Now we appear to have come full circle back to a point of apparent disagreement. What you say, "It's only for the select few" and the quoted passage from Matthew both suggest that there is only one path to wisdom, or at the very least one kind of path consisting in discipleship of some kind, which is precisely one of the things I've been arguing against.

I would agree that the very concern with wisdom is not overly common, but that is about as elitist as I'm prepared to go on this question. I think discipleship is for those who don't have the capacity/(ies) to inquire and think for themselves and practice in their own way (s); it's valid enough for them, but won't suit a freethinker.

I recognize way more than can be scientifically or logically verified and I can't understand why you apparently can't see that. — Janus

It's not obvious from your comments.

We know in this other sense through the arts, music and poetry and religious faith and practice; I have never denied any of that. — Janus

No, but you subjectivize it. It is a matter of personal conviction. And I understand that - it's an inevitable consequence of the culture that we live in. I'm not saying you're wrong to think like that. Just to notice it, that's all. What if these forms of higher knowledge really do address a reality, not simply a social or religious convention.

What if 'the common world' is the mind-created projection of the ego, with no inherent reality?
— Wayfarer

I think there is no reason whatsoever to believe that is true. Even if it were true there could be no conceivable way to demonstrate it — Janus

Modern naturalism assumes that nature can be understood 'in its own right', so to speak, without reference to God or transcendent causes. That is why the claim that the sensory domain may be illusory goes against the grain; because for modern naturalism, nature is the only reality, the touchstone of reality. But I think that calling our native sense of reality into doubt is what scepticism originally meant. It's not like today's scientific scepticism - that nothing is real except for what can be validated scientifically. It is a scepticism that comes from the sense of our own fallibility.

'Fallibilism' in philosophy of science is that hypotheses are only held, pending their falsification by some new discovery. Actually what I'm saying is not too far from that, but it has a wider scope. I think that ancient scepticism was sceptical about our human faculties altogether - that 'the senses deceive', or that the world given to common sense is not as it seems. (And that, in turn, is not far removed from the Hindu intuition of māyā, which, although arising in a different culture, was likewise a product of the 'axial age' of philosophy.)

At issue, is the question of epistemology: what is real? What I started out by saying, is that the setting of Plato's philosophy presumes that there is a real good; Socrates presumes that the world is in such a way that 'things will turn out for the good' (Phaedo 99b-c). Perhaps it's naive, perhaps it's superseded, but that is what's at issue. That is why the question of 'what is good' turns out to involve metaphysics (cf Wittgenstein: 'Ethics are transcendental').

I get that what I'm saying is controversial, goes against the grain, and so on - really do. Just exploring these ideas, and thanks for at least entertaning them, even if they're a bit far out. And I recommend Paul Tyson's book, De-Fragmenting Modernity, to those interested.

Modern naturalism assumes that nature can be understood 'in its own right', so to speak, without reference to God or transcendent causes. That is why the claim that the sensory domain may be illusory goes against the grain; because for modern naturalism, nature is the only reality, the touchstone of reality. But I think that calling our native sense of reality into doubt is what scepticism originally meant. It's not like today's scientific scepticism - that nothing is real except for what can be validated scientifically. It is a scepticism that comes from the sense of our own fallibility.

'Fallibilism' in philosophy of science is that hypotheses are only held, pending their falsification by some new discovery. Actually what I'm saying is not too far from that, but it has a wider scope. I think that ancient scepticism was sceptical about our human faculties altogether - that 'the senses deceive', or that the world given to common sense is not as it seems. (And that, in turn, is not far removed from the Hindu intuition of māyā, which, although arising in a different culture, was likewise a product of the 'axial age' of philosophy.)

At issue, is the question of epistemology: what is real? What I started out by saying, is that the setting of Plato's philosophy presumes that there is a real good; Socrates presumes that the world is in such a way that 'things will turn out for the good' (Phaedo 99b-c). Perhaps it's naive, perhaps it's superseded, but that is what's at issue. That is why the question of 'what is good' turns out to involve metaphysics (cf Wittgenstein: 'Ethics are transcendental'). — Wayfarer

I think that's a sound summary. The naturalists I know mostly don't think that the sensory domain is necessarily a true refection of the world, just that it is the most consistently reliable one available to human beings. Naturalism/physicalism is a spectrum of beliefs which, like politics or religion, has a fundamentalist arm and a progressive/reformist one.

The problem with introducing Gods or transcendent causes as potential collaborators in our understanding of 'truth' or 'reality' is that this just adds further mystification since neither God or the transcendent can readily be defined or understood (enlightened sages and visiting messiahs notwithstanding). Or even agreed upon. If we think senses are fallible, try giving conceptual shape and words to the numinous and the ineffable. Have fun meditating.

I've spent a little time in the company of Donald Hoffman's thesis on the nature of reality which is kind of relevant to this discussion. I find it strangely compelling but of course its focus is on the potential flaws inherent in assuming the natural world is real while it provides no solutions I could find as to what reality actually may be and why it matters. And Hoffman's math are beyond me.

I wonder if so much speculative metaphysics is useful and whether or not this is a distraction from the fact that we do seem to have evolved to identify and happily work within a particular version of reality (contested though its parameters might be) that we are right to be skeptical about but can only ignore at our peril. But that's a different matter.

What if these forms of higher knowledge really do address a reality, not simply a social or religious convention. — Wayfarer

You mean what if these forms of personal conviction really are higher knowledge of reality? My question is how that could ever be demonstrated or known to be true. How could you ever demonstrate that you know that to be true as opposed to believing it to be true?

So, I am not at all denying the possibility. And I am also not claiming that people ought not believe such things; but merely that they should be honest to both themselves and others and admit that it is a question of faith not knowledge (in the sense of being 'knowledge that' or propositional knowledge at least).

The problem with introducing Gods or transcendent causes as potential collaborators in our understanding of 'truth' or 'reality' is that this just adds further mystification since neither God or the transcendent can readily be defined or understood — Tom Storm

That's why I keep going back to the point about classical philosophy and, I suppose, theology. I think they have perfectly consistent and sound methods of, shall we say, facing up to the transcendent. That's what Ifind in Thomist and neo-Thomist (mainly Catholic) philosophers, and in some Orthodox theology. Having said that, I don't feel an affinity with the Catholic religion, but it's probably true that I sense a kind of gravitational pull from Catholicism, or maybe it's from pre-modern Christian philosophy, generally. But my belief is that there was a real, lived metaphysics up until late Medieval times, and that it's been forgotten. The effects of forgetting it is that it can't even be spoken about nowadays, it's like something from another culture altogether. Understanding it is like forensic history. (Check out this blog post).

we do seem to have evolved to identify and happily work within a particular version of reality — Tom Storm

But I don't think Darwinism *is* a philosophy as such. It's a biological theory, and sound, as far as I can tell, although there's an awful lot of ferment going on in respect of epigenetics and so on. But whenever this is said, and it's said a lot on this forum, I can't help but feel that it's putting Darwinism in the place of religion. We have an afternoon radio presenter in Sydney that i've listened to for years, and I've heard him say more than once, when interviewing subjects about topics related to evolution, 'God or Darwin, depending on what you believe', as if they are competing theories.

I don't for once second doubt that h. sapiens evolved more or less in line with what paleontological anthropology says. I remember when I studied pre-historic anthropology, having this moment of epiphany, that those ancient ancestors who somehow survived the last Ice Age are actually us. That was just me, back then, coping, raising children, making a living. (Hey it's a lot better now.) I grew up with Time Life books on evolution and biology, and have never had any reason to doubt them. But that doesn't mean we're simply 'the products of evolution', as if we were simply the accidental by-product of a meaningless series of biochemical happenstances - frozen accidents, as Dennett says. The contrary of that is not creationism or intelligent design, it's more a matter of de-constructing the philosophical presuppositions that underpinned the 'scientific revolution' in the first place. One of the major factors in that, was the rejection of what in Aristotle's philosophy was 'Aitia', 'cause' in the sense of 'the reason why things are as they are'.

Why we exist, you're playing with the word "why" there. Science is working on the problem of the antecedent factors that lead to our existence. Now, "why" in any further sense than that, why in the sense of purpose is, in my opinion, not a meaningful question. You cannot ask a question like "Why down mountains exist?" as though mountains have some kind of purpose. — Richard Dawkins

From the perspective of Darwinian naturalism, species only have one real purpose or rationale, and that is, to propogate. And that's why the only kind of philosophy that Darwinism can provide support for is some form of utilitarianism. Which is sound, as far as it goes, but from my perspective, it's not far enough.

I am also no claiming that people ought not believe such things; but merely that they should be honest to both themselves and others and admit that it is a question of faith not knowledge (in the sense of being 'knowledge that' or propositional knowledge at least). — Janus

Fair enough, I can live with that, although the suggestion of 'mere belief' chafes a bit.

Fair enough, I can live with that, although the suggestion of 'mere belief' chafes a bit. — Wayfarer

Funny you should say that because I deliberately refrained form using the terms merely believing or merely faith. Faith and belief are incredibly important in human life (as there is really so little of what is most important to humans that we can be certain of). If people don't arrogate to themselves the idea that their faith or beliefs are, or could be, propositional knowledge then they will be far less likely to condemn, fight with or even kill others for disagreeing with them. As you are probably tired of hearing me say, I think the conflation of faith with knowledge is precisely what (not inevitably of course!) leads to fundamentalism and egregious and gratuitous conflict.

That's why I keep going back to the point about classical philosophy and, I suppose, theology. I think they have perfectly consistent and sound methods of, shall we say, facing up to the transcendent — Wayfarer

I can see that you think that and you argue it well. I guess I can't quite get on board but I am happy to keep mulling over it.

But I don't think Darwinism *is* a philosophy as such. — Wayfarer

Nor do I. It's a context and one that does rest upon metaphysical foundations (shaky or otherwise) that the nature of reality can be understood by us, etc.

But that doesn't mean we're simply 'the products of evolution', as if we were simply the accidental by-product of a meaningless series of biochemical happenstances - frozen accidents, as Dennett says. — Wayfarer

I don't know that we can tell if this is true or not. When I think of 'the examined life' I always come back to the idea that there is only so much examination is actually possible.

From the perspective of Darwinian naturalism, species only have one real purpose or rationale, and that is, to propogate. — Wayfarer

Your assessment may be true and obviously it doesn't reflect how lives are experienced. Can it actually be demonstrated that, for instance, thrilling to a Mahler symphony can't happen if naturalism is true? (lets leave Nagel and Chalmers out of this one).

Can it actually be demonstrated that, for instance, thrilling to a Mahler symphony can't happen if naturalism is true? — Tom Storm

Well, I can't see what kind of adaptive utility it provides. Can you? I often think that musical prodigies, in particular, are very difficult to account for from a biological perspective - unless you want to suggest that such abilities are like peacock's tails or a kind of superfluous effervesence. Part of this is due to the historical circumstances sorrounding Darwin and his place in Enlightenment philosophy. As I've mentioned many times, Russel Wallace was inclined much more to spirituality, whereas Darwin was very much a product of the 'Scottish Enlightenment' (along with the likes of Adam Smith and David Hume).

I think there is a naturalist argument for, if not religion, then spirituality in a more generic sense but probably I'm tapped out for the day, got to attend to household stuff.

Funny you should say that because I deliberately refrained form using the terms merely believing or merely faith. Faith and belief are incredibly important in human life (as there is really so little of what is most important to humans that we can be certain of). — Janus

I'm not generally given to simply posting agreement, but I really wanted to highlight this to avoid it being lost in the weeds. It's crucial, I think, to the whole slew of discussions where physicalism is pitted against anything from idealism to religion. Beliefs are absolutely fundamental to who we are, the importance of the narratives we use to navigate the world and give purpose to our actions cannot be overstated. there's nothing 'mere' about belief, no-one is relegating propositions by labelling them as stories rather than facts. In many ways, they're being elevated in importance over something as mundane as a 'fact'.

In a similar vein, to demote them to 'facts' about reality is to remove their beauty, make them dull and lifeless, as if following some dry algorithm of rational thought will yield the answer to 'life the universe and everything' like a maths sum.

:gasp: :up:

An anecdote springs to mind. Many years ago, when I was working on my BA Hons thesis in comparative religion, I was in the University library, looking for a title on a high shelf. I stood on one of the stools provided for reaching the higher shelves, and groped around behind the row of books. Sure enough, a book had fallen back behind the row. I fished it out, and looked at it - it didn’t seem to have the customary paper slip glued into the inside cover. It looked as though it had never been picked up; it didn’t seem particularly old but looked as if it had been misplaced whilst being shelved and subsequently lost, and never noticed by anyone. And when I went to borrow it, the librarian had to create a record for it. It had been truly lost.

That book was called The Unknowable.

It was by Simon (Semyon) Frank, a Russian Orthodox philosopher. I must admit, I couldn’t follow all of the arguments in it, but I was highly impressed by the means by which it came into my hands, which seemed oddly appropriate, in light of the subject matter.

And I was also most impressed by the aphorism which appeared on the fly-leaf of the book, apparently a translation from some script I didn’t recognise, but which, translated, sounded very like a statement from Ch’an Buddhism. ‘The unattainable is attained by non-attainment’.

I might go back and read that book again. If I can find it.

//looked up his entry on Wikipedia. Note this charmingly badly parsed paragraph at the end of the entry (it reads better if you imagine it being read aloud in a Russian accent):

Semyon Frank's philosophy was based on the ontological theory knowledge. This meaning that knowledge was intuitive in whole but also logically abstract; logic being limited to only part of being. Frank taught that existence was being but also becoming. As becoming, one has dynamic potential. Thus one's future is indeterminate since reality is both rational and irrational. As reality includes the unity of rationality and irrationality i.e. of necessity and freedom, Frank's position being for the existence of free will.

Just love that. :heart:

Now we appear to have come full circle back to a point of apparent disagreement. What you say, "It's only for the select few" and the quoted passage from Matthew both suggest that there is only one path to wisdom, or at the very least one kind of path consisting in discipleship of some kind, which is precisely one of the things I've been arguing against. — Janus

Well, IMHO there is nothing wrong with disagreement.

You are right that there is only one path to wisdom in a Christian context as there is only one path in Platonism, Hinduism or Buddhism. You can't walk on more than one path simultaneously. You may draw inspiration from other paths where absolutely necessary but you need to choose one path as your mainstay otherwise you may end up confounding yourself.

There are many ways to the top of the mountain but you can only ascend by choosing one. Some form of commitment is necessary. Too many cooks spoil the broth, etc.

But I think we agree on the rest.

Since this thread is on the examined life, it is important to be aware of the distance between claims of a transcendent reality and one's own experience. One might believe in transcendence but it is often the case that there is an imperceptible move from that belief to a purported reality. The examined life begins with being honest with yourself. Honestly, who here has had such transcendent experience? Who here knows the Forms and the Good? Who is a Zen master or an enlightened Buddha? None of us have knowledge of such things.

This is not to diminish the value of belief and faith, but rather to examine the relative importance of belief and knowledge, or, as the case may be, the absence of knowledge. Whether it is better to accept as true without knowledge or accept as true that one does not know. The problem with the former is that to accept as true without knowledge leaves us open to indiscriminate acceptance of all kinds of things as true, and if true then further inquiry becomes an attack on the truth.

@Wayfarer

A couple of comments on transcendence in the Tractatus and the good in Plato.

Transcendence is not entry into some realm beyond ordinary experience. It is, rather, what is outside the bounds of facts and logic.

At 99c Socrates says he does not know the good itself as a cause. This leads directly to his "second sailing" in search of a cause. (99d). That is by way of hypothesis. What is easily missed is that he is never able to give an account of why it is best that things are as they are. Note that the cause of his not fleeing at 98c-99b is the choice he made regarding what he thought best. That the whole acts in an analogous way is an assumption that is not examined. It assumes that what the jury decided and what he then decided is all in accord with the whole because in both cases it was determined that this was best. But surely what is best is not always the same as what seems to be best.

The problem is clearly stated in the Republic:

Then the good is not the cause of everything; rather it is the cause of the things that are in a good way, while it is not responsible for the bad things. (379b)

The good then cannot be the cause of the whole since the whole obviously contains things that are bad. He goes on to say that by the good he means what is good for us. (379c) There are things that are good for us and things that are not. The search for the good is the search for the human good, that is, of determining what is and is not good for us.

:clap: :up:

There are many ways to the top of the mountain but you can only ascend by choosing one. Some form of commitment is necessary. Too many cooks spoil the broth, etc.

But I think we agree on the rest. — Apollodorus

I agree with what you say there that there is only one path for the individual, but paths may cross another and even more so as they approach the top of the mountain which would mean, in this 'climbing the mountain' analogy that one could change paths, while obviously still remaining on that one unique individual path.

What if one finds one's own path, avoiding the beaten tracks

And what if one goes back down the mountain and then climbs again? :wink:

Or what if each culture has it own unique mountain to climb?

paths may cross another and even more so as they approach the top of the mountain — Janus

Yes, they might even converge, becoming one path.

What if one finds one's own path, avoiding the beaten tracks. — Janus

Entirely possible. But it would be still one path.

And what if one goes back down the mountain and then climbs again? — Janus

One goes up again by the same or a different one path.

Or what if each culture has it own unique mountain to climb? — Janus

The same one-path method will apply. :smile:

Who is a Zen master or an enlightened Buddha? None of us have knowledge of such things. — Fooloso4

One of the characteristics of Buddhism is just the emphasis on meditation and cultivation of the spiritual life. I think that has been generally lost in Western culture and indeed it's one of the reasons for the upsurge of interest in Eastern culture since the beginning of the 20th century. Obviously 'enlightened Buddhas' are few and far between - there's some doctrinal formula which actually spells that out! - but individuals may still realise insight through these practices.

Consider the well-known text Zen Mind, Beginner's Mind, by Shunryu Suzuki (founder of the San Francisco Zen Center.) The book is a collection of Dharma talks by him on the principles of Sōtō Zen meditation. Since reading it, a few of the phrases in it have always remained with me: 'practice with no idea of gain'; 'In the beginner's mind there are many possibilities, but in the expert's there are few'; 'What we call "I" is just a swinging door which moves when we inhale and when we exhale.' And many others.

I practiced along those lines for quite a few years, mainly because the philosophy of Sōtō Zen is quite approachable for Westerners. Through that, there are moments of insight - 'kensho', in Zen terminology - but, as Jack Kornfield's book title says, 'after the ecstacy, the laundry'. I mean, life goes on, it's not the escape from reality that perhaps my younger self had hoped for! Nevertheless if you practice it - and really Zen meditation is neither easy nor entertaining and very easy NOT to do - then those insights can become integrated into your outlook. Through that you can begin to understand the meaning of those teachings in a kind of embodied way. Does that mean I am enlightened? Perish the thought! Diamond Sutra:

Buddha then asked, “What do you think, Subhuti, does one who has entered the stream which flows to Enlightenment, say ‘I have entered the stream’?”

“No, Buddha”, Subhuti replied. “A true disciple entering the stream would not think of themselves as a separate person that could be entering anything.”

'Strictly speaking', Suzuki-Roshi would say, 'there are no enlightened people, only enlightened activities'.

Does that amount to knowledge, or rather, what kind of knowledge does that imply? As I was discussing above, Buddhists call that jñāna, 'discriminative wisdom' (which is not to make any claims that I possess it!) But such principles can be realised through practice and may be known in that intuitive sense.

As regards the idea of the Forms, it seems to me that most analytic and 20th C philosophy doesn't 'get it'. But it lives on, in a practical way, in philosophies derived from Thomism. Thomist and neo-Thomist philosophers have maintained Aristotelian realism down through the centuries. (I first heard of the neo-Thomism of Jacques Maritain through God, Zen and the Intution of Being which provided a bridge between Zen Buddhism and Aquinas.)

Yes it always by definition one unique individual path, whether one follows one traditional path, many traditional paths at the same or different times or follows no particular traditional path at all

However, in general, it would be difficult to follow too many different paths at the same time, for the simple reason that each path requires a certain amount of dedication, time, intelligence, and energy.

Were this not the case, people would make better and faster progress the more paths they followed. Yet this does not seem to be so.

We may compare it with learning a foreign language. Would we learn faster by focusing on a single language, or by learning a few other languages at the same time?

In other words, the pick-and-mix mentality prevalent in modern society and particularly in the West may not ultimately produce the desired result. On the contrary, it may turn into a habit that leaves us forever dissatisfied and always on the search for something new.

The doubt may arise as to whether we are "missing" something if we do not constantly try this or that method or path and that doubt may ultimately prove to be a false friend.

The very fact that people turn to non-Western traditions because they have no knowledge of what Western philosophy and spirituality have to offer suggests that they are acting out of ignorance. And this may not be a good start to begin with.

That prompts no disagreement—it all makes sense to me.

One of the characteristics of Buddhism is just the emphasis on meditation and cultivation of the spiritual life. — Wayfarer

Meditative practice for the sake of practice is not the same as meditative practice as a means to the end called enlightenment. The terminology, especially in translation, is problematic but there is still the expectation of transformation, of sight and insight.

But such principles can be realised through practice and may be known in that intuitive sense. — Wayfarer

Is that something you know or something you believe can be attained?

As regards the idea of the Forms, it seems to me that most analytic and 20th C philosophy doesn't 'get it'. — Wayfarer

What does 'get it' mean? Platonic Forms were hypotheticals.

Thomist and neo-Thomist ... Aristotelian realism ... Jacques Maritain ... — Wayfarer

This is not Plato's Forms.

As regards the idea of the Forms, it seems to me that most analytic and 20th C philosophy doesn't 'get it'. — Wayfarer

Correct. Some fail to understand the Forms - and Plato himself - because they make no effort to do so. Or for some psychological reasons.

The fact is that transcendence and immanence in Plato are not mutually exclusive. The Forms are present in their instances in the same way universals are present in particulars. They are simultaneously transcendent to and immanent in the particulars.

By definition, the universal that is present in many particulars is (1) immanent in the particulars and (2) other than each and all of them, and therefore transcendent to them.

A colored object is apprehended by the eye but color itself is apprehended by the mind. The universal “color” is not a figment of imagination or mere concept, it is a real, intelligible thing. The Form cannot be merely “one-over-many”, it also is “one-in-the-many”.

The misunderstanding arises from erroneously thinking of the Forms in spatial terms. But, clearly, the Forms being incorporeal are not separated from their instances by some dividing line that exists somewhere in space. The Forms are “other than” the sensibles but not “spatially separated” from them.

This is why Socrates compares the Good with the Sun (or Sun God) who is immanent in the visible world. And why, with training, the Forms can be grasped by the soul in extrasensory perception.

But such principles can be realised through practice and may be known in that intuitive sense.
— Wayfarer

Is that something you know or something you believe can be attained? — Fooloso4

If you commit to the formal practice of sitting meditation, you can definitely learn things from that. That is why 'mindfulness' has become a big deal. Now, it's not to say it's a panacea, as it's definitely not; it ought not to be forgotten that 'right mindfulness' is only one aspect of the Buddhist eightfold path.

So, through those practices, I believe I attained a greater degree of equanimity, and a loosening of self-centredness. Does this mean I'm a 'perfectly enlightened Buddha'? Of course not! There are still many uncertainties, obstacles, doubts and hindrances. There might be all of my life.

Thomist and neo-Thomist ... Aristotelian realism ... Jacques Maritain ...
— Wayfarer

This is not Plato's Forms. — Fooloso4

They are what became of the idea of the Forms, after having been criticized by Aristotle, and developed by the subsequent tradition. The most long-lived version of that is hylomorphic dualism, the duality of matter and form, which is preserved in scholastic philosophy and neo-Thomism.

As Aristotelians and Thomists use the term, intellect is that faculty by which we grasp abstract concepts (like the concepts man and mortal), put them together into judgments (like the judgment that all men are mortal), and reason logically from one judgment to another (as when we reason from all men are mortal and Socrates is a man to the conclusion that Socrates is mortal). It is to be distinguished from imagination, the faculty by which we form mental images (such as a visual mental image of what your mother looks like, an auditory mental image of what your favorite song sounds like, a gustatory mental image of what pizza tastes like, and so forth); and from sensation, the faculty by which we perceive the goings on in the external material world and the internal world of the body (such as a visual experience of the computer in front of you, the auditory experience of the cars passing by on the street outside your window, the awareness you have of the position of your legs, etc.).

That intellectual activity -- thought in the strictest sense of the term -- is irreducible to sensation and imagination is a thesis that unites Platonists, Aristotelians, and rationalists of either the ancient Parmenidean sort or the modern Cartesian sort. — Ed Feser, Think, McFly, Think

You see there the remnants of the Greek concept of intellect as 'nous', that which recognises the real. This kind of understanding was mainstream in Western philosophy, up until the early modern period, when it was displaced by Cartesian dualism - the rest is history.

The very fact that people turn to non-Western traditions because they have no knowledge of what Western philosophy and spirituality have to offer suggests that they are acting out of ignorance. And this may not be a good start to begin with. — Apollodorus

There are very few Western sources for 'traditional wisdom teachings'. Speaking of scholastic philosophy, the only place you were likely to learn that was having it beaten into you in a Catholic school, and they have hardly been models of enlightened education, in my opinion.

The reason Eastern teachers and teachings made such a big impact in the West is obviously a huge question, but Zen and other forms of Buddhism, Advaita and various yogic disciplines really answer a need which the 'scientism' of mainstream culture, and the dogmatism of the mainstream churches cannot.

Having learned something about those schools, I'm now able to better recognise the wisdom of the Western tradition, but it has been practically obliterated in mainstream Western culture itself.

[Socrates'] knowing how to live in the face of his ignorance is what the examined life is all about. — Fooloso4

:fire:

Zen and other forms of Buddhism, Advaita and various yogic disciplines really answer a need which the 'scientism' of mainstream culture, and the dogmatism of the mainstream churches cannot. — Wayfarer

I agree that the need is there. However, yogic disciplines include yama, niyama, asana, pranayama, pratyahara, dharana, dhyana, samadhi (and others), that take years to learn and practice. How many Westerners are there that actually practice or even understand all of them?

And the reality is that there are more fake “gurus” than genuine ones and the same applies to “students” of yoga who go on a “yoga retreat” somewhere for a few months to one year and come back with a “certificate” or "diploma" and with the expectation of being treated as “yoga teachers”.

Unfortunately, in many cases (though by no means all), it becomes a pseudo-spirituality (or ersatz religion) that is just a form of materialism by another name.

Of course, all that is true. Very few practice any of those disciplines successfully. But it has become part of the dialogue. I think a lot of philosophy of mind has been influenced by that - talk of ‘consciousness’ always seems to me to carry an echo of the Sanskrit ‘citta’. Also enactivism and the ‘embodied cognition’ movement has some Eastern influences. All part of life’s rich tapestry.

I don't rule out the possibility of such capabilities; all I'm saying is that they cannot be demonstrated. If Gautama believes he can remember his past 5000 incarnations, how could that ever be proven? How could even the Buddha know that he is not deluding himself or mistaken? — Janus

It's not like Gautama cares what you think about him and his abilities. You know, just like you --

As I see it all it requires is not being concerned about the opinions of others and making up your own mind. — Janus

I have yet to see any argument explaining why I should believe that the purported truth of what the Buddha believes he knows can be rationally or empirically tested.

Yes, I know that and I've already explored that world for more than twenty years and found it wanting.

Are you happy with the world of spirituality,

In that case, you're still in the positions of victim or martyr in relation to spirituality.

why would you be wasting your time here in the world of logic, rational argument and empirical justification?

Thanks for the laugh!
Getting involved in philosophy, I've learned that there is no such thing as philosophy without ideology.

Can it actually be demonstrated that, for instance, thrilling to a Mahler symphony can't happen if naturalism is true? — Tom Storm

Well, I can't see what kind of adaptive utility it provides. Can you? I often think that musical prodigies, in particular, are very difficult to account for from a biological perspective - unless you want to suggest that such abilities are like peacock's tails or a kind of superfluous effervesence. — Wayfarer

To understand this, we need to go back a bit from Mahler, to the music of the Classical period, notable composers being Mozart and Beethoven. The music of the Classical period delivered via music the classical worldview. This is exemplified, among other things, in the three-partite way the movements of a Classical piece are typically ordered: the first is a cheerful one, the second is sad, disappointed, the third is a moderate, leaning toward the optimistic, but not cheerful -- neither the cheerfulness of the first nor the sadness of the second. (The structure is adopted accordingly for musical forms that have more than three movements, but the overall ordering is the same. Also, some Classical composers, esp. Beethoven, broke this order in the initial movements, but ended Classically.) Such is the Classical spirit.

This differs notably from the Romantic spirit (and many later developments) where pieces don't end on a moderate note, but in sadness or aporia. Compare, for example, the final movements of Beethoven's 5th symphony and Tchaikovsky's 6th.

People have always directly or indirectly managed their emotions through music (and this is its adaptive utility). And via managing their emotions, their worldview.


(And as for Mahler, specifically: Without a formal music education, it's hard to grasp the sheer effort that goes into his music, so musically uneducated people tend to be overly pathetic about it. If they manage to listen to the pieces in full at all, heh)

I'm OK with humility, but I have no truck with obedience; that is for pets and children. — Janus

We are children of the State to whom we owe obedience. Or the State beats it into us.

I think there is no reason whatsoever to believe that is true. Even if it were true there could be no conceivable way to demonstrate it. Believing that could not change a thing; you would still be run over and killed by the semi-trailer you stepped in front of no matter how enlightened you are. — Janus

It is said that the spiritually advanced are generally beyond any "very bad karma" happening to them. Rumor has it that an enlightened person could, in fact, step in front of a semi-trailer, but the semi-trailer's engine would fail or its brakes malfunction and block just in time for the semi-trailer to stop before it would hit the enlightened person.