher attains the highest states of experience, knowledge, and existence.

I think it is essential to understand that philosophy in general has been theistic from its very beginnings in Ancient Greece until recently. — Apollodorus

I don't agree with the use of that word 'theistic' in this context. It opens up all kinds of arguments about 'who's God?' or at least, whose version of God. And the historic relationships of theistic religions have hardly been a testament to heavenly peace. I agree that traditional philosophy has a concern with what is called in Western religions 'salvation', and what is called in the East 'liberation' or 'mokṣa', but that is not always or exclusively conceived in theistic terms; Jains, Buddhists, and Stoics were not 'theistic' in that narrow sense, but all were soteriological paths. It's arguable that Plato and Aristotle were not 'theistic' in a Christian sense but they were subsequently assimilated into Christian apologetics, obviously without much chance of representing themselves when that happened. (I do recall reading that Proclus, who did live in the Christian era, had a 'cold disdain' for Christianity, notwithstanding that his ideas were also to be assimilated, or appropriated, by later Christians.)

I haven't read Leo Strauss - mind you, there are enormous numbers of authors I haven't read - but I did look up the SEP entry on him after your comments about him. He's obviously a complex thinker with a large opus, so I wouldn't want to rush to judgement, but I did notice this passage in his Wiki entry:

Although Strauss accepted the utility of religious belief, there is some question about his religious views. On one hand he was openly disdainful of atheism and disapproved of contemporary dogmatic disbelief, which he considered intemperate and irrational. On the other hand, like Thomas Aquinas, he felt that revelation must be subject to examination by reason. At the end of The City and Man, Strauss invites us to "be open to ... the question quid sit deus ["What is God?"]", and Edward Feser writes that:

Strauss was not himself an orthodox believer, neither was he a convinced atheist. Since whether or not to accept a purported divine revelation is itself one of the "permanent" questions, orthodoxy must always remain an option equally as defensible as unbelief.

Which seems a fairly moderate attitude to me.

I agree with you that the religious or spiritual aspect of Platonism is often deprecated in today's culture, and also with the general outline of the philosophical path as a path of illumination, although I think the only real Platonism in that sense that is preserved today is probably associated with Eastern Orthodoxy (Incidentally, this is a homepage for an interesting contemporary Platonist theologian, Alexander Earl, in case you're interested.)

But I am also mindful of the fact that this is a philosophy forum in a secular culture, and that such rhetoric will often generate more heat than light. I too am critical of the shortcomings of liberal individualism and the philosophies of the Enlightenment but I personally would rather try and express those criticisms in a rather more circumspect way and being mindful of the prevailing cultural norms.

I don't agree with the use of that word 'theistic' in this context. — Wayfarer

I tend to use "theistic" in the sense of "not atheistic" and "spiritual", if you will.

Gerson defines Platonism as consisting of antimaterialist, antimechanist, antinominalist, antirelativist, and antiskeptic elements that predate Plato but were brought together and systematized by Plato and later Platonists.

Another important fact to bear in mind is that Plato does have a theology. However, Plato's theology and "theism" are of a particular form in that they are based on a hierarchy of metaphysical entities or realities from the Gods officially worshiped at Athens (the Olympic Gods), to the cosmic Gods (Sun, Moon, etc.) to the Good or the One. Plato's supreme deity has two aspects, an anthropomorphic one represented by the Maker of the Cosmos and a higher, non-anthropomorphic one, represented by the Good/the One.

The goal of Platonism is knowledge which in its highest form is self-knowledge, self-realization, or self-recognition in which the conscious self or soul realizes its identity with the Universal Consciousness which is ultimate reality.

The process that leads to the highest state consists of three basic phases or stages (1) purification, (2) illumination, and (3) deification or unification.

There are several methods or paths of achieving this: (1) philosophy proper based on intellectual training and contemplation (theoria), (2) religious and devotional practices (theourgia), and (3) the mystery traditions (mysteria).

Depending on the individual's psychological makeup and stage of intellectual and spiritual development, any one of the above paths may be more suitable or effective than the others. In ideal circumstances, a qualified teacher or guide assigns the philosopher to one path or the other. But all three ultimately lead to the same goal and may even be used concomitantly with one another.

It follows that though to some Platonists "God" or the supreme principle is pure universal consciousness or something that is indescribable, unfathomable, etc., to others it may be the Maker of the Universe, or indeed, one of the cosmic Gods such as the Sun. This is why it is rather difficult to describe Platonism as "not theistic" particularly in view of the fact that Plato's works are very much about divine realities. But we must, of course, understand "theistic" in the Platonic sense.

Whilst it is true that we live in a "secular" world with strong anti-theistic tendencies, we must, as far as possible, try to understand Platonism on its own terms. But this is just my opinion.

As the Wiki article goes on to note, the nature of the distinction between nous and "the processing of sensory perception, including the use of imagination and memory, which other animals can do" was and is a highly contested topic. The following passage is particularly focused upon:

"For that which acts is always superior to that which is affected, and the first principle to the matter.[Actual knowledge is identical with its object; but potential knowledge is prior in time in the individual but not prior even in time in general] ; and it is not the case that it sometimes thinks and at other times not. In separation it is just what it is, and this alone is immortal and eternal. (But we do not remember because this is unaffected whereas the passive intellect is perishable, and without this thinks nothing." — Aristotle, De Anima, 430a18, translated by D.W Hamlyn

As Aristotle goes on to develop the differences between perception and thinking in Chapter 7, he says the following:

To the thinking soul images serve as sense-perceptions (aisthemata). And when it asserts or denies good or bad, it avoids or pursues it. Hence the soul never thinks without an image. — ibid, 431a8

With these set of conditions being put forth as an explanation of our experience, "divine illumination" seems to be the only light bulb around.

With these set of conditions being put forth as an explanation of our experience, "divine illumination" seems to be the only light bulb around. — Valentinus

Wikipedia and Aristotle may say many things. However, just because they say something, it doesn’t follow that Plato and Platonism are wrong.

The soul’s intelligence operates on different levels from sense perception to emotions to discursive thought to non-discursive (or intuitive) perception. Socrates in the Phaedo says very clearly that true knowledge and experience of reality is attained when the soul is alone by itself and gathered into itself without body, sense perceptions, or anything else apart from pure reason:

Would not that man do this most perfectly who approaches each thing, so far as possible, with the reason alone, not introducing sight into his reasoning nor dragging in any of the other senses along with his thinking, but who employs pure, absolute reason in his attempt to search out the pure, absolute essence of things, and who removes himself, so far as possible, from eyes and ears, and, in a word, from his whole body, because he feels that its companionship disturbs the soul and hinders it from attaining truth and wisdom? Is not this the man, Simmias, if anyone, to attain to the knowledge of reality?”
“That is true as true can be, Socrates,” said Simmias (65e-66a)

Divine illumination comes from the fact that the Forms are divine and that contemplation of them by means of pure reason (logismos) or intellect (nous) logically leads to the inner illumination (photismos or ellampsis) of the soul with the light of truth. This is why the soul must turn away from the body and the material world, and look on the intelligible world of realities that are divine like itself:

“Now we have also been saying for a long time, have we not, that, when the soul makes use of the body for any inquiry, either through seeing or hearing or any of the other senses—for inquiry through the body means inquiry through the senses,—then it is dragged by the body to things which never remain the same, and it wanders about and is confused and dizzy like a drunken man because it lays hold upon such things?”
“Certainly.”
“But when the soul inquires alone by itself, it departs into the realm of the pure, the everlasting, the immortal and the changeless, and being akin to these it dwells always with them whenever it is by itself and is not hindered, and it has rest from its wanderings and remains always the same and unchanging with the changeless, since it is in communion therewith. And this state of the soul is called wisdom. Is it not so?”
“Socrates,” said he, “what you say is perfectly right and true” (Phaedo 79c-d)

I was replying to Wayfarer's reference to the meaning of nous as used by Aristotle. There are various ways to understand the text. I merely offer one of them. Perhaps you read the text differently.

I am very familiar with your view of Plato due to your constant repetition of the interpretation. If it is the only thing you have to say about anything brought up in regards to the matter, perhaps you should post your own thread where the discussion of your views can properly monopolize all discussions made therein.

I am very familiar with your view of Plato due to your constant repetition of the interpretation. — Valentinus

Well, I don’t think it is “my view” or “interpretation” in this case at all. Divine illumination is a key element of Greek philosophy in general and of Platonism in particular.

Divine illumination played a prominent part in ancient Greek philosophy, in the later Greek commentary tradition, in neo-Platonism, and in medieval Islamic philosophy.

Divine Illumination - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

Socrates makes it very clear that perception in the sensible realm is due to the light of the Sun that illumines the material world, and knowledge in the intelligible realm is due to the light of truth that emanates from the Good of which the Sun is the offspring:

This [the Sun], then, you must understand that I meant by the offspring of the Good which the Good begot to stand in a proportion with itself: as the Good is in the intelligible region to reason and the objects of reason, so is this [the Sun] in the visible world to vision and the objects of vision …” (Rep 508b - c ).

The text itself says that.

Those who have not known, seen, penetrated, realized, or attained it by means of discernment would have to take it on conviction in others that the faculty of conviction... persistence... mindfulness... concentration... discernment, when developed & pursued, gains a footing in the Deathless, has the Deathless as its goal & consummation, whereas those who have known, seen, penetrated, realized, & attained it by means of discernment would have no doubt or uncertainty
— Pubbakotthaka Sutta

This passage shows the author chasing a mirage, "a 'difference' that makes no difference". What could having no doubt or uncertainty be other than conviction? — Janus

Note the bolded part.

The difference is between knowing things for oneself, or taking for granted that someone else knows.

Plato's dialogues provide plenty of pointers as to what an examined life may amount to in practice. The problem seems to stem from some people's insistence that everything is worthless or at least questionable opinion, and that "Socrates knows nothing" and "Plato says nothing". — Apollodorus

I think the problem stems from seeing Plato and company through modern secular eyes, as skeptics, giving them more skeptical credit than they're due, when in fact it would be more appropriate to see them as religious preachers.