Amazing work. :up:

It seems that most of the "is" statements are definitions. The theories are more vague and require definitions to make them less so.

The Glasgow Coma Scale of consciousness (4 votes) — bert1

This was the only one I wasn't torn over when I voted.

But I'm torn over it now.

The association of numbers with different states of consciousness seems definitional, but the ordering of them seems theoretical.

Hmmmphh! Don't we need to define "defintion" and "theory" first? :smirk:

Most are definitions, or descriptions, and a few are, it seems, in/direct explanations aka (testable) "theories".

Either all are simply definitions or are fragments of theories. Speaking for myself, single sentences are definitional in almost all cases and if not express, clarify, expand upon concepts that are part of a theory, a theory being a set of ideas that are interrelated and designed to provide an explanatory framework for observed phenomena. :lol:

I can't see any "definition" or "theory" in all that. You must look up these words in a standard dictionary.

Amazing work. :up: — fdrake

Could have been a lot better, but thank you! The results so far are fascinating.

It seems that most of the "is" statements are definitions. The theories are more vague and require definitions to make them less so. — Harry Hindu

This was the only one I wasn't torn over when I voted. — fdrake

That's interesting. I thought it was perhaps the most straightforwardly definitional one.

I'm surprised the sentience one is unanimous so far. And I'm surprised some of the others are split nearly half each. Very interesting.

The association of numbers with different states of consciousness seems definitional, but the ordering of them seems theoretical. — fdrake

Hadn't thought of that. :up:

Hmmmphh! Don't we need to define "defintion" and "theory" first? — Harry Hindu

Inevitably! Go ahead. Maybe we should also have a theory of definition and theory as well.

Most are definitions, or descriptions, and a few are, it seems, in/direct explanations aka (testable) "theories". — 180 Proof

:up: Did you do the poll?

Either all are simply definitions or are fragments of theories. Speaking for myself, single sentences are definitional in almost all cases and if not express, clarify, expand upon concepts that are part of a theory, a theory being a set of ideas that are interrelated and designed to provide an explanatory framework for observed phenomena. — TheMadFool

Sure. You can still give a glib summary of a theory in a sentence, no?

You must look up these words in a standard dictionary — Alkis Piskas

Consulting a dictionary is never bad advice. Thank you. :)

Hadn't thought of that. :up: — bert1

I wouldn't've thought of it if last week's work wasn't ball deep in dealing with operationalised scales.

Did you do the poll? — bert1

Yes.

Sure. You can still give a glib summary of a theory in a sentence, no? — bert1

A sentence, to my knowledge, doesn't have a word limit. The convention seems to be to keep it short or rather short enough to understand. True, you could put down an entire theory in the form of a single sentence but that sentence would be very long indeed. You would've won as it were, proven that a sentence can be a theory, but only on a technicality.

Definitions, on the other hand, are usually expressible in a sentence because the concepts involved are fewer.

Inevitably! Go ahead. Maybe we should also have a theory of definition and theory as well. — bert1

A definition describes what something is. A theory describes why something is.

A definition is used for identification while a theory is used for prediction.

A definition is used for identification while a theory is used for prediction. — Harry Hindu

That seems quite good to me. With regard to consciousness it works well. Some definitions (but not others) of consciousness are completely neutral as to which objects can have it. It takes a theory to then predict which things can have experiences and which things cannot.

I just looked at the results and there is a lot of disagreement on many of the questions. It shows just how complex the relationship between theories and definitions are. We use and need definitions to construct theories. However, the developments in theories alter our construction of theories. I am aware of this difficulty in my own threads on the self, evil. I think that what was also so interesting was that a few months ago a thread was started by @T Clark on what is consciousness? What became apparent was that how the many users on this site write about consciousness and have different meanings of the term, and how these are linked to our understanding of consciousness itself.

That seems quite good to me. With regard to consciousness it works well. Some definitions (but not others) of consciousness are completely neutral as to which objects can have it. It takes a theory to then predict which things can have experiences and which things cannot. — bert1

No. In this sense, consciousness has been defined as not being limited to which objects have it prior to any theories being posited. What this actually means is a bit vague and a better definition would be needed in order to test it with theories. It seems to me that you need a definition first to then be able to posit a viable theory as to why consciousness is that way - not being limited to which objects have it.

I think discussions on your threads on self, evil, consciousness, mystery, etc more than most(?) other threads illustrate a metaphilosophical problem: how one can use philosophy (instead of science) in order to generate a "theory" which purports to explain – over and above describing (or stipulatively defining) concepts for – facts of the matter. The assumption that, in other words, 'philosophy is (like) a science' is what's problematic, and many conjure-up eclectic "theories" which are incomprehensible to others trying to clarify how the concepts at issue can be used more consistently and coherently, in effect, talking past each other philosophically. I've yet to be persuaded that philosophy is theoretical (vide Witty et al).

I do think that on my threads and, others at times, it is a problem that people are often talking past one another. I was just looking at a thread started by @Pfhorrest today. This suggests that it would be good if people could begin their thread discussions with showing how their idea relates to previous ideas. I won't explain further because you can look at the thread. However, I think that it is useful when people write threads to do a certain amount of research, but the many ideas which we have come from such a wide spectrum of angles.

When looking at ideas it is almost like peeling back layers and meanings. For example, today I was just reading @"Josh's entry on page 5 of my evil thread, in which he wrote about personal construct theories and I realised how important that is in contrast to metaphysics of good and evil, and seen from that angle, the definitions would be so different from, say a Kantian approach. So, when we begin looking at terms and theories, sometimes it seems to me that it is like trying to dig up the earth and it could go on and on forever.

Because the discussions are freeform and "anything goes" as considered "possibilities" ... Perhaps it can't be helped. It often feels like searching for a needle of good philosophizing (distinct from science, history, etc) in a haystack of bad philosophizing (confused with science, history, etc).

It shows just how complex the relationship between theories and definitions are. — Jack Cummins

Yes, I think that's right. I was very struck by how divided the responses are. There's only one where everyone agrees. It seems, however, that people do recognise an intuitive difference between theory and definition, even if, with some concepts/ideas they are perhaps difficult or impossible to separate completely.

I'd be interested in @Pfhorrest and @Banno's views, and anyone else's.

I think discussions on your threads on self, evil, consciousness, mystery, etc more than most(?) other threads illustrate a metaphilosophical problem: how one can use philosophy (instead of science) in order to generate a "theory" which purports to explain – over and above describing (or stipulatively defining) concepts for – facts of the matter. The assumption that, in other words, 'philosophy is (like) a science' is what's problematic, and many conjure-up eclectic "theories" which are incomprehensible to others trying to clarify how the concepts at issue can be used more consistently and coherently, in effect, talking past each other philosophically. I've yet to be persuaded that philosophy is theoretical (vide Witty et al). — 180 Proof

Philosophy itself is an interesting case. I could have put as one of the sentences: "Philosophy is not theoretical" Definition or theory? I guess 'definition' can be further subdivided into a number of categories. As can 'theory'.

How about a caveat?

This is a really good idea. Upvote. I didn't vote because too many of them were "neither of the above" for me. Now I'm thinking about questions I could put in a poll like this one. Let's see:

True or false:

• Bullwinkle is a dope.
• @180 Proof is a national treasure.
• Psychology is a science.
• The USA is the greatest nation in history.
• pi = 3.14159265358971323846...
• Emus and Ostriches are really the same thing.
• This is the way the world ends. This is the way the world ends. This is the way the world ends. Not with a bang but a whimper.
• 1 + 1 = 10

For anyone that kept being torn between them, what criteria did you decide between definition and theory?

Mine was; the sentence should be a definition, if it unambiguously equates a word with an object or process or otherwise sets out how a word is typically to be used, I'll call it a definition. If it's doing anything else, I'll call it a theory.

There was a lot of ambiguity in which was which for me; as I didn't know how to draw a line between setting out a typical use of words and setting out a connection/claim between a word (like sentience) and a property (integrated information). I imagine in general there isn't one - at least, the latter can do the former.

"Call those oogyboogles which exceed the blimblam threshold pumps".

Mine was; the sentence should be a definition, if it unambiguously equates a word with an object or process or otherwise sets out how a word is typically to be used, I'll call it a definition. If it's doing anything else, I'll call it a theory. — fdrake

Same here.

:smirk:

You did the same mistake. You didn't provide definitions!
Words don't have intrinsic meaning they have common usages. You will need to define Theory and Definition.
i.e. Theory in science means something very different compared to the every day use of the world (even in Philosophy).
In a more general note, all definitions rely on theory. (Paul Hoyningen Philosophy of Science)

I come two years later, but good post and original/substantive poll :up:

For any x, x is either alive or dead — bert1

50 % theory; 50 % A draw, as I expected in this one.

The sun is a giant ball of fusing hydrogen and helium (and other elements) — bert1

Well, I thought it was a definition but some users think otherwise!