As with every moral choice, we must make sense of it at the level of the individual. Every act, thus every moral act, is carried out by individuals.

Every child starts with "I want...", and to fulfill that want, one must take a considerable risk of harming the child one wants to have. Furthermore, there is no way of knowing whether the child, once its born, actually wanted to be born.

So we have a situation where we take a considerable risk on someone else's behalf, having not the slightest idea of how their lives may turn out or how one's parenting style may affect them, not knowing whether the child actually wants to be born, to fulfill our own desires.

I don't think this holds any moral ground.

Jokes aside, that's why the moral rule that has the most appeal is the Golden Rule: Do unto others as you would like others do unto you. Ethics isn't about what most people would want but about what you want. The underlying assumption though, ironically, is that other people are like you and Bob's your uncle!

Yet, it isn't that simple. It's not just about what most people want. We all know that! ( :wink: :wink: :wink: ) - the list of most popular and fastest growing websites will vouch for what I'm hinting at.
— TheMadFool

That's another point.. What if what most people want IS NOT GOOD, but they are not aware of this? — schopenhauer1

Yes, that was my point precisely. The most people defense as you put it is unacceptable as a justification for why something (thoughts/speech/deeds) is good.

Nonetheless, I still feel there's moral value in the most people defense. Remember what I said:

I find it fascinating that both X (Christ) and XXX (porn) turn us on! — TheMadFool

Most people want to tell the truth (not lie), respect private property (not steal) and life (not kill). In other words, most people want to be good.

It reminds me of the red herring fallacy. A hound's sense of smell (our pleasure center - our wants) is a great asset to hunters (us) - sniffing out rabbits (good) but the same keen nose can also be misled by a rotting herring carcass (bad). Put differently, a hound's nose is as attracted to rabbits as it is to putrefied red herrings. That's the nub of the most people defense conundrum - most people want good but also, unfortunately, bad.

That's what happens when you're too efficient. Evolution, instead of developing a separate morality sensor simply used the old pleasure center (the one used for sexual desires, etc.).

Don't reinvent the wheel, just realign it. — Anthony J. D'Angelo

But then, if you start convincing people that you are correct, then many of them will feel bad - for having children, that their parents were immoral. So, then you have made living people feel bad, for the non-benefit of currently non-existing creatures...well, some of them. Which seems even worse than...
My instinct is that not even one person should have a bad life as a cost of the masses having a good life. It follows that natalism is wrong. — Bylaw

People feeling guilty and embarrassed is a cost worth paying for stopping tens of millions having lives of unbearable suffering. This tens of millions is a very conservative figure too; I'm sure humanity will survive past the year 2100.

This is moral realism, though. Might makes right. The downtrodden will not like it.

"The existing natural state is that people have children. Because it is the existing natural state, it's ok." — baker

As usual you've grabbed a barely connected sentence out of context just to use a a springboard for some general whinging. Not even worth a reply really, I'll just quote the rest of the post you decided to ignore

Surely the default should be that the existing natural state is OK until such time as... — Isaac

I don't think it's fair to err on the side of those in a neutral state as opposed to those in unbearable agony. — Down The Rabbit Hole

Not sure how you got that from what I said. I'm comparing only actual living people and predictable effects on future living people. The current well-being of the as-yet-to-be-born doesn't factor in.

I don't know if I said something to the effect of "I just reckon" — Down The Rabbit Hole

But

I would say... — Down The Rabbit Hole

...and still no actual data.

I don't see any evidence to believe humans will go extinct by the year 2100 by which 3 billion people are projected to be brought into existence, and if even 1% of those are a life of suffering, that's 30 million. — Down The Rabbit Hole

Well then you don't see where I'm going. If antinatalism over this period is only partially sucessful, you'll have fewer people (and less incentive) to carry out necessary projects to reduce the suffering of that 1%, such that it might be 2 or 10% that are now suffering. They'll continue to suffer all the while the antinatalist project fails to be 100% successful, yet the more sucessful it is, the greater the percentage of those who remain will suffer.

Just to be clear, I'm just getting a picture of your consequentialism here, not arguing a position I hold. I think it's mindnumbingly idiotic to set as one's goal the elimination of suffering even if there's no one left to benefit from it... I'd as soon have you committed as argue the case, but since the former isn't an option...

at what percentage does the minority get discounted? — schopenhauer1

They never get 'discounted'. That's not how averages work. The 'rule' requires a data point {the probability that your house colour will annoy the rest of the street}. We could set a rule which said 'do not paint your house any colour where the probability it will be disliked is higher than 34.56%. That rule might be an absolute rule, not subject to democratic vote, but it still requires the data point to be determined, and that measures people's current likes and dislikes.

I'm just pointing out that your thinking here is flawed. With natalism, we could have a rule which says "do not have children when the probability that they'd rather they hadn't been born is greater than 0.05%" The rule itself is the moral, and that is not subject to democratic vote, it's not 'might makes right', even if 99.9% of the world disagreed with that rule, it would still be the rule. But in order to work to that rule, the data point {what % of the population would rather they hadn't been born} is needed.

A color to a house and a human life you would think this rule would get more stringent, don't you think? — schopenhauer1

Yes. I think it would. It's reasonable to say that something like a 50% approval of your house colour might be enough. To continue having children with only a 50% approval of being born would be an abomination (if there were no other mitigating factors - which of course there usually are).

Well, that's what I was asking really. Why the assumption that it won't? Once the human race is extinct you can't undo that and you're advocating that position on the basis of "it seems to me, and no one's shown me otherwise". Just seems either monumentally reckless or sociopathic. Surely the default should be that the existing natural state is OK until such time as someone comes up with an absolutely watertight set of figures proving the net gain in suffering is greater if we continue. Given it's a one time switch you can't undo "I just reckon" seems an astonishingly inadequate level of certainty on which to go ahead.

Imagine you're a God. You wipe out the human race to prevent net suffering. One of the other gods comes along with the figures proving that net suffering was actually increased by your actions, distraught over the loss he asks "why did you do it?", you reply "I just had a bit of a think about it and 'reckoned' what the figures might be". Would any normal person be satisfied with that? — Isaac

The unborn are in a neutral state (they experience neither good or bad), on the other hand there are millions that would live in unbearable agony. I don't think it's fair to err on the side of those in a neutral state as opposed to those in unbearable agony. — Down The Rabbit Hole

Not sure how you got that from what I said. I'm comparing only actual living people and predictable effects on future living people. The current well-being of the as-yet-to-be-born doesn't factor in. — Isaac

It seemed like you were saying, in this particular case we shouldn't act on what would probably reduce suffering unless we have a "watertight" case, due to the irreversibility of extinction.

My point was, it's not reasonable to treat extinction as higher stakes than tens of millions with lives of suffering. And stakes being equal, we should use the balance of probability to guide our behaviour.

I don't see any evidence to believe humans will go extinct by the year 2100 by which 3 billion people are projected to be brought into existence, and if even 1% of those are a life of suffering, that's 30 million. — Down The Rabbit Hole

Well then you don't see where I'm going. If antinatalism over this period is only partially sucessful, you'll have fewer people (and less incentive) to carry out necessary projects to reduce the suffering of that 1%, such that it might be 2 or 10% that are now suffering. They'll continue to suffer all the while the antinatalist project fails to be 100% successful, yet the more sucessful it is, the greater the percentage of those who remain will suffer. — Isaac

It is reasonable to believe the promotion of antinatalism will barely reduce the population, bearing in mind it must compete with our evolutionary hardwiring and religion. Reduction of the population is necessary to free enough land and resources to ensure quality of life, and deal with the 9 million deaths per year from pollution (16% of all deaths).

Just to be clear, I'm just getting a picture of your consequentialism here, not arguing a position I hold. I think it's mindnumbingly idiotic to set as one's goal the elimination of suffering even if there's no one left to benefit from it... I'd as soon have you committed as argue the case, but since the former isn't an option... — Isaac

Well I appreciate your patience :lol:

The whole point of that example is that no one suffers due to lack of surprise party. It’s a surprise. They weren’t expecting it. You can’t suffer due to not having something you weren’t expecting.

Are you currently suffering due to me not gifting you 10000 dollars? No. Because you don’t expect 10000 dollars from me. But would you be happy if I gifted you 10000 dollars? Probably. — khaled

Well, no one suffers not living. I don't have any argument against giving someone money or a gift, even if they weren't expecting it. I just don't agree with giving someone a burden and then justifying it by giving them a gift.

They aren’t the same obviously but I think most people would rather lose a million dollars of their lifetime earnings than to have someone make it so that they have never been born at all. I don’t why this fact shouldn’t also be considered here. — TheHedoMinimalist

There are a lot of considerations here. If someone thought something harmful was actually good for them, does that change things or is purely up to someone's opinion? I bring in exhibit a) Pollyannaism b) lowering expectations, and c) adaptation to less ideal circumstances... Just because these are correcting mechanisms, does that mean employing them is good just because they are needed to get by?

Most people want to tell the truth (not lie), respect private property (not steal) and life (not kill). In other words, most people want to be good.

It reminds me of the red herring fallacy. A hound's sense of smell (our pleasure center - our wants) is a great asset to hunters (us) - sniffing out rabbits (good) but the same keen nose can also be misled by a rotting herring carcass (bad). Put differently, a hound's nose is as attracted to rabbits as it is to putrefied red herrings. That's the nub of the most people defense conundrum - most people want good but also, unfortunately, bad.

That's what happens when you're too efficient. Evolution, instead of developing a separate morality sensor simply used the old pleasure center (the one used for sexual desires, etc.). — TheMadFool

Yes I was explaining this to another poster. What if "most people" want something that isn't good for them? You just automatically give them this? What if work, maintenance, and even entertainment are actually quite harmful to that person when compared to never existing?

Well, no one suffers not living. — schopenhauer1

And no one suffers lack of surprise parties, by definition.

I don't have any argument against giving someone money or a gift, even if they weren't expecting it. I just don't agree with giving someone a burden and then justifying it by giving them a gift. — schopenhauer1

Every gift can be a burden. That's the point of the example. Maybe they really didn't want a party right now and are miserable because of it. It's a real if small possibility. On the other hand, we know they won't suffer if they don't receive this surprise party (since they don't know about it). So no surprise parties ever?

The point is, when any gift is not relieving suffering, by your system it automatically becomes wrong to give, since it can always be harmful.

Going by your assumptions (i.e. individualism), antinatalism should be judged on individual basis. It doesn't make sense to treat it as a universal position. This would result in something like: "in this case, antinatalism is true and should have been applied" - "in that case, antinatalism isn't true cause the individual clearly values their existence even if they suffer". Statistically, natalism is true far far more often than antinatalism is. It is just a matter of fact that the overwhelming majority of individuals value life despite suffering and don't see the latter as a reason for not bringing someone into life (or themselves having been brought into life). This statistical conclusion has no bearing on the ethics of any single individual case. It's just a meta-analysis of the mass of individual cases.

You're trying to draw an absolute conclusion regarding antinatalism. It's either always true or its opposite is always true. This goes against your assumption of individualism. Your universal conclusion silences the individual that you claim should be the focus of our ethical attention.

Of course, it seems like we can judge the ethics of a particular case only after the fact, only after someone has experienced life.

Yes I was explaining this to another poster. What if "most people" want something that isn't good for them? You just automatically give them this? What if work, maintenance, and even entertainment are actually quite harmful to that person when compared to never existing? — schopenhauer1

That's something to think about. A desideratum of most people is life but it didn't take us long to find out that's just not enough (suicide); another essential requirement is happiness or the absence of suffering. The question of all questions is, "is a life of happiness possible?" If yes, anitnatalism is wrong but if no, antinatalism is right on the money.

The point is, when any gift is not relieving suffering, by your system it automatically becomes wrong to give, since it can always be harmful. — khaled

Are we measuring whether someone makes a statement at a point in time that “All burdens that happened, currently exist, and will exist are fine and dandy.” or Are we measuring the amount of actual burden one is given once one is given the dual“gift” of both burdens and non-suffering circumstances? Certainly, most surprise parties and gifts don’t reach anywhere near the imposition, enduring duration, and frequency of burden as this gift.

Is it permissible to do something on someone else's behalf because one has a notion that "most people" would "want this"? — schopenhauer1

"Most people would want this" might be appropriate guidance in the absence of knowledge about what the (actual) individual would want. We don't always know what the actual person wants. Does the unconscious cancer patient want to forego treatment? We don't know. "Most people" want cancer treatment, at least to start with. Some, though, do want to forego any or further treatment, for some possibly valid reasons.

The alternative of "most people" is either one's self, or no one.

is ethics then simply based on the current preferences of a particular group? Are ethics voted in by majority rule? — schopenhauer1

Yes, to some extent. Particular groups (Roman Catholics) teach their ethics about abortion. Another group, secularists, teach a different ethic. The majority are in a position to gradually work their will into law and ethical teaching and practice. Capital punishment used to be far, far more common than it is now. It came under increasing condemnation over many decades, so that now a hanging is rare.

I don't see any source of ethics outside of the people, the body politic, the religious movements, etc. -- all of which involve "most people" one way or another. I presume that Hammurabi referenced what most people thought.

Where does this leave antinatalism? Our actions have a significant effect on the lives of future persons not yet born. The ethical concern about global warming is primarily about the environment that will probably exist for future persons not yet born. We ought to be concerned about the circumstances of life for both the born and unborn. We can also be ethically concerned about the ethics of bringing people into a world where the environmental conditions will be very bad.

A diminishing birth rate may represent economic barriers to supporting children adequately. It may also represent a loss of confidence in the future, such that people feel it would be unethical to bring another child into the world.

It seemed like you were saying, in this particular case we shouldn't act on what would probably reduce suffering unless we have a "watertight" case, due to the irreversibility of extinction. — Down The Rabbit Hole

Yes, that's not far off what I was saying.

it's not reasonable to treat extinction as higher stakes than tens of millions with lives of suffering. And stakes being equal, we should use the balance of probability to guide our behaviour. — Down The Rabbit Hole

Firstly, why is it not reasonable? Many people think the extinction of the human race is a big deal, and that suffering can be reduced to levels which make it worthwhile by social and political action. Do their values not count?

Secondly, the balance of probabilities isn't sufficient. It's more likely that we'll invent the space elevator if we continue having children, so on the balance of probabilities we should support natalism... But hang on, do we care about building a space elevator? Balance of probabilities isn't enough. An unlikely outcome which we value very highly is worth more than a likely one which we value less. Most people seem to think it a good idea to strive for the unlikely, but highly valued, future society in which everyone is grateful to be, rather than the very likely but disvalued one where no one is suffering at all, but no one exists either.

Reduction of the population is necessary to free enough land and resources to ensure quality of life, and deal with the 9 million deaths per year from pollution (16% of all deaths). — Down The Rabbit Hole

On this we can agree (though I wouldn't go as far as 'necessary', it would certainly help).

Well I appreciate your patience :lol: — Down The Rabbit Hole

Just waiting on the paperwork...

Permissible by whom?
— baker

Permissible as one's own ethical guideline. — schopenhauer1

What are you, five years old, a handmaid, or a slave to need to ask for permission for what to have as your ethical guideline?

As usual you've grabbed a barely connected sentence out of context just to use a a springboard for some general whinging. Not even worth a reply really, I'll just quote the rest of the post you decided to ignore — Isaac

*sigh*

I pointed out the trouble ahead. I didn't elucidate all the steps because I figured readers can fill them in on their own.

My point was, it's not reasonable to treat extinction as higher stakes than tens of millions with lives of suffering. And stakes being equal, we should use the balance of probability to guide our behaviour. — Down The Rabbit Hole

Firstly, why is it not reasonable? Many people think the extinction of the human race is a big deal, and that suffering can be reduced to levels which make it worthwhile by social and political action. Do their values not count? — Isaac

The negative consequence of one position is neutral (the unborn are in a neutral state), the negative consequence of the other is tens of millions with lives of suffering. I don't think neutrality is higher stakes than tens of millions with lives of suffering.

Of course this only holds for people that's ethical priority is suffering. There are plenty of other flavours of ice cream.

Secondly, the balance of probabilities isn't sufficient. It's more likely that we'll invent the space elevator if we continue having children, so on the balance of probabilities we should support natalism... But hang on, do we care about building a space elevator? Balance of probabilities isn't enough. An unlikely outcome which we value very highly is worth more than a likely one which we value less. Most people seem to think it a good idea to strive for the unlikely, but highly valued, future society in which everyone is grateful to be, rather than the very likely but disvalued one where no one is suffering at all, but no one exists either. — Isaac

Yes, the stakes have to be taken into consideration as well as the probabilities, but if the stakes are equal or in your favour, it's reasonable to act on what's most likely.

Correct me if I'm wrong but I don't think I've shown any inconsistencies in my position. We just have different ethical foundations.

Correct me if I'm wrong but I don't think I've shown any inconsistencies in my position. We just have different ethical foundations. — Down The Rabbit Hole

I don't think so no. You want to reduce suffering down to zero, killing everyone will do that because there's no on left to suffer. I'm just not sure that reducing suffering to zero regardless of the consequences counts as an 'ethical' foundation, just a foundation perhaps. If I said that my ethical foundation were to increase my personal wealth as much as possible regardless of the consequences, you'd just say that I'd misunderstood what the word 'ethical' means.

Ethics has to do with people. No ethical strategy can remove people and yet remain an ethical strategy, its just a plain strategy then, not an ethical one.

According to Richard Dawkins:

“The total amount of suffering per year in the natural world is beyond all decent contemplation. During the minute that it takes me to compose this sentence, thousands of animals are being eaten alive, many others are running for their lives, whimpering with fear, others are slowly being devoured from within by rasping parasites, thousands of all kinds are dying of starvation, thirst, and disease. It must be so. If there ever is a time of plenty, this very fact will automatically lead to an increase in the population until the natural state of starvation and misery is restored. In a universe of electrons and selfish genes, blind physical forces and genetic replication, some people are going to get hurt, other people are going to get lucky, and you won't find any rhyme or reason in it, nor any justice. The universe that we observe has precisely the properties we should expect if there is, at bottom, no design, no purpose, no evil, no good, nothing but pitiless indifference.”

http://www.austroindonesianartsprogram.org/blog/most-polluted-river-world-citarum-river-indonesia

Are ethics voted in by majority rule? — schopenhauer1

Unfortunately yes.And that's why even if Democracy is the "worst" best thing for societies, still isn't right. "Most people" = democracy. Logical people have to suffer in democracies. It's inevitable and also fair at the same time!

Are we measuring whether someone makes a statement at a point in time that “All burdens that happened, currently exist, and will exist are fine and dandy.” or Are we measuring the amount of actual burden one is given once one is given the dual“gift” of both burdens and non-suffering circumstances? — schopenhauer1

I legitimately don’t understand what you’re saying here.

Certainly, most surprise parties and gifts don’t reach anywhere near the imposition, enduring duration, and frequency of burden as this gift. — schopenhauer1

So unlike in the OP, it’s not that doing something on someone else’s behalf when most people would want it is wrong, period. It’s only wrong when the imposition becomes too much, correct? There are situations where “most people would want this” is enough to justify a certain action, you just don’t think birth is one of them because it’s “too much” of an imposition.

So again, you’ve gone from a type argument to an extent argument. And so you again don’t have any objectivity behind your claim. What makes birth too much of an imposition while surprise parties are not too much? Why would someone who thinks birth is not too much be objectively wrong?

I bring in exhibit a) Pollyannaism b) lowering expectations, and c) adaptation to less ideal circumstances... Just because these are correcting mechanisms, does that mean employing them is good just because they are needed to get by? — schopenhauer1

If you believe that life is overall bad for most people then you can, of course, argue for antinatalism with that. I just don’t see how the consent argument makes a difference here. As someone who wishes that he had never been born, I think easy access to euthanasia drugs provides a pretty good solution for those who wish that they had never been born.

If someone thought something harmful was actually good for them — schopenhauer1

Woah, your usual project this has taken a rather dark turn. Now not only should we end the human race because too many people suffer too much, but now we should do so because you think they'd suffer too much even if existing examples say they're not. Nicely self-immunised argument. Now no matter what the human race achieves it's doomed.

"Right everyone... time to turn off the music and go home, I know you all think you're having a great time, but you're just kidding yourselves and are all miserable really, best stop now rather than waste any more time on this charade!"

What are you, five years old, a handmaid, or a slave to need to ask for permission for what to have as your ethical guideline? — baker

Don't be a dickhead. We follow our own ethical guidelines all the time. I didn't say it has to be enforced by an outside entity. You can argue that no one follows ethical guidelines, only what is in their self-interest at the time, but you have not presented that. All ad hom, no philosophy. Come back when you want to offer something.

Where does this leave antinatalism? Our actions have a significant effect on the lives of future persons not yet born. The ethical concern about global warming is primarily about the environment that will probably exist for future persons not yet born. We ought to be concerned about the circumstances of life for both the born and unborn. We can also be ethically concerned about the ethics of bringing people into a world where the environmental conditions will be very bad.

A diminishing birth rate may represent economic barriers to supporting children adequately. It may also represent a loss of confidence in the future, such that people feel it would be unethical to bring another child into the world. — Bitter Crank

Interested in your input:
Do you think that because someone says they like something at a point in time, it is good to encourage what they like? For example, addicts of narcotics or opioids. They want drugs. Does that mean that it is right to just give them drugs because they want it? This is a different question than if it should be allowed as a law, just as an individual to another individual.

Can people's own assessment on life be similar to that of an addict? Can it be true that internal mechanisms like Pollyanniasm, adaptation to worse circumstances than the ideal, and comparison to worse circumstances had by others allows us to have this kind of addiction-distortion?

I think easy access to euthanasia drugs provides a pretty good solution for those who wish that they had never been born. — TheHedoMinimalist

Do you think that suicide is easy for people? And do you think the difficulty of doing something like that is a reason why life is then a good thing for that person?

It’s only wrong when the imposition becomes too much, correct? There are situations where “most people would want this” is enough to justify a certain action, you just don’t think birth is one of them because it’s “too much” of an imposition. — khaled

It's about how we assess what "too much" imposition is. Sometimes, a slave for example, might not know how bad they have it objectively, because that's all they know, perhaps. I'm just getting you to think a little outside this box you are trying to steer this into.

...

Do you think that because someone says they like something at a point in time, it is good to encourage what they like? — schopenhauer1

Provided that "what they like" is a good thing and provided that it can be encouraged or "given", I'd weigh in more heavily on 'yes' than 'no'. But not everything that is wanted can be given. Athletic prowess at the olympian level might be wanted but it can't be "given". Then too, good things that are wanted and can be given have limits. Beer is a good thing and I might want more, but since I am already drunk, the right answer is "time for you to go home".

Should this child's desire to read books be encouraged? Absolutely, provided that she isn't reading books about how to poison people.

For example, addicts of narcotics or opioids. They want drugs. Does that mean that it is right to just give them drugs because they want it? This is a different question than if it should be allowed as a law, just as an individual to another individual. — schopenhauer1

Are narcotics (like coca and opium) good things? They are, but only in the right context of limited use. Chewing coca leaves is one thing -- snorting purified cocaine is altogether different. Morphine and its derivatives are good for relieving pain in the short run, but not good over the long run. Using opioids for pleasure is, like snorting cocaine, altogether different.

Properly purified cocaine and heroin, in appropriate doses, is not inherently harmful. The same goes for numerous other drugs--benzodiazepines, barbiturates, antidepressants, stimulants, etc. Addiction and/or dependence is the problem. "Want" changes to "need", and the need is intense, and that is not a good thing.

Many people can use narcotics occasionally without adverse consequences--with emphasis on 'occasional'. Regular use leads to addiction.

Don't be a dickhead. — schopenhauer1

*sigh*
I couldn't be if I wanted to.

We follow our own ethical guidelines all the time. I didn't say it has to be enforced by an outside entity. You can argue that no one follows ethical guidelines, only what is in their self-interest at the time, but you have not presented that. All ad hom, no philosophy. Come back when you want to offer something.

*sigh*
You're the one asking about whether something is permissible or not.

Well, my compassion is limited, and you've maxed out on it.