I'm wary of claims like [ that we are separate and knowledge is limited ] since there is no a priori reason to listen to philosophers about what is or isn't part of the human condition — Snakes Alive

Well all they have are a clear and thorough descriptions and examples at hand, but if you feel that philosophy has nothing legitimate or worthwhile to say about doubt, fear of uncertainty, and the desire for control, than maybe you haven't been gripped by the necessity philosophy can instill, which differs from the solidity of the method of science.

One of the things I like about OLP is that it is able to treat problems as they arise in their native home. The bad flip side of this is that its refusal to create an abstract theory or set of procedures prevents it from being very effective in a lot of practical environments. — Snakes Alive

I agree with the globalization of skeptical doubt, but Witt and Cavell uncover a informative reason the skeptic needs/wants that jump (I tried to get into this about Witt's Lion Quote in another discussion). I'm not sure OLP doesn't have a set of practical procedures--it is being used in aesthetics and literary theory and education.

I hadn't noticed it, and have not read Cavell, although I have addressed Kripke's Wittgenstein before. But I'm not sure there is more to be said than is set out in §201. — Banno

This would be the point at #217 where we are no longer looking at interpreting a rule, but examining the act of obeying a rule; how we teach that and the implications when that falls apart. Cavell and Kripke are similar in believing things can still fall apart, but differ in how we keep it (put it back) together.

Well all they have are a clear and thorough descriptions and examples at hand, but if you feel that philosophy has nothing legitimate or worthwhile to say about doubt, fear of uncertainty, and the desire for control, than maybe you haven't been gripped by the necessity philosophy can instill, which differs from the solidity of the method of science. — Antony Nickles

It's more that philosophers will read a series of books written in response to each other, and assume that what's talked about in those books must be universally meaningful or interesting, or get at what problems intrinsically confront human beings in some interesting way. The problem is that their scope is typically limited, and so they're typically wrong – usually because the only thing they've read is those books. Skepticism in the sense phils talk about it is just not something most people throughout history would have even understood.

It's more that philosophers will read a series of books written in response to each other, and assume that what's talked about in those books must be universally meaningful or interesting, or get at what problems intrinsically confront human beings in some interesting way. The problem is that their scope is typically limited, and so they're typically wrong — Snakes Alive

Are you sure you're in the right forum...?

Or get stuck on a raft with Banno and mock each other while drifting, slowly, nowhere.. — Antony Nickles

I give him a hard time, but I'm certain any position he has represents quite a bit of work. One could easily point to poetry and call it nonsense writing. But, anyone that's understood it knows otherwise. Language philosophy just seems to add an unnecessary detour to every inquiry. Can't I say something without having to imagine 360 degrees of qualifications any given term might entail. I rather be misunderstood than difficult to understand.

Can't I say something without having to imagine 360 degrees of qualifications any given term might entail. I rather be misunderstood than difficult to understand. — Cheshire

I might put it that, in making a claim about what the implications are of the expressions of our concepts (how we qualify knowledge, intention, meaning), we are saying something; something important to the problems of philosophy. Calling it "language" philosophy is to assume that there is (always) a space between our words and our lives.

I might put it that, in making a claim about what the implications are of the expressions of our concepts (how we qualify knowledge, intention, meaning), we are saying something; something important to the problems of philosophy. Calling it "language" philosophy is to assume that there is (always) a space between our words and our lives. — Antony Nickles

No it isn't. Calling it language philosophy implies it has a corner it ought stay in which it resents. It's titled with terms Language Philosophy in the OP. I respect that others see value in it, but to me it is a self gratifying form of attention deficit disorder which frustrates more than it informs. I'll reserve judgement as to whether that's about words or lives. It must be entertaining in some way I haven't experienced.

Calling it language philosophy implies it has a corner it ought stay in which it resents — Cheshire

This is reserving judgment? What you see as resentment is perhaps a projection of jealousy (enough to want to trivialize OLP as only about words). Not being interested does not make you right.

This is reserving judgment? What you see as resentment is perhaps a projection of jealousy (enough to want to trivialize OLP as only about words). Not being interested does not make you right. — Antony Nickles

I wouldn't defend that statement to be honest. I felt your interpretation of my localized use of a label over reached, so I demonstrated the phenomena. I'm under the assumption I'm wrong about the matter entirely. It's been the case in the past. I just keep waiting for evidence to emerge.